


BRAHMA-MIMAMSA



H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR







UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ SERIES NO. 1

BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

Jijñāsādhikaraņa

VOLUME I

BY

VIDWAN H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR, M.A., D.O.C.

Palace Dharmadhikari, Mysore Retired Assistant Professor of Philosophy


(Author of "Bhāratīya-Tattva-Sāstra-Sangraha" "The Dvaita Philosophy and Its place in the Vedānta", "Dvaita Vedānta", etc.)


with an Introductory Note by

T. BURROW

Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE MYSORE 1965





WITH GRACIOUS PERMISSION MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

TO

HIS HIGHNESS SRI JAYACHAMARAJA WADIYAR
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., LL.D., D.LITT.
MAHARAJA AND GOVERNOR OF MYSORE

MAYINAYI MANAMATA ALTA SA

MOTTO

Madhva holds

"There is nothing sacred apart from correct knowledge."

He says

TASMĀDVASTU YATHĀ-RŪPAM JÑEYAM DHYEYAM CA SARVADĀ KĀRAŅAM PURUŞĀRTHASYA... ... MITHYĀJÑĀNAM ANARTHADAM

"Therefore a thing as it is ought to be understood in all circumstance and reflected on, because it causes good, while incorrect knowledge breeds evil."

[Anu-Vyākhyāna 4.1.3.]

MY FITTEDNESS

My fittedness (adhikāra) in attempting an exposition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, the philosophy of Madhvācārya.

It is often heard from foreign scholars that works on Indian philosophy are generally written by those that have not made a study of the subject in the original Sanskrit works and they are therefore not reliable. Hence it may not be out of place to say a few words about my fittedness to expound Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

Mysore University has done a great honour to this work in accepting it as a university publication. This act of kindness is no other than recognising the fittedness of the author.

I may still submit that Brahma-Mīmāmsā is almost lost to the world. Even its name is erased by calling it dvaita and inferring its contents from this name. But as the reader himself may see, the lesson it gives is the light that illumines life placed in any circumstance at any part of the universe. To understand Brahma-Mīmāmsā is to appreciate and lead the life of it. Therefore the idea of both the fittedness and the reliability of the author has a significant place in this understanding. By way of giving a guide to the reader, indicating my special preparation for expounding Brahma-Mīmāmsā and pointing to the reliability of the exposition, I may say the following:

In a Mādhva-Brāhmaṇa family distinguished as *Tangedi*, and reputed for its learning in Vedānta I was born in April 1895 at Holavanahalli, Tumkur District, Mysore Province in South India. Most Revered Sri S. Narayanacharya was my father

In my early boyhood when there was less distraction I used to have continuously the following reflection, "Is all what I know something like a dream? In that case I alone exist. If that is so why am I forced to have this or that idea? Which is the source of this force? Surely they are not the external objects. For, these objects come into existence and go out of it. So the source of all must be that which is always the same. It must be in all. Which is it? What is it? How to know it? Who can tell me about It? If something is said to be that how am I to know that it is so? Can I know it in my life? Why do not others speak about it? What is my

duty towards it? In short that is God to me or to any other in which there is nothing wanting. How am I to know it? To believe in a thing is not to know it."

I loved to sit at the feet of those that knew. In early days my father taught me Kośa and Stotra-Pāṭhas. In my 9th year I had my Upanayana-Saṁskāra. My father taught me Yajur-

Veda along with some portion of Rg-Veda.

Sri Srikanthasastri, a local pandit taught me Laghukaumudī in Sanskrit Grammar and Raghuvamśa, Megha, Māgha, Campu and Śākuntala in literature and particularly Kālāmrta, Muhūrta-Mārtānda and Bṛhajjātaka in Jyotiṣa. He used to introduce me to the principle tenets of Advaita-Vedānta in relevant contexts.

Pandita Śrī Mutya Bhimachar taught me Viṣnu-Stuti and some portion of Madhva-Vijaya. Vidvān Sri Holavanahalli Seshacharya, later Maha-Vidvan Pauranikaratnam, Palace Dharmadhikari, a most reputed scholar in Mādhva thought taught me the remaining portion of Madhva-Vijaya, Rukminīša-Vijaya and Sangraha-Rāmāyana. He commenced teaching Madhva's Daša-Prakaraṇas with Jayatīrtha's commentary in Vedānta and Tarka-Sangraha with Nyāya-Bodhinī, Dīpikā with Nīlakanthīya, Muktāvalī with Dinakarī with Rāmarudrīya in Tarka-Śāstra and Dharma-Śāstrā. As I was studying works in Vedānta under revered Seshacharya, Pandita-Ratnam Mayakonda Krishnacharya, Maharajā's Sanskrit College, Mysore taught me Pancalakṣaṇī and Caturdaśalakṣaṇī in Nyāya, Naiṣadha and Rasagangādhara in Sāhitya and Panditaratnam Hassan Narasimha Sastry, Maharaja's Sanskrit College, Mysore taught me Kaumudī.

Vedānta attracted me most. My interest in it was developed. By this time I had made a study of Madhva's Daśa-Prakaraṇas (Ten Philosophical Treatises), the ten Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas, the Bhāṣyas on the Bhagavad-Gītā and Rg-Bhāṣya with commentaries. I liked to study the Bhāṣyas of the other Vedānta philosophers also. I made some attempt in that direction.

At this stage my early reflection assumed a developed form. To explain the whole of experience in terms of 'I' was roughly Advaita (Sankara) and to explain everything by reference to a principle different from myself was roughly Madhva's thought (Brahma-Mīmāmsā) in so far as I studied it. Visiṣṭa (the qualified Brahman) of Visiṣṭādvaita Vedānta seemed to me an

ingenious mixture of unmixable entities and bhakti and prapatti (love and intense love i.e., faith and intense faith) of this system a burden forced on a thinking principle i.e., mind.

Further I reflected on the relative merits of these two thoughts, Sankara and Madhva. If Advaita were true, then I am Brahman Itself and there is no need for me to try to be Brahman. Whatever I am, I am bound to be Brahman. But if non-Advaita were true then there comes the difficulty. I must have a disciplined life so as to adjust myself to Brahman which

is not myself.

Further I thought as follows—Virtually the thought 'I am Brahman' is in spirit the very starting point of an individual life. Usually with reference to every life this thought, in spirit works implicitly or explicitly. To entertain this thought therefore no study is really required. Similarly the thought 'I am at least in a subtle form as enduring as Brahman' is after all the language that even Brahman has to adjust Its activity to my needs. Specially in devotional i.e., emotional acts this thought comes to surface. Hence there is no need for Śāstra to teach this truth to us.

In spite of my observation of doership and enjoyership on my part, to understand that I am absolutely dependent on Brahman even with reference to the very reality of what I call myself and my things is very difficult. Without Śāstra one cannot understand it.

This thought introduced me to Madhva Sāstra with wholehearted devotion to the study of it with a view to seeing its

soundness against rival theories.

My interest in Madhva was developed under Holavanahalli Sri Seshacharya, my most revered teacher. I specialised myself in Vedānta, and in 1915 I passed the Vidvat Examination of Maharaja's Sanskrit College, Mysore in Dvaita Vedānta, the usual name for Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Next I studied advanced works in Vedānta. My interest in Vedānta was so great that I learnt the texts by heart. I was prepared to satisfy any examiner. I was usually distinguished by a spirit of enquiry and a comparative and all-absorbing outlook, though at times these virtues were regarded as vices.

As the present work amply illustrates Madhva taught Brahma-Mīmāmsā, an unmodified and increasingly rich enquiry

into Brahman as taught by Veda, the one principle of the whole of existence in the form of spirit and matter. As a rule my understanding of this fact was consistent with this teaching because it was shaped by it without the operation of any other element. Often I came across certain followers of Madhva holding different views about Madhva's thought. But soon I found out that their views were not based on study.

I never saw any other possibility of interpreting Madhva's works than my own. If any such possibility was introduced to me I could readily see that it was refuted by Madhva himself in some connection or other. In addition to this circumstance I saw that with regard to every point that is philosophically important Madhva's judgement is the soundest being at the same time comprising of the excellences that may distinguish the consideration of the same point in the other philosophies. The fact that I was born a Mādhva had practically nothing to do with my reflection as testified later by Prof. A. R. Wadia in his foreword to my work 'The Dvaita philosophy and Its place in the Vedānta' as "Though born a dvaitin also by conviction he is a dvaitin." In truth I never appreciated Madhva as he was presented by my contemporaries, because he was not the Madhva whom I saw in his own works.

There is no wonder that the meaning of any of the statements made by Madhva occurred to my mind without any special effort of mine and it was unknown to Madhva scholars of the day. Even at an early date His Holiness Satyadhyana Tirtha, the Pontiff of the Uttaradi Mutt who was considered to be an authority in Mādhva thought recognised my speciality and told me in great appreciation that he would treat me as being specially his own. At the time of the oral examination connected with my Vidvat Examination Panditaratnam Gaudagere Venkataramanacharya of Bangalore, a highly reputed scholar in Mādhva thought, being one of my examiners remarked in the course of my examination to those that were assembled there including Sri Rangachar, Principal of the college and the co-examiners "This boy is wonderful. We are ignorant of the meaning he gives to the statements of Madhva. But we cannot oppose it. Reflecting over it I feel that it has an enduring value. Against it the validity of the meaning that we usually give becomes questionable".

I worked out the distinction between my meaning and the meaning offered by other scholars of reputation. I realised the truth of the observation made by Sri Venkataramanacharya. I tried to convince others about the soundness of my meaning and the defects of the others' meaning. Practically I failed in my attempt. For discussions used to lose impersonal character. Often I became the subject of derision of those with whom I discussed things. I revised the whole discussion in my mind and became more confirmed with regard to the soundness of my meaning. I became practically friendless in the world of thought.

I started self-criticism. I wanted to know the reason why the popular meaning did not come to my mind and why people in general have only that meaning and like it. In reply I

obtained the following points-

1. I could not have some other meaning because I was clear that Madhva's exclusive greatness is that he was consistently after Brahman, given by Veda, as the principle of the whole world of experience. The others had different ideas because they started from the wrong conviction that Madhva was born to establish the absolute reality of the world as well as the unmodified difference of the world from Brahman against other philosophies. But they did not see that to hold that the world is real on its own merit is sublated by Veda which holds that Brahman is secondless and to hold that the world is absolutely different from Brahman is to separate it from Brahman, the giver of its reality according to Veda. Both these ideas, 'the reality of the world and the difference of the world' if pressed end in the denial of Brahman. For Madhva, the Vedantin the world is real because it is the work of Brahman and Brahman for this reason is distinct from the world, but not the world separate from Brahman i.e., independent of Brahman.

2. Further I started with the definite idea that Madhva's thought is essentially *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* as characterised by himself and as practised by Jayatīrtha, the chief exponent of Madhva and appreciated and adopted by Vyāsatīrtha and with him Rāghavendratīrtha, the chief commentators on

Jayatīrtha.

The others started with the conviction that Madhva taught Dvaita (dualism) against Advaita (non-duality) taught by

Sankara and therefore according to Madhva there ought to be in the world two things irreducible each to the other. They took this to be the implication of his theory that the world is real. They tried to interpret the whole of Madhva's teaching in terms of these ideas. If they found that any word used by Madhva did not support their idea then they readily attributed a secondary meaning to that word even at the cost of the master's perfection. Further Madhva holds that the world is paratantra (dependent) because its reality is given by Brahman. But the others confined this position to the servant-master-relation and held in support of their dualism that the world is co-real and co-eval with Brahman.

3. I started with the realisation that Madhva's unmodified emphasis on enquiry (jijnāsā) gives absolutely no room for faith in any degree. Unlike the bhakti of Rāmānuja, the word bhakti Madhva uses as a rule means knowledge with deep interest (sneha or ādara), i.e., absorption in enquiry being in itself a product of enquiry and this absorption is the expression of the stability of knowledge as he himself points out.

The others started with the conviction that irrespective of knowledge faith is everything to Madhva because he says that bhakti is most important. Evidently they took bhakti to mean faith. An idea like this in very early times might have been responsible for the growth of the so called Bhakti-Pantha also called Dāsa-Pantha or the path of Haridāsas, the devotees of Hari. Madhva has clearly shown in his Bhāgavata-Tātparya that the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa interpreted in terms of the principles of thought presented by the Brahma-Sūtras expounds with illustration the philosophy of Brahman. But this movement originally drew its strength from Bhāgavata with the stress on its apparent meaning and it seems even to have directly or indirectly paved the way for the Northern Bhakti cults such as Nimbārka, Vallabha, or Caitanya.

The point to note in the present context is that no scholar so far bothered himself to see that this path after all consists in devotion to God in which one believes. But belief including God vanishes when enquiry takes place. Especially in India, originally the land of Veda i.e. philosophy there was much reason that even an ordinary scholar might have found out long back the individuality of enquiry that it gives no room for belief.

But quite the contrary this movement has somehow established itself among Mādhvas and replaced philosophy in such a manner as to interfere with the genuineness of the followers of Madhva. At the early stages of this movement though the distinction between $Vy\bar{a}sa$ i.e., Veda-Vy $\bar{a}sa$ (reason) and $D\bar{a}sa$ (faith) was made, in the long run $d\bar{a}sa$ conquered $Vy\bar{a}sa$. $Vy\bar{a}sa$ has become interpreted in terms of $d\bar{a}sa$ or he is dismissed. But in thought $Vy\bar{a}sa$ is the soul of Madhva. To subdue or to dismiss $Vy\bar{a}sa$ is nothing but to subdue or dismiss all that is Madhva. The soundness of Madhva's thinking as he himself illustrates consists only in his being spontaneously one with $Vy\bar{a}sa$. The truth of this observation becomes clear as the student proceeds with the study of the present work.

In the course of my study I noted that Madhva holds unceasing enquiry and marks a stage of the perfection of the same enquiry as realisation and a further stage as release. This truth led my study.

The others ignored the unceasing character of enquiry and emphasised realisation (sākṣātkāra) as opposed to enquiry. They followed Dāsa-Pantha and meant by realisation actually seeing God as one sees a physical object. They thought that Madhva composed Sāstra to effect this type of realisation.

Madhva emphasises that the Brahman he studies is understood only by means of never-ceasing enquiry (Sāstra) into the meaning of Veda as it gives rise to ever fresher problems. He asks the student to keep this fact steadily in view throughout the course of the study. He notes further a study of this kind never comes to an end.

But the others with Hari-Dāsas as their model held that God is actually seen by those who believe in Him. They entertained no doubt about it and believed that Madhva himself was their ideal in this direction.

4. Madhva is completely self-sufficient in his system of thought. As his studenthimself sees he has successfully discussed all problems and all subjects that come under philosophy as it is commonly known and philosophy in the special sense in which Vedānta thinkers use the term Tattva-Sāstra or even Brahma-Vidyā, the possible Sanskrit or Vedic equivalent to it. As Vedānta thinkers recognise Veda to be an independent source of

knowledge, a system of *Vedānta* becomes profoundly different from a system of philosophy coming from non-Veda.

I started my study of Madhva with full recognition of these facts.

But the others somehow thought that the system of logic expounded by Nyāya-Vaiśesika is indispensable both in understanding Madhva and in maintaining the position held by Madhva. It has been usually thought by many Madhvas that without Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Madhva is nowhere. But Madhva in fact reduces Nyāya-Vaisesika either to Buddhism or to Sankara's Māyā-Vāda and discards it. Irrespective of this fact the upholders of the opposite view are not satisfied until they practically identify Madhva with Nyāya-Vaiśesika. Even in past among those that are known as Mādhva-scholars the great majority had made a study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to an extent and on the strength of that knowledge interpreted Madhva and consequently, mostly unconsciously of course, disregarded the cardinal principles of Madhva's own thought. This circumstance has even given rise to many works on Madhva in Sanskrit for the last several centuries and consequently Madhva in their hands has become a dualist or pluralist even as Nyāya-Vaiśesika is.

5. To understand Madhva is specially difficult because of his dual method underlying a discussion. In establishing a position he follows the reason underlying his thought the soundness of which he has shown in his works on Theory of Knowledge. He never accepts a position without showing the error in the opposite views. He points out errors in opposite views following the trend of the reason the respective view has adopted. All this is made clear by Madhva himself. Without giving proper value to this distinction Madhva cannot be understood. Hence I studied Madhva in terms of these ideas. But the others did not somehow respect this circumstance. Further to respect this circumstance presupposes discriminative study of Jayatīrtha's works on Madhva who clearly indicates the distinction between the two sets of reasoning in their application.

Together with this circumstance the genuine Mādhva tradition, practised by Jayatīrtha and following him others, is to understand Madhva by his own words. But it is difficult

and misleading because every expression of Madhva is highly technical and to attribute to it what is usually regarded as the literal meaning never presents Madhva in a correct manner. This does not mean that the meaning of words that Madhva has in mind is not literal. It is literal from the standpoint of Veda in which these words occur first and the works allied to Veda. If the significance of this point of view is understood and appreciated, then it indeed becomes very hard to recognise the so called literal meaning itself to be truly literal. But obviously in the case of a beginner it is therefore very difficult even to imagine what exactly the meaning of Madhva's expression is. The only purpose of Jayatīrtha's commentary on Madhva as he himself makes it clear is to explain Madhva's meaning of his expression by the meaning of a similar expression of his and to point out the full justification for the position signified by the meaning thus made clear, by means of reason given by Madhva himself. Hence the well known Mādhva tradition is to understand Jayatīrtha in order to understand Madhva. My method of understanding Madhva was dictated by this fact.

But with the others the thing was different. Jayatīrtha seemed to have been taken by them no more than being a student of Madhva as they themselves were. The practice common during these days is that the works like Nyāya-Sudhā consisting of 1350 pages (Royal size) of purely terse and technical Sanskrit are usually taught to students almost within the course of a few months.

6. Another circumstance special to Madhva is the perfect unity of Purpose running through all his works found to be 38 in number. Of them, four are on the Brahma-Sūtras. He makes it clear in several works of his that the Sūtras are the determining factor of the validity of all works linguistic in character that ever exist in the world. This point will be made clear in the course of the present volume. Consistently with this idea, with reference to his other works the meaning, if it is to be valid, must be determined by the Sūtras. The word sūtra in this context stands for the Sūtras with his different commentaries on them, because without commentaries the Sūtras are unintelligible. The net idea is that the Brahma-Sūtras in this particular sense decide the meaning of the other

works of Madhva. His other works are on several subjects such as Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Being, Spiritual discipline leading to release, the evaluation of the different ideas about it, the evaluation of the teaching of Mahābhārata including Bhagavadgītā, the teaching of Bhagavata, the teaching of several other Purānas, and several religious and ritualistic disciplines generally considered to be sacred as taught by works of importance. After the Brahma-Sūtras Madhva sees that enquiry and enquiry alone is the one spiritual discipline that can never be defied, never fruitless and never insufficient and that does full justice to the other forms of discipline if only they lead to enquiry. Hence he shows in his several works, how, left to themselves the other disciplines kill the very spirit of enquiry and how therefore this spirit i.e., enquiry must be safeguarded and developed at all cost.

My studies were governed by these facts. But in the case of others the place of enquiry in Madhva's thought was somehow unnoticed and the disciplines that are mentioned to be rejected in some sense or other in the interest of enquiry were as a rule observed with all seriousness and Madhva was interpreted in terms of them. Further each work of Madhva was taken by them as a unit by itself and conclusions were made. inevitable contradictions in the conclusions were explained away by holding that each is applied to particular individuals of particular temperament. It was not somehow seen that this kind of explanation leading to equal justification of all cases of discipline is the greatest enemy to philosophy in general and enquiry (Brahma-Mīmāmsā) in particular. If this explanation were to be sound then nothing can be conceived as applying to the whole of humanity. It is therefore sublated by the very concept of humanity. The concept humanity by way of implication keeps one in touch with some principle that applies to all human beings though this one may not be clearly conscious of it. It must be remembered that to uphold disunity in discipline is to uphold disunity in man. To conceive unity in discipline is to conceive unity in man. Even to speak of points of view or standards of judgement is to sow the seed of disunity in spiritual outlook and therefore in man's existence. The view-points or standards are relevant only in the act of illustrating wrong thinking.

Right thinking is characterised by oneness which is no other than straightforwardness called by Madhva rju-bhāva in Sāstra. The practice of it alone is the salvation of mankind. That which is opposed to this is the enemy of mankind. It causes degeneration. It must be avoided at all cost. But to do it exposition and study are indispensable.

The reader of this work realises even as I do that Indian philosophical reflection reached its culmination in Madhva's thought. Therefore without a study of the whole course of Indian thought Madhva cannot be understood. Any sanskritist may obtain some idea from reading Madhva. But it must be kept in mind that it is never a legitimate study. Further in his analysis of thoughts opposed to him he reduces every item of thought to Sankara's Māyā-Vāda or Advaita (non-duality) and then points out that the defects that vitiate Māyā-Vāda vitiate that item of thought. Therefore without good knowledge of Sankara Madhva can never be understood. A scholar in Advaita is best suited to make a critical study of Madhva. For, Madhva, with reference to every problem, examines Sankara to secure soundness. It is only he that has made a good study of Sankara that can appreciate Madhva properly. Judged correctly Madhva is not one of the philosophers but he is the philosopher. An appreciation of this fact presupposes that Indian thought is throughout governed by a well defined unity of purpose.

I dimly saw the correctness of these observations even at that early stage. I gave particular attention to the portion of the work I studied which relates the opponent positions with a view to examining them in the interest of arriving at the correct judgement. This circumstance kindled my desire to know the whole of Indian thought in detail. My studies in Madhva were thus consistent with these several facts.

But the practice of others was entirely different. With them the opponent position had no significance. They thought-'The mention of an opponent position is a burden to works: It is sure that Madhva rejects them: There is therefore no use in studying them: Similarly there is no use in trying to know the details of Madhva's position: It is enough, in their words, to know that much that confirms faith in God and makes one worship God in the form of some concrete object such as

a piece of stone or a metal and to observe fasting on the ekādaśi, the 11th day of the lunar and solar half of the month measured by the changes in the moon and such other things.' As some of the most aged put "Study of Sāstra is like crying in the absolute wilderness or Sāstra is the forest like Dandakāranya." But all the same they were very keen in opposing 'enquiry' at least in the interest of their daily routine. Some others used to say "It is going against all that is sacred to press 'enquiry' too much. It may be Bādarāyaṇa's view. Who denies it? It is alright with the bygone days. But now there are aparokṣa-jñānins, people who have actually seen God (who have aparoksa of God) and who can tell us all about Him. Further we are all scholars. We are respected by great people. Bādarāyaṇa reigned supreme in those days. But we reign supreme in these days. What we say is Dharma or Tattva or God. Did not Madhva respect the usage of the learned (vidvadrūdhi)? Are we not vidvans? Further, to enquire is to doubt. To enquire into God is to doubt His existence. It is heresy. Sāstra is for unbelievers. Madhva refuted unbelievers. He finally established his position. That is enough for us. We can safely depend on It. God is hard on non-devotees. We are devotees. He comes to us even as a mother to her child. To doubt it is to ruin one's self. Those that ask why are haitukas. They are paṣandas. So says Sāstra. Take care. If you persist, curse will be on you".

These ideas are going on being upheld by Mādhvas and encouraged by non-Mādhvas. No attempt is so far made to understand Madhva properly. Books are being published in which Madhva is reduced to a theist, theologian, mystic or dāsa at the cost of his philosophic acumen. Madhva is treated by them as if he took different parts in the drama of life. For the fault of Madhva's discovery of sākṣi-pratyakṣa, a principle of thinking he is said to hold like the Cārvākas that perception is the highest source of knowledge forgetting at the same time that he is a thoroughgoing Vedāntin and for him Veda is the highest source of knowledge. Curiously enough these writers think that by recording their own ideas they are greatly

honouring Madhva.

My opponents however developed party spirit to defend themselves against Truth. Still I saw that philosophy is the birth-place of peace of mankind. There came the determination to me to do my little service to 'enquiry' throughout my life. I thought over ways and means. So far as my study is concerned to be independent of the society of which I happened to be a member seemed to be the only solution.

I may relate an incident. Srī, late Karpur Srīnivasarao, the then Chief Engineer, Mysore himself studied Tarka-Sāstra. In an examination held by him in Tarka-Sāstra at Tirupati he much appreciated my knowledge of this Sāstra. He gave me the first prize with special prize also. Now and then he created some spare hours and gave me an opportunity to discuss the problems of Vedānta particularly related to Anu-Vyākhyāna of Madhva with Nyāya-Sudhā by Jayatīrtha. Being pleased with my way of discussing things he used to exclaim "Ācārya! If you had known English the whole world would have been benefited by your knowledge of Sāstra. You are young. If you make up your mind to take up English, you will have my full support. Further there is such a thing as philosophy in college course. If you can have an opportunity to

study that subject you can do wonders, etc.

His kind suggestions worked in my mind. The possible study of philosophy in the college course attracted me. I took up English and in 1925 I passed M.A., Examination of Mysore University in Philosophy. In both B.A. and M.A., I studied Western Philosophy with Indian Philosophy under the most distinguished Professors Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the now President of India, Professor A. R. Wadia and Professor M. Hirianna. With their expert teaching they inspired me with new enthusiasm and gave a vigorous and critical life to what I had already studied. Often I blessed myself because I made up my mind to study English. The study of Western philosophy made my previous study really philosophical. I saw within myself that I was altogether a new man. In philosophy classes the critical outlook I had in some degree was much developed. In Indian philosophy classes the little knowledge I had already acquired was much admired. I was given all possible privileges. But in my B.A., class I was shocked when Prof. Hirianna gave the class lecture that there is nothing in Madhva to learn as Madhva taught at best some religion that appeals to commonsense. He was kind enough to ask me particularly to see him in his room which I did. He asked me if I were offended by his class lecture. I did not say anything. He said 'In course of time you do some research and see if anything can be done to Madhva.' But I had the experience of his very warm appreciation when at about the same period I heard him saying to Prof. A. R. Wadia, 'Raghavendrachar's Darsana knowledge is very profound... He writes beautiful Sanskrit. His style resembles that of Prācīna-Nyāya. One who is merely used to classical Sanskrit cannot think of writing it' and so on. Just before this time Prof. Radhakrishnan on the eve of his journey to Calcutta while stepping into the railway carriage took my hands and placed them in the hands of Prof. A. R. Wadia, saying 'Wadia, take care of this young man, You will do well for Indian philosophy.'

After my B.A. Examination was just over, Srī N. S. Subbarao the Principal, Maharaja's College told me "I am told by your professors that your knowledge of Indian Daršanas is very deep. You have a rare combination of Sanskrit and English and Indian philosophy and European philosophy. You have a great future. You take up M.A. Mysore University does not leave you out."

In M.A., I had to study specially Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Bradley's Appearance and Reality, together with the History of European philosophy including contemporary philosophy, the Upanisads, in Vedānta—Sankara, Rāmānuja and Madhva in detail and the History of Indian philosophy in general, all according to Dr. Brajendranath Seal's syllabus. All this study naturally gave a shining to what I had learnt already and the previous study in turn made my new study after all an aspect of itself. Thus the whole course of my study became an organic whole-

When I was in the first year M.A., the place formerly occupied by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan fell vacant. The University thought of appointing me in that place. Dr. Brajendranath Seal, the then Vice-Chancellor, an authority in Indian thought examined me. He expressed 'I am fully satisfied with you. You will hear the result shortly. You will be a man of thousand soon.' With the approval of the Government the

place was kept vacant for me till I passed M.A.

With reference to my studies in M.A., I may make a note of a circumstance. Owing to long contact and liking to me Prof. Hirianna asked me to do the syllabus in Dvaita and interpret

Madhva in the class. I obeyed. By that time Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita were already over. But in view of texts I had to start Madhva just from the point with regard to which Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita were silent. My teacher showed the sign of being dissatisfied and said 'You start with Madhva proper. Why do you interfere with the other systems? How do you know that Madhva really understood them?' Probably he thought that I was passing my own remarks against the other systems.

By that time the bell rang and the period was over.

I attended the class on the morrow. My professor began 'Last night I reflected over the kind of the discussion we had. I am sorry I made remarks against a scholar who never says things without sufficient basis. Kindly tell me if the procedure of your thought is true to the originals'. I said 'Yes' and illustrated how, at least according to Madhva, there was a necessity for him to appear because the conclusion of the previous philosophies were not sound and the Truth taught by Vedanta remained unknown and how that Truth is the only solution for all the problems human in character. The experiences such as this resulted in a better environment in the class room. The fact was that my Professor belonged to Advaita tradition. He naturally thought that the Advaita that Sankara taught was the highest that can be conceived. There was also the general presumption that one who does not belong to that tradition is one from whom philosophy is far removed: Madhva could never be a philosopher because he found fault with Sankara.

As my relations to my professor developed, at the close of the term, in appreciation of a discussion my professor was kind enough to say "coming in close contact with you Raghavendrachar, I realise that Madhva as a philosopher is at least as excellent as Sankara. . . . I am glad I made a responsible statement in the council that it takes several centuries to give birth to a man of the type of Raghavendrachar. Do not you think that I made a correct statement? . . ." Repeating prof. M. Hirianna's statement Principal N. S. Subbarao warmly congratulated me.

In all these experiences my admiration to my professor's frankness, straightforwardness and readiness for appreciation along with profound scholarship was much enhanced.

In preparing myself for M.A., I had the rare opportunity to study all the original works of the different Darśanas-Nāstika and Astika. This circumstance encouraged me to write in Sanskrit a competition thesis for Navīnam Ramanujacharya's prize given by Mysore University to the best thesis. The subject fixed for that year 1924 was "The place of Reason in Indian Philosophy". I felt that this was a heavy task. The possible intention behind it, or the expectation from the essay made the problem more complex. I prepared myself with a fresh study of the Darsana works chiefly on Epistemology and wrote the thesis. It won the prize. The thesis was highly appreciated specially for the original element it contained by both the internal and external judges. I heard from my professor Dr. Radhakrishnan from Calcutta that he appreciated the thesis very highly asking me to go to him to fix my career to come.

After M.A., I learnt that some other candidate was thought of for the place kept vacant for me. It naturally meant that my deservedness was questioned. Principal N. S. Subbarao came forward to see that justice is done. He requested Dr. Seal to test the two competitors with the understanding that if they were found to be equal then the place might be given to the other candidate and if Raghavendrachar (myself) were to be found decidedly superior, then only the place would go to him. Accordingly I was tested. Dr. Seal said at one stage of testing which continued from 2 p.m., to 6.30 p.m., "I am much pleased with you", at another stage "I must confess that I am much pleased with you and you are really a great scholar", and at another stage "Under whom did you study all this? It is really wonderful. Is there really a scholar who could teach all this? Surely you are a born scholar. In the course of your life I am sure you will be an author of highly original, technical and useful works, more than 25 in number of this size (indicating through his hands a big size of 800 to 1000 pages)." Throughout the test he asked me to interpret most difficult lines in the most advanced works belonging to each Darsana such as Advaita-Siddhi of Advaita, Sarvārtha-Siddhi of Viśistadvaita, Nyāyāmṛta of Dvaita, Śloka-Vārtikā of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā, Prameya-Kamala-Mārtānda of Jaina, Nyāya-Kandalī of Vaisesika and Nyāya-Manjarī of Nyāya. At the close of the meeting he expressed his great satisfaction, compared me to the great Astosh Mukharji of Calcutta, promised great encouragement to me, chalked out the programme of my research and lastly he asked me to go to Principal Subbarao and relate to him all that took place and how he (Dr. Seal) was completely satisfied with me. Subsequently he introduced my qualification to the Council, I was told by Principal N. S. Subbarao, as "Mr. Raghavendrachar is not only good in English, not only good in Sanskrit, not only good in Western philosophy, not only good in Indian Philosophy but above all he is a man of samskāra. He is a born scholar in Indian thought" and so on.

It was in 1925 I joined service in the Philosophy Department Maharaja's College, Mysore at my age 31. I retired from service in 1951 having one year extension. I was reappointed for Indology. Under the kind direction of Dr. M. V. Gopalaswami, the principal I started and ran the Department in the Maharaja's College for nearly two years.

During these periods I taught several aspects of Indian philosophy to the students of B.A., B.A. (Hons)., and M.A., classes. Apart from contributing articles to several institutions and journals I wrote and published through Mysore University two major works "Bhāratīya-Tattva-Sāstrā-Sangraha" and "The Dvaita Philosophy and Its place in the Vedānta" and wrote two volumes of Brahma-Mīmāmsā—i. Jijnāsādhīkaraṇa and ii. Janmādhikaraṇa of which this volume is the first. Throughout my career both as a student and as a teacher in the University I enjoyed the warm support given to me by my professor A. R. Wadia.

My service in the college became a preparation to expound Brahma-Mīmāmsā. After I entered service I saw that the general feeling was that Madhva's thought was no philosophy and therefore it did not deserve a serious study. I wrote a paper on the concept of 'Bheda' as taught by Madhva. It was published by Mysore University Magazine, 1926. I showed there that the concept does not mean dualism or pluralism and it signifies that the highest Reality that is the source of the reality of all without being modified by anything is Brahman. I wrote another paper on the 'Sensa' so as to show that the world under consideration is never unreal as its reality is

required to point out the indispensability of Brahman as its author. This was published by both Indian philosophical congress and the Mysore University Magazine December 1927

Dr. Brajendranath Seal advised me that in order to make my contribution to Mādhva thought more effective against the existing environment to establish myself as one who has really understood Advaita. I took up Advaita theory of knowledge and wrote three chapters—Caitanya, Adhyāsa and Ajñāna. They were published by the Mysore University Journal 1928-9. These contributions were much appreciated by scholars like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Glasenapp of Koeinsberg University, Germany and Dr. A. B. Keith of Edinburgh University.

In 1928 Dr. Von Helmuth Glasenapp visited Mysore. He was interested in Indian philosophy. In search of a scholar in Indian philosophy, with special reference to Madhva he found me out. We spent about a week together mostly engaged in discussing the problems of Vedanta and appreciating the soundness of Madhva's conclusions on the basis of a comparative study.

Subsequently Dr. Rudolph Otto of the fame of "The concept of the Holy" and a person of political importance, of Marberg University, Germany came to Mysore. Having already heard of me from Dr. Glasenapp, through Mr. J. C. Rollo, the Principal of the Maharaja's College he met me. After usual courtesy he asked me to give a brief note on the concept of Brahman according to the three Vedanta systems on the basis of the text of Sruti "tattvamasi", pointing out merits and demerits of each thought. At the close of my note Dr. Otto expressed great joy and satisfaction and asked me to be always with him so long as he stayed in Mysore. Next day he presented me two books in German, one Grammar and one Reader. He himself started teaching me. He stayed in Mysore for 23 days. Every day whenever there was leisure some problem or other connected with Indian philosophy was discussed and I was the recipient of his great appreciation and admiration. He noted with keen interest that the intensive application to the study of each Darsana gave me the capacity to do full justice to the position in question. One day Advaita was discussed against Dvaita. That day several Scholars of Mysore took part in the discussion. The upholder of Advaita found himself to be weak and asked me to lead the discussion which I did. At the close of the discussion Dr. Otto singularly pointed it out and remarked before the others that it is the true individuality of ancient Indian mind. He said taking off his hat and holding it high—"I came to India 15 years ago to meet a scholar in Indian philosophy. I visited several Universities and several institutions which professed that they stood for Indian wisdom. But I found nothing worth noting except a few people of religious fervour. Now once more I have come to India. After visiting several places of importance at last I came to Mysore. I am fortunate enough to meet a person i.e., Dr. Raghavendrachar (as he referred to me) who has made me feel that I am actually in the presence of an ancient Indian sage, an imaginable being. Gentlemen, you all are eyewitnesses how to begin with Dr. Raghavendrachar started opposing Advaita but seeing that the present defender of Advaita is too weak to maintain his position, at his request as I saw, took up Advaita and defended Advaita. But I do not even for a moment think that his conviction is Advaita. That is the greatness of Indian mind which we admire most and worship in Germany. Indian mind never ignores an opposition without trying to justify it to the utmost"

I may add the following to indicate how warm Dr. Otto's

appreciation to Indian thought was:

At the close of his stay in Mysore he told me in the presence of a Sweedish Bishop, a pupil and companion to Dr. Otto that he would take me to Germany to educate the best suited German students in Indian philosophy on the lines that I was myself educated. He said that he had to confess that German knowledge of Indian philosophy was very shallow though German scholars are believed in India to be the greatest authorities in Indian thought. He promised in clear language that I would be much honoured by the German and other Universities and I would be introduced to Von Hindenberg, the then German President. He continued that after staying there mostly with him for five or seven years, if I wanted to come down to India he would request the British Government with which the German Government was then on good terms and see that I was sent back to India as a governor of a country in India.

All this simply meant to me his high appreciation to my subject. By that time he had already prepared much ground in my interest. He had asked some German Officer in Madras through the German Consular-General in Calcutta to give me all help. He said that he had requested H.H. the Maharaja of Mysore to give me passage money and to reserve for me a professorial seat in the Maharaja's College, Mysore. He talked to Matthin, the then councillor for Education, the Government of Mysore. Seeing that I was a bit orthodox and old fashioned in my taste he promised that he would take personal care of me in Germany and give me the food etc., to my liking. All this was very kind of him, and much encouraging to me also. But I must not forget to tell that no such offer attracted me. My subject as well as a life of satisfaction it caused was everything for me. He noticed and read my inner thoughts and exclaimed "What! Am I disappointed in my proposal, Dr. Raghavendrachar? Surely you are an Indian Sage! I do not observe even a ray of approval on your facial expression". Dr. Otto anyhow waited for me for three years. In the third year he brought on me even the Viceregal influence. He made me a member of "Die Marburger sammlung" under "Im Namen Der Marburger Gasellschaft Der Wissenschaften,"

Later Principal Rollo came to my class room and said "I congratulate you, Raghavendrachar. You are favoured by so great a man as Dr. Otto whose word is law in Europe".

I was contented with what I was in Mysore University. Mysore University published in 1930 my work entitled Bhāratīya-Tattva-Śāstra-Sangraha, History of Indian philosophy in Kannada. In my research in Indian thought I realised the whole of Indian thought in all its details finds its meaning and significance in Madhva. Madhva as he is revealed in his works is neither a theist, nor a theologian, nor a dualist, nor a pluralist as he is commonly taken to be. But he is a thoroughgoing Brahma-Vādin and he taught Brahma-Mīmāmsā, Monism of the very highest order. I worked it out and taught it to students. I saw that the spirit of Madhva's Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the only saviour of humanity suffering from faiths and imaginations. While others insisted on truths and maxims Madhva emphasised correct knowledge without giving room for faith or imagination. According to

him faith, imagination and so on are varieties of wrong

knowledge, because they can never be true to objects.

I succeeded in publishing my work "The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedānta" in 1941. In great appreciation of this work the Bhārat Dharma Mahāmandal, The All-India Sanskrit and Spiritual University, Benares, conferred on me the honorary degree of D.O.C. (Doctor of Oriental Culture with Ph.D. 1942.). It was really encouraging to me when Dr. R. P. Tripathi, the Vice-Chancellor, Saugar University with his friends in great appreciation of the book for specially altogether a novel approach it contained arranged for a meeting in the house of Dr. B. L. Manjunath, the then Vice-Chancellor, Mysore and discussed with me several problems and conceptions connected with Madhva's thought in 1952. Through his courtesy Hindi Prachara Samiti of India has taken up this work for translating it into Hindi and publishing it.

I may add the following:

1. In 1934 I led the Symposium in the Indian Philosophical Congress, Waltair, "The Concept of God in Advaita from the standpoint of Dvaita" in which I showed the limitations of Advaita and the indispensability of Madhva to make the valid element in the thought started by Sankara complete.

2. In 1943 I presided over Indian Philosophy in the Indian philosophical Congress, Lahore. In the Presidential Address I showed with illustration how Madhva's thought is unadulterated form of Monism being the very culminating point

of Vedanta Thought.

The Dvaita philosophy was published in 1941. The Mādhva people with absolutely no academic interest questioned the validity of my conclusions. Uninformed criticisms were multiplied. Almost a schism was started. Even my most revered teacher Dharmadhikari Holavanahalli Seshachar was opposed to me. For what I learnt under him was not what he thought he taught. He somehow felt that he taught me dvaita but to me he actually taught Brahma-Mīmāmsā. For example—If he explained how the world is real and not mithyā it meant to me on the strength of the text I was studying that Brahman's creative activity is not māyā, magic but real and

reliable. Madhva holds that the world is real only in connection with amplifying the truth taught by Sruti: "athainamāhuh satyakarmeti satyam hyevāsau kurute". (They say that It (Brahman) is that the action of which is real. So It does indeed the real only.) It is my rare privilege that my guru somehow made up his mind to discuss the matter in detail. He stayed with me for 15 years. To the credit of my subject I must say that he was completely convinced of the genuineness of my position. He even delivered public lectures in this regard in Madras, Bangalore and Mysore, explaining at the same time how he corrected himself and how this thought has been lost to the world roughly for the last 3 to 4 centuries.

With a view to convincing at least those who came to attack me in person and at the same time who really wanted to know the truth that Madhva taught I have been holding free Vedānta classes in my house every morning from 5-30 to 7-00 a.m. on ancient Guru-kula basis. About 20 persons in all have been attending the classes. Of them one was my colleague in the department of philosophy and several others are still in service and some others are retired. Some of the college students of mine were also attending these morning classes. After preliminary discussions I taught them Madhva's Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya with Jayatīrtha's Tattva-Prakāsikā for these 22 years. Recently I commenced for them Madhva's Anu-Vyākhyāna with Jayatīrtha's Nyāya-Sudhā. As I have been all along showing with illustration, to teach these works is to study the whole of Indian philosophy in different capacities.

- 3. In 1948 I contributed the chapter on Madhva to the History of Philosophy Eastern and Western sponsored by the Government of India in which I showed that Vedic or Vedantic Monism found its full expression in Madhva.
- 4. At about the same time I contributed a chapter on Madhva to "The Cultural Heritage (III Volume) published by Ramakrishna Mission. In this essay I have shown how Madhva's thought is not Dvaita but it is as Madhva himself defines it *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*.

Throughout the period of my service I contributed to several Institutions papers on different aspects of Indian Darsanas with a comparative study, pointing to the fact in the same circumstance that every genuine discussion of any problem leads finally to *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*.

In 1946 I commenced expounding Brahma-Mīmāmsā in 50 volumes.

In recognition of my continuous application to the study of Indian philosophy in general and Vedānta in particular His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore graciously appointed me The Palace Dharmadhikari in 1950 when I was still in active service. This is a place of honour and it is usually given to the best of the Sanskrit scholars existing. The manner in which this gracious gift came from H.H. the Maharaja reminded me of the great Emperors of the Purāṇic age. This is a rare privilege which has made me more devoted to my studies in various forms.

About Brahma-Mīmāmsā

My work in Brahma-Mīmāmsā went on. At the outset in the interest of bringing my work to light I thought that I had myself to manage the printing of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Some portions of the present volume were printed. I was still in service (1951). I submitted my work to prof. T. Burrow, the Boden professor of Sanskrit, Oxford University for suggestions. But he was kind enough to write an Introductory Note to the work and thus encourage me in my attempt. I submitted the printed portion to Dr. B. L. Manjunath, the then Vice-Chancellor of Mysore University, with the idea of acquainting him with the kind of work I was doing. He appreciated the work highly and felt that it deserved to come out as a University publication. The two volumes Jijñāsādhikaraṇa and Janmādhikaraṇa which were ready for print at that time were taken up by the University.

I felt however that the Vice-Chancellor's attitude towards the subject and my work created a new confidence in me.

Subsequently Dr. T. A. Purushottam, Professor of Philosophy in recommending to the University my work on Brahma-Mīmāmsā to come out as a Mysore University publication has expressed "... The fittedness of the author to execute the work he has undertaken is therefore as unimpeachable as

it is rare... It is a work that no one can undertake to interpret except after a discipline of a lifetime scholarship, meditation and purity of soul.... It is a work which I doubt not is destined to reach round the world and affect beneficially the lives of generations of readers, Indian and foreign..." These expressions reveal some circumstances connected with the publication.

This is my fittedness with genuine appreciation from proper persons which has created an urge in me to understand more of *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* by way of expounding it to the world of thinkers so that they are at least better placed to find out a really sound philosophy.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

By T. Burrow

Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford

In the history of Indian Philosophy, the teachings of the Vedanta are not only the beginning and the source from which other systems are derived, but they have outcasted these other systems, and when the latter were either extinguished or relegated to a subsidiary role, established their unrivalled sway in the country. The exposition of this Philosophy is based on the Upanisads and other Vedic texts. In order to systematise and expound the doctrines contained therein, Bādarāyaṇa composed the Brahma-Sūtras. Later philosophical work takes the form of commentaries on these Sūtras, in which the fundamental doctrines are expounded from various points of view. Sankara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, to mention only the most important of the founders of schools, differ considerably in the methods and results of their interpretation. It will easily be understood that lively controversy between the adherents of the various schools has been a continuing feature of philosophical discussions.

As far as Western interest in India is concerned,—and the same on the whole is true of Modern Indian Scholars—attention has been directed primarily to the Philosophy of Sankara, and it is normal to regard Vedānta primarily in the light of Sankara's interpretation. Not very much attention has been paid to detailed criticism to which his views have been subjected by other schools, and to the independent contributions to

Indian thought made by these others.

In particular one finds that comparatively little attention in modern times has been directed to Madhva and his school. In order to remedy this omission, the author of the present work, who is in every way admirably equipped for the task, has undertaken a detailed exposition of the doctrines of the school of Madhva based on the Bhāṣya of Madhva and the commentaries on it. The exposition takes the form of a detailed commentary in English on the relevant texts, which follows

faithfully the traditional lines of interpretation, and at the same time expounds the ideas in such a way as to be readily intelligible to the modern reader with some philosophical background. In order that the meaning may be quite clear the passages of the original texts are quoted in transcription and explained in detail, so that the reader has continually before him the original material on which the exposition is based. Those who wish to understand the philosophical ideas of Madhva and his school, will find a sure and reliable guide

They will also find the work to be of great service for the light it throws on the development of Indian philosophy in general. The problems that arise here are also the subject-matter of other branches of Indian Philosophy. Raghavendrachar, after a lifetime's teaching of Indian Philosophy in its various aspects, is able to expound the questions in hand against the general background. It is on the basis of all that has been discussed before that the author of the Bhasya proceeds to his philosophical exposition. The criticism of the work of previous philosophers, and a re-examination of the crucial points which remained questionable in their exposition, formed the basis of later exposition. It is against this background that it must be studied, so that the significance of Madhva's innovations may be appreciated.

In presenting this exposition the author insists on the philosophical as opposed to the religious interpretation of the Bhāsya and associated works. There has been a tendency to reverse the roles and consequently to overlook the philosophical basis of Madhva's system. This has led to a neglect of these works in the general study of Indian Philosophy, a neglect which the publication of this work should go a long

way to remedy.

The proper understanding of Indian Philosophy is difficult for those who have not been brought up in the atmosphere of the traditional teaching which has been handed down in unbroken continuity from teacher to pupil. It should be studied with the help of those who have received this training, and are steeped in the ancient traditions of thought. Only thus is it possible to be aware of the exact significance of the arguments, and the contexts in which they are propounded.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Raghavendrachar has all the advantages which a profound study on traditional lines can give, and at the same time a familiarity with modern ways of thinking and expression which enables him to provide a bridge between the two. It would not be easy to find a scholar equally well equipped to expound the Philosophy of *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*.

T. Burrow

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APPROACH

Brahma-Mīmāmisā is the exposition of Vedānta by Madhva. The approach to the study of it must be consistent with what it aims. It aims at never ceasing enquiry into the Highest. Madhva states this aim in every work of his. His statement in Anu-Vyākhyāna may be taken as a real representative. At the close of the Pancādhikaraṇa he states his position and shows that it cannot be understood without ceaseless enquiry as:

tasmāt šāstreņa jijnāsyam asmadīyam guņārņavam vāsudevākhyam advandvam param brahma akhilottamam

[The word tasmāt is taken by Nyāya-Sudhā to signify the thought in its historical setting. The other words are defined by Madhva himself in proper contexts. Therefore the translation of the passage is the following:]

(As the Propertyless (Nirguna) cannot be studied because it is contradiction in terms and the mind which knows that there is Veda to give the knowledge of the ultimate Truth cannot be silenced, our position is that which results only from enquiry by means of the principles of thought prescribed by Veda itself and brought to light by Brahma-Mīmāmsā i.e., the Brahma-Sūtras. This position is that Brahman—the Complete is Akhilottamam-the Independent doer of all and for this reason Gunāranavam-the abode of all attributes each in itself being complete and for this reason Vāsudevākhyam-the spiritual principle that gives reality to all and therefore Advandvam-the superiorless and equalless and for this reason Param-transcendent in the sense that It is the subject-matter only of 'enquiry into the meaning of the statements of Veda' i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā.) The idea is that none of these concepts is intelligible without Jijñāsā, philosophy.

In view of all these ideas Madhva defines the purpose of $S\bar{a}stra$ as:

JANMĀDI-KĀRAŅAM YATTAT SĀKṢĀT NĀRĀYAŅĀBHIDHAM VADANTI ŚRUTAYO BRAHMA ŚĀSTRAM CA ETAT TADARTHATAḤ PRAVŖTTAM

(Srutis hold that the immediate cause of the birth etc., of the world of the spiritual and the non-spiritual entities is Brahman. They define Brahman as Nārāyaṇa-the complete, the perfect, the most objective and the most attainable. In order to expound this truth this Sāstra, Brahma-Mīmāmsā has its rise.)

Madhva indicates that Brahman, Vāsudeva and Nārāyana are the same, because these words present finally the same idea of

Truth.

The Sanskrit words used in Sāstra are as a rule technical. The meaning is in every case consistent with Brahman. A meaning that does not state Brahman is sublated. The present translation is an illustration of the fact that the meaning of every word must have a reference to Brahman. The above two passages from Madhva while defining the aim of Sastra define the approach relevant to It. The correct approach is that which helps the knowledge aimed at and this is the knowledge in the

form of ceaseless enquiry into Brahman.

A note on these passages as defining the correct approach to the study of Madhva removes misconceptions prevalent in some quarters that stand in the way of correct understanding of his philosophy. Some of these misconceptions are-Madhva taught dualism or pluralism: He asserted the world against Brahman: He lacked philosophic acumen: He emphasised Purānas against Veda; He made much of the difference, bheda between things: He was destitute of integrity of outlook: He was pleased with discursive thinking: He developed sectarianism: He was not for the good of all: He taught theism or theology: He advocated faith (bhakti) against or as alternative to knowledge: He encouraged ritualism against all that is spiritual: and He silenced his opponents even by using physical force.

The approach to Madhva becomes clearly defined in its

historical setting.

Madhva's Historical Importance

Generally Madhva's thought is identified as Dvaita and taken to be an alternative to Advaita. At times it is juxtaposed with other systems of Vedanta as if there are many systems that are simultaneously given and one may select any system that one likes. These ideas are sublated by the fact that Madhva is the very last of the Vedānta philosophers and the different systems that preceded him are different stages of the evolution of the same substance of thought i.e., the concept of Brahman. The starting point of Madhva's philosophy is the conclusion of the previous philosophies with which he was not satisfied. Without proper recognition of Madhva's position in the history of thought it is not possible to understand him. For in this circumstance the student does not know where exactly he has his starting point of his study and consequently becomes confused.

APPROACH

History necessitated Madhva to be self-complete. For to borrow any thought from any Darsana did not help his thought because he found fault with all other Darsanas in all their details.

Self-completeness of Madhva's Thought

In order to study Brahman, the Transcendent there appeared Veda and Brahma-Sūtras with their own system of language and method of thought. The same is the language and the method of thought of Madhva's exposition also. In so far as the positive side of his philosophy is concerned he borrows nothing from the previous Darsanas. After Veda and the Brahma-Sūtras he develops as he himself makes it clear his own system of Language, Logic, Psychology, Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics and so on. Without identifying these aspects of his thought justice is not done to his thought.

The self-completeness of Madhva's thought makes it universal in its application.

Universality is the characteristic of Madhva's thought

In illustration of this point four ideas may be mentioned-

(i) Madhva illustrates how his thought holds good at any time, in any place and in any circumstance. He is therefore addressed as *Trailokyācārya* by his immediate followers. This word means that he is the teacher of the three worlds—the Earth, the worlds below the Earth and the worlds above the Earth, existing throughout the course of time.

(ii) Madhva holds that Brahma-jijñāsā is the driving force of all. It is in essence Brahman Itself. The teacher of Brahman

is an expression of this force. He therefore presents himself as the vital principle of all in the light of Balitthā-Sūkta of Veda which studies this aspect of existence under the concept Vāyu.

(iii) His philosophy of Brahman as being complete ensures the inexhaustible source of individual life. For individual life both in its origin and in its continuity is nothing but the creation of Brahman, the Complete.

(iv) Further his philosophy of Brahman as being Vedic in the sense that it is the position of Veda established only through unmodified and the most comprehensive jijnāsā removes all misgivings that characterise empirical, theological and theistic thinking. Pure philosophy is the secret of life and is universal in its application.

The non-sectarianism of Madhva's thought confines the thought strictly to Veda in the act of defining Brahman.

Madhva and Vedic Brahman

In studying Brahman as expounded by Veda Madhva had to meet a special circumstance. Previous to him the word brahman was taken to mean particular ideas independently of Veda by different thinkers. But Madhva saw that none of these ideas was relevant to Veda, because they were all the creations of thought outside Veda. In addition as it is shown in the course of the present work Madhva felt inherent defects in each of those meanings which in their turn made the concept of Brahman itself impossible. He showed that all these ideas are contradictions in terms. On his part he consulted in the light of the Brahma-Sūtras Veda itself with a view to finding out for what reason Veda calls the subject-matter of enquiry Brahman. Further he observed that the author of the Brahma-Sūtras indicates that all that is meant by the word brahman by Veda is brought out by Veda itself by the word vișnu and the Vedic study of the Vedic Vișnu is the same as the Vedic study of the Vedic Brahman. So the Vedic words brahman and vișnu have to be regarded as synonyms. Similarly vāsudeva, nārāyaņa, hari and so on become synonyms of viṣṇu and therefore synonyms of brahman.

Thus the significance of these various concepts is purely philosophical. These concepts left to themselves have nothing

religious in them. It may however be noted that these findings are indispensable for any person who wants to understand Brahman studied by Veda, in whatever deity he believed, Viṣṇu or non-Viṣṇu prior to his commencement of enquiry into Brahman.

The study of Madhva which is strictly confined to Veda removes all that is religion from Madhva's thought.

Madhva and Vaisnavism

It is not legitimate to think that Madhva contributed to Vaisnava cult. To think so is an attempt to lose the very philosophical excellence of Madhva's thought and to uphold some faith. Madhva's Viṣṇu is out and out Vedic and It brings out the distinguishing feature of Vedic Brahman and as such It is profoundly different from Viṣṇu of religion. Madhva's Viṣṇu is the subject-matter of enquiry into the meaning of Veda. But Viṣṇu of religion is a case of faith giving no room for enquiry. Viṣṇu of religion is an imagination. But Vedic Viṣṇu is the Reality.

Hence the literature and tradition to which Madhva belongs are Veda and its genuine tradition called Smrtis. To subject Madhva to any other literature or tradition popularly called Dvaita or Vaiṣnava is to lose Madhva himself and with him Brahma-Mīmāmsā. For Madhva's Viṣnu is purely Vedic and his concept of difference, bheda is the language of the highest reality of Viṣnu. [The term Brahma-Mīmāmsā as applied to Madhva's thought brings out the absolute purity of his philosophy. That denomination is relevant to that which brings out its character as a case of pure philosophy of Brahman.] Judged correctly the so called Dvaita or Vaiṣṇava literature is an independent growth, in essence non-Vedic in character.

Madhva and Dvaita

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The popular notion that Madhva taught dvaita, duality is erroneous. Madhva's one and only aim is to understand Brahman strictly in the capacity of Its being presented by Veda. His whole teaching has an internal, adhyātma importance. It is his tapas; spiritual discipline. He shows that it is the only case of tapas that is Good and that leads to Good. His

thought is straightforward, rju and he has absolutely no interest in anything that is not-straightforward, anrju. He says that his criticism against anrju is only that much which is required to abandon it in the interest of following the straightforward thought. So it is not correct to think that he rebelled against a position that may be called Advaita and supported a position that may be called Dvaita. He did neither. He had no interest in any idea that falls outside Veda. In his works on Vedic texts one comes across passages such as "anyathā-pratyayo dvaitam . . . harih advaitah (Wrong knowledge is avaita. . . . Hari i.e., Brahman is Advaita" (M.Bh.), "ekam tu śubham uddistam asubham dvaitamucyate (One is the sign of Good; evil is taken to be dvaita (Bh.T.) and "paramārthāpekṣayā advaitam (Brahman is Advaita in the sense that It is the Highest." So in view of passages like these his position is through and through Advaita i.e., Brahman as the Highest. Against this fact to call his position dvaita is to negate Madhva at the very outset. In the interest of safeguarding the Truth i.e., Brahman as the Highest he shows that to speak of the non-duality of Brahman and individual self which is named advaita by others is non-Vedic and it is at the very outset of thinking to negate Brahman Itself. In illustrating this point Madhva uses the term dvaita strictly in the sense that Brahman as the highest is distinguished from the world. Thus the use of the term dvaita has only a polemic interest. But to take this fact as the proof for dualism or pluralism is a mistake committed against language itself. One ought rather to see that the negation of non-duality helps the formation of the concept of Brahman as the highest. Unless Brahman as Brahman is distinguished from all that It is not It cannot be recognised to be the highest. Unless It is recognised to be the highest there cannot be a serious attempt to study It abandoning at the same time interest in things that fall short of It. So the fact of refuting non-duality in the name of dvaita does not necessarily imply that he is opposed to the term advaita itself and he supported dvaita against Veda.

Madhva's works are thoroughly Vedic. To fix the attention of the student strictly to Veda he composed different works on different items of thought that come under the purview of

Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

Madhva's Works

Tradition has handed down 38 works as composed by Madhva. These works are—4 Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣyas, 10 Treatises on different concepts of philosophy, 10 Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas, 2 Bhāṣyas on the Bhagavadgītā, Bhāṣya on the Rgveda, Mahā-Bhārata-Tāṭparya-Nirṇaya, Bhāgavata-Tāṭparya, Tantra-Sāra, Dvādaśa-Stotra, Kṛṣṇāmṛta-Mahārṇava, Yamaka-Bhārata, Yati-praṇava-kalpa, Nṛṣimha-Nakha-Stōtra, Jayantī-Nirṇaya,

Kṛṣṇa-Stuti and Sadācāra-Smṛti.

There is a point of difference between Madhva and other Vedanta philosophers with regard to composing works. While others from different points of view have composed different works, Madhva in every work of his makes it clear that his study is concerned only with Visnu because It is the one and the only meaning of Brahman as taught by Veda. Hence his works are distinguished by the identity of purpose. But the teaching of one work of his is not the same as the teaching of his other works. The necessity for writing different works arose also because he saw that perfect unity of thinking underlies the whole field of Sruti (Veda) and Smrti and to make this fact explicit he thought that it was necessary to write different works. He expounded the principle of discovering this unity in his Bhāsyas on the Brahma-Sūtras. His intention as he himself explains is that in order to understand the Vedic Brahman the whole field of language must be studied in such a manner as to do justice to the principle of thinking prescribed by the Brahma-Sūtras to decide the meaning of Veda. His other works also are not an exception to this rule. This means that his other works must be studied subjecting them to the principle of thought prescribed by the Brahma-Sūtras. To study them independently of the Brahma-Sūtras results in contradictions. Madhva himself makes this fact plain in proper contexts in his works. Hence to treat Madhva's works from the commonly known standards of interpreting a Sanskrit work does not yield the required result. It even does harm to his thought.

There is another circumstance in Madhva's thought. Corresponding to every decision on the basis of Veda that characterises his philosophy i.e., Sāstra there is a counter decision in the Darsanas that preceded his thought. He

holds that unless the counter decision is thoroughly examined and its defect is brought to light the soundness of his thought cannot be fully understood and without this understanding the knowledge obtained by the study of Sāstra cannot govern the life of man. He cautions that without Sastra life is blind and in this circumstance life becomes an easy prey to all kinds of faith and imagination. So he has in view two items of thought-Sāstra which is strictly one and non-Sastra of various denominations. He sees that the principle of thinking that applies to non-Sastra does not apply to Sastra. He does not therefore examine non-Sastra from the point of view of Sastra. In examining a school of non-Sastra Madhva adopts the point of view relevant to that school and points out the defects-contradictions and so on. After thus dismissing non-Sāstra and adopting the principle that governs Sastra and illustrating how well that principle is satisfied by the position characterising Sāstra, he brings out the soundness of Sastra. His method of thinking can be followed only by that student who is endowed with this discrimination. So to study Madhva from the standpoint of common standards of judgment does not give his thought which is the only light in life as one sees as one advances in one's study.

Further the style of Madhva follows Sūtra. For the sake of clearness and definiteness of thought the Vedic thinking insists on this style on the author of Bhāṣya on Sūtra also. Madhva's Bhāṣyas are distinguished from the other Bhāṣyas in this direction also. The circumstances such as these necessitated commentaries on Madhva's works as a discipline on the part of the learned as well as in the interest of beginners. So to interpret Madhva independently of these circumstances has its own risks.

Commentaries on Madhva

Several attempts were made to make Madhva intelligible by his immediate followers. But perhaps owing to the force of predispositions they all failed to bring the self-consistent character of Madhva's teaching to light. Finally Jayatīrtha, a mediate follower of Madhva succeeded in presenting Madhva's teaching consistently. This truth is vouchsafed by the fact that Jayatīrtha's works give the student a comprehensive outlook and make him able to see the shortcomings of other commentators

and realise the inexhaustible richness and comprehensiveness and self-consistency of Madhva's teaching. This circumstance is taken to account for the breakless continuity of right kind of thinking. Hence the Mādhva tradition is to study Madhva with the help of Jayatīrtha's commentaries. These commentaries being consistent in themselves are naturally complex. This makes the instruction of an expert teacher an absolute necessity. In recognition of all these circumstances the timehonoured practice or at least the ideal of the followers of Madhva is to study Madhva only under the care of a proper guru-proper in the sense that he is able to remove all doubts and difficulties with regard to the meaning of Veda through correctly i.e., consistently interpreting Madhva. Even the adverse critics of Madhva, if there be any, may be free from their adverse attitude if they only study Madhva with proper approach. It is hoped that the readers of this volume will see the truth of these observations to some extent at least to begin

Approach is an aspect of Madhva's concept of fittedness (adhikāra) consisting in vairāgya, freedom from wrong knowledge and Viṣnubhakti, devotedness to enquiry into the Truth which is the very Highest (Sarvottama).

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President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, my most revered teacher has said on 20-12-62 in Bombay, The Hindu, 21-12-1962: "India would overcome all the troubles that she faced today if the people lived according to the three fundamental teachings of the Bhāratīya-vidyā, Indian wisdom and Indian Culture, namely tranquillity of spirit, non-attachment and non-hatred. . . . The purpose of all the Sastras and all the learning was to help and impart in one the knowledge of self.... If we are to acquire tranquillity, peace and freedom from fear, we must realise that this world is rooted in something else, that this passing show is not all and there is something behind which man is called upon to understand".

Obviously, this is a profound instruction. Its profundity consists i. in being the outcome of an exhaustive study of the whole of Bharatīya-vidyā, ii. in making the life of the world a preparation to the life spiritual and iii. in giving an effective start to a serious study of the subject. The theme of this instruction breathes the very essence of Bharatīya-vidyā and I am happy that it is, according to my mind, exactly the subject of the present study entitled "Brahma-Mīmānisā" which is no other than "Bhāratīya-vidyā". literature Veda is pere

Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the system of Vedanta expounded by Madhva in conclusion of the whole of Vedanta thinking. As Veda holds the birth-place of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the necessity to find out the answer that Veda gives to the questions put by Veda itself-From where do these creatures come? By which do they exist? Into which do they go and disappear or endure? These are evidently the questions intimately connected with 'the Reality behind all'. Madhva shows that Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the process of understanding 'the Reality behind all' being in the same circumstance that in which the whole world is rooted and which is therefore the one and only explanation of all. Apart from this Science no item of experience can be correctly explained. In this circumstance, even the idea of 'Reality behind all' becomes unwarranted.

The origin of the idea of 'the Reality behind all' is briefly the following: The world of change is meaningless without a principle that is the source of its reality. This principle is 'the Reality behind all' as the source of the reality of all. Which is the source of knowledge of 'the Reality behind all'? In answer the following may be noted-Perception and inference are invalid if they are taken independently of 'the Reality behind all'. Further granting that they are correct they, perception and inference are empirical. They do not help the conception of 'the Reality behind all'. Further the idea of this Reality is given for explanation even as the idea of perception or inference is. Human mind is not the origin of this idea. For human mind is confined to perception and inference and this idea i.e., 'the Reality behind all' is independent of perception and inference. Further to make use of the idea of 'the Reality behind all' in inference is unwarranted. Hence as there can be no other alternative, that which is its origin must be something that gives rise to knowledge in the absence of perception and inference. This thing can only be speech (vāk). Obviously this aspect of speech is not the creation of any person. Yet it is indispensable. For without it the idea of Reality cannot be explained. Hence it must have been given along with the beginningless world. Because of this reason the Vedanta thinkers have identified this speech as Veda in the light of Veda

As literature Veda is very extensive. Its language is called Samskrta. It is not Samskrta in the usual sense. Samskrta is that which is perfectly furnished both in form and in matter. The language in this sense is the distinction of Veda. In presenting 'the Reality behind all' it studies all aspects of life. It is said that Veda is the plan and the world is the construction. This means that the world existing in time and space is exhausted by Veda. In support of all these ideas in Veda itself one comes across the passages as "vedāh te nityavinnatvāt" (They are Veda because they are indispensable from the beginningless to the endless time). It is also said that there is nothing in the world that is not stated by Veda. (anuktam pancabhih vedaih na vastvasti kathancana). Veda is therefore the language of the concepts that are relevant to 'the Reality behind all'. Hence Veda is considered to be infinite (ananta).

Attempts to understand Veda are defeated by the very disposition of Veda itself. It is so rich in thought and so many-sided that the student is easily distracted and is therefore lost in confusion and made to lose finally Veda itself. Not to understand Veda is to lose Veda. Indian thinkers in general and particularly the Vedanta thinkers are convinced that to lose Veda is to lose all that is good in life. That which is consistent with 'the Reality behind all' is good. With the loss of Veda this consistency is lost. So it is said "veda-pranihito dharmah adharmah tadviparyayah" (Good is that which is established by Veda; that which is not established by Veda is evil.) With the loss of Veda there is the loss of the knowledge of the Reality in which the world of experience is rooted. At best there may be some surmises. Surmises are not knowledge. In this circumstance the world is left abstracted from its basis. Consequently in this environment no case of knowledge of the world or an item of the world can be correct, because in this case every item of knowledge is bereft of its essence i.e., the secret of its reality. Incorrect knowledge is the birth-place of all evil. Though in certain cases man seems to be happy in spite of his being in the presence of incorrect knowledge, he is never free from the evil resulting from incorrect knowledge. The effect of wrong knowledge is such that even the divinities cannot be free from it.

To do good to creatures Bādarāyaņa classified Veda and made it intelligible. For this reason he is also called Vedavyāsa. He also composed several Smrtis in illustration of the Truth taught by Veda. But the mind given to the world is such that it was still incapable of understanding Veda. Several methods of understanding Veda were imagined. It was forgotten that Veda by virtue of its being Veda, the original vāk is the origin of all languages. The words of Vedic discipline were interpreted in the light of common usages. In connection with fixing the discipline leading to the highest good logic, meditation and faith were asserted each against the others. Interest in the subjective sense led the discussion. Sectarianism pervaded. Particular ideas were taken to have been presented by the particular statements of Veda and they were crystallised against the others. The relation of Sruti and Smrti to life was cut off. Abstraction i.e., baseless reflection governed thought. These are the common characteristics of the Darsanas prior to Uttara-

To bring these activities to an end the same Badarayana taught that there is a single principle of thought by applying which alone Veda with reference to all its divisions and the details connected with the divisions can be understood as presenting 'the Reality behind all.' This is the principle of enquiry (fijnasa). He worked out this principle in its application to the whole of Veda and through it the whole field of speech. This work is known as Brahma-Sūtras. The word Brahma-Sūtra means that work which decides that Brahman, the Reality behind all, is the one and only meaning of the whole of Veda in all its aspects. To be the meaning of Veda is to be the meaning of the whole of experience, because Veda is the origin of knowledge as such. Therefore even though Veda transcends experience it is inclusive of experience. So to emphasise experience against Veda is to make experience blind and to emphasise Veda against experience is to uphold dogmatism. Hence the harmony of the two in which the individuality of Veda is not sacrificed and experience is not falsified becomes inevitable. These are the points that distinguish the teaching of the Brahma-Sūtras.

Soon there appeared the problem of consistently understanding the Brahma-Sūtras and carrying on the principle of enquiry in its application to the whole of Veda without giving room for a set-back. Many attempts were made to solve this problem. But none of them succeeded. The reasons were many.—Commonsense dominated somehow. Veda was made to yield. Understanding Brahman was sharply distinguished from the realisation (aparoksa) of Brahman. Realisation was emphasised against understanding i.e., enquiry. Understanding was viewed askance. Independently of understanding, ways of achieving realisation were conjectured. Meditation and faith were generally considered to be indispensable discipline with or without enquiry i.e., understanding. The propriety of Brahma-Sūtras themselves was questioned. Convenient meaning was attributed to them. System after system appeared. These points characterise the Vedanta philosophies that preceded Madhvācārya. The thinking mind however remained

The possibility of the Brahma-Sūtras meaning entirely

different things became more keenly felt. It could not be ignored that even logic, meditation and faith were in their own way the creatures of enquiry though the person who practised them failed to recognise it owing to some predisposition. Further to abstract realisation from understanding was found to be unwarranted. This circumstance necessitated an attempt that would do full justice to enquiry and release it from the fetters of the anti-intellectual elements—meditation or faith or even logic as used against Jijnāsā, and show that realisation is a continuity of enquiry.

This necessity finally gave rise to Madhva (Madhvācārya), a Vedānta thinker. He defended the Brahma-Sūtras and through them Veda against the cold war raised against them. In his works collectively known as Brahma-Mīmāmsā he showed that enquiry (mīmāmsā) into Brahman i.e., Veda and the meaning of Veda is the only discipline that results in the good of mankind. In the absence of enquiry man is subject to illusions in the form of faith, religion and so on with their consequent evils. These are the only cases of evils because other evils such as physical and environmental are strictly speaking no evils at all as they are aspects of Nature. With enquiry man is in the conscious presence of Brahman, the Reality behind all being inclusive of all and he has therefore no occasion for illusions with regard to Truth.

Previous to Madhva in place of Jijnāsā logic, meditation and faith had been emphasised as independent cases of discipline, spiritual in character. If at all there were enquiry, then it was both preceded and followed by them. But Madhva saw that logic by itself is discursive thinking; that meditation by itself consisted in forcing the mind on something determined by logic or verbal testimony which he respects without intending increase of knowledge and that faith by itself silenced mind and resulted in emotional outbursts. He explained how logic is indecisive because it is partial and limited in origin and scope; how meditation in the sense it was practised is an arrest of intellect and therefore a kind of spiritual death, because in its presence mind is made inactive, and how faith is the negation of spirituality because it makes mind blind. He also noted that the defender of these disciplines himself becomes conscious of these defects at a stage of his own mental history. He further pointed out that the excellences that might be attributed to logic, meditation and faith are indeed present in "jijnasa with all their accompaniments. He showed that realisation is a fully ripe, highly advanced and most developed form of enquiry and to separate realisation from enquiry is to posit something that is not mind. Mind is in all stages an event of a regular history.

Enquiry is based on the recognition of this fact.

Madhva further explained that in every case of enquiry the emphasis is on enquiry but not on that which is supposed to have been established by enquiry. The method is more important than the result. Emphasis on result causes prejudice. But emphasis on method keeps the mind open growing in strength. Endless enquiry speaks for the limitless character of the subject-matter. Enquiry creates levels of understanding till it is able to envisage the complete, the perfect, the most objective and the most attainable. To deny any one of these epithets is to deny the whole. For each is implied in the other. Veda calls this whole Brahman and asks one to enquire into It. (tadvijijnāsasva tad-brahma). As it is only Veda that presents It, to enquire into It is to enquire into Veda and into the meaning of Veda to understand It, Brahman, the Reality behind all, being the one and only explanation of all. In order to be confined to Veda this enquiry is necessarily inclusive of the whole field of experience with all the branches of its learning which are but the constructions of perception and inference. For unless the limits of perception and inference are shown the indispensability of Veda cannot be understood. A note on all these ideas illustrates how the title Brahma-Mīmāmsā cannot be applied to any system of thought which does not fully justify them. A system of thought may be called Vedanta in some sense, but it may not be Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Vedānta is necessarily Brahma-Mīmāmsā, Otherwise it is only so called.

The enquiry of this specific disposition has its roots in a mind shaped by tranquillity of spirit, non-attachment, non-hatred and freedom from fear and by devotion to the Truth which is the very highest, being equalless and superiorless, all-inclusive, all-transcendent and all-absolute, standing in the same circumstance the test of ever-growing and endless enquiry. These virtues are rather the basic form of

enquiry. Without these virtues enquiry is inconceivable. These virtues in an increasingly more explicit form are as well the effects of enquiry in all their stages of development. So enquiry is the mother of all that is good removing at the same time all that is evil and bringing men, even Gods and nature together. It is enquiry that makes a man man and a God God. Enquiry makes nature friend of man. The different entities—gods, nature and man are the different expressions of the same enquiry. Enquiry is then the unifying force of all as the Brahma-Sūtras show in later sections. Enquiry is therefore virtue of virtues for Madhvācārya. Madhvācārya shows with illustrations that virtues are irrelevant to a mind bereft of enquiry at least in its rudimentary form. For him true education is that which kindles the spirit of enquiry.

Born in 1118 A.D., (near Udupi, West Coast, S. India), Madhvācārya is the last of Vedānta Philosophers. Being the last he had the privilege of studying the whole history of Philosophy that preceded him. He discarded the fallacious positions in it. He concentrated on its excellence and contributed his own to make that excellence enduring and perfect. The Philosophy he gave to the world is thus purely constructive and all-inclusive. He carried through the work undertaken by his predecessors and left imperfect by them and brought it to perfection. He is thus the friend of friends of his predecessors who were after Truth. Similarly with perfect catholicity he recognised the possible merits of all rival theories and organised them into a whole in his Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

In recognition of these facts in my work "The Dvaita Philosophy and Its place in the Vedānta" published by the University of Mysore 1941, I made the statement in conclusion—"After a careful study of the three systems of Vedānta in their historical order one may naturally come to the conclusion that the philosophical reflection in India has reached its culmination in Dvaita Vedānta". The same Brahma-Mīmāmsā is nowadays somehow known as Dvaita-Vedānta.

With a view to studying this thought—Madhvācārya's Brahma-Mīmāmsā further and thereby seeing the unity of purpose consciously or unconsciously governing the whole

formation of Indian thought with all its disunity which is only apparent, I have undertaken to cover the subject in about fifty volumes of the type, both in form and in matter, of the present volume which is the first of its series.

This volume is distinguished as Jijñāsādhikaraņa because it is on the first section (adhikaraņa) of the Brahma-Sūtras

which goes by the same name.

In this work Madhvācārya's Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya on Jijnāsādhikaraṇa with commentaries is presented and translated and the thought is expounded. In conclusion of this work, Madhvācārya's other works on the same section are presented with translation. In relevant contexts a comparative study also is attempted. In suitable connections the implications of the ideas presented by Madhva are worked out.

The present author is submitting this work to the world of scholars purely in the capacity of a genuine student with a

view to giving them some new food for thought.

As is already indicated Madhvācārya after careful examination holds that Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the only solace and as such the only source of peace and unity of mankind. With regard to the objects that can be experienced oneness of judgement brings men together. But with regard to things that are beyond experience such as Reality behind all, theories do not bring men together but it is enquiry that is relevant to them that brings them together. Spirit of enquiry thus ensures social unity and solidarity. Madhva therefore asks man to put an end to worldliness and engage himself in Brahma-Jijnāsā. "tadalam bahulokavicintanayā pravanam kuru mānasam īšapade". We have therefore a fresh field to understand and examine. This is the only justification for the publication of these volumes.

Enquiry in the form of Brahma-Mīmāmisā is characterised by integral thinking which is at the same time straightforward and normal and is therefore distinct from enquiry in the usual sense. Enquiry in the usual sense is much limited by the limitations of the individual in question. The state of being confined to perception and inference, the state of being governed by particular social and individual habits of thinking that is not conducive to enquiry, the state of lacking fittedness and mental disposition conducive to the virtues—tranquillity

of mind and so on, the state of falling short of the approach to the very highest Truth, absence of study, failure to obtain proper teacher and proper environment, inability to overcome the evil influence of predispositions and personal idiosyncrasies and break of study are the main items of limitations. To have Brahma-Mīmāmsā against these limitations speaks for personality which in its turn promises the construction of an ideal society in which people are related to one another as the teacher and the taught. According to Madhva the ideal society is that in which the learned teach and the non-learned hear irrespective of age and circumstance and the subject-matter of teaching in all cases being Brahma-Mīmāmsā in its application to all aspects of life. For without this Science correct knowledge is impossible and correct knowledge is the only wealth that men can safely depend upon.

It may be noted that a critical appreciation of the foregoing ideas helps the study of this work which is virtually the study of the Mind of the minds i.e., Vedavyāsa who brought Veda to light and to make it intelligible composed *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*, the origin and goal of universal culture.

The spirit behind the work of this kind is expressed by Jayatīrtha at the close of his Nyāya-Sudhā, a commentary on Anu-Vyākhyāna. He says:

na vaiduşya-bhrāntyā na ca vacana-cāturya-kudhiyā na mohāveśāt na ca capalatā-doşa-vasataḥ param śraddhā-jāḍyāt akṛṣi kṛtim ācārya-vacasi skhalannapyetasmāt na hi nindyosmi viduṣām.

In the light of Madhva tradition as exhibited by Jayatīrtha himself the translation of this passage is the following—

(Not by the pride of learning; not also by the evil mind that there is cleverness of speech, also not by being overcome by jealousy and not by the defect of momentary likes and dislikes; but owing to my profound love for the Teacher's (Madhvācārya's) statement i.e., Anu-Vyākhyāna, because it is as a rule the expression of reason, I have composed this work. Though I may be misunderstood by the uninformed I will surely be appreciated by those that are competent to follow my work.)

Jayatīrtha thus expresses that his composition is the work of joy (Ananda) of Reason.

I may remember a circumstance early in my life that has been partly responsible for my will to translate and expound Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In 1928 when Dr. Rudolf Otto, Marburg University, Germany stayed in Mysore for a few days, I had the rare privilege of constantly being in his company and discussing vital philosophical problems mostly comparative in character.

In connection with a discussion leading to the concept of the means for the lasting happiness of mankind the soundness of the position taken by *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*, put forward by me was much appreciated by him. He exclaimed:

"You (Indians) have treasures of thought in your sacred works. I must frankly admit that we, the Westerners are quite unable to follow them. What little we have done so far shows the shallowness of our knowledge. You do a great good to the world if you translate your works and make the thought available to others. Even an imperfect translation, if it is philosophical enough will be of great use etc., etc."

Indispensability of the Texts in the exposition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā

I may add that to present the position of Brahma-Mīmāmsā in one's own words independently of the text under which the position in question occurs is not to do justice to Brahma-Mīmāmsā, as in the course of understanding the position much of common sense becomes mixed and in this circumstance one loses the real significance of the original language in which the position is expounded. Therefore it is always profitable to study the position in the presence of the texts by which it is originally expounded.

Vākyārtha is the soul of Brahma-Mīmāmsā

So in *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* a position as a rule emerges as *Vākyārtha*, the meaning of the original text but not as a mere product of thought. With regard to this subject the mere product of thought independently of text does not transcend

the level of imagination. However able a man be, his thought is necessarily tainted by his subjective limitations. His mind becomes completely replaced by the mind characterised by enquiry through a legitimate study of the text of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Therefore interpretation of text (Vākyārtha) is indispensable in the course of the study. It makes man purely objective. Therefore Vākyārtha is the soul of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, because it is the philosophy of Veda.

Enquiry and Common Man

It is said that to enquire into God is difficult for a common man, but it is easy for him to believe in It (God): This is an incorrect observation. No man is ever led by faith, though he may delude himself and others by the idea that he is led by faith, so long as men respect a man of faith i.e., believer. Let a person see within himself. What he does is prompted by enquiry i.e., discrimination and reason on the basis available. But at the same time owing to habit he may think that he is prompted by faith. He may believe in a God as master. But in his action, he is the master of himself. Reason that is his own rules his action. This reason is always in the form 'I do this, because I like it'. A note on this fact reveals that enquiry is the common characteristic of man and faith is superimposed on him. Brahma-Mīmāmsā asks him to develop the spirit of enquiry in all aspects of life and be responsible for a new order of life in which the real is that which stands enquiry in its fullness. In this order of life virtue is that which is necessarily conducive to enquiry culminating in Brahma-Mimāmsā.

Philosophy and Brahma-Mīmāmsā

A note on the difference between philosophy in the Western sense and Brahma-Mīmāmsā which is so far introduced and which is the subject-matter of the present volume is a necessity. Philosophy as it is commonly known does not tolerate any source of knowledge definitely other than immediate apprehension and inference along with what is at times distinguished by words such as intuition, idea and Reason. But Brahma-Mīmāmsā subordinates immediate apprehension

and inference etc., to Veda and makes enquiry into the meaning of Veda, the chief source of the knowledge of Reality.

Brahma-Mīmāmsā finds fault with philosophy as commonly understood for the reason that it attempts to consider the nonempirical objects such as the right, the wrong, soul and God by the sources of knowledge which may finally be reduced to immediate apprehension and inference. This philosophy does not trouble itself to understand how it first comes to have vague ideas of 'the right' and so on. Simply it assumes things in some sense and the philosopher concerned tries to justify the sense in which he takes them to start with. So practically the position he expounds is the very starting idea of his discussion by means of his own reasons which may after all prove the contrary. Brahma-Sūtras reject a position like this as "kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā" or "tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt" showing that empirical reasoning is not decisive. So philosophy in the popular sense is after all based in essence on assumption at some stage or other. If this defect is removed then its claims in the scheme of education are very significant specially in these days of Science when philosophy in a healthy form ought to be a compulsory subject as it underlies all scientific thinking. Philosophy as Brahma-Mīmāmsā is free from all assumption as it will be made clear in the course of its development and it gives a new vigour and life to Science as such because in this case Science comes to have the Ultimate

It is generally said that to bring in Veda in philosophy is to uphold theology. If this were true, then there would be no philosophy at all. Thales, the first philosopher of the West did make use of the words, water, cause, 'water is the cause' and so on heard from others with the ideas behind these words. Further the philosophy of Veda is philosophy but not theology. Further Brahma-Mīmāmsā enquires into Veda not in the capacity of its being a case of verbal testimony but in the capacity of its being the language of reason. It may also be noted that it recognises perception and inference backed up by philosophy (śāstrārtha-yukta).

Brahma-Mīmāmsā has its origin in the very source of the knowledge of 'the right' and so on. This source is Veda and the thorough enquiry into it is Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Hence it

has all the virtues that a sound philosophy is expected to have, leaving out at the same time the defects that philosophies in the usual sense actually suffer from. Brahma-Mīmāmsā is in this sense shown to be the origin, maintenance and goal of all branches of learning. Madhva insists that the rulers of countries who are interested in promoting enlightenment ought to give free scope to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It is only then they save the country from the tyranny of blind faith.

If the truth of the foregoing ideas that characterise Brahma-Mīmāmsā is made intelligible by my humble attempt in the form of this work to the reader I deem it that my attempt has been more than amply paid.

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude and highest respects to my most revered Guru, Mahā-Vidvān,

HOLAVANAHALLI SESHACHARYA

Pauranika-Ratnam, Palace Dharmadhikari, Mysore, at whose feet I learnt *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* prior to my English education and to my most revered professors,

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan M. Prof. A. R. Wadia Prof. M. Hirianna

who not only taught me philosophy and made the field of my study extensive but also gave a shape to my critical outlook.

With feelings of deep gratitude I thank most respectfully Dr. B. L. Manjunath, M.A., Ph.D., [the then (1953) Vice-chancellor, Mysore University] without whose encouragement this book would not have come into existence in the present form and to professor T. Burrow, Boden professor of Sanskrit, Oxford University who has honoured this work with his Introductory note and the authorities of Mysore University who have contributed to the success of this publication.

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Mysore Śobhanakṛt Caitra Śuddha Tṛtīyā 28-3-63 H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR

SUGGESTIONS TO THE READER

AUTHOR'S PRINTER

In this work Sūtra is in big block letters in Italics, Bhāṣya of Madhvācārya is in block letters and the other Sanskrit passages are in usual Italics. The translation of Sanskrit passages is in parenthesis as-(...). The extra idea in the course of translation which is given to complete the sense is within brackets as [...]. With reference to the translation of Tatparya-Candrika presented as T.C., in the middle of a statement or between two sentences, passages from a work called Prakāśa are quoted and translated in separate paragraphs within brackets. The Sanskrit passage that comes within brackets is translated in parenthesis. Next after the close of the brackets, the translation of T.C., continues. Sometimes this translation may be followed by the matter between brackets and next the translation continues. The concepts Vișnu, Nārāyaṇa etc., are in Italics to indicate that they are purely philosophical. With regard to anusvara the diacritic mark is made either as m or as n. The reader is requested to make this discrimination in the course of his study. The rest of the matter with no brackets consists of comments of the author. In translation complex Sanskrit sentences are broken into simple sentences. Throughout attempts are made to make the ideas presented by Sanskrit passages intelligible to the reader who has some philosophical background. (1) ... fine ... fine ... (1) ... fine ... (1) ... Missing ... (1) ... University without whose encouragement

his book rould not have come into existence in the present form and to protessor T, harrow, Boden professor of Smearch Orderd University who has honorised this were with his Introductory note and the authorities of Nivere University who have con ributed to the success of this publication.

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Wesley Press, Mysore who took a deb prins to the printing or

Mysore Harante Schaner H. N. Rachavenderen Sching String and String Stri

ABBREVIATIONS

Anu-Vyā. = Anu-Vyākhyāna

Bṛ-Up. = Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

 $Bh.D. = Bh\bar{a}va-D\bar{\imath}pa$

Bh.T. = Bhāgavata-Tātparya

Bhā. Tan = Bhāgavata-Tantra

Br.Sū.Bh. = Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya

D.Ph. = The Dvaita philosophy and Its place in the Vedanta

M.Bh. = Māndūkya-Bhāṣya

 $N.S. = Ny\bar{a}ya-Sudh\bar{a}$

Ny.Amṛ = Nyāyāmṛta

Ny.V. = Nyāya-Vivaraṇa

T.C. = Tātparya-Candrikā

T.Pr. = Tattva-Prakāśikā

ARRESTVATORIS

Ann Fyn. = Ann Folt vâna

Bi-Uo = Bita an anyatoraniyed

Bi-II = Bită anta-Titanya

Shâ. The = Phile analo-Rein-Didge

Bi-Sh Bi-Erabend-Rein-Didge

O Pa. = The Draw o moophy and Irs place in the Addita

W.Eh. = Mandilsya-Bidsya

N.S. = Araya-Sidia

N.S. = Araya-Candun

T.C. = Taraya-Candun

T.C. = Taraya-Candun

T.D. = Taraya-Candun

CORRIGENDA

Page	Line	For	Read '
49	5	said	says
,,	36	yajūmisi	yajūmsi
54	26	twenty	twelve
57	8	said	says
58	31	"	"
59	32	"	,,
60	29	,,	"
62	2	,, ,, ,, ,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
93	17	interpreted	interprets
95	13	stated	states
96	28	interpreted	interprets
99	12	stated	states
"	27	said	says
100	2	said	"
101	10	explained	explains
121	24	transcient	transient
149	18	in	is
180	36	tathāpare	tathāparā
184	20	siddeḥ	siddheḥ
216	23	is understood	the meaning is under- stood
232	39	acetana ·	is acetana
248	34	kaṭhaka	kāṭhaka
259	24	sakṣai	sākṣāt
289	. 36	NIRŅAYAḤ." stating	nırnayaң" stating
293	12	Brahman.	Brahman,
305	7	etene	etena
394	13	T.Pr.,	T.C.,
418	13	Vișnu Name	Vișņu, name
425	7	naval	navel

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AUM TAT SAT

BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ IIINĀSĀDHIKARAŅA

CHAPTER I

THE PLACE OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ IN INDIAN THOUGHT

]

VEDA AND VEDĀNTA

Indian philosophy is considered to be the most ancient by historians. Its origin is Veda and it finds its culmination in the Vedanta. Veda is the name given to a literature in Sanskrit and it is considered to be the most sacred literature of the Aryas. In course of time, several views about this literature have been developed. Some Indian thinkers attribute a superhuman origin to it. Many hold that it is authorless in the sense of being beginningless and endless. Some others think that it contains faiths and beliefs of some primitive people. Modern scholars1 think that it is useful in so far as it presents the ideas and practices of the ancient Āryas which form the very origin of the varied phases of Indian civilization. The term Vedanta according to Indian tradition means: (1) The Upanisads, a part of the Vedic literature; (2) The Brahma Sūtras which are also called Brahma Mīmāmsā and (3) The schools of thought that appeared by way of interpreting the Brahma Sūtras. But modern writers somehow confine the term to Advaita Vedanta.

Regarding the relation of Veda and Vedānta in the sense of Brahma Mīmāmsā, there is a difference between the Indian outlook and modern ideas. The Indian outlook moulded by the Vedic tradition sees no opposition between Veda and Vedānta, the former being related to the latter

¹ Modern Scholars are those scholars whose scholarship is the product of Modern European Civilization.

as one that is explained to the one that is its explanation. But many modern scholars feel that the Vedānta interpretations of the Vedic statements are often exegetical and hold that the Vedānta systems contain much that is not Vedic in the strict sense of the term. They also think that there is no unity of thought even in Veda. They support their thought by particular passages of Veda the apparent meaning of which has led even some Indian thinkers to hold anti-Vedic thoughts. This is how the systems, Nyāya, Vaišeṣika, etc., have appeared. A modern student of Indian philosophy being encouraged by this circumstance sees no unity of sense or purpose in the growth of Indian philosophical systems.

There are thus on the whole two views with regard to Veda, Vedānta and their unity. One view holds that there is perfect unity of sense and purpose, ekavākyatā throughout Veda and the Vedānta. This is the position expressed in the Munḍaka Upaniṣad "Brahma vidyām sarvavidyā-pratiṣthām" (the science of Brahman which is the origin, support and goal of all sciences). Those that hold this view understand by Brahma Vidyā, Brahma Mīmāmsā. The other view is put forward by modern scholars. They hold that the growth of Indian philosophy consists of several stages each of which is diametrically opposed to the others. In holding this view they are supported by those Indian thinkers that rejected Veda wholly or partly in the interest of propounding their own systems of thought.

The former of these two views, viz. the view that there is perfect unity of sense and purpose throughout Veda and Vedānta, is the basis of Brahma Mīmāmsā. Unless we consciously realize the significance of this truth in its distinction from the other view, it is impossible to comprehend the teaching of Brahma Mīmāmsā. Therefore a brief note on how the supporter of the latter view arranges the different stages of

Indian philosophic thought may not be out of place.

THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AS A MODERN STUDENT SEES IT

According to modern view, Vedic literature is not composed in a single period of time. The difference in its age, subject-matter and language implies that it is the composition of several periods of time. Of this literature the hymns of the Rgveda are the most ancient; of these, the earliest composition takes us back to several thousands of years B.C. These hymns are as famous for their poetry and religion as they are for the elements of philosophy they contain. Their poetry formed the basis of Indian mythology; their religion consisted in personifying and worshipping the various natural phenomena and in the long run, their religion developed into Vedic ritualism. Some elements of Vedic philosophy are implicit in their poetry and religion while some are explicit. These elements formed the basis of all philosophy that followed this period. The same philosophic outlook is to be observed in the other branches of Veda till the appearance of the Upanisads, logically the last phase of the Vedic literature.

There are more than 200 Upanisads. But only the earliest of them, about a dozen in number, are philosophically important. They concentrate their attention on the philosophy of the Rgveda. In doing so, they denounce the Vedic ritualism, even using strong expressions such as Istāpūrtam manyamānā varistam nānyacchreyo samvidante pramūdhāh (Those people who think that worship, charity etc., are the best, are in deep delusion and they never understand the real nature of Reality)-Kāṭaka. Circumstances of this kind have given rise to various theories about the Vadic literature. They seek to show internal discrepancy in Veda itself. On the strength of this circumstance, particular Vedic statements are emphasized as against others in the philosophy of Nyāya, Vaisesika, Sānkhya, etc. The Pūrva-mīmāmsā gave an undue prominence to that portion of Veda that is supposed to teach karma, sacrifice and so on. Sankara practically dismissed the karma portion of Veda and saw an irreconcilable difference between the statements that teach the all-inclusive (Saguna) nature of Brahman and the statements that have in view the all-exclusive (nirguṇa) nature of Brahman and he called the latter statements mahāvākyas (great sayings). Rāmānuja saw a clear distinction between the portion of Veda which he called Karma Kānḍa and the portion of Veda which he called Jūāna Kānḍa and somehow reconciled the two.

Quite against the spirit of the Vedic teaching but on the supposed basis of the same, the *Purāṇas* developed weak theories of Reality together with self-contradictory ideas of morality. One can easily see that any idea of truth or any act in life can equally be justified with the help of the Purāṇic statements.

Next appeared the philosophical systems with the advent of Nāstika thought. A Nāstika thought is that which denies the validity of all that is taught by Veda. Three schools, Cārvāka, Bauddha and Jaina, advocated the Nāstika positions. Cārvāka stressed the material world and made all that is spiritual impossible. Bauddha denied all that is supposed to have an enduring value and emphasized complete detachment as the best way to escape from the life of misery. Jaina made anything absolute impossible in the interest of showing the relative character of everything, with a view to helping an altruistic world-outlook.

The six systems of Indian philosophy succeeded the Nāstika thoughts. The first five systems were much influenced by the apparent meaning of particular statements of Veda and consistently with their starting point, they developed their own views of Reality. Of these Nyāya of Gautama and Vaisesika of Kaṇāda emphasized the enduring nature (nityatva) of some elements of the world independent of any basic principle. Sānkhya of Kapila made Prakrti, a non-spiritual entity, the active source of all and Purusa, the so-called spiritual entity, completely passive, so that it had no effective function. On the same metaphysical basis, Yoga of Patanjali developed a course of discipline which minimized the importance of knowledge and emphasized in its stead meditation and so on. Next appeared Pūrva Mīmāmsā of Jaimini. It asserted the absolutely eternal character of certain elements of the world and held that Karma, a supernatural entity is the operating principle of all.

Seeing that all these ideas made the Vedic or the Upanisadic doctrine of the Ultimate Reality impossible, Bādarāyaṇa propounded the doctrine of the Ultimate Reality, naming it Brahman or Ātman after the Upanisads. He systematized the whole Vedic teaching so as to show that Brahman and Brahman alone is the complete source of all that exists. His system was called Brahma Mīmāmsā or Uttara Mīmāmsā.

These six systems went on operating on the minds of thinkers as and when there appeared fresh support among the rival schools. Commentaries and commentaries on commentaries appeared but the system of Badarayana became the most outstanding. Yet it was not defectless. It gave a theistic 1 touch to the absolutism of the Upanisads. The Vedanta thinkers that preceded Sankara, the expounder of Advaita Vedanta, did not do full justice to the Upanișadic philosophy. Sankara by way of interpreting the Brahma Sūtras overcame their defects. He established pure philosophy of the classical Upanișads as Vedānta, also called Advaita Vedānta. After Sankara, there appeared some Vedanta teachers like Rāmānuja and Madhva. Their outlook was more of religious character; they could not comprehend the high philosophy of Sankara. They imagined some god, who, they believed, could satisfy their religious needs and they became the leaders of 'men of common-sense'. They revived the theistic ideas which Sankara had already rejected. Therefore they do not deserve serious attention of a philosopher.

This is, so far, a brief account of the ideas that generally seem to work in the minds of modern students of Indian philosophy.

III

THE NATURE OF INDIAN THOUGHT FROM THE VEDIC STANDPOINT

A careful study of the post-Sankara development of Vedānta thought, especially at the hands of Madhva, reveals entirely different truths about Veda and Vedānta. Madhva notes that the exponents of the non-Vedānta systems together with the Vedānta thinkers that preceded him missed the

¹ Theism is belief in a personal God. It is a case of faith. It is therefore anti-intellectual and opposed to philosophy.

truth taught by Veda and expounded by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma Sūtras. In the light of his teaching, one is bound to observe complete oneness of the teaching of Veda and Brahma Sūtras and in this connection one does not fail to note the following points both in Advaita and in Visisṭādvaita,

which are supposed to present the Vedic truth.

Of the two Ācāryas, Sankara with all his love for Veda somehow decided to give prominence to a few Vedic statements like "That thou art" (Tattvamasi) and so on. In the light of the almost verbal meaning of these statements, he not only studied their implications but practically dismissed the rest of the Vedic literature as having truth only on the empirical level. Because of this circumstance the Upanisadic Brahman according to him, became Pure Being, having no attributes to make it the real basis of all that exists. Because he assumed the truth of this position, he had to account for the origin of the world having recourse to some unknown principle. He called this principle māyā or avidyā. At this stage he felt the necessity for overcoming the dualism of Brahman and māyā, giving at the same time prominence to Brahman. To meet this demand he postulated the doctrine of adhyāsa or āropa and held that māyā which is the stuff of the world of subjective and objective series of things is superimposed on Brahman, not from the standpoint of Brahman but from that of the individual self. He invented technical terms to indicate the relative importance of these two conceptions, Brahman and māyā. He called that which is superimposed non-real, mithyā and that which forms the basis (adhisthana) of superimposition real, satya.

In the language of the later Vedānta thinkers of the rival schools, this system is called Māyā Vāda. This name indicates that after all, Sankara, having conceived Brahman as attributeless, made it a non-entity and in spite of his saying that māyā was mithyā, he made māyā the real source of the world. The later thinkers saw that his position was in direct opposition to the Upaniṣadic teaching that the real source of all is Brahman. In seeking to overcome the dualism between Brahman and Māyā Sankara has attempted to show that distinction (bheda) as such is superimposed. But dualism still persisted. Yet he calls his position Advaita Vidyā or Advaita Vāda. Against this position his opponents sometimes call their own

position Dvaita Vāda. Thus these two technical words have only a polimic importance and they must not be taken to be identical with the Vedic terms, Advaita and Dvaita, occurring in such passages as Advaitah sarva-bhāvānām, Sāntam sivamadvaitam, etc.

Modern writers on these points somehow call Sankara's system Advaita Vedanta. Even students of philophy identify without hesitation advaita in this usage with the Upanisadic term advaita. They jump to the conclusion that Sankara is the only Indian thinker who represents the true spirit of the Upanisadic teaching. They hold that his opponents in criticizing him, go against the very spirit of the Upanisads even accepting dvaita as true, though it is condemned in the Upanisads in an explicit manner. This prejudice on the part of most of the modern students of Indian philosophy has narrowed their philosophic vision and made them consciously or unconsciously ignore the really philosophical insight of those that have clearly brought the defects of Sankara's system to light. The Vedic term advaita even like Brahman cannot be exclusively employed by any particular philosopher unless he fully justifies its significance.

Next appeared Rāmānuja. The tendency of his thought was diametrically opposed to Sankara's thought. He perceived great truth in those Upanișadic expressions such as Antaryāmi Brāhmana of the Brhadāranyaka which, he felt, taught the organic relation of Brahman and the world of cit and acit (spirit and matter) and he interpreted the rest of the Veda consistently with this idea. In spite of this relation, he attempted to give prominence to Brahman to gain consistency with the spirit of the Upanisadic teaching. He considered Brahman to be Sarīrin (embodied) and the world Sarīra (embodiment). He emphasized this relationship so much that he could not concentrate purely upon Brahman as the only ground of all, as the Upanisads taught. Nor could he disregard this truth altogether. He developed different viewpoints. He spoke of Brahman as the most supreme and in the same breath he insisted on the nature of Brahman as visista (qualified), as cidacidvisista (qualified by spirit and matter). This circumstance made him consider Brahman in two forms, in the cause-form and in the effect-form. In the cause-form, Brahman was considered to be Sūkṣma cidacid viśiṣta and in the effect-form sthūla cidacid viśiṣta. But to consider Brahman in this fashion forced him to attribute change to Brahman from cause-form (sūkṣma) to effect-form (sthūla). To attribute change to Brahman was sublated by the Upaniṣadic teaching that Brahman is nirvikāra (changeless). To remove this difficulty he asserted that Brahman even as viśiṣta was advaita (identical). But he did not somehow perceive that these two ideas contradicted each other: if Brahman is qualified differently, then it cannot be identical completely and if it is completely identical, then it cannot be necessarily qualified. Rāmānuja's conception of organic relation of Brahman and the world therefore ended in contradictions.

IV

THE VEDIC VIEW POINT IS INDISPENSABLE

Thus the several stages of Indian philosophical thought appeared as though each was completely independent of the others; every stage apparently made the others impossible. Though Sankara and Rāmānuja propounded their systems of thought, even according to their own statements, only by way of expounding what Bādarāyaṇa had already taught in his Brahmasūtras, their positions were not in fact consistent with Bādarāyaṇa's exposition. They modified his teaching a good deal and even sought to supplement it in many places.

A reference to Sankara's Adhyāsa Bhāsya and Rāmānuja's interpretation of Prakrtyadhikarana amply illustrates this point. In his Adhyāsa Bhāsya, opening section of his commentary Sankara prepares the ground for his Māyāvāda which is totally foreign to Bādarāyaṇa's position. This point is proved by the very fact that adhyāsa needed a separate exposition. To illustrate this point further we may take into consideration the very first Sūtra, 'Athāto Brahmajijīāsā', which ordains enquiry into the nature of Brahman. Brahman in this passage, it may be noted, is not some God or the Absolute conceived independently of Śruti i.e. Veda but it is Brahman as taught by Śruti (Śrutyukta Brahma).¹ Brahman as taught by Śruti is definitely the Ultimate Ground of

¹ The significance of this position will be made clear in the following exposition.

all reality as defined by the Taittiriya Upanişad, "Yatovā imāni bhūtāni jāyante . . . tat Brahma." If this is the position of first Sūtra, it naturally follows that Adhyāsa Bhāṣya, which speaks of superimposition of māyā, the supposed ground of all, on Brahman, is out of place in the scheme of Brahma Mīmāmsā.1 Similarly, while Sruti definitely holds that Brahman is the only ground of all that exists in different forms as cause, effect, etc., and Bādarāyaṇa supports the truth of this position in the second Sūtra, 'Janmādyasya yatah', Rāmānuja in Prakṛtyadhiharaṇa, a section in his commentary comes to the final conclusion that the ground of all consists of three elements, Brahman as Sarīri, subtle cit and acit as Sarīra.2 The reason for going against or modifying the teaching of Badarāyaṇa by these two thinkers seems to be some definite outlook they privately adopted. But their outlook is finally opposed to the very spirit of the genuine Vedic thinking. The several implications of this observation viz., how a position that is different from the Vedic position is necessarily opposed to it and is therefore sublated by it and how to have been sublated by Sruti is a serious defect which makes philosophy or Brahma Jijnasa impossible, will be amply illustrated in the course of this work.

The recognition of complete harmony between Veda and the Brahma Sūtras therefore characterizes the genuine Vedic

² Jayatīrtha discusses this point in his Nyāya Sudhā, 'Prakrtiśce-tyadhikaranam Brahmano jagadupādānatā pratipādanārtham iti vyācakṣate. . . Tadetannirākaroti.'

(That the Adhikaraṇa beginning with the word prakṛtiśca intends to establish that Brahman is the material cause of the world is what some others assert Madhva shows that Sutrakāra refutes it.)

¹ Jayatīrtha elaborately discusses this point in his Nyāya Sudhā as Māyāvādināhi . . . Bandhasya . . . mithyātvam svabhāṣyādau varnitam. Tadanupapannam. Bandha mithyātvasya asūtritatvāt. Asūtritārtha varnaneca bhāṣya lakṣaṇābhāvena abhāṣyatva prasangāt . . . Adhyāsa varnanasya kā sangatih. Ajñānasya mithyātvam tu kaphonigudāyitam. Nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt. (By Māyāvādin, as it is well-known, the unreality of empirical life is assumed in his Bhāṣya and so on. His position does not hold good. For the unreality of empirical life is not the position of Sūtra. If a position that is not proved by Sūtra is assumed, then Bhāṣya ought to lose its significance and thus cease to be Bhāṣya . . . What is the occasion for assuming superimposition? To speak of the unreality of empirical life is similar to licking jaggery placed on the tip of one's own elbow. The unreality of empirical life is in fact refuted by Sūtra.)

outlook. This is in a sense supported by Sankara and Rāmānuja also. For if they were consciously opposed to it, then they could not have thought of expounding the Vedic truth by way of interpreting the Brahma Sūtras. It may however be noted that without the proper appreciation of the oneness of the Vedas and the Brahma Sūtras one is bound to fail to comprehend the real greatness of Indian thought. It is for the failure of this appreciation, it is submitted, the real position of Indian philosophical thought seems to transcend all that is familiar to modern writers, Indian or foreign. The indispensibility of this appreciation is revealed by the general disposition of Indian thought as such. To illustrate it the following circumstances may be taken into consideration:

1. The Vedic passages emphasize the idea that the knowledge of Brahman is obtained only through Veda: Nāvedavinmanutedam brhantam (One who does not know Veda can never comprehend Brahman which is complete); Nityayā... staumi Brahma tatparamam padam (By means of this eternal speech, i.e., Veda, I praise Brahman, the Ultimate Reality); Vedāhyaivainam vedayantı (Only the Vedas give us the knowledge of this Truth, ie., Brahman); Teṣām duhkha prahāṇāya śrutireṣā pravartate (The Veda has appeared to remove the misery of those that are after the knowledge of Brahman); Vijñeyam Paramam Brahma jūāpikā paramā Śrutih (That which is really known is Brahman and that which causes this knowledge is Śruti), etc.

2. The Upanisads support the Vedic position: Sarve

Vedāh yat padamāmananti (All the Vedas teach that Truth, viz., Brahman).

3. The Bhagavadgītā adopts same view: Vedānta kṛt Vedavidevacāham (I am the author of the Vedānta and I alone know what Veda teaches); Tasmāt śāstram pramāṇamte kāryākārya vyavasthitau (Therefore the only source of knowledge is Śāstra, i.e., Veda, in order to discriminate between the right and the wrong). The Purāṇas also point out the same truth: Vedah kṛtsno adhignatavyah sarahasyo dvijanmanā (The whole Veda must be studied by one who is qualified to know Brahman), etc.

4. The Brahma Sūtras establish the same position: The

first Sūtra, Athāto Brahmajijñāsā, ordains enquiry into Veda if the knowledge of Brahman is to be obtained. Another Sūtra, Sāstrayonitvāt, explains how Sāstra, i.e., Veda, is the source of the knowledge of Brahman. Yet another Sūtra, Kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā, shows how every other source of knowledge according to usage is incapable of producing the knowledge of Brahman.

5. The attitude of the Nāstika thinkers was directed only to condemn the Vedic literature as such. It did not even make room for recognizing any element of truth in Veda; at the same time, it failed to see self-contradiction in its own attiude, first in condemning but restating the truths that Veda had already stated and next, in elevating the sayings of particular leaders to the level of the highest authority and blindly drawing every important conclusion from those sayings.

6. The Astika thinkers on their part had the earnest desire for establishing the validity of the Vedas as against the Nāstika position. They did not hesitate in the course of this attempt even to dismiss God and abandon the comforts of the world for establishing the necessity of the life of Vairāgya (detachment), as a preliminary step towards realizing the truth of Veda as they understood it. The truth of this observation is amply illustrated by the mighty analysis of experience used in Pūrva Mīmāmsā to prove the infallibility and eternality of Veda.

7. The keen analysis of the sources of knowledge by the Vedānta thinkers pointed out the futility of all empirical knowledge and established the position that the Vedas alone could give us the knowledge of Brahman. It is really the fulfilment of this demand that justifies the existence of a Vedānta thought.

8. The general disposition of the Indian outlook is never adverse to the Vedic ideas. It may be observed in this connection that generally an Indian who goes by the name phiosopher in the modern sense somehow leads inevitably a double life. He may have the appearance of such a philosopher in outward behaviour but he exhibits in his private life a profound respect to Veda and its injunctions, as for example in the celebrations of Vedic ceremonies of various descriptions. Even a person who does not seem to care for these ideas

repents for his actions at least at some stage of his life or other. The truth of this observation may easily be granted by anyone who knows the real Indian conditions of life.

V

VEDA IS PHILOSOPHY IN HIGHEST FORM

These circumstances, however, reveal the profound impression that Vedic literature has made on the general Indian mind. But the particular tendencies created by modern ways of thinking make a ready recognition of this fact impossible. Veda is generally taken to correspond to what is called 'authority', a term employed in European thought to signify implicit faith or belief. Consequently, all philosophy that appears to make use of Vedic ideas is condemned as theology and the possibility of philosophy being influenced by religion, which has been often true in western philosophy, is indiscriminately attributed to Indian philosophy. A student of philosophy who shows signs of respecting Veda is laughed at. Even among the Darsana thinkers, a philosopher is condemned as a religious leader for his more constant reference to Vedic thinking. All this would be valid if in Indian philosophy Veda had operated on the minds of thinkers as authority. The ideas applicable to authority are not applicable to Veda. Authority is anti-intellectual. If intellect asks us to enquire, authority asks us to believe. Veda is accepted not as authority but as pramāņa. Pramāņa is the source of correct knowledge and correct knowledge is that which is fully faithful to its object. It is for this reason that it is not sublated by any other piece of knowledge. This fact brings out the truth that pramana is an item of a system which is fully coherent with reference both to the elements within itself and to the elements that may be supposed to be outside. But an idea obtained by an authority is an element that disturbs the system, for it forms a foreign element in the system and is therefore never coherent with the other elements in the same. Thus authority is opposed to pramāṇa. If an idea supposed to have been given by an authority is known to be coherent, then it is a mistake to think that it is caused by an authority, because it is only a pramāņa that can cause a

coherent idea. Postponing a more detailed discussion of these truths for the present, it may be noted that the writings of some modern scholars about Veda cause more confusion than knowledge. To avoid this confusion a clear distinction must be made between Veda as pramāṇa and Veda as authority. While the Indian philosophical systems consider one of the correctly-recognized pramāṇas as Veda, most modern writers find fault with those systems, holding that they are after all guided by authority i.e. Veda. It must be noted that as Veda, Veda is not pramāṇa, but as pramāṇa it is Veda. Attempts have been made to substantiate this position in the following pages.

The question may arise: what happens if the discussion of these ideas is left out, either because philosophy does not tolerate anything as authority or because there are reasons to believe that the occidentalists do not respect one who thinks of Veda in discussing philosophy? In forming an answer we must note the following: supposing the Indian position is correct, a failure to recognize a pramāṇa as Veda makes philosophy incomplete. An incomplete philosophy is no philosophy, because it does not contribute towards spiritual integrity. Spiritual integrity is the necessary pre-supposition of the progress of philosophy. Progress is the characteristic

feature of philosophical thinking.

It is possible to mistake the very statement of these facts for an attempt to introduce medieval ideas into modern philosophy; but one must note the real position of Indian thought. Indian thinkers regard an aspect of pramāṇa as Veda. But in western medieval thought, philosophy was in some manner or other subordinated to authority. So the two positions are entirely different from each other. In the final stage, it may be possible to find out that some system or other in India has not fully worked out the truth that a pramāṇa is Veda. This only means that to that extent it is a defective philosophy. Irrespective of any modern writer taking interest in these ideas, a genuine student of Indian thought cannot ignore these facts. To have ignored them has been the cause of the failure of nāstika thought. Along with the appreciation of Veda, to have elevated the empirical Pramāṇas to the level of the pramāṇa called Veda accounts

for the final failure of the āstika systems like Nyāya. Particular Vedānta thoughts, however profound they may appear, become finally untrue to experience because of this difficulty. To present Indian thought without due recognition of these ideas is not to do justice to it. In fact, it is impossible to study Indian philosophy without due regard to these ideas. It is true that we do find profound thought in Indian philosophy even without giving any consideration to Veda. But with its consideration, we understand the real greatness of this thought. The greatness of Indian philosophy consists in its absolutely universal character and one understands this truth if one carefully studies the different Vedānta philosophies in their historical order, giving particular attention to Advatia, Viṣṭādvaita and the so-called Dvaita,¹ with a view to understanding what importance each of these schools gives to Veda as pramāṇa.

But the prevalent practice is to stop the study of Indian philosophy with Advaita and to justify this act by dismissing other Vedanta systems either as theology or as religion. The following pages show that this is to miss the very essence of Indian thought. Whatever defects or merits one may attribute to a Vedanta system according to one's interest, a student of Vedanta ought to realize that unless he has really refuted the possibility of the oneness of Veda and Brahma Mīmāmsā, he is not in a position to discard any idea presented by Brahma Mīmārisā. If this position really operates on the mind of a student, then he can never ignore any aspect or stage of the growth of Vedanta thought. A study of this growth necessarily becomes the study of Brahma Mīmāmsā. This is the study that leads to the knowledge that pramāņa in its highest aspect is called Veda. It is this knowledge that accounts for the oneness of Veda and Brahma Mīmāmsā. An appreciation of this truth removes all narrowness and sectarianism from mind. So Veda or Brahma Mīmārisā is the language of Truth, universal in character. It is for this reason the study

¹ Dvaita is qualified as 'so called' because this term does not bring out the significance of the system to which it is applied. As it becomes clear in the following pages this system is a genuine case of Monism or Absolutism. It takes its rise in order to expound Brahma Mīmāmsā and consequently becomes Brahma Mīmāmsā itself. Brahma Mīmāmsā may be taken to be equivalent to spiritualistic Monism.

of Brahma Mīmāmsā becomes indispensable in the case of every person who is endowed with seriousness of thought.

It is necessary to note at this stage that, as the following pages explain, a study of Advaita and Visistādvaita reveals the fact that in the course of their development they became more important than Brahma Sūtras. With this circumstance Brahma Mīmāmsā became practically lost. The same situation would have continued, had not Madhva, the exponent of what is usually called Dvaita Vedanta, brought to light the truth that after all it is Brahma Mīmāmsā that expounds the real Vedic philosophy. He shows that in this system of thought nothing that is truly philosophical is left out and nothing that is non-philosophical is respected. He also explains that the extent of the universality of this thought is such that no other philosophy, however nāstika it be or however wrong it may appears to be, can be independent of the truth that characterizes Brahma Mīmāmsā, i.e. it is after all a certain twisting of Brahma Mīmāmsā that gives rise tonāstika thought. Such is the outlook of Brahma Mīmāmsā called the Samanvaya outlook by Badarayana. With this outlook, Brahma Mīmāmsā happens to be the Vedānta of Vedanta and as being wholly devoted to bringing out this truth, Madhva's system comes to be not only the real guide of a student of Vedanta, but also identical with Brahma Mīmāmsā itself, as it happens to be the very language of Brahma Mīmāmsā.

Attempts are made in the following exposition to indicate briefly in the light of Madhva's teachings the philosophy of Brahma Mīmāmsā, so that this forms an introduction to a detailed study of Brahma Mīmāmsā in the originals. In the course of this exposition attempt is also made to justify all that has been noted so far as forming the background of the teaching of Brahma Mīmāmsā.

VI

MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the only aim of the exposition of what appears under the title Brahma Mīmāmsā is to indicate the truth of Brahman as it is finally suggested directly or indirectly in the long history of Indian.

philosophy, with all its aspects, without excluding even the so-called *Nāstika* thought, whose very purpose is avowedly and wholly to deny the very possibility of Brahman and thereby Brahma Mīmāmsā.

The Sanskrit term, Brahma Mīmāmisā, is composed of two words, Brahma and Mīmāmisā. Madhva, the exponent of this science takes the word Brahma to mean two ideas: (1) Veda and (2) the truth taught by Veda, this Truth being Para Brahman. Mīmāmisā means enquiry in its full sense; jijīāsā or vicāra is its Sanskrit equivalent. The compound term Brahma Mīmāmisā stands for the idea of unconditional enquiry into the real meaning of Veda which gives the knowledge of Para Brahman.

It follows that the idea for which Veda stands demands some further elucidation.¹ Generally, Veda, as already observed, is taken to mean an authority or some literature to which the name Veda is given. Sometimes its meaning is for some purpose or other extended and the term is taken to signify the highest religious authority. Even though it is said sometimes that the authority called Veda contains the highest knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean knowledge resulting from pure enquiry. What is spoken of as knowledge is some idea that is taken to be the result of some intuition or realization of an exceptionally spiritual character. But wherever there are these expressions, there is nothing to help us to understand what exactly the words 'intuition', 'realization', 'spirituality' mean. More often than not, neither the speaker nor the hearer has any idea of what the words really mean; but generally, both of them somehow think that they have understood something definite by these words. The use of such terms is so common that every person feels certain that he knows the meaning of these terms.

Further confusions are created by the development of some empirical sciences. In psychology and in some philosophical literature, 'intuition' is taken to mean a stage of immediate apprehension of perceptual character. In religious literature, 'realization' is taken to mean some power or siddhi of superhuman or supernatural character. In ethics and religion, 'spiritual' is taken to mean some sort of virtuous or

pious disposition. But a moment of reflection shows that whatever be the value of these ideas, they do not present the highest knowledge which is the outcome of pure enquiry and therefore it is futile to define the highest knowledge in terms of these ideas.

Moreover, even when there is a philosophical discussion, every member that participates in the discussion has his own meaning of these terms, which evidently is irreconcilable with the meanings of other members and this circumstance is due to the training that the members receive in different circumstances. Consequently, unnecessary observations take place in the name of discussion and finally nobody gains anything to help the highest knowledge and everyone returns with his own ideas more confirmed. Even with reference to a serious philosophical discussion, it is very difficult to say whether a person has only discovered new ways of setting forth his old ideas or he is distinctly conscious of the fresh contribution to his own mind by means of discussion. It is more often true that in the course of discussion he is finding out fresh reasons for his old thinking, even though the person who maintains an opposite position feels that he has convinced him. The necessity for recognizing the truth of this observation may not be keenly felt in the case of discussions connected with the common affairs of the world. But with reference to the discussions connected with problems particularly philosophical, we cannot disregard the influence of the psychological background (pūrva vāsanā) of the person. The difficulty connected with a philosophical discussion is this: the use of certain words would be responsible for the formation of a particular mental background at a previous period. But the same person with the same mental background would later be expected to make himself familiar with a new position with the help of the same words. This circumstance offers difficulties of its own quite unconsciously and the result is adding confusion to confusion.

It is at this stage that a student of philosophy needs to be highly self-critical. He must objectively analyse his own self, i.e., the several ideas contained in his self as forming a particular disposition. He must see the limit of each idea and its relation to other ideas and their sources and thus he

must know what exactly he is expected to know from the opportunities offered in the course of discussion. His effective participation in the discussion depends upon the degree of the conscious analysis of his own mental background.-An analysis of ideas presupposes a conscious distinction between ideas and a distinction between them presupposes a consciousness of the definiteness of each idea. This circumstance brings us to the necessity of defining each idea as it takes place. It is at this stage that one is intellectually forced to recognize the inevitable relation of an idea to a word which is supposed to present it. This is the problem of thought-language relation the recognition of which is the basis of all correct thinking. It is equally necessary at this stage to recognize the fact that our ideas are innumerable but that the language that expresses them is extremely limited; we have to control a comparatively infinite world with the most finite resources. This is naturally beset with many difficulties. It gives rise to various problems without the proper solution of which correct thinking becomes impossible.

The process that leads to correct thinking may then be briefly indicated. We must first study why or how there is an intimate relationship between sound (sabda) and an object (artha). Secondly, we must note the distinction between the sound inarticulate and the sound articulate. Thirdly, we must determine how these two form part of language. Finally, we must judge whether the language in question is really formed on the basis of correct study of the ideas so far stated. The formation of words, their combination into a sentence and the operation of the sentence on the human mind must be well conceived by us. The solution of all these demands in a satisfactory manner makes the language perfect. Madhva calls this language Saniskrta and so what we commonly know as Saniskrta is not what he calls Saniskrta. Interpreting his language from the standpoint of popular Saniskrta is one of the

reasons why his thought stands still unknown.

But in the ordinary thinking level, even the same word or xpression means one thing at one stage of our thinking and a ifferent thing at another stage and this process is constantly oing on in our thinking life. The recognition of this truth may not be very necessary in mundane matters; but even this

statement is true only in a limited sense; because are we not often introduced in legal contests to the subtle distinction between two shades of meaning of the same word being responsible for very great changes? It is however absolutely necessary to recognize fully the truth that real philosophical thinking requires a conscious recognition of every detail. It is therefore impossible to admit any limited knowledge as the highest knowledge. This brings us to the necessity of fixing the nature of the highest knowledge and with that there is the necessity of fixing the language that presents the highest knowledge. To this language Madhva gives the name Veda. According to him, to enquire into the highest truth is to enquire into the nature of the highest knowledge and this is to enquire into Veda. His position in this connection creates a special circumstance that characterizes his system. His system for this reason is as much Sabda Sāstra (The Science of Banguage) as it is Tattva Śāstra (The Science of Truth and Reality).

The meaning of Brahma Mīmāmsā must thus be understood with due respect to all these observations. Not to have done this is the cause of rejection of Madhva's position as theology or religion by certain modern scholars. The full recognition of all these ideas with its full operation as the necessary condition of the correct understanding of Brahma Mīmāmsā is by no means a novel burden imposed by Madhva. It is in fact demanded as the absolute condition by Bādarāyana himself, as he establishes that the Brahman he is enquiring is Sāstrayoni, i.e. Brahman as taught by Veda.

It is to justify this position that Madhva understands by Brahma in *Brahmajijñāsā* both Veda and its meaning Para Brahman, the highest Brahman. Jayatīrtha, the greatest exponent of Madhva's thought brings out the significance of this interpretation in *Nyāya Sudhā* as *Brahma Vedah tadarthah Parabrahma vā*. The word *vā* illustrates how close the relationship of these two meanings is. As it will be explained later on, the position that Brahma means Para Brahman emerges from the position that Brahma means Veda. So without enquiry into Veda Para Brahman, the Ground of all, can never be comprehended. It is the discussion and elucidation of this truth that forms the content of Brahma Mīmāmsā. By bringing out this truth,

the very essence of Brahma Mīmāmsā in the full sense of the term, Madhva happens to be the real exponent, Bhāṣyakāra of Brahma Mīmāmsā. For this reason he becomes the Bhāṣyakāra of the Bhāṣyakāras. As the recognition of this fact helps a correct understanding of his Bhāṣya he is in the following exposition presented as Bhāṣyakāra and his work is introduced as Bhāṣya. Tradition gives the name Bhāṣya to the work of the principle exponent of the Sūtras. The commentary on Bhāṣya is called Tīkā and a commentary on Tīkā is called Tīppani.

Another circumstance may be noted. An intensive study of Bhāṣyakāra shows that his position is self-explanatory and it requires no justification from outside. The commentary (Tīkā) of Jayatīrtha entitled Tattvaprakāsikā is nothing but an intensive study of Bhāṣyakāra. This is illustrated by his statement of programme at the commencement of Tattvapraāśikā 'Sangamyante gurorgirah' (The statements of the teacher [Bhāṣyakāra] are brought together.) Bringing them together consists in interpreting one statement by means of another. This simply means that Bhasyakara needs no support of a commentator. This circumstance speaks for the clearness, definiteness and soundness of Bhāṣyakāra's position. The value of Jayatīrtha's works consists in bringing this truth to light. For this reason they are indispensable in our study of Brahma Mīmārnsā. So in the following exposition both Bhāṣya and Tattvaprakāšikā and relevant passages from the commentaries on Tāttvaprakāśikā, Bhāvadīpa and Tātparya Candrikā and particular passages from the works of other Vedanta systems are translated and the positions they expound are studied. The translation and exposition of the passages taken from the works of other systems of Vedanta show the correctness of Madhva's observations against the other Bhāsyakāras as well as the thoroughness of Madhva's treatment of the subject matter of



HARIH AUM

CHAPTER II

JAYATĪRTHA'S INTRODUCTION TO BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

Jayatīrtha introduces himself at the outset as one who is full of exceptional reverence to, devotion to, and meditation on the Truth that is going to be expounded by the whole Śāstra, namely Brahma Mīmāmsā. This Truth is Brhman. He defines Brahman as follows:

Śuddhānandoru - samvidyutibala-bahulaudārya-vīryādideham Cintāsantāpa-lepodbhava-mṛtimukharāśeṣa-doṣātidūram.

Sadbhih vairāgya-bhakti-śrutimatiniyatadhyānaja-jñānayogāt Gamyam vande mukundābhidamalamamalam brahma vedānta

(I bow to Brahman which is of the form which is no other than pure bliss, complete knowledge, resplendence, strength, infinite generosity, energy and so on; which is completely free from all defects such as worry, pain, responsibility, birth and death; which is attained by those that are fitted by means of the discipline of knowledge produced by detachment from wordly things, devotion to truth, study of Sāstra, contemplation over the subject matter of Sāstra and the application of what is studied and understood to life; which is called Mukunda, the giver of liberation; which is through and through Absolute; and which is understood only through Vedānta.)

The following is the idea contained in this passage.

Brahman is complete (Pūrna). Every attribute of It is complete and absolute (Svatantra). In this sense it is bliss (Ananda). It is pure consciousness (Samvit). It is illumination (Dyuti). It is energy (Bala). It is generosity (Audārya) and It is power (Vīrya). It consists of these attributes. These attributes therefore constitute its form i.e., body (Deha). It is absolutely free from all defects, such as anxiety (cintā), pain (santāpa), responsibility (lepa), birth (udbhava) and death (mrti). It is apprehended, realized or attained by those that are devoted to It. The only means for attaining It is knowledge (Jñāna). This knowledge is produced by the process of a discipline consisting of the stages, correct understanding of Śāstra,

(Śruti), reflection over what is understood (mati) and the corresponding application to that which is the result of reflection (Niyatadhyāna). This discipline is necessarily that which emerges from detachment from that which is not Brahman and devotion to that which is Brahman. It is understood only through Vedānta i.e. Brahma Mīmāmsā. It is Brahman in the purest sense. It is this Truth that goes by the name Mukunda, the giver of Mokṣa, the highest good. It is to this Truth that I bow now at the commencement of the study of Brahma Mīmāmsā. This is the gist of the very first passage of his work entitled Tattvaprakāšikā, a commentary on Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya by Madhva.

In the next four verses Jayatīrtha remembers, with great devotion and appreciation and with respectful feelings, Vyāsa, the source of learning as such and the author of Brahma Sūtras, Amanda Bodha i.e. Ānanda Tīrtha (Madhva), the author of Bhāṣya (the exposition of Brahma Sūtras), Paṅkaja Nābha Tīrtha and Akṣobhya Tīrtha who studied Śāstra under Madhva and led a life consistent with it even before Jayatīrtha

was born.

Yācnā mandara-lolitādyata udaidvidyaindirā nirjaraih Jato bhārata-pārijāta-sutaruh sadbrahmasūtrāmrtam Āsīttantra-purāṇa-sanmaṇigaṇo jātah sukenduh sadā Soyam Vyāsasudhānidhih bhavatu me bhūtyai satām bhūtidah.

(May that nectar-sea which is no other than Vyāsa i.e., Bādarāyaṇa, the author of Brahma Mīmāmsā, the sea from which churned by the divinities (Devas) with the help of the mountain called Mandara which is no other than prayer there appeared Indirā, i.e., Lakṣmī who is no other than the Brahmavidyā; the sea from which the good tree of Pārijāta which is no other than the Bhārata, i.e., the Mahā Bhārata appeared; the sea from which came the nectar which is the same as the Brahmasūtras with all the excellences that make an exposition the best and the highest; the sea from which appeared the best of the precious stones in heaps which are no other than the Tantras and the Purāṇas; and the sea from which appeared the moon which is no other than Suka i.e., Sukācārya, be the perennial source of my spiritual wealth. This sea is indeed the giver of all wealth to those that deserve it.) The idea is that

Vyāsa is more than the sea because he gives all spiritual wealth to those that deserve when the sea is incapable of doing it.

Svāntadhvānta-nikṛntane jitamahā-vaikartanāmśu-vrajam Nirdoṣam jitacandra-candrika-malam tāpatrayonmūlane Gāmbhīrye jita-sindhurāja-mamitam Bhāṣyam Yadāsyāmbujā Dāvirbhūta-mamandabodha bhagavatpādān prapadyetha tān.

(With all my might, effort and sincerity I depend upon that well-known Amandabodha, the one whose knowledge is defectless i e., Madhva from whom there appeared the Bhāṣya by which in point of destroying the darkness which is no other than the darkness existing within the mind are defeated the groups of the bright suns; the Bhāṣya which is defectless; the Bhāṣya by which in point of removing the threefold miseries—those that pertain to body, those that pertain to the physical world and those that pertain to the controlling agents of the world—is defeated the moonlight with the moon; the Bhāṣya by which in point of majesty the best of the seas is defeated and the Bhāṣya the meaning and significance of which are unfathomable.)

The idea is that the Bhāṣya composed by Madhva is the only source of solace and success of life in all its aspects. Nobility is all that is required for the success of life and the destruction of nescience is all that is required for a spiritually successful life.

Śrī-Madhva-samsevana-labdha-śuddha Vidyāsudhāmbho-nidhayomalā ye Kṛpālavah Paṅkaianābha tīrthāh Kṛpālavah syānmayi nityameṣāṁ.

(Pankajanābha Tīrtha [also called Padmanābha Tīrtha] is one who is the sea of the nectar of defectless learning obtained by serving Madhva the great well. For this reason he is himself defectless and graceful. May there always be even an aspect of his blessings on me.)

Padmanābha Tīrtha was a direct disciple of Śrī Madhva. In this passage the emphasis is on the fact that he became defectless because of his devotion and service to Madhva. The idea is that without devotion and service to teacher defectless learning cannot be obtained. Mere intellect and

effort do not help the purity of knowledge. Purity of knowledge presupposes the psychological purity of the student and psychological purity consists in devotion and service to teacher.

Śrīmadramāramaṇa-sadgiripādasaṅgi Vyākhyānināda-dalitākhila-duṣṭadarpaṁ Durvādivāraṇavidāraṇa-dakṣadīkṣa Makṣobhya-tīrtha-mṛgarāja-mahaṁ-namāmi.

(I bow to lion-like Aksobhya Tīrtha who had the egoism of all evil forces completely subdued by means of his roar-like teaching that is intimately connected with the mountain-foot like Lord of Ramā i.e. Lakṣmī and whose avowed vow is to cut into pieces the elephant-like enemies of Truth.)

In this passage are indicated the correct teaching and its function as well as the correct form of the discussion of the philosophical problems and its function. It is also suggested that the teachership of a teacher consists in the attributes that are given to Aksobhya Tīrtha. He also was a direct disciple of Śrī Madhya.

In the next verse he states that the sole purpose of his work i.e. *Tattvaprakāśikā* is the exposition of *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Ānanda Tirtha, as he understands it in the light of the teachings so far made available.

Atha tatkṛpayā Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣyam yathāmati Vyākurve Śrīmadānanda-Tīrthārya mukha-nihṣṛtam.

(Having qualified myself for the work I have undertaken with the blessings of my gurus—Aksobhya Tirtha and so on, in accordance with my capacity, I expound the Brahma Sütra Bhāsya that came out from the mouth of the great Ānanda Tīrtha.)

Yathāmati also means 'without giving room for abnormal thinking.'

In the following verse he presents the character of his exposition.

Gangā sangena nairmalyam Rathyādbhihrlabhyate yathā Vāco visuddhi sidhyartham Sangamyante guroh girah. (Even as purity is obtained by the street-water by its relation to the water of the Ganges, just to get my speech purified, my teacher's (Ānada Tīrtha's) statements are brought together, by me so as to interpret one in the light of the other.)

He points out that the position of Ānanda Tīrtha is so clear and definite, that his own exposition consists in nothing but bringing different statements of Ānanda Tīrtha together. He makes the spirit of his approach clearer still by stating that even this act of bringing together is merely the process of purifying his own speech i.e. the mind at the background of speech. He says, 'Vāco viśuddhi siddhyartham sangamyante guroh girah.' Next he introduces in a prose passage Ānanda Tīrtha's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya as:

Athāvidyā-paṭala-pihita-nayanaihanyaihanyathāvyākhyātāni Brahma Sūtrāṇi yathāvadvyācikhyāsuh Bhagavānācāryavaryah prāripsita Bhāṣyasya kaivalyādyakhila phalasādhanatā-siddhyartham nirantarāya parisamāptyādyarthamca Nārāyaṇa namaskāram grathayati granthārambhamca pratijānīte: NĀRĀYAŅĀM iti.

(After the necessary preparation that is required for the exposition of Sāstra, the most revered teacher i.e., Madhva desires to expound the actual teaching of the Brahma Sūtras, seeing that by others who wrote Bhāṣyas, ideas that are not supported by the Brahma Sūtras are presented as constituting the teaching of the same. Next he mentions his respectful devotion to Nārāyana which brings about all that is good, Kaivalya i.e. Mokṣa and gives no room for break of thought in the course of his exposition. He next states the commencement of his Bhāṣya as Nārāyaṇam and so on.)

Bhāṣya: Nārāyaṇam Guṇaih Sarvaih Udīrṇam Doṣa Varjitam Jñeyam Gamyam Gurūmscāpi Natvā Sūtrārtha Ucyate.

(Having bowed to Nārāyana, complete with reference to every attribute, free from all defects, the object of knowledge, the goal to be attained and also to the teacher, the position of Sūtra will be stated).

Jayatīrtha explains the ideas contained in the verse:

'Atra nirupapada Sūtra sabdena Brahma Sūtramucyate. Tasya mukhyārthābhidhāyakatvāt. Tesām ca tādrsatvāt. Vaksyamānameva Sūtrārtham srotrsemuṣīm anukūlayiṣyan ādau prastāvayitum viseṣaṇa-catuṣṭayena iṣṭadevatām visinaṣṭi. Tathāhi.'

(In this verse by the unqualified word Sūtra Brahma-sūtra is stated. For, the word that is unqualified states the very primary meaning and they (Brahma Sūtras) are the primary meaning of the word Sūtra. In order to introduce the position expounded by the Sūtras, at the beginning, with a view to helping the mind of students Madhva qualifies the God he is devoted to by attributes four in number. The same is elucidated.)

'Adisūtre Bhagavatah prasatyā puruṣārtho bhavati iti sūcite adhikārinah śankā unmiṣati. Puruṣāntare anupalabhya- mānam puruṣārtha-pradatvam tasya cet kīdṛśah asau iti. Tām nivārayat ādyādhyāyasya arthah Gunaih sarvaih Udīrṇamiti. Tatra hi aparyāyānanta śabdānām mahāyoga-vṛtyā Harau Samanvaya-Samarthana-dvārā Sarvaguṇodīrṇatā eva varṇyate. Saca yuktyā-dibhih uktasamawaye nirodhite doṣavānapisyāt iti āśaṅkām pariharatah dvitīyādhyāyasya arthah Doṣavarjitam iti. Tatra yuktyādīnām ābhāsatva-varṇanena nirdoṣatvasyaiva bhāṣitatvāt. Evam vidhasya ca prasādah kayā vidhayā bhaviṣyati ityāśaṅkām pūrayatah tṛtīyasya arthah fēeyatāyāh kathitatvāt. Prasannaśca kīdṛśam pumartham tasya ffeyatāyāh kathitatvāt. Prasannaśca kīdṛśam pumartham trayacchati iti āśaṅkām pūrayatah turīyasya arthah Gamyamiti. Tatra jñāninah Bhagavatprāpti-lakṣaṇa mokṣasya uditatvāt.'

(By the first Sūtra it is indicated that by the grace of Bhagavān the Good of man occurs. To one who has adhikāra i.e., who follows the implication of this indication a question occurs—If Bhagavān has the state of giving or effecting the good of man when any other being is devoid of this state, then what is He i.e. what is His nature? The position of the first chapter of Brahma Mīmāmsā that He is Gunaih Sarvaih udīrnam (Complete in all attributes) is expounded to meet this difficulty. What is really expounded in this chapter is the state of being complete in all attributes. This is done by means of establishing the absolute and complete application (Samanvaya)

to Hari1 of the infinite number of sounds-articulate and inarticulate. Each of them is unique in its meaning. Samanvaya is effected on the basis of that relation (vrtti) between a word and its meaning which is signified as mahāyoga. Mahāyoga is the relation based on the fact that the word in question is applied only to that thing which it literally signifies as being absolutely complete. If this application, Samanvaya thus expounded is beset with difficulties based on reasoning and so on, then it follows that It, Hari ought to have defects also. This difficulty is removed by the second chapter. The position of this chapter is stated by Bhāṣya as Doṣavarjitam (Free from defects). For, in this chapter reasoning etc., that appear to prove that Hari has defects are shown to be fallacious and this circumstance results in establishing the state of Hari being Defectless. Next appears the question, How does the Grace of the Entity thus defined occur? In answer to this the third chapter appears. The position it expounds is stated as Jneyam, (That which is the object of knowledge). For in this chapter Hari's attribute, the state of being the one object of all knowledge is established. The realization of this truth occurs on the basis of detachment and devotion. It is the one case of spiritual discipline. With it Its Grace takes place. Next appears another question-what is the nature of the Good that Hari who is pleased gives? In answer to this question the fourth chapter appears. The position of this chapter is stated as Gamyam (the Goal to be attained.) For in this chapter Moksa, the Highest Good is defined and it is shown to be the same as the attainment of Bhagavan by the person who has knowledge.)

Jayatīrtha studies the implications of the conception of

Nārāyana as defined so far as follows:

'Athavā naitannārāyanapadam (devadattādipada) ditthādipadavat sānketikam bhavati. Kintu višista gunānapi ācaste ityā-

śayavān pada catuṣṭayena tam nirvakti. Tathāhi.'

(Or [as it follows from the previous interpretation] this word Nārāyaṇa is not conventional even as the words (Devadatta and so on) Dittha and so on. In fact it presents the highest attributes. To illustrate this Madhva defines Nārāyaṇa by means of four expressions. This is explained as follows.)

¹ The term Hari is applied to that Truth which is purely spiritual, absolutely opposed to all that is non-spiritual.

Doşārasabdayoh abhinnatvāt nanasca viruddhārthavācitvāt doşaviruddhāh gunāh nārāh. Tadāsrayo Nārāyaṇah. Nanah abhāvārthatvāt arāsrayo nabhavatīti vā Nārāyaṇah. Narasanbandhitvāt narīyate anenetivā nāramaṇam yenetivā nirdoṣa vedotpannatvādvā nāram jñānam viṣayatayā tadāsrayatvācca Nārāyaṇah. Aravidhuratvāt aratirahitatvāt kṣayarahitatvādvā nārāh muktāh tadāsrayo Nārāyaṇah. Naganākādi sabdavat

ayam śabdo jñātavyah.'

(The words doṣa and ara are synonymous. The word nan means that which is opposed. For this reason the word nārāh means the attributes that are opposed to defects. The basis of these attributes is Nārāyaṇa. Nan means absence. Hence Nārāyaṇa is so called because he is not the basis of defects. For the reason that nāra is related to nara, that it does not perish, that it does not lead to pain or that it is produced by Veda which is defectless, it (Nāra) means knowledge. Nārāyaṇa is so called because It is the basis of knowledge in the sense of Itself being Its object. Further Nārāh means the liberated, because the liberated are free from defects, free from pain and free from destruction. Nārāyaṇa is so called because It is the basis of the liberated. In this connection this word nāra ought to be interpreted just as the words naga, nāka, etc. are interpreted.)

Jayatīrtha draws the implication of all this as:

'Athavā Nārāyanasyaiva namyatvopapādakametat. Yohi bahuguņo vidoşah Šāstrajñeyo adhītasāstra-gamyah sahi vandyo bhavati.'

(In the light of the previous ideas the same passage presents the following position. This passage illustrates how of all things only Nārāyaṇa is the object of reverence. It happens to be the object of reverence which has attributes complete in character, which is free from defects, which is understood only by means of Sāstra and which is attained by one who has obtained knowledge directly through Sāstra).

Jayatīrtha introduces the rest of Bhāṣya as:

'Devatānatisamanantaram gurūnapi namati—Gurūmsca iti.'
After bowing to God Madhva bows to the Teacher also as
Gurūmsca

Bhāṣya: Gurūmścāpi Natvā Sūtrārtha Ucyate.

(After bowing also to the Teacher the position expounded by Sūtra is stated.)

Jayatīrtha explains the ideas contained in the Bhāṣya. 'Gurornāma nagṛḥṇīyāt śiṣyo bhāryā paterapi ityato natannāma jagrāha. Svasya guru-devatā-bhede arucim sūcayati apipadena. Yadyapi Guruh na Devatā-bhinnah. Tathāpi viśeṣānugrahārtham pṛthannatiriti.'

[He did not mention the name of the Teacher. This is the origin of the rule of conduct, viz., the pupil must not call his teacher by name and similarly the wife must not call her husband by name. By the word api he indicates that he does not hold that there is difference between God and Teacher. It may however be noted that the Teacher is not different from God. Yet He is revered in order to obtain His grace as Teacher.]

Jayatīrtha notes further implications of the same passage of Bhāṣya.

'Anenaiva Šāstrasya adhikāri-visaya-prayojana-sambandhāśca śrotr-pravṛtyanga-bhūtāh sūcitāh jñātavyāh. Tatsmaraṇasya mahāphala-hetutvācca. Taduktam. "Adhikāram phalamcaiva pratipādyamca vastu yat Smṛtvā prārabhato grantham karotīśo mahatphalam" iti. Namaskārādhikāryādi-grathana-sūcane śiṣyaśikṣārtham. Tathāhi. Jñeyatva-gamyatvayoh jñātṛgantṛ-sāpekṣatvāt tadyogyah tadicchureva adhikārī sūcitah. Nārāyaṇa eva viṣayah. Tadjñānagamane prayojanam. Yathāyogyam sambandhah iti.'

(By the same Bhāṣya, with reference to Sāstra, one who is fitted to study Sāstra, the subject matter, the purpose of the study and the mutual relation of these three which make the student interested in the study—these four ought to be understood to have been indicated. Further to remember them leads to the realization of great good. For this reason it is said "God causes great good in the case of one who commences the study of the work after having remembered fittedness, result and that which is the subject matter." The purpose of mentioning reverence and indicating one who is fitted to study and so on is to give a discipline to the pupil. The same is explained thus: the state of being known and the state of being attained are relative to the agent who knows and the agent who attains. For this reason it is indicated that one who deserves the attainment and desires the study is one that is fitted. Nārāyaṇa alone is the subject matter. The realization of the purpose consists in the knowledge of Nārāyana and the attainment of the same. The relation is that which is consistent with these three.)

A Note on Jayatīrtha's Introduction to Brahma Mīmāmsā.

In the first verse Jayatīrtha states first that Brahman has a form and it consists of complete and absolute attributes. This must not be taken to have any theistic implication. Rather, it means the rejection of theism. For, the author in this passage refutes theism by illustrating how Brahman has no body other than complete and absolute attributes, Ananda and so on. This position is profoundly different from Sankara's Nirguna and Rāmānuja's Brahman as Sarīri. In the next statement the author shows how Brahman is free from defects. These defects are those that fall short of the Absolute and Complete. They must not be taken to be defects in the usual sense i.e. in the ethical sense. So the conception of Brahman as Gunapūrņa and Nérdoşa is totally different from Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman. According to him Brahman is complete with qualities which are considered to be auspicious and is free from the qualities which are considered to be inauspicious by us. He attributes birth, etc., to Brahman in so far as he speaks of change (parināma) of Brahman. But Jayatīrtha shows how birth, etc., are definitely defects and Brahman is absolutely free from them. The third statement shows how the spiritual discipline leading to the attainment of Brahman i.e. moksa is purely intellectual in character, consisting of the study and application of Sastra, i.e. Brahma Mīmāmsā. The expression Vedānta-vedyam shows how there is no other means to know Brahman. The word amalam shows how this Brahman is purer than Nirguna of Sankara. Mukundābhidham implies that mokṣa is no other than the attainment of Brahman and the means for attainment is nothing but Brahman. It is on account of these two circumstances Brahman is called Mukunda, the Giver of moksa. It further illustrates how the names like Mukunda must not be taken to mean anything theistic in character. Alam indicates the absolutely perfect character of Brahman. By remembering all this the author intends to show that the same is going to be

Further, in the light of Bhāvadīpa, the following points

may be noted: The expression of Bhāṣya 'Guṇaih sarvaih udīrṇam' apparently means substantive-attributive relation, holding that Nārāyaṇa is the substantive and the guṇas are attributive. This way of defining Nārāyaṇa ends in some kind of dualism. Tattvaprakāśikā shows that this is not the correct way of interpreting Bhāṣya by the first statement, Suddha . . . deham. This means that guṇas themselves are deha (content) of Nārāyaṇa. Hence the idea of substantive-attributive relation does not apply to Nārāyaṇa.

Further, by suddha is meant santatva satisayatva rahitya. This means that the gunas in question have no limit (anta) and nothing higher or superior (atisaya). The same is called Svatantra. This qualification indicates that the gunas are not attributive and they are absolutely complete. Further amalam is taken to imply that Brahman in question is not sabala, i.e.

saguna.

Further it is also indicated that the expressions gunaih sarvaih udīrnam and suddha . . . deham mean in one word Brahman. Doṣavarjitam and cintā . . . dūram mean amalam; jñeyam, gamyam and sadbhih . . . gamyam mean vedāntavedyam, so that the whole position of Sāstra is stated as Brahman which is amalam and vedānta vedyam. A note on the identity of the meaning of these expressions is a discipline that helps the study of Sāstra. It may be seen how well these ideas support the implications we have already drawn.

By remembering the author of the Sūtras and so on, Jayatīrtha keeps his outlook in perfect harmony with the tradition started by the Sūtrakāra. Next he states that the purpose of his writing consists in explaining the position of Bhāṣya of Ānanda Tīrtha. By this he implies that he is not making any fresh contribution to Sāstra and by the implication of this fact he illustrates the natural fullness of Sāstra. He elucidates the same point in the next passage in which he states that his work consists only in bringing together the different passages of Bhāṣya.

Next he points out that the other *Bhāṣyas* do not do justice to the *Sūtras*. He states that the reason for this is the absence of the outlook required. He mentions further that Ānanda Tīrtha's *Bhāṣya* is the only faithful exposition of the *Sūtras*. By this statement he must not be taken to have made much of

this *Bhāṣya*. On the other hand, by pointing out this circumstance he has taken on himself the responsibility of showing perfect harmony between the *Sūtras* and *Bhāṣya* which he explains. This indirectly shows how he sees no harmony

between the other Bhāṣyas and the Sūtras.

The expressions Kaivalyādyakhilaphala-sādhanatā-siddhyartham and Nirantarāya parisamāptyādyartham must be read consistently with the spirit of Sastra1 i.e., Bhasya. For, if Bhāṣya is really the exposition of the Sūtras, then no special effort is needed to make it bring about moksa: and similarly there can be nothing to stand in its way in so far as it is the expression of the Complete and Absolute Truth i.e., Brahman. So the first expression must be read as siddhih arthah prayojanam yasya tam siddhyartham and the second samaptyādi arthah prayojanam yasya tam samāptyādyartham. This reading is justified by Jayatīrtha's own expression in Nyāya Sudhā. In this work he qualifies Bhāṣyakāra as 'Svayamantarāya vidhurah' (One who has no obstruction). So these two expressions define the character of namaskāra (obeisance) that the author of Bhāsya mentions. The use of the word kaivalya (aloofness) in place of moksa indicates how aloofness of a jīva is nothing but the attainment of Brahman. This explains how aloofness as defined by Sankhya as the state of purusa being left to itself is inconceivable. If Brahman is complete how can purusa be aloof in the sense other than attaining Brahman? His statement of the commencement of Bhāṣya warns the student to fix his attention on the Sūtras, so that he may see how intimately Bhāṣya is related to the Sūtras.

The author of *Bhāṣya* at the very outset states the position expounded by the Śūtras. This position is presented in terms of *Devatā* and *Guru*. *Devatā* means the Truth absolute and complete. It is presented as Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa is the name of the principle of all and this is defined as *Guṇapūrṇa Nirodoṣa*, Jūeya and Gamya. From this it follows that the Truth called Nārāyaṇa is impersonal. It is in this sense that Brahman is the subject-matter of jijāāsā, enquiry. *Guru* is the source of knowledge. He is therefore the source or the principle of jijāāsā. As Bhāṣyakāra explains in

¹ The word Sastra stands, according to context, for Veda, sutra or Bhasya or all put together.

Anuvyākhyāna, He is śāstra-prabhava, the origin of Śāstra, i.e., Brahma Mīmāmsā including Śruti and Smrti that are fixed by Mīmāmsā. He says in Išāvāsya-Bhāsya, that this Guru is the very source of knowledge, jñāna and the presupposition of knowledge, sphūrti—as-'yasmāt brahmendra-rudrādi devatānām śriyopica—jñāna—sphūrtih sadā tasmai haraye gurave namah.' obeisance to Hari i.e., Nārāyaṇa and to Guru i.e., Nārāyaṇa from whom alone as a rule knowledge and all that is presupposed by knowledge occur to the well-known gods, Brahmā, Indra, Rudra, etc., and even to Śrī, Abhimāninī, the principle of all thought and existence.] In Tātparya Nirnaya he refers to this Guru as suraguru, the teacher of all gods. In all these passages he means by the word Guru the Absolute and Complete Source of all that is connected with knowledge.

So according to *Bhāṣya*, *Devatā* and *Guru* are the two aspects of the Truth expounded by the *Sūtras*. The act of greeting It is to adopt the outlook consistent with It, so that there is no break of thought in the course of *Bhāṣya* and there is the appreciation of the Truth leading to the realization of It.

By the word Sūtra used in Bhāṣya, Jayatīrtha understands Brahma-Sūtra, because he finds that Brahma-Sūtra is the primary meaning of Sūtra. This circumstance gives us the method of interpretation that governs his work. This method consists in interpreting a word in its primary sense. Anything that falls short of this sense does not find a place in his work.

To place the student in the right direction Madhva as presented by Jayatīrtha gives a brief note on the position expounded by the Sūtras. This position consists of the following truths;—(1) The Prasāda¹ of Bhagavān causes puruṣārtha. (2) No other puruṣa is able to cause it. (3) These two ideas are the implications of the fact that Bhagavān i.e., Nārāyaṇa is complete by every attribute. (4) This truth is concluded from the formation of the application, samanvaya of the infinite number of sounds to Hari in their absolute and complete sense, mahāyoga, having clearly recognized that no two sounds mean the same thing. (5) This truth is never contradicted by any reason or consideration. (6) To suppose that it is contradicted is a case of illusion. (7) If this illusion occurs the

¹ Prasāda, grace is purely a philosophical concept in Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

application of all sound to Hari is only obstructed. (8) Owing to this circumstance, defects i.e., the attributes that are opposed to the absolutely complete character of the attributes of Hari, are supposed to characterize Hari. (9) The illusion caused by wrong considerations is removed by showing that these considerations are fallacious. (10) The knowledge of this Truth-Guṇa pūrṇa and Nirdosa-is necessarily the result of Grace, prasada of Hari. (11) This knowledge consists in realizing that It is Jueya, the object of knowledge. (12) Therefore exclusively to know It as Yñeva is to have the knowledge of It. (13) This knowledge is as a rule the result of vairāgya, detachment and viṣṇu-bhakti, devotion to the Truth absolute and complete. (14) It is this knowledge, namely, the knowledge produced strictly in this manner that is the indication of Grace that leads to Moksa. (15) The result of this Grace is the realization of the Truth that is Gunapūrņa, Nirdoṣa, Jñeya and Gamya. This is the expression of the fact that It is the only thing that is capable of being attained. (16) The realization of Truth as Gamya is essentially the knowledge of the Truth, Gunapūrņa, Nirdosa, Theya and Gamya, that results in the actual attainment of Bhagavan and this attainment is called Bhagavatprapti or Moksa.

At every stage of thought with reference to every idea the student is required to see that he is proceeding in the direction that is consistent with the process of thought, so far defined. The student who appreciates the indispensability of this procedure is in a position to understand what the application of the word Nārāyaņa to the highest Truth signifies. This is explained by the expression Athavā naitannārāyanapadam etc. In popular language the word Athavā means an alternative. But this meaning has no place in Sāstra. Sāstra is the deciding factor and therefore to speak of alternative is irrelevant to it. In Sastra therefore a position does not give room for its opposite. A term therefore does not have more than one meaning. If in a particular connection a different meaning seems to have been given, it is required by a genuine student to see that it is only the implication of the meaning that is already given. Applying this circumstance to the present connection the real meaning of athavā may be studied.

So far, the whole position of Sāstra is briefly stated. If this is appreciated its implication may be studied. Its

one implication is the knowledge of the correct meaning of Nārāyaṇa. This meaning is the restatement of the whole Sāstra. An appreciation of this implication leads to the understanding of the further implication. This understanding consists in knowing which exactly is the object of worship or reverence. With the full appreciation of these implications knowledge becomes complete. Completion of knowledge leads as its implication to the idea of the complete identity of Devatā and Guru. This idea signifies that the Principle of all is the Principle of the knowledge of all. The full appreciation of all these truths makes Sastra fully significant. With this significance Sāstra comes to have clearly all its prerequisites, namely adhikārin, viṣaya, prayojana and sambandha. An appreciation of this point is the necessary condition of the study of Sastra. Thus the process of the study of Sastra is really endless and in this endless process what has been already studied and understood forms the background of the study and understanding of that which follows. One implication of all this is that anything that in any sense goes against it or modifies its importance makes Sāstra impossible.

Jayatīrtha notes all this at the commencement of his work just to show that only he who has fully recognized all this can follow Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This must not be mistaken for explaining knowledge by the same knowledge i.e., it must not be supposed that the author holds that the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā ought to know even before his study the truth expounded by it. But it is to show how the required knowledge necessarily presupposes an outlook consistent with it. Whatever is known forms an outlook and makes on its basis the further knowledge possible. This is the expression of the continuity of the spiritual growth. It is in the process of this growth that

Jayatīrtha commences the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER III

QUERIES LEADING TO BRAHMA-MIMĀMSĀ

I

QUERIES REGARDING Visaya (SUBJECT MATTER)

THE first chapter was concluded with the presentation of the correct meaning of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, i.e., Brahma-Jijnāsā as enquiry into that which is Brahman, i.e., Veda as well as its meaning, Parabrahman. Any thinking person to whom the necessity for this kind of enquiry is introduced is naturally confronted with a host of difficulties. What is this highest truth? It is easy enough to say that it is the Absolute. But what is the Absolute? If it is said that it is the meaning of Veda, what is then Veda? What is the meaning? In short, what is the content, subject matter or Visaya of Brahma-Mīmāmsā? Further what do we gain by studying the highest truth? Can we not be satisfied with the truth that we possess? As we are living in the relative world, what have we anything to do with the Absolute? What is this Veda which is supposed to present the Absolute? If it is a case of verbal testimony, then how is it different from the verbal testimony with which we are ordinarily familiar? We normally have verbal testimony on the basis of immediate apprehension, pratyaksa and reasoning, anumāna of several kinds. What is this verbal testimony which is supposed to present the Absolute and is therefore independent of pratyaksa and anumana?

II

Queries Regarding Prayojana (End)

Further, what is the use, prayojana of holding or even recognizing all this? Is it something that we enjoy in this life? Or is it something that we expect to enjoy after death? If it is to occur after death, what is the nature of this enjoyment? What is it that survives death?

SELF

If what survives death is something that is usually called self or soul, what is its nature? How does it survive? Does it survive of its own accord? Or does anything make it survive? How far does it survive? Is it immortal? What is immortality? If the knowledge of the so-called truth is taken to help the enjoyment of the self after death, does this enjoyment last for ever? Or does it stop at any stage? What is the law that governs it? Does the self have body after death? What is the nature of this body? Or does the self enjoy things then without body? If, as is sometimes thought, it is held that the self after death attains emancipation, moksa, what is emancipation? If it is release from bondage, why should the self have it only after death? Why does it not have it during life-time? What is the principle on which our judgement in this connection is based? What is bondage? What is its cause? When does it begin? What was the self before? If it is beginningless how can it be conceived that it comes to an end? What is the relation between self and bondage? Does self have a beginning? If it has, what is its cause? If it has not, what is the meaning of birth and death? What was the self before birth? How far is it responsible for getting bondage? How did it become responsible for bondage? If it has bondage without its own responsibility, how is it possible to think that self ever gets rid of it?

GOD

If a God is responsible for the bondage or release of the self, what is the nature of God? Who gave Him the power of ruling a self? Why not a self itself rule the God? Is ruling a self a burden to God or is it a source of happiness to Him? In the former case how can He be God with burden and in the latter case how is the action of God justified? What is the function of God? How is He related to a self? How is a self to believe in God? If it is a question of belief what is the guarantee of its validity? Why is not belief in the opposite direction equally valid? What is the law that governs belief or non-belief, validity or non-validity? If a God is believed to exist who made God? What is His abode? On what does

He live? Is He immortal or mortal? What is the principle on which our decision rests? If God is self-established how does He come to have this status? How can He then have any relation to the world the nature of which is totally different from His nature? Does God act according to law? If the answer is in the negative, does not God become capricious and thereby cease to be God? If the answer is in the affirmative, is not the law higher than God? If it is higher, then is not law the real God and the so-called God its creature? What is it that brings law and God together? Is this law one and absolute? Or is it different under different conditions? Who is to supervise it? How can God who Himself is subject to it supervise it? How does God know it? If He is omniscient and therefore knows it, how can anybody who is not omniscient know that He is omniscient? What is omniscience? Why should God alone of all beings have it? If the law that rules the world or according to which God has to rule the world differs constantly, how can God maintain His omniscience? If the law is one and omniscience is fixed, then which of the two is the governing principle? If they are co-eternal, when did God learn to act according to law? If by nature He is acting in this manner, is He ever condemned by this dependence? Or does He ever become free? In either case what is the law that governs our thought? If God is omniscient, how can He maintain order and law in the universe? When He knows everything, how does He maintain priority or posteriority of things? What is the principle He follows? If He is governed by any law external to Him for maintaining order, then what is the limit of His power? With limited power how is He God? If His power is unlimited why should He take the trouble of creating or governing the world? Has He anything to achieve from creation? If He has, is He not like an ordinary mortal? If He has not, what is the purpose of creation? If it is said that He creates the world to enable the selves to attain moksa, then is it not in itself something achieved on His part? If the satisfaction of the selves has nothing to do with the satisfaction of God why should God, try to give satisfaction to the selves? Further, what have these selves to do with God?

THE RELATION OF SELVES AND GOD

In fact, what has any self to do with the other selves? What is a self? Is there anything common to all selves? Can all selves be united? Can they be identical? Or do they remain different? If they become identical, how are they given to be different? What is it that makes them different? If it is found out, what is its relation to the selves? Is it independent of or dependent on God? If it is independent, how is God God? If it is dependent, then why should God take the trouble of getting freedom to the selves? If the selves continue to be different, then how are they related to one another? If they are not interrelated, how can they be absolutely different? If they are not interrelated, then how is the idea of many selves possible and how have we to explain our own action on others or others' action on ourselves? Further, what relation have the selves to the material world?

MATTER

What is matter? How do the material objects come into existence? Does matter need inter-action of soul? Or does it act independently? If it needs interaction, how is it independent? If it has independent action how do law and order get into that action? Does matter or material object exist independent of knowledge? If it does how is that position established? If it exists as objects of knowledge, how can it be taken to be independent of knowledge? If it is dependent on knowledge, how are we sure that there are two entities, knowledge and matter?

KNOWLEDGE

Further, what is that knowledge that apprehends matter? What is knowledge? Which is it that reveals knowledge? Is knowledge self-luminous? If knowledge is self-luminous, then in every case of knowledge there ought to be two elements, knowledge and matter revealed, and in that case, how does knowledge which is not matter reveal matter? Or how is matter which is not knowledge revealed by knowledge? Is knowledge independent of knower? Is it a property of knower? What is the relation of the two? How is knower.

known? If knower is known by knowledge, then how is knowledge only a property of knower? Why should not knower be a property of knowledge? If the whole world of soul and matter with God above them is interpreted in terms of knowledge, is not knowledge absolute? In that case, is not knowledge itself God? Is knowledge one or many? If it is many, how are the many cases of knowledge related to one another? If it is one how does it apprehend different objects? Does consciousness of every object create a new circumstance in knowledge? With this constant change how can knowledge be considered to be one? If both identity and difference are attributed to knowledge, how is the difference between these attributes reconciled? Does not identity in difference present the same difficulty? Further if knowledge alone is the doorway to the world of objects, how are we sure that knowledge is true to objects? If it is true then how do we come to have two cases of knowledge, true and untrue? If knowledge fails to apprehend object in one case, how can we rely on it as the only means? If it misrepresents objects in one case, then how are we to hold that it acts correctly in other cases?

TRUTH

What is truth? What is untruth? How does knowledge come to have it? How does knowledge arise? Does the cause of knowledge partake of the nature of knowledge? How does it cause truth or untruth in knowledge? How is truth or untruth known? What is the object of true knowledge? What is the object of untrue knowledge? If untrue knowledge has object, how is it untrue? If it has not and still it is knowledge, then what is the guarantee that the so-called true knowledge has object? If the function of knowledge is to present object, then how is false knowledge called knowledge? Are differences implied in knowledge to be attributed to the world of objects? If they are attributed, then against their differences how is unity of the world maintained? Of unity and difference which is real and which is false? What is the relation of the real to being? Are they the same? If they are, then does 'false' mean non-being? If it does not, then is there anything between being and non-being? If unity of the world is a fact, then how are we to reconcile these different ideas? If on the other hand difference is a fact, then how are the different entities related to one another? Is there any difference in their ontological status? What is difference? How does it operate? Against it how is the thought of identity possible? Is identity mere appearance? What is appearance?

THE REAL

What is reality? Should the real be recognized in terms of all the foregoing ideas? Does an answer to this question introduce us to gradations of the reals or kinds of the reals? What is the implication of gradation and kind? What is the place of the unreal or non-being in this scheme? If gradation is true, then which is the highest and which is the lowest among the members of gradation? If kinds are true what is then the significance of equality? Does equality of things merge into variety or identity? Or does it mean absolute plurality or plurality in similarity? Does similarity end in identity? If these positions are accepted, then what is the ontological status of plurality and similarity? If plurality and similarity are unreal, illusory, or mithya, then what is unreality, illusion or mithyātva? What are their implications? Can they be made intelligible by making them refer to reality, satyatva? In case unreality, illusion or mithyātva is upheld against reality, have we not postulated the unreal, illusory or mithyā in place of plurality or similarity? If we have, does not the problem of explaining plurality or similarity remain the same as it was? In place of accounting for plurality, etc., have we not to explain the unreal, illusory or $mithy\bar{a}$? If we explain it following the same method as that in which we explained plurality, etc., have we not to hold that in the end unreal is unreal, illusory is illusory or mithyā is mithyā. Have we not in this case arrived at the same position with which we started the discussion? Does not this method of explanation lead to infinite regress?

ILLUSION

Further, what is the origin of illusion? How far are the subjective and objective conditions of knowledge responsible for it? How does the subject come to have it? What is the equipment of knowledge in normal case? Does knowledge

pre-suppose knowledge? If it does not, how is knowledge possible? If it does, then what is the form of knowledge which forms the pre-supposition? If every case of knowledge is thus produced how are the different pieces of knowledge united? What is the uniting principle? How is the principle related to knowledge? How are these two entities, the principle and knowledge related to the different sense organs and body? How is the organism formed? Is knowledge a product or aspect of body? If knowledge and body are different, can they exist independently of each other? If they do not exist independently and yet are different, what is the stuff out of which they are made? Is there difference in the stuff also? If there is difference what is the relation of the two stuffs? Do they point to some ultimate thing as their basis?

Of the two cases of knowledge, true and untrue, which is stronger and which is sublated? What is it that makes knowledge stronger or sublated? What is strength? What is sublation? What is the significance of each? Does knowledge admit of divisions and sub-divisions other than the division between true and untrue knowledge? What are these divisions and how are they related to each other? Is there knowledge enduring? Does it form a part of other cases of knowledge?

OBJECT

Is knowledge always of something? What is this something? Is it outside knowledge? What is its relation to knowledge? How is this relation justified, especially when it is supposed to relate two things of different nature? How is knowledge itself known? Is it an object? How can it be both subject and object simultaneously? If these are different aspects of the same knowledge, then how are these aspects brought together? Is the object of knowledge which is supposed to be outside knowledge, immediately given or mediately given? Does the manner in which it is given modify knowledge also? If it modifies knowledge, then does it follow that there are two divisions of knowledge, immediate and mediate? If there are, what is the relation of the two? Are these the different items of true knowledge? Are there degrees of truth? Or are all cases of knowledge equally true? If they are, how can we attain the final truth?

Is object conceived in terms of knowledge or knowledge in terms of object? What is object? Does it correspond to knowledge? How are we to measure correspondence? Holding the theory of correspondence, how are we to define truth of knowledge? Does knowledge copy object? Further, what is the function of knowledge? Are we to distinguish between two cases of knowledge—knowledge that leads to successful activity and knowledge that does not lead to successful activity? How are we to define and measure successfulness? If it is through knowledge, how is its truth guaranteed? Further, is truth determined by coherence? What is coherence? What is incoherence? Similarly, are we to distinguish between knowledge sublated and knowledge unsublated? What is sublation? How are we to know it? How is the truth of knowledge justified?

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

In case knowledge is true and it is generated by senses, inference and so on, how many sources of knowledge are there? How do the sense organs cause knowledge? Is it by immediacy or by mediacy? What is the immediacy in knowledge? What is mediacy? How does one piece of knowledge relate to another piece of knowledge? How is inference formed? How do we get knowledge by teaching? How does language produce knowledge? How is language formed? What is the relation of thought to language? What is the relation of language to its object? How does a person form language? How does his mental equipment operate on language? If language pre-supposes this operation, how can it guarantee objective certainty? If the knowledge that is produced by language is thus subjective how can we regard language as the source of knowledge? Even supposing that language causes knowledge how is this process different from the process of inference? Granting that the way in which language produces knowledge is different from the way in which inference produces knowledge, what is the nature of things that happen to be the objects of these cases of knowledge? Are they of the same nature as the objects of sense perception? Or are they of transcendent nature? What is meant by transcendence? How do we come to know it? If our sense perception presents only normal things and this knowledge forms the basis of both inference and the operation of language, how are we justified in holding that things that are of transcendent character are known through inference and operation of language?

LANGUAGE AND ITS OBJECT

Further, is there an author of the relation between language and the object revealed by language? Who is the author? If this relation is the work of an author how can language become the source of knowledge by its own virtue? Does not the fact that language is by its own merit the source of knowledge, indicate that its relation to its object is not conditioned by the equipment of any author? If it is not conditioned, then is it necessary for us to distinguish between two aspects of language, the one composed by an author and the other composed by no author and therefore not composed (apauruseya)? Does this necessity mean that there is something which is apauruseya? If it does, which is apauruseya in language? Should not apauruseya be beginningless and endless? Should not its truth be conditoned by nothing external to it? Should it not transcend all that we know by other methods? Can we in this case, judge its truth from the stand-point of other cases of knowledge? Does the fact that it must not be judged from the point of view of other cases of knowledge mean that it may be opposed to the other cases of knowledge? If so, what is the good of enquiring into the nature of other cases of knowledge? Is not the conception of this eternal language itself the result of empirical consideration as we have so far conceived it? Does this not mean that there is no opposition between language eternal and non-eternal on the one hand, and language eternal and other cases of knowledge on the other? Further, should not the object of eternal language be necessarily transcendent? In the light of the foregoing considerations should not the transcendent be consistent with the normal? What is the meaning of the limit of this consistency? What is the function of these thoughts in the process of philosophical thought? If the aim of philosophical thought is the conception of the transcendent, should we not consistently with this idea hold that the conception of eternal language is necessarily an aspect of this truth transcendent? Hence are we to posit that philosophical enquiry in the true sense aims at knowing the transcendent truth with its language?

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO LIFE

Supposing that we can answer all these questions successfully, what do we gain by this? Can we not live happily without all this trouble? If curiosity introduces us to these problems, what is the place of curiosity in life? Is it idle? If it is, is it not better to overcome it instead of satisfying it? If it is in any sense a necessity, how does satisfying it help life? Does it contribute to happiness in this life or beyond this life or in both states? Cannot this contribution be had from other sources such as moral activity, social activity, life of devotion, life of piety, life of meditation and so on? Of these two kinds of discipline, discipline of knowledge and discipline of something other than knowledge, which is better or which is it that brings about peace and immortality? If it is the latter, then is it not the expression of futility of all philosophical reflection? If it is the former, can mere knowledge as forming the content of discipline be justified? Is not knowledge without moral activity, spiritual activity and so on, a mere waste? If knowledge needs the assistance of other things to form discipline, then of the two things, knowledge and assistance, which is more important? Supposing we emphasize other things have we not to face the difficulty of making them possible? Without the background of knowledge, can any virtue, moral activity, devotion, or piety be conceived or justified? If it is not, then does this not mean unconditioned priority of knowledge in all cases of discipline worth the name?

Supposing that knowledge is the only discipline proper, what is it that is realized by it? Is it of the nature of knowledge or of something else? If it is of the nature of knowledge what is its object? or is it objectless? If it has object, what is the relation of the subject to the object? If it is objectless, is knowledge itself the fruit of all discipline? Supposing it is, is objectless knowledge possible? What is the state of the subject as well as the state of knowledge itself in this condition? Is it possible to consider that which has no subject, which has no object and which is not conscious of itself to be a case of knowledge? If it is a case of knowledge is there any possibility of considering all this? Is not all our consideration

based on a false view of knowledge, i.e., the view that considers knowledge to be a property of a subject, to be conscious of

itself and to be of some object?

Further, granting that knowledge is the fruit of all our endeavours, what satisfaction is derived by it? Is knowledge source of misery or of happiness? Supposing that it is the source of misery, can we posit knowledge as the highest aim? Can we on the other hand consider knowledge to be the source of happiness? Is it not true that more often non-knowledge causes happiness? Further, is there absolute happiness? Is not happiness as a rule conditioned by misery? So is to posit happiness to posit misery? Further granting that happiness is absolute, what are its conditions? What is its duration? If it is produced should it not end? If it ends, what is it that follows it? If it does not how is it possible to hold that it is produced? If it is not produced and if it is present, then where was it before the attainment of this condition? If it is ever there as the highest end, then what is the source of misery, ignorance, imperfections and so on? If there is any source, then how can happiness be the highest end of all as there is something to modify it and give rise to misery and so on? If misery, ignorance, etc., are illusory, then what is the source of illusion? Against difficulties like these, how are we to conceive the highest end, prayojana? Does this all mean that the highest end is inconceivable? What is then inconceivability? Is not to define inconceivability to conceive the inconceivable? Does any answer to these questions negate the end, prayojana?

III

QUERIES REGARDING Adhikārin

Further, who is it that is qualified, Adhikārin, to know the subject matter of Brahma Mīmāmsā in order to realize the fruit it is supposed to yield? Is he in need of any equipment? If he is, what is the nature of the equipment? Is it of the character of intellect? If it is, is it something exceptional? If it is exceptionl how are the people who have only normal capacity helped by this Śāstra? If on the othar hand, the equipment is non-intellectual in character, is it of the nature of action, karma, or of faith? Supposing that it is karma,

what is its nature? How does it being non-intellectual lead to intellect? Even supposing that it does, does it first become intelligible before it is supposed to operate on intellect? In order to operate on intellect, if it is taken to be intelligible, is this not to give priority to intellect? Against this priority how can harma be held to form the pre-supposition of intellect, jñāna? Further, can we ever suppose that the so-called bhakti in the sense of blind faith leads to knowledge? Can blind faith lead to concentration or meditation? Is it not rather the negation of knowledge? Further, granting that there is a person who is equipped to follow Brahma Mīmāmsā, what is his interest in doing it? In order to realize what he intends to realize by this study, is there no other means? Can he not live without any interest of this type?

IV

QUERIES REGARDING Sambandha

Further, what is the relation, sambandha of these three things—Viṣaya (subject matter) Prayojana (the end) and Adhikārin, (the person qualified to attain the end)? Is the relation of the subject matter to the end in question absolute or conditioned? If it is conditioned, why should we think of these two things together? If it is absolute, how are we to justify our conception of the relation, when we are so far unable to form a successful conception of subject matter and the end? Further why should there be insistence on a qualified person? Is not a non-qualified person able to follow the subject matter? Does he not enjoy the end if it occurs to him of its own accord?

In the light of these considerations, in substance, the question the student is expected to answer is this. If Brahma Mīmāmsā has any justification to exist, then what is its subject matter (viaya), what is it that is to be realized (prayojana) by the study and knowledge of this subject matter, who is the proper person (adhikārin) that can be expected to make a study of this subject matter in order to realize the end and is there a necessary relation (sambandha) among these three things?

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER IV

THE RISE OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

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Before expounding the position of Sāstra against foregoing difficulties, it must be acknowledged that the statement of these difficulties may not seem to have been stated in the Sanskrit texts, Bhāṣya and Tīkā. But the manner in which the necessity for meeting the problems connected with viṣaya, etc, is emphasized, indicates that the authors must have had all these ideas in mind and therefore expected this knowledge on the part of the student before they stated the main problem. The author of Bhāṣya indicates all this by the manner in which he introduces the Sūtra, 'athāto brahma jijūāsā.' The author of Tīkā (Tattvaprakāṣikā) brings out the significance of this idea clearly by stating the problem, expounding pūrvapakṣa, the position that stands in the way of knowledge and stating how it is met by Sūtra itself.

II

The criticism of pūrvapakṣa starts with the observation on the use of the word Brahma in the Sūtra. This word as well as the other words of the sūtra especially in the hands of the author of the Sūtra has a definite significance. In order to follow it, we must understand the circumstance in which Sūtra appeared as also the purpose of its teaching. The author of Bhāṣya at the very outset presents how Sūtra appeared and for what purpose. T. pr., introduces this portion of Bhāṣya as

for what purpose. T. pr., introduces this portion of Bhāṣya as 'nanu yadupādeyam tadevānanyārthatayā vyākhyeyam. yacca pramāṇatve sati iṣṭasādhanatāvabodhakam prāyah tadevopādeyam. atah katham brahma-sūtrāṇām vyākhyeyatvopayogi upādeyatāyai prāmāṇyādi ityāsamkām parihartum sūtrāgatikramam āha.

(That which is indispensable alone needs interpretation for its own sake. The indispensable is generally that which is not only the source of correct knowledge but is also that which tells us what helps the realization of the good. So, how can we hold that the Sūtras are the source of correct knowledge and so on, the determination of which alone justifies the act of interpreting them? In answer to this question the author of

Bhāṣya said:)

DVĀPARE SARVATRA JÑĀNE ĀKULĪBHŪTE TANNIRŅAYĀYA BRAHMARUDRENDRĀDIBHIḤ ARTHITAḤ BHAGAVĀN NĀRĀYAŅAḤ VYĀSATVENA AVATATĀRA. ATHA IŞTĀNIŞŢAPRĀPTI PARIHĀRECCHŪNĀM TADYOGAM AVIJĀNATĀM TADJÑĀPANĀRTHAM VEDAM UTSANNAM VYANJAYAN CATURDHĀ VYABHAJAT CATURVIMSATIDHĀ SAHASRADHĀ DVĀDASADHĀ CA. TADARTHA-NIRŅAYĀYA BRAHMA-SŪTRĀNI CAKĀRA.

(In the period of time called *Dvāpara* everywhere knowledge became rare having in its place only doubts and illusions. In this circumstance Nārāyaṇa, the ultimate source of all was invoked by Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, etc., to fix knowledge. In response to this Nārāyaṇa appeared as Vyāsa. Then in order to instruct those that really desire to obtain bliss and remove evil but do not know how to do it, He brought to light Veda which had been lost in the sense that its order was confused and meaning obscured. He classified Veda into four divisions—*Rk. Yajus*, *Sāma* and *Atharva*, *Rk.* into twenty-four divisions, *Yajus* into one hundred and one divisions, *Sāma* into one thousand divisions and *Atharva* into twelve divisions. In order to fix the meaning of Veda he composed the *Brahma-Sūtras*).

T. pr., presents the meaning of certain expressions of this

passage of Bhāṣya.

sarvatreti sārvatrikapuruṣoktiḥ. jñāne samyagjñāne. ākulībhūte kim idam adoveti samdigdhe anyadeveti mithyādṛṣṭi-duṣte ca. ākulībhāva samarthanāya dvāparagrahaṇam. tadyogam iṣṭa-prāptyaniṣṭa-parihāropāyam. vedam utsannamityāderapapāṭhā-dinā tirohitam. prāgeva caturdhā-vibhaktam vedam ṛnnigadādī rūpam vyaktīkṛtyaikaikasmādekaikobhāga iti caturdhā vyabhajat ekaikam cāvāmtaram ṛgādivedam caturvimsatyādi sākhābhedena vyabhajadityarthaḥ. taduktam-ṛcassarca udhṛtya ṛgvedam kṛtavān prabhuḥ. yajūmiṣi nīgadāccaiva tathā sāmani sāmataḥ. iti avāntara vedādi-vibhāga-kathanamca jñānākulībhāva-samarthanārtham. cakre vedataroḥ sākhāh dṛṣṭvā pumsolpa-medhasaḥ ityādeḥ.

(Sarvatra is the statement of all time and of all place.

means correct knowledge. Akulībhūtē means that with regard to which there is the doubt-whether it is this or that—as well as that which is made defective by a wrong outlook. The word dvāpara is used to prove narrowness or destruction. Tadyogam means the means for obtaining what is desired and the means for getting rid of what is not desired. By the expression vedam utsannam and so on is meant that which has disappeared owing to wrong reading and so on. Having brought Veda consisting of Rk, Nigada and the like which was already divided into four sections [He] effected four divisions each from each part. Thus there appeared the sub-divisions of Veda called Rk and so on. The idea is that [He] divided it into several sections twenty four and so on. The same is elsewhere stated as 'From the Hymns having brought to light the Rk the omnipotent Lord effected Rgveda. From the Nigada he effected the Yajur-vedas. From the Sama he effected the Sāma-vedas.' The exposition of the division of the sections and so on of Veda has in view the establishment of the fact of the disappearance of knowledge prior to the Vedic division. This idea follows from such passages as 'Having seen the men of weak mind he effected branches from the tree called Veda'.)

T. pr., explains the idea contained in these statements of

Bhāsya:

ayam bhāvah. vākya-prāmānyam tāvat nirdoṣatayā sambhavati. nirdoṣatāca apauruṣeyatayā āptimūlatayāca, āptisca vaktṛ-nirdoṣatava. āpti-mūlatvāt brahma-sūtrāṇām prāmāṇya-siddhiḥ, pramādājiāna-samsaya-viparyayāṇām nārāyaṇāvatāre vyāse asambhavāt. bhagavatvādeva. vipralambhakatvasyaca śrotṛ-doṣa-nibandhanasya tad-abhāvena, abhāva nirṇayāt, jñānāyogyatāyāh brahmādi-śrotṛṣu abhāvāt. apahāsasya ca prasanga-doṣa-nibamdhanasya tad-abhāvena abhāva-nirṇayāt. ajūāna nirha-raṇasya ca prasaktatvena prasanga-doṣābhāvāt. āptimūlatvenaiva prāmāṇya-siddhau sutarām śruti-nirṇāyakatvena śrutiyukti-mūlatvāt. iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāpti-parihāra-sādhana-vedana-hetu-veda nirṇāyakatvena iṣṭa-sādhanatāvabodhakatvamca siddḥyati. ato brahma-sūtrāṇām atyupādeyatvāt vyākhyeyatā iti.

(This is the idea. A verbal testimony comes to have the state of being the source of correct knowledge if it is free from defects. Freedom from defects is found in two cases—1. If the verbal

testimony is apāuruseya (not composed by any author) and 2. If it is composed by an author who is reliable. Reliability consists in the author himself being free from defects. Brahmasūtras are recognized to be the source of correct knowledge. For they are the outcome of reliability. Vyāsa is Nārāyaņa Himself. It is not possible to attribute to Him delusion, ignorance, doubt, and illusion. For Nārāyaņa is complete and is therefore the source of all, being free from defects. Teacher's intention of diverting the student is due to the defect in the student himself. In the present case there is no defect in the student. It follows from this that there is no intention of misleading students on the part of the teacher. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that in the present case the students are the divinities, Brahmā and so on and they are not incapable of obtaining knowledge. The absence of seriousness is due to the defect in the circumstance of discussion. But when the circumstance is defectless there is no absence of seriousness. The circumstance in which the discussion takes place is defectless because its very purpose is to remove ajñāna, delusion, doubt and illusion. If what is expounded by Vyasa can be recognized to be the source of correct knowledge because it is the work that results from reliability, then the same conclusion becomes strengthened further when it is understood that it is supported by Sruti and yukti, i.e., reason employed in fixing Sruti. Further, Brahmasūtras determine Veda. Veda gives the knowledge of the discipline that leads to the realization of the good as well as the removal of evil. So the Sūtras give us the knowledge that leads to the realization of the good. Therefore the Brahmasūtras are the most indispensable and for this reason to interpret them is inevitable).

In this passage the conditions under which a verbal testimony is the source of correct knowledge, the qualities that make one a preceptor, the qualities that define a genuine student, the circumstances that make philosophical discussion possible and the purpose of the exposition of Sāstra are given at the beginning. In this connection the present preceptor is shown to be the very ideal as he is the very principle of the whole existence. The philosophical significance of applying the term Nārāyaṇa to the preceptor will be explained shortly. The

students to whom this knowledge is given are the very best that can be thought of. For they are no other than the divinities, Brahmā, etc. These are divinities in the sense that they are the principles of thought. This also will be made clear shortly. So the circumstance in which Sastra appears is really exceptional. Next the text shows how Sāstra is the source of correct knowledge, pramāna. To prove that Śāstra is pramāna several circumstances are mentioned. In the first place in the light of the foregoing ideas apti, reliability is shown to be the source of Sāstra. Āpti connotes all that go to make one a defectless teacher. The fact that apti is the source of Sastra proves that Sāstra is pramāṇa. In the second place, Sāstra fixes the meaning of Veda. To fix the meaning of Veda is in fact to fix Veda itself. Veda or its meaning is fixed by the operation of reason that applies to Veda. This circumstance, therefore, means that Sāstra is based on Śruti which is in spirit yukti, reason itself. Veda is apauruseya, (uncomposed by an author). It is therefore defectless, i.e., it is not vitiated by the defects of the author. This explains how it is the source of correct knowledge and hence has a definite meaning. This meaning is not due to mere interpretation. Irrespective of interpretation it is already there. With this meaning Veda is pramana, (the source of correct knowledge). Hence what it means is rational. For that which is correct can never be irrational. If Sūtra fixes the meaning of Sāstra then it necessarily follows that it is rational and is supported by Veda. Fixing the meaning of Veda is not giving meaning to Veda. If it were so, Veda can never be pramāna, for before its meaning is fixed it must be devoid of meaning. In this case the test of the validity of Veda becomes irrelevant. So fixing the meaning of Veda consists in finding it out. This must be done only by the application of reason to Veda. This reason cannot be imposed on Veda. It must readily apply to Veda and be therefore innate in it. Hence the reason that can be applied to Veda must have all the virtues of reason outside Veda, and it must also underly Veda. By the application of reason Sāstra finds out the meaning of Veda. In this circumstance Sāstra necessarily becomes supported by Veda as well as by the reason that is innate in and therefore consistent with Veda. This explains how Sāstra is pramāna.

The fact that Sāstra is pramāņa is justified in every way in

which a pramāna is justified. Further to fix Veda is a great necessity, because Veda gives the knowledge that helps the removal of evil and realization of the good. From this it follows that Brahma-Sūtra, the only function of which is to fix Veda, is the most indispensable. This position indirectly means that without Brahma-Sūtra, the meaning of Veda or Veda itself is never fixed and there is consequently neither the removal of evil nor the realization of the good. Apart from Brahma-Sūtra there is nothing that helps us in this direction. For this reason, and this reason only, the author of Bhāṣya undertakes a study of Brahma-Sūtra.

III

Having found out the whole circumstance that characterizes *Brahma-Sūtra* Bhāṣyakāra shows that Vyāsa expounds the same position in *Smṛti* i.e., the literature in the epic style in *skānda*.

T. pr., introduces Bhāsya as: uktamevārtham pramāņena

sthāpayati TACCA iti.

(Bhāṣyakāra establishes the position he has so far expounded by means of pramāṇa, reason, in the passage beginning with the word tacca.

BHĀṣYA: TACCOKTAM SKĀNDE.

Nārāyaṇādviniṣpannam jñānam kṛtayuge sthitam. Kimcittadanyathā jātam tretāyām, dvāparekhilam. Gautamasya ṛṣeśśāpāt jñanetvajñanatām gate. Sankīrṇa-buddayo devāḥ Brahma-Rudra purassarāḥ. Śaraṇyam śaraṇam jagmuḥ Nārāyaṇam anāmayam. Tairvijñāpita-kāryastu Bhagavān puruṣottamaḥ Avatīrṇo mahāyogī Satyavatyām Parāśarāt Utsannān Bhagavan Vedān ujjahāra Harissvayam Caturdhā vyabhajat tāmśca caturvimśatidhā punaḥ Śatadhācaikadhā caiva tathaiva ca sahasradhā Kṛṣṇo-dvādaśadhā caiva punastasyārtha vittaye. Cakāra Brahma Sūtrāṇi.

(It is said in *Skānda*. Knowledge came from *Nārāyaṇa*. For sometime it stood as it came. This period is called *Kṛtayuga*. Next to some extent doubt and illusion vitiated knowledge. This period is *Tretā*. Next knowledge as such disappeared. This is *Dvāpara*. This was helped by a special

circumstance namely the curse of a sage, Gautama. [It is said that Gautama protected learned Brahmins when they were in need of protection. But the Brahmins owing to envy instead of being grateful to Gautama brought discredit to him by making him kill an artificial cow and for the thing which was their creation they abused him. Gautama in turn cursed the Brahmins and this took away the power of knowledge from them.]-Owing to these circumstances, knowledge was mistaken for non-knowledge. Consequently non-knowledge was taken to be knowledge. Thus Gautama's curse took away knowledge from the ungrateful Brahmins. That this whole circumstance was the work of the period of time called Dvāpara must not be forgotten. This is a period in which there was neither teacher nor knowledge. The conditions of this period were such that even the divinities, Brahmā, Rudra, etc., could not help the situation. They could only pity men who were after knowledge but they could not help them. This points to the intensity of degeneration-so they completely depended upon Nārāyaṇa, the defectless. Having been requested by them, Purusottama, the source of all reality, Bhagavān, the most complete, Mahāyogī, the omnipotent appeared as the son of Parāśara, the father, and Satyavatī the mother. Veda was then in a confused form. Himself being the most complete, he brought it to order. He, Kṛṣṇa (the controller of all) divided and classified it into four branches, further into twenty-four branches, one hundred and one branches, a thousand branches, and twenty branches. Next in order to fix its meaning he composed the Brahma Sūtras).

T. pr., explains certain ideas contained in the Bhāṣya as: sthitam yathotpannam tathaiva. anyathājātam idamado veti samdigdham anyad eveti mithyā drṣṭiduṣṭam ca. Aklilam anyathājātam.

(Sthitam means that which is the same as it was produced. Anyathājātam means that which is subject to doubt whether it is this or that as well as that which is vitiated by wrong knowledge. Akhilam became anyathājātam i.e., the whole case of knowledge became subject to doubt as well as vitiated by wrong knowledge.) T. pr., continues.

kālato bhāga dvayasya anyathātvam yuktam na sarvasya

ityato višesakāraņam ca āha—GAUTAMASYA iti.

(It is reasonable to hold only that owing to time two parts of knowledge became subject to doubt as well as vitiated by

wrong knowledge. But to apply the same idea to the whole case of knowledge is not correct. If this objection is put forward, in answer to it Bhāṣyakāra gave another reason also as Gautamasya and so on.)

T. pr., gives the meaning of certain expressions of this

passage of Bhāsya.

Ājūānatām ajūānamiti pratīti-visayatām samdeha-gocaratām ca. brahmādi-buddhi-samkīrņatā nāma sajjanānukroša-yuktataiva. ājūānādimišratvam. gautama-sāpasya svahata-gonirmātṛ-mātra-visaytvāt kālābhibhava-sūnyatvācca teṣām lokasya ca sampradāya-pravartakābhāvena kālataścājūana-prāptih taduktamanyatra naṣṭa-dhrma-jūāna-loka-kṛpālubhih brahma-rudrendrādibhih ityādi. taṣya vedasya bahu-vacana-prayogepi nārthabhedah śaṅkanīyā iti bhāvenaika-vacanam.

(Ajñānatām means the state of being the object of the idea that this is nescience, ajñāna as well as the state of being the subject of doubt. [The helplessness of the intellect of Brahma and so on means the state of being compassionate to those that are good. The idea is that they are compassionate; but they cannot help knowledge.] But this expression does not mean the state of being mixed with nescience. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the curse of Gautama is limited only to those Brahmins who created the cow which was killed by him. An additional reason is the fact of their not being defied by the spirit of time. But with reference to the world the case is different. As there is none to continue the tradition and there is in addition the evil influence of time there is the occurrence of nescience. The same thing is stated elsewhere as 'By Brahmā, Rudra and so on who are compassionate to the world which has lost the knowledge that sustained them . . . ' so on. The expression tasya means 'of Veda'. This word is in singular. This indicates that even though there is the use of the word in plural it should not be taken to mean difference in meaning i.e., several sections each having its own meaning that is opposed to the meaning of other sections.)

It must be noted that the whole circumstance illustrates that it is only $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$, that can do this work, because the nature of the work is such. A note on this point gives us a discipline. In the course of our study we must always make

it a point to see that if we are understanding things, then they must be explained only by this special circumstance. One thing must be clearly recognized at this stage. We must not mix up anything of our own with this teaching. We must not interpret this teaching from common sense point of view, or from any points of view connected with any prepossession. Further it must be kept in mind that *Brahma-sūtras* are as indispensable as Veda because they are required to fix the meaning of Veda.

CHAPTER V

THE INDISPENSABILITY OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

I

Next Bhāṣyakāra continues to show the special importance of the Sūtra teaching.

T. pr., introduces Bhāṣya as:

vedanirņayāya sūtrāntarairalam kimebhirityata āha Yeṣām iti.

(In order to fix Veda the existing sūtras are enough. Why should then these śūtras be composed? In answer to this Bhāṣyakāra said Yeṣām and so on.)

BHĀṢYA:

'Yeşām sütratvamanjasā Alpākṣramasamdigdham sāravadviśvatomukham Astobhamanavadyamca sütramsütravido viduң.'

(They, the Brahma-sūtras, are the highest of the Sūtras. This is illustrated by their very disposition and this consists in their being alpākṣara, asamdigdha, sāravat, viśvatomukha, astobha and anavadya. Those that know the secret of sūtra know that these are the characteristics of sūtra). T. Pr., gives the meaning of these characteristics.

ʻ yāvadakṣaratām vinā vivakṣitārthāsiddhih tadalpākṣaratvam. evam ca bhaviṭum arhatītyavacanam asamdigdhatvam. viśiṣtārthatā sāravatvam. bahuśākhā-nirṇāyakatvam viśvato-mukhatvam. vyarthākṣarādi-rāhityam astobhatvam. apaṣʿabdādi-vaidhuryam anavadyatvam.'

(Alpākṣara is that which consists of only that number of letters as are absolutely necessary to give the idea intended. Asamdigdha is that which does not give room for the possibility of any other meaning. Sāravat is that which is satisfied only with the absolute and complete meaning. Visvatomukha is that the decision of which holds good with reference to all branches

of Veda. Astobha is that which is devoid of letters that are devoid of their individual function. Anavadya is that which is devoid of expressions that are in any manner defective.)

It must be noted that in this passage viśvatomukha is defined as bahuśākhā-nirņāyaka. The word bahu must not be taken to mean 'many'. In consideration of the absolute character of the teaching, bahu must be taken to mean 'all'. So the idea given in this connection is that a sūtra finally fixes the meaning of all branches of Veda. In the discussion of Sāstra, bahu is often used in the sense of the Complete. We may take for example *Bahujña*. This word does not mean one who knows many things. It means one who knows the Complete, i.e., Brahman. Further *anavadya* is said to be that which is devoid of apasabda. This must be taken to mean all kinds of defective expressions, defective from the standpoint of grammar; from the standpoint of meaning and so on. Further the characterization of the Brahma-sūtras gives us a discipline. Whenever we think of the meaning of a sūtra or a part of sūtra, it is our first duty to see that the meaning in question satisfies the demands made by this sixfold characterization.

Next Bhāṣyakāra shows how the idea that the *Brahma-sūtras* are the highest is not something formed now at the time of interpreting it, but it is what is handed down through tradition.

T. pr., presents Bhāṣya as:

etacca sūtratvam kuto brahma-sūtrānām āmjasyena ityata āha Nirvišesīta iti.

(What is the reason for holding that the state of being sūtra in the manner defined so far, occurs absolutely appropriate to the *Brahma-Sūtras*? In answer Bhāṣyakāra said Nirviśeṣita and so on.)

Внаяча: nirviśeșita-sūtratvam Brahma-sūtrasyacāpyataņ.

(Because the state of being sūtras in an unqualified sense occurs only to Brahma-sūtra.)

T. pr., explains the passage of Bhāṣya as:

yato Brahmasūrānām mukhya-sūtratvam ata eva nirvišesitasūtratvam apyasti purānādau anyathā tannasyādityarthaḥ. (As the *Brahma-sūtras* have the state of being *sūtra* in the primary sense, they enjoy the state of being *sūtra* without any qualification. If this were not the case this idea would not have been mentioned in the *purāṇas* and so on. This is the meaning of a passage.)

T. pr., introduces the next passage of Bhasya:

yadyatra nirvišesitam tat tatra mukhyam; yadamukhyam tadvišesitam ityetat kutra dṛṣṭam ityata āha YATHĀ iti.

(Where is it illustrated that that which is not qualified is that which is primary and that that which is not primary is that which is qualified? In answer Bhāṣyakāra said YATHĀ and so on.)

Bhāṣya: Yathā vyāsatvam ekasya kṛṣṇasyānye viśeṣaṇāt. (Just as Kṛṣṇa is vyāsa in an unqualified sense and others are vyāsas in a qualified sense.)

T. pr. explains the idea of the passage;

yathā kṛṣṇasya nirviseṣita-vyāsatvam ata eva tanmukhyam anye drauṇyādayo amukhyāh tatasca viseṣaṇādvyāsāḥ tathā nirviseṣitatvāt mukhyasūtratvam brahma-sūtrāṇām ityarthaḥ.

(Just as Kṛṣṇa has the state of being Vyāsa in an unqualified sense and for the same reason the application of the word Vyāsa is primary, others, Drauṇi and so on are Vyāsas not in the primary sense and therefore they are Vyāsas in a qualified sense, in the present context as there is the absence of qualification the state of being sūtra in the primary sense occurs to the Brahma-sūtras. This is the meaning.)

T. pr., presents the next passage of Bhāṣya:

anya-sütrānām api mukhya sütratvāt kim višisyābhidhīyatā brahma-sütrānāmevetyatah āha: Savišesana iti.

(As other sūtras also are sūtras in the primary sense what is the reason for giving a special treatment only to the Brahma-sūtras? In answer Bhāṣyakāra said Saviśeṣaṇa and so on.)

The idea is this. The fact that there is a certain expression with or without qualification does not necessarily prove primary or non-primary sense of the term. Other sūtras also may as well be called sūtras in the primary sense. In this case to give a special treatment to the Brahma-sūtras does not hold good. There is a serious difficulty in showing that the

Brahma-sūtras are sūtras in the primary sense. To meet this difficulty T. pr., cites Bhāṣya.

BHĀṣya: Saviśeṣaṇa sūtrāṇi Hyaphrāṇi vido viduh: (Men of wisdom hold that other sūtras are sūtras in a qualified sense.)

T. pr., explains the position of Bhāṣya:

anyasūtrāṇām saviseṣaṇatvāt na mukhyatvam iti bhāvaḥ. etadupapādanāyaiva anye viseṣaṇāditi prāgeva dṛṣṭānta uktaḥ.

(The idea is this. The other sūtras are sūtras with qualification. They are not therefore sūtras in the primary sense. Only to illustrate this idea the example was given in a previous

passage as anye visesanāt and so on.)

The position is this. This is not the question of treating something in any manner as we like. It is the question of understanding the traditional view with regard to the use of the word sūtra. We have therefore to depend upon traditional expressions. They are handed down to us in the form of Purāṇas and so on. We have already noted the fact that other sūtras are sūtras with qualifications. They are not therefore sūtras in the primary sense.

TT

T. pr., mentions a difficulty with regard to this position and introduces Bhāṣya to remove it.

nirvišesaņa-savišesaņatvābhyām kuto mukhyāmukhyatve dṛṣṭānte kāraṇāntara-sambhavāt ityata āha: Микнуаsya iti.

(Why should the state of being primary and the state of being non-primary be concluded on the basis of non-qualification and qualification? The expressions in the example given may be explained in a different manner. To remove this difficulty Bhāṣyakāra said Mukhyasya and so on.)

BHĀṣYA:

Mukhyasya nirvišesena-šabdonyesām višesatah. Itivedavidah prāhuh šabdatattvārtha-vedinah.

[With reference to the primary meaning a word has no qualification. The meanings other than the primary are obtained by means of qualification. This is what those that know the truth of Veda say and they are the knowers of the truth of sabda, sound articulate and inarticulate and its meaning.]

Following the spirit of the discussion T. pr., presents the sense of one word and thereby indicates the meaning of the whole passage: mukhyasya mukhyasyaiva.

(The word mukhyasya ought to be taken as mukhyasyaiva—only in the case of primary meaning.)

The gist of Bhāṣya is this—Just as Kṛṣṇa is Vyāsa in an unqualified sense Brahma-sūtra is Sūtra in an unqualified sense. There may be many other persons called Vyāsa but they are called so, in a qualified sense. Similarly other sūtras are so-called in a qualified sense. This is what those that know the nature of sūtra know. What follows from this is that which is primary is given a name without qualification and all others, namely, the non-primary are given names with qualifications. This is what those that know the real meaning and significance of sound are certain about, because they know what Vcda is.

Kṛṣṇa, the son of Satyavatī is called Vyāsa. This is the primary sense of the word. For this reason, the bare name Vyāsa is enough to denote Kṛṣṇa. But Aśvatthāma, the son of Droṇa is also called Vyāsa. But he is called so in a secondary sense. Hence the bare word Vyāsa does not denote Aśvatthāma unless it is qualified as Droṇi, the son of Droṇa. The full name in this case is Droṇi Vyāsa. The same consideration holds good with reference to the different sūtras. The unqualified term Sūtra is applied only to Brahma-sūtra. Brahma in Brahma-sūtra signifies this fact. Brahma means entire Veda. Brahma-sūtra means sūtra of entire Veda.

Of all the sūtras why should the Brahma-sūtras alone be held to fix the meaning of Veda?

T. pr., mentions this difficulty and introduces Bhāṣya that removes the difficulty:

astvetat sütratvam amjasā brahma-sütrānām tathāpi vedārthanirņayāya sütrāntarairalam kimebhiri yasya katham anena porihārah ityata āha SÜTREŞU iti.

(Let the state of being sūtra occur absolutely appropriate only to the Brahma-sūtras. Even then the other sūtras are enough to fix the meaning of Veda and in that case where is the necessity to depend upon the Brahma-sūtras? This is a difficulty. How is this difficulty removed by means of the

foregoing considerations? In answer to this question Bhāṣya-kara said Sūtreṣu and so on.)

BHĀSYA: SŪTREŅU YEŅU SARVEPI NIRŅAYĀḤ SAMUDĪRITĀḤ

(In these sūtras, namely, Brahma-sūtras all the conditions that are required for fixing Veda are stated in their final form i.e., all the decisions viz., reasons that help fixing Veda and its meaning are finally arrived at.)

T. pr., explains the position of Bhāṣya:
yat sūtra-dharmatayoktam viśvato-mukhatvam tat yadā brahmasūtrānām eva amjasā bhavati tadā teṣām eva sarva-śākhānirnāyakatvam bhavet. ato anya-sūtrebhyo atisayena nirnāyakatvāt
tadvacanam yuktam iti bhāvah.

(The position is this. It is already established that the characteristic of sūtra is the state of its being all-comprehensive. All-comprehensiveness occurs absolutely well only to the Brahma-sūtras. For this reason the state of deciding all branches of Veda i.e., deciding the meaning of all branches of Veda occurs only to them. Therefore these sūtras fix Veda and its meaning more decisively than others. What is so far said therefore is completely justified.)

At this stage we may fix our attention for a while on two expressions of T. pr.-Vedārtha-nirnayāya occurring at a previous passage and sarva-śākhā-nirņāyakatvam occurring in the present passage. The second expression speaks of the determination of śākhā, branch of Veda i.e., Veda itself. Consistently with this idea the former expression vedārtha-nirņaya must mean the determination of both Veda and its meaning. What is therefore indicated by these passages is that Veda is in as much need of determination as its meaning is. Just as any meaning is no meaning of Veda, any passage called Veda is no Veda when a wrong meaning is attributed to it. The so-called Veda in this circumstance is called Sāvakāśa, giving room for another meaning and it is considered to be no pramāņa, the source of correct knowledge. It is easy to see that that which is no pramana ceases to be Veda, because Veda is the name given to pramāṇa. All this consideration is with reference to a passage which is properly recognized to be Veda. Supposing any statement is forced on us as Veda, it is equally inevitable to see that it is really Veda. This is the determination of Veda as Veda. In doing this the character or artha i.e., meaning needs to be determined. These are the ideas conveyed by the statement that the Brahma-sūtras fix Veda as well as its meaning. This is the characteristic feature of Bhāṣyakāra's teaching. Looked at from this point of view there is very little to say in favour of other Bhāṣyas. In studying them we see how Veda and its meaning go to the background and the author becomes more important than Veda. These circumstances must steadily be kept in mind in properly understanding Madhva, the Bhāṣyakāra.

T. pr., mentions a difficulty in holding the all-determining character of the sūtras and introduces Bhāsya that removes the difficulty: anyeṣāmapi dvitra-śākhā-nirṇāyakatvāt katham eṣām sarva-nirṇāyakatvam anyathā tadvaiyarthyam ityata āha Śabda iti.

(As other sūtras also determine two or three branches [of Veda] how can the state of determining all be attributed to these [sūtras).] Otherwise they become useless. In order to remove this difficulty Bhāṣyakāra said Śabda and so on.)

The idea is this. The act of determining Veda and its meaning is by no means special to the Brahma-sūtras. There are other sutras which determine two or three branches of Veda. 'The Brahma-sūtras may take up the work of determining those branches of Veda that are not so far determined. In that case all-determining character cannot be attributed to the Brahma-sūtras. Against this difficulty if the Brahma-sūtras can be held to be all-determining, then it is as good as holding that the other sūtras are useless. The point to note is this. "Useless" does not mean superfluous. It is, consistent with the spirit of this discussion, equivalent to 'fallacious'. This is evident by the fact of the narrowness in their outlook. They could have kept in view the determination of the whole of Veda. To have confined their attention only to a few branches proves their narrow outlook. It is not impossible to see that they were forced to be narrow because the rest of Veda could not satisfy their interest in some preconceived idea. All this is made clear by Bhāṣyakāra.

Bhāṣya: Śabda-jātasya sarvasya yatpramāṇaśca nirṇayaḥ (The *Brahma-sūtras* present the standard of measure of all items of Śabda, sound.)

It must be noted that the significance of this position is very great. This is the expression of the truth that Brahma-vidyā is the pratisthā, support of all other branches of learning. All learning worth the name must get its principle from Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It is valid only in so far as it is based on Brahma-sūtra. So to understand a branch of learning is necessarily to understand that it is the outcome of the principle given by Brahma-sūtra. If a particular branch of learning does not admit of this knowledge, then it is defective and it does not lead to the realization of any spiritual value.

T.pr., explains the same position as:

sarvasya sabdajātasya nirņayah iti sarvaih sabda-samūhaih kriyamāņo nirņayah yatpramāņo yanmūlakah anyeṣām nirņāyakatvepi brahma-sūtrāņām astyeva sarva-sākhā-nirņāyakatvam, tannirņayasya brahma-sūtra-mūlatvena vyākhyānarūpatvāt, srutimūla smrtivat avaiyarthyopapatteh iti bhāvah.

('śabda jātasya sarvasya nirnayah' is equivalent to 'sarvasya śabda-jātasya nirnayah'. This means 'the conclusion arrived at by all verbal testimonies. The source of this conclusion is the Brahma-sūtras i.e., the standard of measure given by the Brahma-sūtras. There may be other sūtras which may fix the meaning of certain portions of Veda. Even then the Brahma-sūtras do not lose their control over all the branches of Veda. For the decision arrived at by the other sūtras is really governed by the Brahma-sūtras. For this reason the other sūtras in so far as they go are only different expositions or applications of Brahma-sūtras. This circumstance may be compared to that of Smṛti. Just as Smṛti is based on Sruti and therefore an exposition of Sruti and for this reason is not superfluous, the other sūtras being the exposition of the Brahma-sūtras are not useless. Bhāṣyakāra concludes:)

BHĀṢYA:

'EVAM VIDHĀNI SŪTRĀŅI KŖTVĀ VYĀSO MAHĀYAŚĀḤ BRAHMA-RUDRĀDI-DEVEŞU MANUŞYA PITR PAKŞIŞU JÑĀNAM SAMSTHĀPYA BHAGAVĀN KRĪDATE PURUŞOTTAMAḤ ITYĀDI.'

(Vyāsa whose reputation is unbound having composed the Sūtras of this nature and established knowledge in Brahmā,

Rudra, etc., the different divinities, men, fathers and birds, enjoys His creation as though He is engaged in sport. All this illustrates how He is *Purusottama*, the Source of all reality.

T. Pr., brings all kinds of means of obtaining knowledge under the perview of this position as—

brahma-rudrādi-deveşu jñānam samsthāpyetyanena pūrvasthitasyaiva višeşa-yuktyādibhih drdhī-karanam kvacid aprāpta-lābhascocyate. jānamtopi višeṣārtha-jñānāya sthāpanāya vā prcchamti sādhavah ityādeh, evam jñānam punah prāpuh ityādes ca ayam evārthah virincetareṣām tirohita-lābho vā. yata āhuh brahmanas tu

prāyo nāpratibhāsitam ityādi.

(By the expression 'brahma-rudrādi-deveṣu jñānam sam-sthāpya' we have to understand the following—making the knowledge that is already existent more definite by means of fresh reasons and in some cases getting the knowledge that is not so far obtained. The same interpretation must be given to other texts like 'Those that are interested in the development of knowledge (sādhavaḥ) make enquiries even with regard to things they already know in order either to know more details or to make knowledge that is obtained more stable. Thus they obtained knowledge once more.' With reference to those that are other than Virinca i.e., Rudra etc., attainment of knowledge consists in obtaining what is not so far obtained or what is obscured. For they say, 'On the whole there is nothing that is not known by Brahmā i.e. Virimca.')

It must be noted that this passage points out how knowledge in whatever form it may come is a case of fresh acquisition as a whole. It is Vyāsa that gives it. Though the process of its coming is differently described, it is in all cases a complete gift pre-supposing nothing. The whole process of acquisition and development of knowledge must be interpreted

in terms of this truth.

Bhāṣyakāra, so far, in support of his thesis that the source of knowledge is Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, traced the history of these *Sūtras*, referring to their origin and purpose as stated in the *Skāmda*. A note on this gives us an idea of the discipline to interpret the expressions of the *Sūtras*. The *Sūtras* appeared in order to fix the meaning of Veda. This is done by means of reasoning that applies to

Veda, because it underlies Veda. This circumstance gives us a clue to the nature of interpretation. A correct understanding of this nature alone helps us in understanding the meaning of the expression of Sūtra. Hence it is incorrect to attribute some one meaning to the Sūtras. The meaning must explain the whole circumstance of Veda in question. The meaning of Veda thus determined must be such that it is never sublated in any circumstance. This point illustrates how Veda is the highest aspect of philosphy.

T. pr., concludes the discussion:

tad evam aty upādeyatvāt vyākhyeyāni brahma-sūtrāņīti sthitam.

(Thus for the reasons stated the *Brahma-Sūtras* deserve our attention in every sense. It is for this reason that they stand to be expounded. This is the one position at which we have arrived.)

We have so far seen the justification for selecting only this work for our study. This selection is universal in character. The only thing that a man ought to do wherever he may be in whatever condition is the study of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. Study involves the exposition of the same. Apart from it there is nothing indispensable for a man.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER VI

THE BODY OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

T

Having explained the indispensability of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, T. Pr., introduces the first Sūtra (aphorism) as:

atra ādi-sūtrasya idam samgatyādi. atra brahma-jiñāsāyāh kartavyatva-samarthanāt asti śāstra-samgatih, anyathā śāstrasya anārambhanīyatva-prasamgāt etat samarthanīyam. adhyāya-pāda-samgatis tu ānamdamayādhikaraṇam ārabhyaiva gaveṣaṇīyā, tato arvāktanānām adhikaraṇānām adhyāya-pāda-pīthatvāt. Prathamādhikaraṇatvāt śruti-vicārasya adyāpy anārabdhatvāt nādhikaraṇa-śruti-samgatī ca.

[In this context (the context of expounding the Brahma-Sūtras) the place and so on of the first Sūtra is the following. In this (first) Sūtra the indispensability of the enquiry into Brahman is established. Therefore this Sūtra has a place in Sūstra. Otherwise there is no justification for starting Sūstra. (In order to show this justification) this (the indispensability of Sūstra) must be established. The place of the (first) Sūtra in the particular chapter and in the series of sections must be considered from the section called ūnamdamayūdhikarana (the sixth section of the first quarter of the first chapter.) The sections that precede this section form the basis of the chapters with their quarters. As the present (first) Sūtra is the very first section, the consideration of Sruti is not yet begun, there is presupposed neither the reference to a section previous to it nor Sruti which makes the consideration of Sruti necessary.]

T

With reference to this passage the following must be noted. Sāstra is the process of systematic thinking. This process has a definite start because life in general is unsystematic and out of this unsystematic mass system must arise. There can be no two systems, because to think of different

systems is contradiction in terms. It is true that commonly different systems of thought are talked of. But this has only a relative importance. The system that is absolutely true must, by nature, be one and one only. It is this system that is relevant in the present context. This system is on its own merit indispensable: Anything that goes by the name system, if it falls short of this absolute system gives way at some stage or other i.e. it is found to involve assumption, contradiction, absence of consistency, growthlessness and so on. With this discovery it ceases to be a system and on the basis of its negation a higher system emerges. This process continues till there is the emergence of the absolute system. This is the process of the growth of thought. This process or growth

being inevitable this system is indispensable.

This may be illustrated by taking for example the history of Indian Philosophy. According to the tradition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā the language of the absolute system of thought is Veda. If this truth is not sufficiently appreciated there is only confusion of thought. The idea of several thought-systems with reconciliation or without it is an aspect of this confusion. This is what is signified by Bhāṣya as 'jñāna was mistaken to be ajñāna'. 'Veda became obscured', and so on. It may be remembered that the effect of the confusion is so deep that even the divinities, Brahmā and so on could not help the situation. To meet this circumstance Vyasa organised Veda. This means that he presented to the world the absolute system of thought and this system is an expression of the complete organisation of thought. It is not enough if this system or organisation exists in a single mind or in a work composed by that mind. It must exist in every thinking being. The mind in which this is not existent is naturally confused and the result of confusion is misery. On the other hand the result of the system or organisation is bliss, anamda. The full expression of this anamda is signified as moksa, release. Hence Sastra in Hindu thought is also called mokṣa-śāstra. To define Śāstra in this manner is the language of the highest appreciation of the truth contained in such expressions as 'thought for the sake of thought' 'freedom of thought' and so on. Some modern observation that Indian thought is after all pragmatic as thought is not for its own sake and it is needed for getting release,

moksa to the philosopher does not apply to Brahma-mīmāmsā, because according to this tradition thought in its highest ex-

pression is release itself.

If all these truths are not properly appreciated, then it is the degeneration in thought and there is what is signified as the loss of knowledge viz., the loss of Sāstra. In this circumstance the men who are sufficiently intelligent think that it has befallen to their lot to conceive truth and teach it to the world. Under the condition of the loss of knowledge, however intelligent they may appear to be, they are not without mental reservations of various kinds and accordingly they imagine certain truths. Because they are intelligent and therefore they may also occupy certain important positions in life and in addition they may have power to attract common men they expound certain ideas and their expositions go by the name systems of thought. Generally in this circumstance they command a following and they are respected for their originality. This is generally the case in all parts of the thinking world.

II

But there is a special circumstance in India and this is the circumstance of the ever continuing Vedic tradition which is no other than the tradition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Whether it is understood and appreciated or not it is always there at least in a vague and general form. This circumstance has its own advantage or disadvantage to those that count independence of thinking. Some may feel that it is not to their advantage to respect Vedic tradition and for this reason they denounce the tradition in many ways. Some may feel that it is to their advantage to recognise Vedic tradition and for this reason they incorporate this tradition in so far as it is to their advantage placed in certain conditions of time created by particular levels of thought. The former of these are signified as nāstika and the latter āstika. Nāstika is one that does not acknowledge Vedic tradition and āstika is one that acknowledges the same. Though the tradition of the Vedas and that of Brahma-Mīmāmsā are one and the same and each is the language of the other owing to prepossessions thinkers do not readily recognise their identity and they believe that the tradition of the Vedas is independent of the tradition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā and expound their ideas accordingly. All these ideas will be fully worked out in the course of the study of Sāstra. But these ideas are not strange to the students of Indian philosophy in general. The very fact that the Indian philosophical systems are divided into two classes-nāstika and āstika sufficiently indicates that the study of Indian thought cannot be made independently of Vedic tradition Whether you accept or reject it it is always there as something that demands your serious notice. In other parts of the world some thinking without any reference to these ideas may go by the name philosophy, but it is due to the total absence of any idea connected with Vedic tradition and under this condition particular ideas of Veda in which the thinker is interested may be idealised and other ideas may be laughed at.

But the position of nāstika systems of thought is different. They clearly see that the Vedic tradition is a serious obstruction in the way of their free thought. Unless they remove, at least apparently, this obstruction they cannot proceed further. Therefore they give deep consideration to this problem. They make a critical study of all the circumstance in which Vedic tradition becomes indispensable. Because of their predisposition they criticise this circumstance adversely and arrive at their own conclusions. This is the distingushing feature of the nāstika systems of thought.

IV

From the point of view of the absolute system of thought i.e. Brahma-Mīmāmsā even the nāstika systems have their own contribution to make towards the formation of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. By tentatively expounding a position against Brahma-Mīmāmsā the nāstika thought helps the speedy discovery of its own hollowness against Brahma-Mīmāmsā and thus helps the generation, formation and growth of the latter. This explains how these systems with all their opposition to Brahma-Mīmāmsā as they follow one another effect a nearer and nearer approach to Brahma-Mīmāmsa, though in a negative fashion.

Further the tradition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is so definite that it does not tolerate even the slightest modification in the outlook. Any system that falls short of it in any manner is as bad as any other system. Hence the division of systems as nāstika, āstika and so on has little significance to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Having in view all these ideas in the course of its teaching Vyasa criticises and evaluates the positions of some early thinkers-Jaimini, Āśmarathya, Bādari, Audulomi, Kāśakṛtsna and Atreya. In this connection he shows how their positions are different from his and how therefore they do not help the knowledge of Brahman. He presents himself in the name of Bādarāyaṇa and thereby signifies how important his view is. In expounding these ideas Bhāṣyakara shows how Bādarāyaṇa's omniscience knows no bound and how Jaimini and others fail even to approach Bādarāyaṇa. He illustrates in this context how Badarayana is the absolute and one Lord of all learning and how other thinkers somehow own some idea (eka-deśa) of his thought bereft of its context and make much of it and shine as great thinkers. He defines Bādarāyaṇa's position as being such that once it is understood it can never be given up. It follows from this that Jaimini and so on can never understand Bādarāyaṇa's position, the reason for this being their defective outlook and in this circumstance they imagine something and present it as truth. The difference between Badarayana and the other thinkers is this. While the other thinkers expound some position with absolute ignorance of Badarayana's position, Badarayana establishes his position with careful understanding and evaluation of the positions of other thinkers. A note on these points indicates that it is not to do justice to Brahma-Mīmāmsā to take Bādarāyana as one of the thinkers, thereby suggesting that there were or may be others equal or superior to him. Without the proper appreciation of Bādarāyaņa as the one thinker of the world Brahma-Mīmāmsā can never be within the reach of the student. This note is never intended to advocate faith in Badarayana. It is still worse to believe that Badarayana is the highest thinker, because in that case the person in question develops dogmatism. But to consider Bādarāyaņa to be the highest philosopher of all ages is a matter of understanding. It is a matter of realization by means of careful study on the part of the student.

It may be asked that before Bādarāyaṇa's exposition of the Brahma-sūtras how could Jaimini and others understand his position? In answer to a question like this Bādarāyaṇa and following him Bhāṣyakāra would draw a distinction between

two classes of thinkers—one—those that imagine things in the absence of knowledge and two—those that hanker after knowledge till it is obtained. It is needless to say that the latter are superior to the former and the former in this circumstance become the opposers of truth and the latter the proper students of Sāstra.

V

Under the title Indian philosophy in these days a number of systems are studied as nāstika, āstika and so on. But the order in which Bādarāyaṇa criticises systems of thought is different. In the course of his early exposition he criticises Pūrva-Mīmāmsā in the name of Jaimini and Yoga. In the second quarter of the second chapter he criticises several schools of thought. They are in order—Nirīsvara-Sāmkhya, Seśvara-Sāmkhya, Lokāyatika, Puruṣopasarjana-prakṛti-kartṛtva-vāda, Prakṛty-upasarjana-puruṣa-kartṛtva-vāda, Paramānvāram-bha-vāda, Ānvīkṣakī or Tarka-vidyā, Paramānu-puniṇa-vāda, Sūuya-vāda, Vijīāna-vāda, Syād-vāda, Pāsupata-pakṣa and Sakti-pakṣa. All these schools of thought and the ideas consistent with any of them are shown to negate Brahman and they are therefore shown to be of defective thinking.

Further it must be noted that Bhāṣyakāra has criticised twenty-one Bhāṣyas that preceded his Bhāṣya and shown that they are expressions of defective thinking and that they fall far short of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In the same context he illustrates how the positions of these Bhāṣyas are already criticised by Bādarāyaṇa himself in the Sūtras. Taking the two outstanding schools of these twenty-one the fact how these two schools viz., Māyāvāda of Samkara and Visisṭādvaita of Ramānuja are criticised by Bādarāyaṇa may be briefly indicated. Bhāṣyakāra explains that Māyā-vada is criticised under Śūnya-vāda, nāsato dṛṣṭatvāt (2. 2. 8. 26.) and visiṣṭādvaita under prakṛṭy-adhikaraṇa prakṛṭis ca pratijāā-dṛṣṭāmtānuparodhāt (1. 4. 6. 24.).

A doubt arises how can these schools be criticised by Bādarāyaṇa who composed his Sūtras far earlier? In answer Bhāsyakāra shows how Veda and Brahma-Mīmāmsā are inseparable and as this whole presents the final system of thought how the criticism of all ideas that fall short of it is presupposed by it. Veda is impersonal, Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the language of the reason innate in Veda. This is how these two are one

and the same and they are inseparable. Hence Veda necessarily presupposes the criticism of all thought that in any sense opposes it. Any idea that falls short of it is a defect in thinking and it creates an obstacle in the way of understanding Brahman. Therefore it is as good as opposing Veda. Hence it is criticised by Veda and this criticism is innate in the Vedic statement and Brahma-Mīmāmsā brings it to light. As impersonal Veda is beginningless. The thought it criticises also is beginningless. Thus both knowledge and non-knowledge are ever there with all their details. At particular periods of time particular ideas are favoured by men and the same old ideas are presented as being the most original. Even Māyāvāda and višistādvaita are, as is already indicated in the introduction, no exceptions to this rule. Bhāsyakāra compares the philosophical schools to the flow of a river which occur with intervals. The underlying idea is that knowledge presupposes a conscious criticism of non-knowledge. For this reason whenever there is the need for establishing knowledge there is already the operation of non-knowledge. It is in this circumstance Bādarāyaņa expounded Brahma-Mīmāmsā and Bhāsyakāra composed Bhāṣya.

Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the same as Brahma-Sūtras. It is in Vedic Sanskrit. Even as Veda ceases to be Veda if it is translated into any other language including even classical Sanskrit Brahma-Mīmāmsā ceases to be Brahma-Mīmāmsā if it is translated into any other language. The reason for this is this. The meaning of Veda is unlimited though it is definite. Similarly the meaning of the Brahma-Sūtrās is unlimited even though it is definite. But the meaning of rendering as such is limited and therefore indefinite. The mind behind Veda and Sūtra is omniscience, but the mind behind any rendering is limited knowledge. Hence Veda and Brahma-Mīmamsā have a definite connotation and denotation. Any modification in it is to lose Veda as well as Brahma-Mīmāmsā. All these details will

be worked out in the course of our study.

VI.

Brahma-Mīmamsā begins with aum athāto brahma-jijīāsā aum and ends with aum anāvrttih sabdāt anavrttīh sabdāt aum. It is divided into four chapters, adhyāyas-samanvaya, avirodha,

sādhana and phala. Each chapter is classified into four quarters, pādas and the relevant titles are given to them. Each quarter consists of several sections, adhikaraṇas. One or more aphorisms, sūtras form the body of a section.

The first chapter, first quarter has twelve sections in thirty-one aphorisms: the second quarter seven sections in thirty-two aphorisms: the third fourteen sections in forty-three aphorisms and the fourth seven sections in twenty-nine aphorisms.

The second chapter first quarter has eleven sections in thirty-eight aphorisms: the second twelve sections in forty-five aphorisms: the third nineteen sections in fifty-three aphorisms: and the fourth thirteen sections in twenty-three aphorisms.

The third chapter first quarter has twenty sections in twenty-nine aphorisms: the second twenty sections in forty-two aphorisms: the third forty-two sections in sixty-eight aphorisms and the fourth eleven sections in fifty-one aphorisms.

The fourth chapter first quarter has eight sections in nineteen aphorisms: the second ten sections in twenty-two aphorisms: the third six sections in sixteen aphorisms and the fourth eleven sections in twenty-three aphorisms.

The tradition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā says that these divisions and the details have great philosophical significance. Bhāṣya-kāra after having the first hand knowledge of these divisions from proper sources is said to have fixed them. So according to him any variation in these details as is found in the reading of Samkara and so on is definitely inconsistent with Bādarā-yaṇa's intention. These ideas become clear as the student progresses in his studies.

It may however be noted that this is Sāstra signified as Brahma-Mimāmsā. Under the purview of this the whole literature of Sruti and Smṛti is studied and bringing out the reason innate in them their meaning is fixed. This is the content of Sāstra and this is Brahma-Vidyā which is defined as the origin, support and culmination of learning as such in the light of Munḍaka-Upaniṣad. It is sarva-vidyā-pratiṣṭhā i.e. with it other branches of learning shine and in this circumstance they are constructive and help mankind and without this they are destructive and put an end to mankind. All these ideas become clear as we proceed in our study.

Having made a very brief note on the foregoing ideas,

the conditions that each aphorism and each section ought to satisfy may be studied. Aum athāto braha-jijnāsā aum is the first aphorism and by itself the first section of the whole Sastra. As it establishes the indispensability of enquiry, jijñāsā i.e mīmāmsā it has an indispensable place in Sastra. This section with the following four sections form the basis of the whole Sastra. They together form the outlook that must govern the study of Sāstra. Without this outlook no study is possible. Such a study is called anyāyādhyayana, illegitimate study. A student of Śāstra must at all cost avoid a study of this kind i.e. illegitimate study. Therefore with reference to the first Sūtra the question about its place in the chapter and in the first quarter does not arise. Further each sūtra aims at fixing the meaning of Veda. As this is the very first beginning of Sastra any consideration of Śruti is not presupposed. For the same reason the reason for the exposition of this section consisting particularly in meeting the difficulty caused by a previous section does not apply to it. Hence the Sūtra as it appears is well established.

In the light of these ideas the conditions that a section ought satisfy are the following. The appearance of a section in general is justified if it has 1 śāstra-samgati, having its place in Sāstra; 2 adhikaraṇa-samgati, the section it forms being made inevitable by a previous section; 3 śruti-samgati, its formation being made necessary because of fixing the meaning of a particular passage of Śruti; 4 pāda-samigati—its inevitable place in the particular quarter; and 5 adhyāya-samigati—its necessary place in the particular chapter. Hence the first business of a student is to see that a sūtra completely satisfies all these

conditions and then only his study becomes decisive.

The one lesson from the study of all these ideas is this. A student who has digested carefully all these conditions under which alone Sāstra becomes possible is never in a position to confuse Sāstra with anything that falls short of Sāstra.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF BRAHMA MIMAMSA

1

Having made these preliminary studies the problem of Brahma-M \bar{m} amins \bar{a} may now be studied. T. Pr. states the problem as:

'Prāripsitatayā cittasamgata-śāstre pravartanīyā brahmajijñāsā viṣayah. kartavyā naveti samdehaḥ. ubhayavidha-vyāpāradarśanam samdeha-bījam'.

(Sāstra is related to our mind as something the study of which is about to begin. The subject-matter of this Sāstra is brahma-jijñāsā, enquiry into Brahman. This enquiry is itself called Sāstra. There is a doubt whether enquiry is a necessity. The fact that some feel the necessity for enquiry while others do not is the cause of doubt.)

It must be noted in this connection that to feel the necessity for enquiry or not to feel it is itself an intellectual necessity. This indicates that to do either is governed by a particular tendency. In the presence of a particular tendency the several questions that may occur to an individual do not lead to anything of a serious nature. They just appear and vanish in many cases. But in particular cases they may have a deeper effect. Under this condition the individual comes to see that some experience has a finality and that there is no need for anything like brahma-jijñāsā. Then he falls back on some action, karma, or some faith. This tendency therefore forms the background of what is termed pūrva-pakṣa, antithesis.

In normal thinking, first a fact is suggested. This suggestion is governed by objective conditions as well as the corresponding subjective dispositions. After the suggestion of the fact, there is consciously or unconsciously an attempt at examining whether the thing suggested can stand or not. This is the process of doubt. It consists in doubting the thing. This pre-supposes a conscious or unconscious observation of the elements that establish the thing and of the elements that negate the thing together with their operation on

mind. The operation of either elements is not very effective because each makes the operation of the other possible. Doubt has two phases: (i) As if it is the nature of doubt, it leads to the negation of the thing to start with. In this case negation puts an end to thinking process and it does not help knowledge to establish the thing. (ii) In particular cases owing to some natural conditions the process of establishing the thing comes to operate. This involves the removal of the possibility of negating the thing. For unless this possibility is removed the thing is not established and in this case knowledge of the thing as established becomes impossible. So whether we are able to have knowledge or not, the process of making the thing impossible is inevitable. If no knowledge is attained the thought of impossibility of the thing persists; if knowledge is obtained this thought disappears. This thought or the position based on this thought is called pūrva-pakṣa. It is not something imagined. It is a necessary background of knowledge. Pūrva-pakṣa is removed when the reasons that are supposed to lead to it become falsified. The process of falsifying them forms the content of uttara-paksa. As a result, true knowledge or true position, in other words, siddhamta is obtained. The process of the falsification of the reasons for pūrva-pakṣa does not function purely negatively. It is a process of appreciation as well as of negation. A genuine pūrva-pakṣa as a rule involves certain elements of truth that go to make up knowledge and elements that make the former elements ineffective. An analysis of any case of wrong knowledge illustrates this point. Whenever a thing is mistaken for something else, there is always the recognition of certain element in the thing mistaken which is necessarily an element in the thing for which it is mistaken. In mistaking a shell for silver, perception of shining in the shell is a necessary condition of mistake, for silver for which the shell is mistaken enters into mind only in terms of shining. So also every case of pūrva-pakṣa is a case of illusion. It is mistaking something for something else. So it is bound to have both the elements of truth and those of untruth. Hence uttara-pakṣa which emerges from pūrva-pakṣa is necessarily an appreciation of the true element in the pūrva-pakṣa as well as the rejection of the element of untruth. Rejection of the element of untruth is necessarily in the interest of maintaining

the element of truth. Though pūrva-pakṣa contains some amount of truth it is considered to command no truth, as it makes use of truth in order to uphold untruth. Uttara-paksa discriminates between these aspects-truth and untruth and removes untruth completely so that the truth is made to stand by itself. In this connection by amplifying and supplementing truth, it brings truth to its final form. This is the way in which truth is maintained and knowledge is obtained. process indicates the process of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. So the process of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is never conditioned by the love of system making, though a system emerges finally. In no sense is it artificial. In fact, as will be made clear in the following pages, it sets an ideal for intellect to work. It is for reasons like these Mundaka holds that Brahma-Vidyā is Sarva-Vidyā-Pratisthā, i.e., the origin, support and goal of all branches of learning.

We have so far noted that the growth of knowledge is a process. It consists of several stages marked by the statement of a position, viṣaya, observation of the reasons for and against, doubt (samsaya), pūrva-pakṣa and uttara-pakṣa. These several stages stand for a variety of purpose. The statement of the position presents thesis. Pūrva-pakṣa, the result of observation and doubt, presents antithesis. Uttara-pakṣa with a closer observation maintaining the thesis against pūrva-paakṣa presents synthesis. So every case of knowledge is of the nature of synthesis. In the process of the further growth of knowledge this synthesis becomes a thesis. This gives room for antithesis and makes further synthesis possible. This is the process of knowledge in its growth. This fact indicates the process of

Brahma-Mīmāmsā, i.e., Brahma-Vidyā.

If the student is properly qualified, pūrva-pakṣa necessarily leads to uttara-pakṣa in his mind, because having the necessary equipment to have knowledge, he is not satisfied with pūrva-pakṣa. A question may arise: How can a person who has necessary equipment for knowledge have pūrva-pakṣa? In the light of the foregoing analysis the answer is that he develops pūrva-pakṣa because it is a necessary stage in the course of development of knowledge. Further, in the case of a person who is not properly qualified, doubt must necessarily lead to pūrva-pakṣa and it does not lead to knowledge. It marks

the end of mental life. This is the conclusion arrived at by Isa-Upanişad as 'eke cātmahano janāh'. (Those are the very people who have put an end to Ātman, the principle of their own existence). This principle is of the nature of knowledge itself. Any other thing cannot be the origin of mental life. So, in any case, if doubt occurs, pūrva-pakṣa is inevitable. As Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the origin of knowledge, with reference to every idea which forms the subject matter of this Sāstra, we have the active operation of the whole process with all its stages.

After stating the fact of doubt T. Pr. mentions pūrva-paksa: na kartavyeti pūrvaḥ-pakṣaḥ. adhikāri-viṣaya-prayojana-sambaindha-sünyatvät. na tävat brahma vişayah, asamdigdhatvät, pramānābhāvena jīva-vyatiriktasya brahmaņo abhāvāt, jīvasya ca svaprakāśatvāt. na hi kaścit prakāśamānerthe samdigdhe. na cātmanah sva-prakāśatve vivaditavyam. aham ity anubhavāt. na cāyam mānasonubhavah, tasyāpi jñāyamānatvena anubhavāmtarānvesaņe anavasthānāt, kasyacid anubhavasya sva-prakāsatve svātmana eva tat. jijñāsāyām evānubhavo anubhūyate iti na vācyam, anubhavavirodhāt. na hi ajñāyamāna-jñāna-sadbhāve kim cin mānam. na ca sva-prakāśa-samvidāśrayatayā ātmā avabhāsate iti yuktam. auttarikānusmrti-siddha-sausuptikānubhavābhāva-prasamgāt. na hi susuptau ātmātiriktā samvid astīti sambhavati. samvidātmakatvāc ca ātmano na samvidāśrayatayā pratītih. atah sva-prakāśātmātiriktasya brahmano asamdigdhatvāt navisayatvam sambhavati, na ca jijñāsāyāh prayojananm asti, jñāyamānepi brahmani tadanupalambhāt. vişaya-prayojanābhāvāt na brahma-jijnāsāyām adhikārī vidyate. ata eva na sambandhah. ato na brahma-jijñāsā kartavyeti nastacchāstram ārambhanīym iti.

(Enquiry into Brahman is not indispensable. For it is devoid of one who is interested in it, subject-matter, end and their mutual relation. Brahman is not the subject-matter. For it is not doubted. As there is no proof there is no Brahman which is different from jīva. Further jīva is self-luminous, i.e., self-established. No man indeed entertains doubt with regard to a thing which is self-luminous. Nor is it possible to dispute the fact that ātman (jīva) is self-luminous, because of the experience, 'I'. This is not the experience belonging to manas. The reason is this, If it belonged to

manas, then it itself requires to be known. If we have to search for some other experience in order to explain the fact that it is known, then our procedure ends in infinite regress. If in this procedure some experience is taken to be self-luminous, then the original experience itself which formed our starting point may conveniently be considered to be self-luminous. It must not be supposed that there is experience of experience, i.e., consciousness of consciousness, only through jijnāsā. For this supposition is sublated by experience. Nor is there any proof for holding that there is knowledge (experience, consciousness) which is itself unknown.

Nor is it reasonable to hold that ātman (jīva) is known to us as the substratum of knowledge which is self-luminous. For in that case there ought to be no knowledge of the self (jīva) in sleep on the basis of the memory that follows the state of sleep. It is not possible to hold that during sleep there is knowledge which is different from ātman. As ātman is of the nature of knowledge, i.e., is the same as knowledge there is no experience of ātman as the substratum of knowledge. Therefore, Brahman which is no other than ātman, the self-luminous, is beyond doubt. For this reason it does not

form the subject-matter of Sāstra.

Nor is there anything to obtain from philosophical enquiry. For though Brahman is, in the manner stated above, known, nothing special is thereby obtained. As there is neither the subject-matter nor anything to be realized by the knowledge of the subject-matter, there is no person who may be interested to have brahma-jijñāsā. For the same reason there is no relation between these three things. Therefore, brahma-jijñāsā is not something indispensable. For this reason this Sāstra need not be commenced.

¹ Māyāvāda holds that antaḥkaraṇa i.e., manas is non-spiritual, but it is the abode of knowledge called vrtti.

² This is the position of prabhākara. He holds that in every case of perception three things are presented—object presented by knowledge, knowledge which is self luminous and self (Ātman) presented by knowledge as substratum. For this reason perception (pratyakşa) is called Tripuṭī.

II

In order to arrive at correct knowledge, *siddhāmta*, a careful study of the implications of *pūrva-pakṣa* is inevitable. Without correct evaluation of *pūrva-pakṣa* the difficulties presented by it cannot be overcome and knowledge cannot be obtained.

At the stage of doubt whether Brahma-Mīmāmsā is a necessity, the fact that if it has a subject-matter that requires jijñāsā is seriously considered. If jijñāsā is a necessity, then its subject-matter must be something the existence of which is not certain. But any serious thought in this connection requires a careful decision, viz.. to posit a thing the existence of which is certain makes jijñāsā quite unnecessary. In order to make this decision possible a thing the existence of which is certain is posited as the subject-matter of jijñāsā and consequently jijñāsā is shown to be impossible. This process forms the content of antithesis, viz., pūrva-pakṣa against the thesis, viz., the necessity for jijnāsā. Obviously jijnāsā stands for the growth of knowledge while pūrva-pakṣa stands for the arrest of knowledge. With jijnāsā knowledge arrested by pūrva-pakṣa is let free and it has the scope to grow; one who stops with pūrva-pakṣa has put an end to mental growth. This state is an indication of how one has already developed a tendency to hate the growth of knowledge and with it, all that makes knowledge possible. A careful study of this position with its implications reveals the fact that jijñāsā, philosophical enquiry is possible only in one sense. It is never possible so long as the subject-matter is considered to be in any sense certain. It is possible only in so far as its subject-matter is not certain. To hold that it is not certain is not to deny it, but it is not at the same time to assert it. So in the light of these observations we can speak of only one philosophy and not of several philosophies.

But much against this truth we commonly speak of several systems of philosophy, each contradicting the others. This is not possible, because that which does not lead to philosophy, $jij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}s\tilde{a}$, is opposed to philosophy. By determining that which does not lead to philosophy, the proper course of philosophy is indirectly fixed. Finally brahma-jij\tilde{n}asa becomes the only philosophy and all other so-called systems of thought become merely the expressions of negation of philosophy. So from

the standpoint of brahma-jijñāsā, all other systems of thought are only different items of pūrva-pakṣa. The truth they speak of is in some sense or other certain and it is therefore already familiar to the philosopher even before jijnāsā. Hence it marks the arrest of knowledge and the system by which it seems to be expounded becomes therefore artificial. In such a system as this, self-contradiction, superficiality of reasoning, sudden introduction of particular positions and assertion of

their truth are quite common.

The pūrva-pakṣa as mentioned in Tattva-Prakāśikā illustrates all these points. It states first that Brahman cannot be the subject-matter of brahma-jijñāsā. This is proved by the fact that Brahman is not doubted, asamdigdha. This means that which is not doubted cannot be the subject-matter of Sastra. This circumstance also illustrates how religious faith of any kind negates Brahma-Mīmāmsā. So this Sāstra knows no religion and it gives its own scheme of life; this life being the expression of knowledge helps the further growth of knowledge. Hence to judge any position of jijnāsā from the standpoint of any religious conviction is definitely opposed to the very spirit of Sastra and it does not make Sastra possible.

Pūrva-pakṣa illustrates how Brahman is asamdigdha by holding that Brahman is the same as jiva on the ground that there is nothing which gives us the knowledge of the difference between the two. It may be noted that this kind of thinking is quite natural at the stage of pūrva-pakṣa. When the mind takes rest on something certain, the tendency is to catch hold of the most immediately certain and consider it to be Brahman. This is how pūrva-pakṣa arrives at the idea of Brahman being the same as jīva. As it is interested in positing that which is certain, it does not think of the possibility of having a source of knowledge which presents that which transcends certainty to start with and is made certain only through Sāstra. This circumstance is due to its disposition of taking things of normal or commonsense experience to be absolute. The whole consideration gives us an idea of how anything that is in any sense identical with jīva is never the subject-matter of jijñāsā.

Further, pūrva-pakṣa attempts to show how jīva is most immediately certain on the basis of the assumption that it is self-luminous, sva-prakāśa. It may be seen that this

assumption is conditioned by the interest in maintaining the immediate certainty of $j\bar{\imath}va$. This assumption also illustrates how in the course of $p\bar{\imath}va-pak_ja$, some assumption forms the starting point and there is an attempt to substantiate it by a number of assumptions, which only seem to support the original assumption. Next $p\bar{\imath}va-pak_ja$ shows how with regard to a thing which is revealed, no doubt can be entertained. This circumstance commits $p\bar{\imath}va-pak_ja$ to a particular meaning of $sva-prak\bar{a}s$. According to this meaning $p\bar{\imath}va-pak_ja$ holds the view that $j\bar{\imath}va$ which is supposed to be the subject-matter of $jij\bar{n}a\bar{s}a$ is luminous to the student in question. This circumstance makes $jij\bar{n}a\bar{s}a$ unnecessary. It indirectly gives us an idea how $jij\bar{n}a\bar{s}a$ does not present anything that can be known without $jij\bar{n}a\bar{s}a$.

Pūrva-pakṣa next removes the possibility of dispute with regard to self-luminousness of ātman. It points out the experience, 'I' as the basis of its position. The idea is this: If ātman were not self-luminous then there would not have been the experience, 'I'. There is the experience, 'I' and

this proves the self-luminous character of ātman.

Further, pūrva-pakṣa cites theories that explain the experience, 'I' but do not support that ātman is self-luminous. In consideration of the fact that experience as such comes into being and goes out of it, it is taken to be a property or state of manas in the systems, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and so on. If this position holds good, then the experience 'I' cannot be taken to prove self-luminousness of ātman. Hence in the interest of maintaining self-luminousness of ātman, pūrva-pakṣa points out that the position of Nyāya-vaiśesika and so on is wrong. The reason is this: Granting that the experience 'I' belongs to manas, one might be taken to have proved that it is not selfluminous. But how does one become conscious of this experience? To meet this demand if another experience is posited, then the same difficulty appears in explaining how this experience is known. If another experience is posited to meet this demand, then the position ends in infinite regress. If in the course of this consideration any one experience is taken to be self-luminous, then it would naturally suggest that the first experience itself would have been considered self-luminous and thereby the whole dispute would have been conveniently avoided. To note this is to get an idea that any consideration that results in infinite regress does not help jijñāsā.

Some may hold that no doubt the experience of 'I' is selfluminous, but the individual comes to be conscious of this fact only through jijnāsā. This is in substance the position of various religious faiths which incorporate with them jijnāsā also. Unless this position is carefully considered, jijnāsā, i.e., philosophy cannot be made independent of faith. To mix consciously or unconsciously any element such as faith with jijnāsā is in the end to condition jijnāsā. Under this circumstance the conditioning entity becomes more important than jijnāsā and finally makes jijnāsā superfluous.

The position of jijāāsā is definitely this: It takes place only if its subject-matter is doubted, sandigdha. If the subject-matter is in any sense made not-doubted, asandigdha, then jijāāsā becomes impossible.

III

If we understand the full significance of this position it is easy for us to appreciate the following ideas: Some may believe in some kind of God or some kind of truth of the world. In order to justify what they believe they may have jijñāsā. In such circumstances as this, it is not jijñāsā that governs the other faculties of mind but it is belief, etc., that govern jijñāsā. Hence what they have is only a semblance of jijñāsā, but not jijñāsā proper.

Some may altogether mistake the implications of the subject-matter of philosophy (jijñāsā) being samdigdha. They may take samdigdha to be the language of absence and arrive at the conclusion that to hold that the subject-matter of philosophy must be samdigdha is to hold that it does not exist. But a conclusion like this is thoroughly erroneous. The error consists in inferring certainty from uncertainty. If the subject-matter of jijñāsā is samdigdha then its absence also is equally samdigdha. If it is not samdigdha, then to hold that the subject-matter is samdigdha becomes meaningless.

Some others may argue that to hold the subject-matter as sandigdha may be theoretically or scientifically a correct position but practically a dangerous one. For are not men who work for the progress of society, men who work for

political and material welfare, men who work for moral and educational upliftment always moved by some kind of faith in the ultimate Truth? Did not at the periods of degeneration of outlook, dharma-nāśa, great souls appear and help the world in various ways? Is not their unadulterated faith in ultimate values the only thing that accounts for their success? If these ultimate things are made samdigdha, doubtful, is it not perhaps an unconscious effort to put an end to all civilization? In answer to this difficulty it must be noted at the outset that philosophy makes or attempts to make the ultimate truth of all intelligible. The problem of ultimate truth appears only when civilization attains its culmination. So it does not negate civilization, rather civilization is its necessary pre-supposition. The ultimate truth viz., the subject-matter of philosophy, is samdigdha prior to philosophy; otherwise philosophy itself becomes impossible. Hence to hold that the subject-matter of philosophy is sandigdha indeed marks the culmination of civilization. Further to explain the origin of civilization by some kind of faith is itself an erroneous view. Regarding men who are supposed to be great, their faith and the actual work they might have done may not have any relation to each other. Whenever we are advised by our elders or men of experience with regard to matters of any serious nature, how often have we ourselves not thought that we need not follow their faith but follow their experience? Following experience is believing in the rationality underlying the advice. This is finally to follow philosophy of some value. So whenever there is a real achievement in the direction of truth there is always the corresponding philosophy at bottom. Owing to failure of a correct analysis of a circumstance we wrongly connect faith and achievement. With the correct understanding of the whole position, it is no wonder if we arrive at the conclusion that the faith that the men in question might have had, would have even formed a hindrance to their greater achievement. We may even appreciate the position that if those people had a philosophical vision of the ultimate truth that vision would have formed a sound basis for their constructive work. If all these truths are properly appreciated, then we are in a position to see the futility of all developments that are not philosophical. They are, as a rule, at some stage or other dangerous to society.

and they mar the individual improvement. When they actually prove to be dangerous it is philosophy that must give us solution. If on the other hand all developments are controlled by philosophy so as to satisfy the demand of the Upanisadic truth, 'brahma-vidyām sarva-vidyā-pratisthām', then it is in every case of success, philosophy that is at work. In this circumstance there is only one science, vidyā, that is philosophy, jijnāsā, i.e., Brahma-Mīmamsā. Further, to appreciate philosophical truth has always immediate influence on life. Therefore our common expression that 'X' is friend, guide, philosopher, poet, politician, etc, conveys no meaning that is precise. Though commonly we seem to have understood something exceptional we have not in fact understood anything at all, because after hearing such expressions we are not in a position to define any idea that we are supposed to have. The previous considerations have taught us that along with philosophy nothing intellectual as opposed to philosophy can be mentioned. Hence to know that a person is a philosopher is to appreciate all that is really good in him. Civilization that is worth the name justifies itself if it makes philosophy possible; and philosophy is worth the name if it makes Brahma Mīmāmsā indispensable.

There may be yet some others of seemingly pious disposition that may tell us that to hold that the subject-matter of philosophy is samdigdha is to condemn great souls with exceptional abilities including the great authors of Brahma-Mīmāmsā themselves. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of this Śāstra is God Himself and He is necessarily omniscient. The author of Bhāṣya, whoever he be, is sarvajña, one who knows all and the other authors who expound the position of Bhāṣya are sarvajña-kalpas, those that have paractically reached complete knowledge. If this is the actual circumstance in which Sastra is expounded, to say that the subject-matter of philosophy is as a rule samdigdha is a sin committed against these great beings. Against this difficulty the following may be noted. In fact there is no difficulty at all. The so-called difficulty is due to some kind of abnormal thinking. Granting that it is a difficulty we may meet it with equal ease. If we take Badarayana to be God Himself the solution is easy. We may quite conveniently hold that he composed Brahma-Mīmāmsā with all its circumstance just as he created the world. If to be omniscient is assumed to form the nature of God, then in spite of his creation Bādarāyaṇa may be considered to be omniscient. If this conclusion is not desired, then he need not be considered to be omniscient at all. With others also the solution is simple. If they have earnestly commenced Brahma-Mīmāmsā, then it means its subject-matter was really samdigdha to them. Consistently with this idea their supposed complete knowledge must be interpreted.

IV

Thus so far we have made ourselves clear with regard to the truth that the subject-matter of philosophy is samdigdha. The author of pūrva-pakṣa as though he knows and appreciates all this, states his position so carefully as to give no room for the possibility of making the supposed subject-matter doubted, samdigdha. He takes every precaution to make the supposed subject-matter not-doubted, asamdigdha. But he never mentions the difficulty in holding that the subject-matter is samdigdha as the basis of pūrva-pakṣa. He only shows how the supposed subject-matter is asamdigdha. There ends his whole work. This circumstance is highly significant. It indicates that he really intends to set a powerful opposition to Sāstra. This is the reason why of all the positions known to philosophy only this position, namely, the non-duality of jīva and Brahman is taken to be the genuine pūrva-pakṣa to Śāstra. Though it appears to give strength to opposition it really helps knowledge which, when once obtained, never makes pūrva-pakṣa of any kind possible.

Next in support of its own position pūrva-pakṣa arrives at the conclusion that there is no possibility of having any pramāṇa, the source of knowledge which would reveal the existence of knowledge which is not known, i.e., which is not self-luminous. In taking this position, pūrva-pakṣa intends to prove the fact that if something is not known, then it does not exist and there can be no pramāṇa to prove its existence. From this it follows that pramāṇa operates only with reference to a thing which is already known. So the ordinary supposition that pramāṇa is the source of knowledge needs a careful examination. A question arises: Is the thing which a pramāṇa, is supposed to reveal known or unknown? If it is unknown, then in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is not possible to hold that pramāṇa reveals it. If it is

known, then there is no need for a pramāna to reveal it. What is the meaning of the idea that it is known? It must only mean that it is self-luminous. Such a thing as this is only knowledge. The same is ātman. Consistently with this truth if we have to interpret a pramāna, then we can justify it only by attributing to it a negative function. According to this interpretation a pramāna removes that which obstructs the manifestation of the self-luminous. Hence the positive significance of a pramāna is finally the manifestation of the self-luminous. The one implication of all these considerations is that which exists is self-luminous and there is nothing that can be distinguished from it.

At this stage a question appears. If all that is is selfluminous, then what is the ontological status of that which is supposed to obstruct its manifestation? The answer is obvious. If what is existent is only self-luminous, then it follows that that which in not self-luminous is not existent. This means that that which obstructs the self-luminous is in truth non-existent. Its obstruction is therefore non-existent and the ideas that the self-luminous needs manifestation and has manifestation and before manifestation was non-manifest

also are wrong.

If all this is non-existent, then what is its stuff and how does it appear? The following is the answer. We have seen knowledge is self-luminous and the self-luminous is knowledge. So knowledge is partless (akhanda.) That which is different from knowledge is non-knowledge, ajñāna, avidyā or māyā. That which obstructs the self-luminous is non-knowledge. Hence the stuff of that which is shown to be non-existent is non-knowledge. Further non-knowledge cannot appear independently of the self-luminous. Outside the self-luminous non-knowledge is impossible. This does not mean that non-knowledge exists in the self-luminous. The self-luminous is partless and it makes nothing outside it possible. But yet non-knowledge appears. This circumstance suggests that it is superimposed on the self-luminous. So non-knowledge appears as being superimposed, Adhyasta, on the self-luminous.

Because non-knowledge is sublated it is not real, sat and because it is superimposed, adhyasta, it is not unreal, asat, as for example, the horn of a hare, sasa-visāna. So it is neither real

nor unreal: neither sat nor asat. It is sad-asad-vilakṣana, mithyā, anirvacanīya or anirvācya. With the manifestation of the self-luminous, it is sublated (bādhita.) This means that when there is the munifestation of the self-luminous, the self-luminous is all that is and there is nothing else. So sublation of non-knowledge means the negation of non-knowledge.

The self-luminous thus, being all that is (satya), enjoys immediate certainty. It is not doubted, asandigdha and

philosophy has no subject-matter.

The foregoing considerations, though they support pūrvapaksa, indirectly give us certain conditions under which alone philosophy is possible. If the knowledge of the subject-matter of philosophy becomes possible only through philosophy, then alone philosophy is possible. To modify the position in any way is to attribute only a negative function to philosophy and this is in the end to deny philosophy itself. Further, as we have already seen, to posit knowledge in any sense prior to philosophy results in the end in assuming all that appears to be different from knowledge to be unreal, mithyā. But to confine the source of knowledge to philosophy results in holding that all that is different from the subject-matter of philosophy is real, satya. Hence mithyā is the language of negation of philosophy and satya is the language of emphasising philosophy. This means that philosophy is justified only by a conscious recognition that all that is different from its subject-matter is satya. As mithyā means the sublated, satya means just its opposite, that is, the unsublated. The position that posits the self-luminous makes all that is different from it sublated; and the position that posits samdigdha makes all that is different from it non-sublated and consequently makes philosophy possible. In other words the theory that the world is illusory, jagan-mithyātva-vāda makes Brahma-Mīmāmsā impossible. On the other hand, the theory that the world is real, jagat-satyatva-vāda makes Brahma-Mīmāmsā not only possible but an absolute necessity. For this reason jagan-mithyātva-vāda, the theory that the world is illusory forms the genuine pūrva-pakṣa of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

In order to strengthen further its position, pūrva-pakṣa considers the possibility of making philosophy possible, holding at the same time that knowledge is self-luminous. So far the position of pūrva-pakṣa is that knowledge is the same as ātman

and it is self-luminous. This we have seen is to make philosophy impossible. In holding this position we did not start with a prejudice against philosophy; we did not hold that knowledge is self-luminous and that it is ātman, not because we wanted to have no philosophy, but because we really wanted to consider whether we can have philosophy at all. But in the course of this consideration we really arrived at the truth that knowledge which is the same as atman is self-luminous. This made philosophy impossible. Now in the interest of justifying philosophy can we modify our position? We may even now recognize the position that knowledge is self-luminous. But this itself does not make philosophy impossible. Knowledge which is self-luminous is after all a property. It requires a substance as its substratum. We may call its substratum, (āśraya) ātman. In this case there may be the need for philosophy. For though there need be no philosophy with regard to the fact of knowledge which is self-evident, philosophy may be a necessity with regard to atman which is not selfevident, though it is the substratum of knowledge that is selfevident. After all knowledge is knowledge, its substratum is substratum, each having its own individuality. What knowledge is, its substratum is not and may not be.

This view is so far an opposition to pūrva-paksa. Pūrvapaksa shows that it is an erroneous view. For this view is not consistent with the fact that there is the experience of ātman (ātmānubhava) during sleep. This fact is proved by the memory that follows sleep. Immediately after sleep is over we have the memory that we had sleep. 'I had sleep' is a case of memory. It must therefore be based on the experience of sleep with reference to me. As the experience of sleep it occurs during sleep. This experience is nothing but the selfluminous character of knowledge. The fact that there is then no experience of things other than knowledge forms the content of sleep. But knowledge is self-luminous. In spite of sleep it shines. If ātman were not knowledge, then the experience of sleep would not have occurred with reference to me. There is nothing to tell us that in sleep there is only knowledge as being different from ātman. So with reference to the experience, 'I slept happily' 'I' stands for ātman as well as knowledge. This is why ātman is never experienced

as the substratum of knowledge.

It may therefore be concluded that knowledge is selfluminous. Atman is knowledge and it is Brahman itself and therefore Brahman is self-luminous and it is not samdigdha and it cannot therefore be the subject-matter of philosophy. This is so far the final conclusion of pūrva-pakṣa, against the subject-

matter of philosophy.

This shows how if knowledge is self-luminous nothing else that is different from it can be thought of. Thereby it indicates how there is nothing the knowledge of which is dependent on philosophy. That which is is knowledge. It is self-evident. No philosophy is needed to give us its knowledge. As distinct from knowledge there is nothing. So to talk of knowledge with its reference to an object is meaningless. So what is, is not doubted. Philosophy has no ground to arise.

At this stage one may ask if this conclusion itself is philosophical. No, is the answer. There is nothing gained by these considerations. No fresh knowledge is obtained. Atman (knowledge) is ever self-luminous. It is always there. It is in fact absurd to talk of philosophy. If anybody feels that it is needed, then it simply follows that he wants to know what he already knows. There is nothing gained by this.

So philosophy has no purpose to serve.

This is the further implication of pūrva-pakṣa. In examining it, it may be noted that whatever form it takes it gives us one lesson in support of philosophy. This lesson consists in recognizing that to posit anything as self-evident in the sense in which pūrva-pakṣa holds it is to negate philosophy. To make philosophy impossible is thus due to our defect i.e., positing something as self-evident. It is therefore wrong to think that it is the defect of philosophy.

Further pūrva-pakṣa illustrates how there is nothing realized by the study of philosophy. A note on this aspect of pūrvapakṣa gives us a condition that justifies philosophy. It consists in insisting upon achieving something that makes the growth

of philosophy possible.

Further pūrva-pakṣa shows how there is nobody who is qualified, who is in a position to justify philosophy or who is in need of the study of philosophy. The reason that pūrva-pakṣa gives is that there is neither subject-matter nor purpose. So pūrva-pakṣa holds that nobody is in need of the study of Sāstra, thus making philosophy impossible.

A note on this aspect of pūrva-pakṣa gives us a certain discipline that tests the validity of philosophy. The study of philosophy must not be a fashion. It must not take place by mere desire or by mere imitation. It is genuine only when it is prompted by the circumstance characterized by the fact that the subject-matter is doubted and the knowledge of it has a definite purpose to serve. A careful application of this truth avoids one's tendency to give a religious colour to the study of philosophy. By some philosophy is commonly studied as a part of religion to which faith the so-called student has already committed himself. But under this circumstance philosophy has neither subject-matter nor purpose. To find out this mistake makes a serious study of philosophy possible.

Finally pūrva-pakṣa shows how there is no relation between the subject-matter, purpose and the person who is in need of philosophy as they themselves do not exist. Pūrva-pakṣa insists upon the mutual relation of the three things, subject-matter and so on, as the necessary condition of philosophy. In the present circumstance, as has been already shown, there is the absence of these three conditions and for this reason, we do not have the relation of these three things and this makes

philosophy impossible.

It may be noted that this part of pūrva-paksa indirectly gives us the relation (sambamdha) of the three-fold condition as a necessary test for the validity of philosophy. The lesson from this is that in the course of the study of philosophy we must stop at every stage and see if the conclusion we arrive at is really the result of the conscious operation of all the foregoing ideas. In the world with which we are familiar, the tendency to believe is common and the tendency to think is exception. This is specially so with reference to spiritual ideas. Hence no emphasis on these conditions is sufficient.

Pūrva-pakṣa in the light of the considerations so far developed presents its conclusion that Śāstra in question cannot be commenced

A successful application of these conditions to one's own thinking seems indeed to be the very ideal of a philosopher, though it is considered to be the very starting point of Sāstra i.e. Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

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HARIH AUM

CHAPTER VIII

THE DISPOSITION OF BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ
THE ENVIRONMENT IN
WHICH BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ IS POSSIBLE

I

We have so far seen how Brahma-Jijnasa is indispensable. The term indispensable signifies that no external compulsion forms the presupposition of jijnasa. Jijnasa on the other hand is internally determined. This fact implies a certain circumstance. As a conscious recognition of this circumstance helps jijnasa, the recognition must be mentioned in Sūtra itself. T. pr., introduces Bhāṣyakāra who makes this point clear.

"Gramthādau Mamgalācaraņasya avašya-kartavyatvāt tat-paratayā atha-šabdam vyācaste."— ATHA' iti

(At the commencement of the work the occurrence of an auspicious disposition is necessarily indispensable. For this reason Bhāṣyakāra interpreted the word atha which formed a part of the Sūtra as signifying this occurrence; as Atha etc.)

of the Sūtra as signifying this occurrence: as Atha, etc.)

It must be noted that if jijnāsā is indispensable, it inevitably follows that the occurrence of auspicious disposition is the necessary background of jijnāsā. The presence of this background signifies that jijnāsā is necessarily the outcome of joy. This fact leads to the idea that jijnāsa is genuine only in so far as it is the outcome of joy and it continues only in so far as it is the expression of joy.

Bhāṣya—атна-śавдо мамдацаятнан.

[The word atha signifies manigala, auspicious disposition consisting in the fact that jijitāsā is the outcome of joy.]

So by the use of the word atha in the Sūtra the author of Sūtra intends to show that an auspicious disposition of mind is the background of jijnāsā. This means that with reference to jijnāsā nothing is laboured, nothing implies pain. Everything that characterizes jijnāsā is an expression of joy, spiritual joy. This disposition is what is called punya or dharma in the

correct sense of the term and it is *śreyas* in the Upaniṣadic sense and it is *mamgala* in the *Bhāṣya* sense. This state of mind marks the beginning of the work viz. the study of Śāstra.

So atha as used in Sūtra is a statement implying discipline. It means that one whose mind does not enjoy an auspicious disposition in the sense explained does not properly appreciate jijūāsā. Auspicious disposition signifies the circumstance favourable for the occurrence and continuation of enquiry. It does not therefore imply assumption and superstition. With

either of these jijñāsā is impossible.

There is a common idea that manigala which is in the form of invocation to a God that is loved and such other things helps the successful ending of a work. A supposition like this is made familiar to us by the works expounding the systems of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and so on. But how a supposition like this is irrelevant to Brahma-Mīmāmsā is obvious. Jijāāsā is the determining factor of all. Therefore it does not require anything external to condition it. No God outside jijāāsā is

God to jijñāsā.

The truth that jijnāsā is the outcome of joy leads to conclusions of very great importance. At the outset it means that no person who is devoid of joy is in a position to follow it. For he has much to distract him. Even though he is supposed to have been somehow engaged in jijnāsā, if anything promises pleasure in the ordinary sense he is naturally distracted by it. So jijnāsā which is not prompted by joy never continues. In this case it is just a thing like many others that are supposed to bring about happiness. In this case jijnāsā has not become indispensable, kartavyā, because by the person in question many other things are taken to command interest.

The same difficulty is seen in those positions which hold that desire for release, mumukṣā, prompts jijñāsā. Therefore all these positions form pūrva-pakṣa of, that is, opposed to, jijñāsā. They hold that the background of jijñāsā is the four-fold discipline, namely, (1) nityānitya-vastu-viveka, discrimination between enduring and non-enduring aspects of experience. (2) ihāmutra vairāgya, detachment from the pleasures both of the life in this body and of the life that may occur to the self after death. (3) śama-damādi, acquirement

and development of the virtues sama, (peace) dama, (control) etc., and (4) mumukṣā desire for release. In this scheme the earlier ones are supposed to help the later ones. Even supposing that the stages of discipline take place in this order, this four-fold discipline stands for the idea that every one that has the desire for release is necessarily introduced to jijñāsā.

T. Pr., examines this position and cites the position of Bhāṣyakāra against it.

"muktyarthi-mātrasya brahma-jijñāsāyām pravṛtti-nirasanaparatayāpi tam vyācakṣāṇaḥ tasya abhidheyam artham āha— ADHIKĀRĀ iti."

(Bhāsyakāra also stated the literal meaning of the word atha, so as to show that merely because a person desires to obtain release he is not introduced to Brahma-Jiiñāsā as)—

BHĀṢYA:—ADHIKĀRĀNANTARYĀRTHAŚCA.

[Further the literal meaning of atha is 'after obtaining the necessary qualification'.]

It must be noted that Bhāṣyakāra intends to show by this passage that every one that desires release does not have jijñāsā. This means that desire for release has nothing to do with jijñāsā. It is only he that has necessary qualification that has jijñāsā.

Bhāṣyakāra on the whole indicates that the word atha of Sūtra has two functions. By its mere presence it signifies mangala, auspicious disposition as the origin of jijāāsā; and literally it means the state of mind after the attainment of the necessary qualification. Sūtrakāra in presenting these two ideas by a single word atha intends to show that these two ideas cannot be separated. The necessary qualification i.e. adhikāra is possible only on the background of auspicious disposition i.e., mangala. An appreciation of this fact brings out the fact that the desire for release is not the prerequisite of jijāāsā. This desire is the cry for happiness supposed to be release. In itself it is a painful attitude of mind as it is the feeling of dissatisfaction with the existing condition of life, It cannot therefore form the background of Brahma-Jijāāsā.

T. Pr., further shows how the word atha means the state after the attainment of qualification, taking the word in its ordinary sense:

atha śabdasya ānamtarya-mātrārthatvepi adhikārasya yogyatayā sambamdhah.

(Even taking atha in the sense of mere 'after', qualification is related to it, because jījñāsā can occur only after qualification but not after anything else.)

It may be noted in this connection that this text gives us the special circumstance connected with the words used in the Sūtra and Bhāṣya. They have their special meaning in these works and this can be understood by us only by study. These works are also used in popular or non-śāstraik works, but with different meaning. So in interpreting these words in Sāstra, this distinction must be kept in mind. Our interpretation must be governed by the śāstraik meaning. Whenever the popular meaning presents a difficulty, the limit of this meaning may be noted and supplementation and so on may be made so as to justify the śāstraik meaning. This circumstance may be illustrated by taking for example the word atha.

II

We have seen how atha indicates that desire for release does not form the background of jijnasa. A difficulty may present itself in this connection. T. Pr., mentions this difficulty and introduces Bhasya that meets this difficulty.

brahma - jijfiāsāyāh prayojana - śūnyatāśamkā - nivārakatayā ataśśabdam vyācaṣṭe—ATA iti.

In order to remove the difficulty that brahma-jijāāsā has no end to achieve Bhāṣyakāra interpreted the word atah which forms another part of Sūtra as,—

BHĀṢYA:—ATAŚ ŚABDO HETVARTHAḤ

[The word atah means hetu i.e. reason.]

It must be noted that the fulfilment of this reason is the aim of jijnasa. The nature of this aim becomes clear shortly.

T. Pr., points out a difficulty with regard to the use of the words atha and atah by the Sūtrakāra and introduces Bhāṣya which removes the difficulty.

nanvathātas-śabda-pūrvakatvam kim nimittam? mamgaloktyādeḥ śabdāntareṇāpi sambhavāt iti āśankām purāṇa-vacanenaiva pariharati—UKTAM CA iti.

(A difficulty may be felt. Why do the Sūtras begin with the words atha and atah? [The supposition that they state mangala etc., may not be a correct justification.] If it is a mere question of the statement of mangala, then some other words could have been used as well. Bhāṣyakāra removes this difficulty by quoting a Purāṇic statement as "UKTAM CA".)

Bhāṣya.—uktamca gārupe

ATHĀTAS-ŚABDA-PŪRVĀŅI SŪTRĀŅI NIKHILĀNYAPI PRĀRABHANTE NIYATYAIVA TAT KIM ATRA NIYĀMAKAM.

[It is said in the Gāruḍa—All the Sūtras as a rule commence with the words atha and ataḥ. What is the reason for this?]

[Nārada puts this question.]

T. Pr., comments on this-

atra prathama- prayojyatve niyāmakena bhāvyam tat kim niyāmakam? na caitat prāthamyam yādrochikam, yato nikhilāny api niyatyaiva tat-pūrvakāņi ity arthah, niyāmakam ca bhavat dvi-vidham bhavet—avasya-vaktavyārthatvam ādhikyam ca iti. ādhikyam ca svarūpatah arthatasceti dvedhā bhavati, tatrādipakṣe prochati.

(The fact that these words are necessarily used at the commencement must be governed by some principle. Their use at the commencement is not an accident. For all the Sūtras as a rule start with them and where they are not actually stated they (Sūtras) presuppose them. The principle that governs this use must be of two kinds: (i) the state of meaning a thing the statement of which is inevitable and (ii) priority. There is the idea of priority under two conditions: (i) if the words themselves as words have priority and (ii) if the meaning of the words has priority. From the standpoint of the first alternative i.e. the state of meaning a thing the statement of which is inevitable a question follows.)

Bhāṣya-kaścārthaś ca tayor vidvan?

[What is the meaning of these words?] O Sage!

T. Pr., comments-

kosau avasya-vaktavyorthah? yena prāthamyam? ity arthah.

(What is this meaning the mention of which is inevitable and for this reason the words in question are required to be stated at the commencement? Thus is the meaning of Bhāṣya.)

T. Pr., introduces Bhāṣya on the second alternative.—

dvitīyam āksipati KATHAM ITI.

(Nārada wants to know the validity of the second alternative.)

Вһаҙуа-катнам иттамата тачон.

How can they [the words in question] have priority? T. Pr., comments—śabdāmtarasya svarūpottamatvādarśanāt katham anayoh tad iti bhāvah.

(As any other word is not seen to enjoy priority in the capacity of its being a word, how can priority be attributed to the words in question? Thus is the idea signified by Bhāṣya.)

T. Pr., introduces the same Bhāṣya on the third alternative

—tṛtīyepi pṛcchati KATHAM ITI.

(Nārada wants to know the validity of the third alternative as катнам etc.)

Вһаҙуа-катнам иттамата тачон?

[How do they have priority?] Nārada shows how deep his interest in obtaining this knowledge is.

Bhāṣya—etad ākhyāhi me brahman yathā jñāsyāmi tattvatah.

[O Teacher, devoted to Brahman! Please explain this to me so that I may understand the truth correctly.]

In answer to this, there is-

Bhāṣya—evam ukto nāradena brahmā provāca sattamaņ.

[Having been thus requested by Nārada, Brahmā who is entirely devoted to Sat, the Absolute and Complete Principle of all, taught the following.]

Bhāṣya—ānamtarye adhikārasya mamgalārthe tathaiva ca athaśabdas tvatasśabdah hetvarthe samudīritah.

The word atha is used both to mention the state of being after the attainment of qualification and to signify auspicious

disposition of mind. The word ataly is stated in order to give reason.]

T. Pr., introduces this teaching—avasya-vaktavyārthatvāt prathama-prayoga iti parihāram abhipretya avasya-vaktavyār thatvam tayoḥ darsayati—ānamtarye iti.

(Having in view the answer that the word the meaning of which is indispensable is to be stated first, Brahmā shows how the meaning of the two words is indispensable—as ĀNAMTARYE etc.)

T. Pr., introduces- atra atas-śabdasya avaśya-vaktavyam arthāmtaram cāha—PARASYA iti.

(Brahmā stated further that of these two words atah has another meaning equally indispensable—as PARASYA etc.

Bhāṣya—Parasya Brahmaṇo Viṣṇoḥ Prasādād iti vā Bhavet. [Further the meaning of *ataḥ* shall be 'Because of the desire i.e, grace of Brahman, the ground of all.]

T. Pr., comments-akāra-vācyād viṣṇoḥ tat-prasādāt jijūāsādi kāryam iti vā atas- śabdārtho bhavedity arthaḥ. a iti brahmetyādi sūcayati para-brahma-grahaṇena.

(The meaning of the word atah is that jijnāsā and so on are indispensable because of Viṣṇu denoted by a i.e., His desire, or grace. By the mention of para-brahma Brahmā indicates the text of Śruti 'a iti brahma' etc. [A means Brahman.] etc.)

T. Pr., explains the position: kim jijnāsādy-artham bhagavatprasādena ity ata āha—sa HI iti.

(Why should the occurrence of jijñāsā and so on be explained by the desire of Bhagavān, the Absolute and Complete Principle of all? In answer Brahmā said sa HI etc.)

Bhāṣya—sa ні sarva-mano-vṛtti-prerakas sam-udāhṛtaḥ.

[He is indeed established as the only source of all minds and their states.]

T. Pr., introduces Bhāṣya that gives further explanation. nanu mamgaloktyādeḥ sabdāmtareṇāpi sambhavāt kim etat-prayoganiyatyā ity ataḥ svarūpādhikyam cāstīty āha—sisṣʀṣoḤ iti.

(The following may be asked. If it is necessary merely to state manigala etc., some other words having the same meaning

may as well be employed. Why should then there be the insistence on the use of only these words? In answer Brahmā said that these words have a speciality and this gives them priority—as sisrksom etc.)

Bhāṣya-

SISRKŞOH PARAMĀD VIŞNOH PRATHAMAM DVAU VINISRTAU AUMKĀRAŚ CĀTHA-ŚABDAŚ CA TASMĀT PRĀTHAMIKAU KRAMĀT TADDHETUTVAM VADAMŚ CĀPI TŖTĪYOTA UDĀHŖTAH.

[As Visnu, the ground of all desired creation, at the first instance two entities came from Him. They are the words aum and atha. Therefore they became prior in the order in which they came. Next there came the third word atah and it presented Visnu as the reason i.e., principle of jijnasā and so on. This is how the truth is established.]

T.Pr., Comments—prathamam vinisrtau atah svarūpottamau tasmāt prāthamikau ity arthah. yat sva-jātau prathamam hareh nissarati tat tatra uttamam iti nyāyo anusandheyah. atas ca trtīyatayā prāthamika udāhrtah. yatah trtīyatayā udāhrtah viṣṇunā ity ato uttamah ity arthah. taddhetutvam ity asya viṣṇoḥ jijñāsādau hetutvam tasya jijñāsādeh mokṣa-hetutvam vā vadan ity anuvādah.

(They came first. Therefore they are the best. For this reason they are prior. This is the meaning of the passage. The principle that must be noted in this connection is this. Whichever comes first from Hari, the creator becomes the best of the things that belong to its class. The word atah is illustrated to be prior in third case. The idea is this. It came from Visnu as the third word. Taddhetutvam means tasya

¹ The words Udāhṛta, samudāhṛta etc., are generally taken to mean said or explained. But in the works from which Madhva takes them they definitely mean something that is philosophically justified. Madhva explains this point in later passages. So whenever Madhva mentions passages from Sruti or Smṛti, he does not quote them as authority to support his own position. In citing those passages his only aim is to show how the reasoning presented by Sūtra underlies those passages and they are but types of several such passages that have the same meaning. Therefore their apparent meaning is no meaning. In fact his position is only this reasoning as well as the application as forming the basis of the whole reality.

viṣṇoh jijñāsādau hetutvam or tasya jijñāsādeḥ mokṣa-hetutvam i.e., Viṣṇu is the cause of jijñāsā etc., or Viṣṇu is the cause of the fact that jijñāsā etc., give rise to mokṣa.)

T. Pr., introduces $Bh\bar{a}$ şya giving an additional reason for priority.—

na-kevalam ādhikyam svarūpata eva kimtu arthatas ca ity atopi prathama-prayoga ityāha—AKĀRA iti.

(The priority is not only from the standpoint of the word as word i.e., from the standpoint of its origin but also from the standpoint of its meaning. Brahmā explained it—as AKĀRA etc.)

Bhāṣya—akāras sarva-vāgātmā para-brahmābhidhāyakaļ.

[The word a states the absolute perfection of the meaning of the whole speech and for this reason it presents Para-Brahman.]

T. Pr., comments. "sarva-vāg-artha-pūrņatābhidhāyakatayā para- brahmābhidhāyakah ity arthah."

(The meaning of Bhāṣya is that the word a through stating the absolute perfection of the meaning of all speech presents Para-Brahman.)

Ta and tha in atah and atha are governed by Prāṇa. They state respectively pervasion and endurance. For this reason also they must be stated prior to stating other words. This is the reasoned-out conviction of those that are devoted to the Ultimate Truth. This is the speciality of atha and atah. Having known this correctly those that know the Ultimate Truth state only these words in priority to all other words.

Bhāṣya-

"TATHAU PRĀŅĀTMAKAU PROKTAU VYĀPTI-STHITI-VIDHĀYAKAU ATAŚ CA PŪRVAM UCCĀRYĀḤ SARVA ETE SATĀM MATĀḤ ATHĀTAS ŚBDAYOR EVAM VĪRYAM ĀJÑĀYA TATTVATAḤ SŪTREṢU TU MAHĀ PRĀJÑĀḤ TĀVEVĀDAU PRAYUNJATA ITI.

[The letters ta and tha are said to stand for the divinities signified as prāṇa, the vital principle and they emphasise pervasion and existence. For this reason they become (the words) that are to be mentioned first by all. This is the tradition of the wise. Having thus correctly understood the

power of the words, atha and atah those that have the highest wisdom mention them only in the Sūtras. So says the Gāruḍa.]

T, pr., comments—prāṇa-devatyau bhagavad-vācakau. abhimāny-abhimanyamānayoḥ aikya-vyapadeśaḥ mahataḥ caturmukhāt ityādau prasiddḥaḥ. vācya-vācakayoḥ āikya-vyapadeśaḥ "ayam vai lokaḥ prathamā mahā-nāmnī" ityādau dṛṣṭaḥ. ata ity upasamhāraḥ. vīryam svarūpādhikyādi-māhātmyam."

(Prāṇātmakau means prāṇadaivatyau. This means having prāṇa as the presiding deity i.e., the principle. Vyāpti-sthiti-vi-dhāyakau means bhagavad-vācakau. This means that they, ta and tha mean bhagavān, that which is absolutely complete. The language of Śruti presents both the presiding deity and the thing over which it presides as though they are identical. This kind of presentation is made familiar to us in such expressions as mahatah caturmukhāt (From Caturmukha who is the same as mahat,) Similarly there is the statement of the identity of a word and the thing to which it is applied. This is seen in such passages as, ayam vai lokah prathamā mahānāmnī. (This is the world which is the first mahānāmnī.) [Mahānāmnī is the name of a Vedic hymn.] The word therefore, (ataḥ) indicates conclusion. Vīryam means speciality consisting in priority of the word as word and so on.)

III

With reference to Bhāṣya and T. Pr., cited above the following points may be noted.

1. Bhāṣya—ATHĀTAS ŚABDA PŪRVĀNI SŪTRĀNI NIKHILĀNYAPI PRĀRABHANTE NIYATYAIVA presents certain details of the circumstance in which the Sūtras are composed. To recognize them greatly facilitates our study. The passage states that all the Sūtras begin having as a rule the words atha and atah prior to them. The question is what should we mean by Sūtras in this passage. Generally we have a tendency to take it to mean different Sūtras composed by different persons on different topics. But does this satisfy the demands suggested by the passage? In order to arrive at a correct answer we must note the following points: (i) Just a while ago we have studied how the word sūtra in its unqualified sense applies only to the Brahma-

Sūtras. In the present passage the word sūtrāni is not qualified. It must therefore apply only to the Brahma-Sūtras. (ii) The present teacher is Brahmā and the pupil is Nārada. As it will be made clear later on, the teacher stands for ideal knowledge. He cannot therefore think of the Sūtras other than the Brahma-Sūtras. Further the pupil Nārada stands for the spreading of knowledge. He is therefore not interested in knowing the greatness of other sūtras. (iii) Nārada addresses Brahmā as brahman. This word denotes one who is wholly devoted to Brahman, the ultimate truth as taught by Veda. So to think of other sūtras is irrelevant in this connection. (iv) The circumstance of the Brahma-Sūtras is such that what applies to the other sūtras does not apply to the Brahma-Sūtras. Further what applies to the Brahma-Sūtras can never apply to the other sūtras. (v) Mamgala, auspicious disposition as defining the commencement never characterizes the other sūtras, for other sūtras fall short of the Absolute Truth and their teaching is never governed by manigala, forming the startingpoint. Further, adhikāra, fittedness that is required for the study of the Brahma-Sūtras is never required for the study of other sūtras. What this fittedness is will be made clear shortly. (vi) Atha and atah are prior to all other words. Their meaning is absolute. Their statement is an absolute necessity. These circumstances do not apply to other sūtras. Therefore the word sūtrāni must mean Brahma-Sūtras. Another circumstance may be noted. As it will be clear every Sūtra is recognized by Bhāsyakāra to be a complete Brahma-Vidyā by itself. So there seems to be no difficulty in holding that every Sūtra has prior to it the words atha and atah. The expression "athātas-sabda-pūrvāņi" also supports this conclusion. Every Sūtra must therefore be taken to have these words prior to it.

2. An account of the speciality of the words atha and atah explains and illustrates how mamgala, auspicious disposition and the state of being after the attainment of fittedness etc., can be best expressed only by these words. If they are expressed by means of other words, then the expression does not come up to the expected level. Owing to this circumstance other words which appear to mean more or less the same thing have no place in Sāstra. The very discussion of this nature implies that in Sāstra every

word is used as the very best choice. There is no possibility of having a substitute for it. To use a substitute does not therefore help Sastra. This indicates how in Sastra the words that are used have their place for which they have an absolute right. They are indispensable in their place. By using a substitute the intended truth is never understood. Further what these words mean is the only meaning required by Sastra. It is the very best that can be thought of. Therefore to express it, only the best words are needed. Though there may seem to be some other words having a similar meaning, as the words do not enjoy the highest place as mere words, their meaning is not the best. Thus there is an intimate relation between the word used in Sāstra and the meaning intended. The intended meaning can be expressed only by that word; and only that word can express the meaning in question. Neither can be had without the other. Further whichever meaning is expressed in Sastra it is in absolute need of being so expressed. Its expression is indispensable. Thus in Sastra every word, its meaning and the necessity for its expression are absolutely indispensable. A substitute for the word, a semblance of meaning and a subjective need for the expression can never be justified in Sastra. If they are in any sense present then it ceases to be Sastra because they can never think of establishing Absolute Truth. We may illustrate this circumstance. In place of atha we cannot employ the word mamgalam or adhikārānamtaryam, because as words they are not the best. For this reason their meaning falls short of the intended one. Further in the course of the study of Sastra before we understand the absolute meaning of Sastra we must move from words to their meaning, but never from meaning to words. For without studying the fact that the words in question enjoy absolute superiority, we are not in a position to conceive the meaning in the absolute sense. So to become first conscious of a meaning and then selecting a suitable word are out of place in Sāstra. That procedure makes Sāstra an impossibility. It is to make Sāstra presuppose Sastra. So in the process of our study we start with the word atha and through it understand its absolutely superior character. We conceive the meaning signified as well as

denoted viz., mamgala as well as adhikārānamtarya in the corresponding sense. This sense is made familiar to us only with the word in question. When we are ignorant of this word with its special circumstance, we can never think of the meaning which can be conveyed only by this word when it is recognized to enjoy absolute superiority. Further of mamgala and adhikārānamtarya the former must necessarily be expressed first and next follows the latter. We cannot change the order at will. The order of words as well as that of meanings are never subjectively determined. They are through and through objective. Every circumstance in Sāstra is characterized by svarūpādhikya of the word in question, arthādhikya and avasya-vaktavyārthatva. All this proves the

absolute indispensability of Sāstra.

3. The significance of atah is very rich. We have seen that atha stands for two ideas—manigala, and adhikārānamtarya. These two are understood to form the background of Brahma-jijñāsā. This position seems to give room for two interpretations: (1) These two things cause jijnasā and (2) Brahma-jijnāsā by its own merit is not in need of any cause and therefore these two things do not stand outside jijnāsā and they are only aspects of Brahma-jijnāsā. The word atah decides the correct interpretation. The basic form of this word is a. It states the absolute completeness of the meaning of the speech as such—A is the beginning of aum.1 For aum consists of a, u, m (akāra, ukāra and makāra). A is the beginning of atha and it is the beginning of atah. If these three words, aum, atha and atah are prior to all other words as they come first from the Creator, then it necessarily follows that a is priormost of all; for without a, the other words cannot be formed. So a being the prior-most has necessarily the absolute and complete sense. This sense applies to all the ideas presented by speech as such. This is what is explained by akāraḥ sarva-vāgātmā. The sense absolute and complete is the aim of speech. It is the aim because it is the source of all meaning. So as fact, it is the source of all facts. Hence it is understood to be para-brahmābhidhāyakah i.e. to represent Para-Brahma, Brahman the source of

¹ Aum is called pranava. The Vedic tradition is that it is prior to all other words including atha and atah. This will be explained later on.

all. The term para is applied to that which transcends. Something transcends some other thing when it is recognized as the source of the latter. After the observation of a thing if we enquire into its cause, we have then actually transcended the thing. So para meaning transcendent is applied to the source of the thing in question. Hence Para-Brahma means the source of all. For this reason Sruti says a iti brahma. (A means Brahma.) and Brahman in this context is Para-Brahman, the Source of all, hence the Highest of all and therefore It is that which transcends all.

The source of Brahma-jijñāsā is therefore Brahman i.e. Para-Brahman and it is not the ideas presented by atha. This is the position determined by the word atah. The same conclusion is further substantiated by tracing every mental state to Para-Brahman as sa hi sarva-mano-vṛtti-prerakaḥ samudāḥṛṭ-aḥ. Manovṛtti is mental state. Preraka is the source. It is the source of reality. If it is in any sense short of this meaning, it can never be the source. So the whole position is that Para-Brahman is the very source of things presented by atha. Mamgala is a mental state. It is the disposition of mind. Adhikārānamtaryam also is the state of mind that follows the attainment of adhikāra. Para-Brahma, the source of all mental states is the source of these two. So the whole position is that Para-Brahman causing these two states of mind causes

Brahma-jijñāsā.

4. The very fact that Para-Brahman is the source of all mental states implies that it is the source of all expressions that present these states. The order in which it brings out these things defines the order or heirarchy of these things. A comes first. The idea of Brahman therefore comes first. So each is the highest in its class. All this illustrates that Brahman, the object of both, is the Highest.

Напін Аим

CHAPTER IX

THE OCCURRENCE OF BRAHMA-MIMAMSA BRAHMA-MIMAMSA IS CHARACTERIZED BY SPONTANEITY

BUT NOT RY WILL

Having expounded the truth signified by the words atha and atah of the Sūtra, the author of T. Pr., introduces the topic of adhikāra presupposed by jijjāāsā as—

"nanu kosau adhikārah kati vidhas ca brahma-jijñāsāyām yad-ānamtaryam atha-sabdo vakti ity ata āha—ADHIKĀRAS CA iti."

(A question appeared: If the word atha is taken to mean 'after the attainment of the required background, fittedness or qualification, then there follow the questions: 'What is this background? What are its different aspects that are consistent with Brahma-iijñāsā?) In answer to this the author of Bhāṣya says—

Bhāṣya-adhikāraś cokto bhāgavata-tantre

MAMDA-MADHYOTTAMATVENA TRIVIDHĀ HY ADHIKĀRIŅAḤ TATRA MAMDĀ MANUŞYEŞU YA UTTAMAGUŅĀḤ MATĀḤ MADHYAMĀ ŖṢI GANDHARVĀḤ DEVĀS TATROTTAMĀ MATĀḤ ITI JĀTI-KŖTO BHEDAḤ.

[Adhikāra is defined in a work called Bhāgavata-Tantra as— Those that have adhikāra are of three kinds—the dull (lower), the ordinary (middle) and the proper (high up). Of them the dull are those that have good qualities among men. The ordinary are Rsis and Gandharvas. The proper are divinities. This difference is governed by birth.]

T. Pr., presents the gist of Bhāsya—atra adhikārikathanepi tad-visesaņatayā adhikāropi ukto bhavati. anena moksayogyatvam sāmānya-laksaņam abhipretam.

(In the passage given by Bhāṣya though one who has adhikāra is defined, yet as an attribute of the same, adhikāra also

becomes stated. By this is intended to present mokṣa-yogyatva, the state of being capable of attaining mokṣa as the general definition of adhikāra as such).

II

A CRITICAL STUDY OF ADHIKĀRA

A STUDY OF SAMKARA-BHĀSYA

So far there is the commencement of discussion of adhikāra by T. Pr. The discussion starts with a question regarding the nature of adhikāra and its different stages. This is not an innocent question. The person to whom this question occurs really wonders if the study of Sāstra really requires adhikāra especially when he sees that Samkara and his followers are definite that no adhikāra is required.

So an understanding of Bhāṣṇa and Tīkā in this connection presupposes a critical study of Śamkara's position with regard to the meaning of the word atha.

With regard to the meaning of atha Samkara says in his Bhāṣya—

"atra atha-śabdah ānamtaryārthah parigrhyate. na adhikārārthah. brahma-jijāsāyāh anadhikāryatvāt. mamgalasya ca vākyārthe samanvayābhāvāt. arthāmtara- prayukta eva hi athaśabdah śrutyā mamgala-prayojano bhavati ānamtaryārthatve kim api vaktavyam yadanamtaram brahma-jijāāsā upadiśyate, iti. ucyate. nityānitya-vastu-vivekah, ihāmutra artha-bhogavirāgah, śamadamādi-sādhana-sampat, mumukşutvam ca. teşu satsu prāg api dharma-jijāāsāyāh ūrdhvam ca śakyate brahma jijāāsitum jāātum ca na viparyaye. tasmāt atha-śabdena yathokta-sādhana-sampattyānamtaryam upadiśyate.

(The word atha forming a portion of the Sūtra is taken to mean "afterness". It has nothing to do with adhikāra. For Brahma-jijñāsā does not presuppose adhikāra. Nor does it mean mangala, for mangala does not form a part of the total meaning of the sentence formed by Sūtra. The word atha is used to denote a particular meaning. But the cognisance of the word by means of hearing indeed results in giving rise to the idea of mangala. If atha is taken to mean 'afterness', then

that after which Brahma-jijñāsā is recommended ought to be stated. In answer the following is said—The discrimination between the enduring and the non-enduring, detachment from the enjoyment of things that belong both to this world and the world that follows, the possession of the discipline—peace, self control, etc., and the desire for mokṣa—if these are there irrespective of the presence or absence of other things i.e., even before Dharma-jijñāsā—enquiry into the nature of Dharma i.e., Karma or after it, it is possible to discuss and know Brahman. Therefore by the word atha is taught the fact of being after the attainment of the disciplines, sādhana-sampatti, stated above).

We are now in a position to see the difference between the view points of Samkara and Madhva. Samkara feels that Brahma-jijñāsā does not presuppose adhikāra. Though he means by the word atha 'after', he says that it is, after sādhanasampatti (attainment of the four-fold discipline), Obviously this sādhana (discipline) is not what he himself calls adhikāra. So the whole position is that Brahma-jijñāsā

presupposes sādhana but never adhikāra.

But Madhva notes that adhikāra is the necessary presupposition of Brahma-jijñāsā. This is already indicated in connection with introducing his meaning of atha. Attainment of four-fold discipline has nothing to do with Brahmajijñāsā. For even though it is there, jijñāsā does not occur and

if adhikāra is there, jijnāsā necessarily follows.

Obviously the four-fold discipline and adhikāra cannot be identified. The very fact that Samkara shows that the former alone is the presupposition of jijñāsā and Madhva points out that the latter alone is the necessary presupposition of jijñāsā indicates that one is diametrically opposed to the other. What is this opposition? The very idea of sādhana is the expression of the superimposition of doership on the self. That which proceeds from this superimposition never leads to jijñāsā of Brahman. In the first place it is based on the empirical experience. It does not take us beyond what is given (empirically). In the second place the discipline resulting from superimposition is irrelevant to jijñāsā. The discrimination between the enduring and the non-enduring makes jijñāsā unnecessary as in this connection both are made familiar. Detachment from the things of this and the other

world, as it forms an aspect of this discipline is the result of doership. It does not help Brahma-jijnāsā. The virtues, peace, self-control etc., are the results of doership. Therefore they do not lead to Brahma-jijnāsā. As it is already indicated the desire for mokṣa is not different from the feeling of want i.e., pain, an inauspicious disposition, and it does not help Brahma-jijnāsā. So the four-fold discipline is irrelevant to Brahma-jijnāsā.

Madhva notes that which necessarily leads to jijiāsā is adhikāra. The fact that this is different from the four-fold discipline indicates its distinguishing feature. Whatever its other aspects be, it is not the result of the super-imposition of doership. It is rather the disposition of the mind when doership is removed from it. This is the implication of the philosophy of adhikāra by Madhva.

III

T.C., examines Śamkara's position.

In order to substantiate this position the author of T.C., shows how the attainment of four-fold discipline, sādhana-catusṭaya-samaptti does not lead to jijñāsā.

"nāpi paresām bhāsyoktāt nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, ihāmutra artha-bhoga-virāgaḥ,sama-damādi-sampattiḥ mumukṣutvam ca iti sādhana-catuṣṭaya-sampadrūpāt adhikārāt. tathā hi.¹ nityānitya-vastu-viveko nāma kim brahmaiva nityam anyad anityam iti vivekaḥ, kim vā ātmānātma- samudāye nityatvānityatve sthaḥ dharmau. tayoś ca dharmibhyām bhavitavyom iti niścayaḥ, yad vā anityasya samsārasya kimcid adhiṣṭānam astīti niścayaḥ na tu brahmeti.'

(As it is said in the *Bhāṣya* of Śamkara atha does not mean 'after adhikāra' which is no other than the attainment of the four-fold discipline—the discrimination between the enduring and the non-enduring, detachment from the enjoyment of things belonging to this and the other world, attainment of peace, self-control, etc., and desire for *Mokṣa*. The following is the reason—What is meant by discrimination between

¹In this passage the word adhikāra is used in the sense of sādhana. The possibility of interpreting sādhana as adhikāra in some sense is also indicated.

the enduring and non-enduring? Does this discrimination mean that Brahman alone is enduring and that which is other than Brahman is non-enduring? Or does it mean definitely that in the aggregation of the things formed by atman and anatman, there are properties endurance and non-endurance and they ought to have some substratum? Or does it mean the conviction that the non-enduring bondage must have some basis, in the circumstance when it is not known that this basis is Brahman?)

These three alternatives are criticised:-

jñātavyasya prāgeva jñātatayā vicāra-vaiphalyāt. na ca saguņa-nirguņa- vivekākhanda- samanvayādyartham śāstram iti yuktam. bhāmatyām nityānitya-śabdayoh satyānṛta-paratvena uktatayā brahmaiva satyam anyad anṛtam iti vivekasya prāg eva siddhau tad-arthasya saguṇa-nirguṇa-vivekāder api anapekṣitatvāt. na hi śruti tātparyādih svarūpeṇāpekṣitā. kim tu jñeya-niścāya-katayā. na ca uktād anyat mumukṣu-jñeyam asti. jīva-brahma-bhedasyāpi brahmātiriktatayā tan-mithyātvasya tad-abhedasyāpi brahma-mātratayā tat-satvasyāpi tenaiva niścitatvāc ca.

(The first alternative does not hold good. For that which is to be understood has become already understood and therefore discussion about it serves no purpose. It may be supposed that Sāstra has a purpose to serve. The purpose may consist in: (1) The discrimination between saguna and nirguna, qualified and attributeless. (2) Showing that akhanda (partless Brahman) is the subject matter of Śruti. (3) Or something other than these two. But in any of these three senses the purpose cannot be justified. (1) Bhāmatī holds that the words nitya and anitya respectively mean satya and anrta. Brahman alone is satya. That which is other than Brahman is anrta. If this distinction is already understood, then there is no need to understand the distinction between saguna and nirguna, the meaning of anrta and satya respectively. (2) Further the understanding of the intended meaning of Sruti is not needed for its own sake, but it is needed in order to make the subject-matter definite. There is nothing other than what is stated by the word nitya that is to be known by one who desires moksa. (3) Further the difference between jiva and Brahman is different from Brahman; therefore

it is *mithyā*. The non-duality of jīva and Brahman is Brahman itself; therefore it is satya. All these facts form the part of knowing the distinction between nitya and anitya.)

The second alternative is examined—na dvitīyaḥ, tan-mātreņa anātma-grahaņena ātma-vicāre pravṛtty-ayogāt. aihikāmuṣmika-bhoga-virāgāyogāc ca.

(The second alternative does not hold good. Prakāśa makes the idea contained in the first statement clear-yady anyad anityam brahmaikameva nityam iti niscinuyāt tadā hi anyaparityāgena brahma-vicāre pravṛttih yujyate. yadā tu nitya tvānityatva-rūpam dharma-dvayam asti tadāśrayau ca dvau iti niścaya-mātram tadā katham ātma-vicāre pravettih. kim tu kim vā nityatvādy-adhisthānam iti samdihānah na kvāpi pravartata iti bhāvah. (If there is the definite idea that the other things are anitya and Brahman alone is nitya, then ignoring other things the will to discuss Brahman becomes possible. If there is only the conviction that there are two properties nityatva and anityatva and two entities as their substratum, then how can there be the will to discuss ātman? In fact in this circumstance the person being unable to fix the entities as the substratum of nityatva, etc., does not intend to know anything.) This is the idea contained in "tanmātreņa anātma-grahaņena ātma-vicāre pravṛtty-ayogāt." (Merely by means of it i.e. the understanding of that which is not atman the will to discuss atman does not follow.) Further according to this alternative there does not result detachment from the enjoyments belonging to this and the other world.)

The third alternative is examined.—nāntyah. brahmaśabdārthatvādeh prakārasya ajñānepi vastuto brahmano anātmādhisthānasya śāstra-vedyasya jñātatvena śāstra-vaiyarthyāt.

The third alternative does not hold good. For the details connected with the meaning etc., of the word Brahman may not be known. Yet Brahman, the basis of the superimposition of that which is other than ātman, which is the subject-matter of Sāstra is known. Therefore Sāstra becomes purposeless.)

T.C., further examines the position of Vivarana-"na ca vivaraņa-rītyā nityānitya-śabdau dhvamsa-pratiyogy-apratiyogiparau, tatas ca brahma-jñāna-phalam sthāyi, karmādi-phalam tu asthāyīti viveko nityānitya-viveka iti yuktam. pratipannopādhau atyamtābhāva-pratiyogitva-rūpa-bādhyatva-vato anātmano dhvamsa-pratiyogitväyogät. päramärthikatväkärena atyamtäbhävah svarūpeņa tu dhvamsa iti cen na. pāramārthikatvasya abādhyatvarūpatvena anyonyāśrayāt. tathā atyamtābhāva-pratiyogitvasya nirākāre brahmany api sambhavāc ca. atātvike rūpyādau anityatvāvyavahārāc ca. 'gaur anādyantavatī, 'esosvatthah sanātanah' ityādi śrutyanusārāya mokșepi atātvikī anuvṛttih nivṛttis tu tātvikī. mukteh bandhāt vaisamyam tu tātvika-nivṛtti-mattā-mātreņety āpātāc ca. kim ca viveko bhedasya tad-vyāptasya vā jñānam. tasya ca bhramatve brahma-vicāro na nitya-phalakas syāt. pramātve tu bhedah satyas syāt. tasmāt paramate na nityānityavastu-viveko yuktah.

(Nor does the position of Vivarana hold good; and this position is—The words nitya and anitya do not mean that which is not destroyed and that which is destroyed respectively. The idea is this. The result of the knowledge of Brahman endures, but the result of karma etc., does not endure. This is the distinction that is called discrimination between nitya and anitya. The following is the reason-That which is not atman is the object of sublation. Sublation according to Vivarana is the state of being the subject (pratiyogin) of absolute negation (atyamtābhāva) attributed to the thing, the basis of superimposition (pratipannopādhi). That which is not atman to which this sublation is attributed is not the object of destruction. This means that the idea that anitya is the object of destruction cannot be applied to that which is not ātman. [As it is the object of atyamtābhāva, it is asat even as the horn of a hare is. Therefore to say that it is the object of destruction, dhvamsa is wrong.] In order to remove this difficulty the following distinction may be made:-There are two view-points to judge that which is not atman, absolute, pāramārthika and relative, non-pāramārthika. From the former point of view that which is non-atman is the object of

atyamtābhāva and from the latter point of view, (svarūpeņa) it is the object of destruction, dhvamsa. By means of this distinction the two positions might be supposed to have been reconciled. But they are never reconciled. The two view points themselves cannot be defined. The definition of each depends on the definition of the other. What is pāramārthīka, absolute? It is said that it is that which is not sublated (abādhya). What is relative? It is bādhya, sublated. What is bādhya? It is that which is not abādhya, Hence the definitions of the two conceptions, pāramārthika and non-pāramārthīka are mutually dependent. Further there is another difficulty. The state of being the object of absolute negation, a'yamtābhāva can indeed be attributed to Brahman. For Brahman is nirākāra, attributeless and therefore no positive state can be attributed to it. Further silver that is super-imposed is not pāramārthika, but to say that it is anitya is not supported by usage. [The followers of Śamkara think that they are correct in holding two views with regard to the world, viz., (1) that the world is the object of destruction, dhvmasa-pratiyogi and (2) that the world is the object of absolute negation, atyantābhāva-pratiyogi, because these two views are actually taught by Śruti-bhūyaścante viśva-maya-nivṛttih (Finally maya the matter of the world is completely destroyed) and neha nānāsti kim ca na. (Brahman is devoid of all distinctions.) The former passage shows how the world is dhvamsa-pratiyogi and the latter how it is atyamtābhāva-pratiyogi. Against their views we may observe the following. Though they believe that they hold these two views because Sruti demands them, they are not in reality consistent with Sruti. If they were really consistent with Śruti, then they ought to hold that avidyā or samsara continues to exist even in moksa consistently with other Sruti texts "gaur anādy-amtavatī". (Avidyā has no beginning, and no end.) "esośvatthas sanātanah". (Bondage, samsāra is biginningless and so on.) In order to reconcile this view with their idea of moksa, they may hold that the continuation of avidyā or samsāra in moksa is not pāramārthika; while its disappearance is pāramārthika. If they are asked to account for the distinction between samsara and moksa, then they may as well say that avidya or samsāra is not removed in the pāramārthika sense during bondage, while it is removed in the pāramārthika sense in the

state of moksa. But they do not hold this view. [They emphasize particular *Sruti* texts because independently of *Sruti* they have developed, somehow, certain views and in the interest of maintaining them they only seek for the help of *Sruti* which apparently seems to support them. If they really follow *Sruti*, then they will have to acknowledge all *Sruti* texts and then on their basis, some view may emerge. But this view will be totally different from all the views they have advanced so far.]

Further in the expression 'nityānitya-vastu-viveka' the word viveka ought to mean either distinction or something of the nature of distinction. In either case according to Samkara it must be an illusion (superimposed). In this case to discuss Brahman cannot be taken to lead to any enduring result. If it is correct and not an illusion, then distinction ought to be real.

Prakāśa makes this idea clear. "yadi brahma-jñāna-phalam nityam anya-phalam anityam iti jaanam brhamah tarhi brahmajñāna-phalam anityam syād iti katham tad-vicāre pravarteta. idam nityam idam anityam iti bheda-jñānasya pramātve tad-visayasya satyatva-niyamena bhedah tātvikah syāt ity arthah. upalaksanam etat. tad-vyāpto dharmo vā satyah syāt ity api grāhyam." (If the knowledge that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is enduring, nitya and the result of the knowledge of other things is non-enduring anitya is an illusion, then the result of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be held to be nitya. In this case how can any one undertake to discuss Brahman? If the knowledge that this is nitya and this is anitya is correct its object ought to be real (satya) and therefore the distinction must be real. From the same idea it follows that anything that is of the nature of distinction ought to be satya.) Therefore the concept of nityānitya-vastu-viveka as it is presented by Śamkara is not correct.)

V

T.C., CRITICIZES virāga

nāpīhāmutrārtha-bhoga-virāgah vivaraņe viṣayair-api nītyam ātma-svarūpa-sukham eva abhivyajyate na tu janyam sukham asti ity uktatvena vaiṣayika-sukhepi virāgāyogāt. mokṣe rāgavatah tattvatah tato bheda-hīne bhoge virāgāyogāc ca.tattvatah tad-bheda-hīnatvepi tadabheda-hīnatva-mātreņa virāga iti cen na, ubhayā-bhāvasya vyāhatatvāt. dṛṣyate ca apāramārthikasyāpi rūpyasya

nedam rūpyam iti śukti-dharmika-laukika-pāramārthika-bheda pratiyogitvam.

(The concept of 'ihāmutra artha-bhoga-virāga' detachment from the enjoyment of the things of this and the other world also does not hold good. In the first place Samkara is not justified in speaking of it. In interpreting Samkara, Vivarana holds that by the objects of experience also, in all circumstances, only the happiness that characterizes the nature of ātman is brought to light. There is therefore no happiness that is produced. If this is the position of Samkara then the detachment from the happiness that is supposed to come from objects is meaningless. In fact it is irrelevant to talk of detachment from happiness especially in the case of one who desires moksa. For the happiness he enjoys by means of objects is not different from the happiness he desires. It might be supposed that from the *pāramārthika* point of view there is no difference between the two cases of happiness. But in so far as there is the illusion that there is no identity between the two there is room for detachment. This supposition is not correct. For to speak of the negation of both difference and identity is contradiction in terms. Further to hold that there is no difference from pāramārthika point of view is not correct. What is the pāramārthika point of view? That which is really known to us is something that is not illusory. Speaking from this point of view we really see difference between two things which are equally pāramārthika. There is silver in the pāramārthika sense. With reference to a shell we have the knowledge. 'This is not silver.' The difference between these two things shell and silver is pāramārthika. If we apply the same idea to the case of happiness we see no reason why we should hold that difference is not pāramārthika.)

Prakāšā makes the idea clear—tathā ca tadvad eva mokṣasattā-samāna sattāka-mokṣagata-tātvikabheda-pratiyogitvam vaiṣayika-sukhasya eṣṭavyam. tac-ca tvayā sad-advaita-bhamga-bhiyā neṣyate iti tad-abhedasyaiva āpatyā virāgāyogo yukta iti bhāvah.

(In the light of these considerations, it is necessary to hold that the happiness resulting from objects is the object of difference found in *mukti* which is as much a fact as *mukti* is. But you do not admit of this because you are afraid of the

failure of sad-advaita (non-difference of the positive). So you ought to hold non-difference of the two cases of happiness. In this case to speak of detachment from happiness is irrelevant.)

In continuation this work says—"yad vā sukhe na virāgaļi kim tu bhoga evety ataļi āha mokṣa iti avatārya vivaraņa-dūṣaṇaparatayaiva yojyaļi mokṣa īty-ādi-gramthaļi."

(To justify detachment it may be supposed that detachment in this connection is not the detachment from happiness, but it is from the enjoyment (bhoga) of happiness—In case this supposition is upheld then the same passage of Vivarana beginning with the word mokṣa may be interpreted so as to show the difficulty in the position accepted by Vivarana")

VI

T.C. CRITICIZES sama etc., as

šamādi-sampattir ity atra ca ādi-sabdo na yuktaḥ, tena titikṣāder eva grahaṇam na tu vivekāder iti niyama-hetoḥ titikṣādy-anugatasya vivekādi-vyāvṛttasya ca upa-samgrāhaka-dhaimasya abhāvāt.

(The concept of 'sama-damādi-sampattih' also is not correct. For in the expression of sama-damādi the word ādi is not intelligible. By the word ādi we have to understand titikṣā endurance etc. but not viveka etc. But on what principle have we to make this distinction? There is no principle that helps the inclusion of titikṣā etc., and the exclusion of viveka etc.)

The idea is made clear by Prakāśa—nanu "śānto dāntu uparataḥ titikṣus samāhito bhūtvā ātmany-evātmānam paśyet." iti eka-śruty-upāttatvam eva samgrāhaka-dharma iti cen na. paśyedity ātma-jñānasyāpi grahaṇāpatteḥ. na ca ātma-jñānāmgatayā upāttatvam vivakṣitam. tac ca bhūtvety-anena śamādi-pancakaśyaiva iti vācyam. uparato viṣayālam-buddhimān ity anena virāgasya samāhito yathā vastu tatvajñah ity anena nityānitya vastu-vivekasya ca prāptyā tayoḥ pārthakyāyogāt iti bhāvaḥ. ata eva titikṣādy-anugatasya ityādy āha.

(It might be supposed. The principle which determines the meaning of $\bar{a}di$ consists in the fact that what all is to be included in the concept is given by a single Sruti text—One

ought to see ātman after being śāntah (peaceful), dāntah (self-controlled), uparatah (contented), titiksuh (tolerant) and samahitah (having the correct knowledge of things.) But this supposition is not correct. If this Sruti is taken to be the basis for determining the meaning of ādi, then as there is the word pasyet meaning knowledge, knowledge also ought to be included in the meaning of the word. It may be further supposed that on the basis of Sruti the intended meaning includes only those that form the background of the knowledge of ātman. These are indicated by the Upanisadic word bhūtvā (after having been) and they are five beginning with sama. This supposition also does not hold good. Uparata means the possession of feeling that the enjoyment of objects is no longer needed. In this feeling detachment is included. Samāhita means one who possesses correct knowledge of things. This includes the discrimination between nitya and anitya. fore to state them separately is unwarranted. This is the idea contained in the passage. In order to indicate this the author says titikṣādy-anugatasya etc.).

VII

The author of T.C., next explains how Samkara's concept of $mumuk_1\bar{a}$ also does not hold good:

"mumuksā ca na parapakse yuktā. moksasya nitya-siddhātma-mātratvena tatra icchāyogāt. vrtty-upalaksītasyāpi ātmano vrttau paścād iva pūrvam api satvāc ca. kim ca kim aham muktak syām iti icchā mumuksā cin-mātram muktam syād iti vā? nādyah. tvan-mate aham-arthasya mukty-ananvayāt. nāntyah. jāteṣṭyadhi-kārinah pituh putra ya svārthatvāt putrah putādih syād iti icchā-vat prakrte cin-mātrasya icchāśrayāhamarthatvābhāvena tādrśecchāyāh adaršanena viparītecchāyāh eva ca daršanena jñānasya aniṣṭa-phalatvāpātāt.

kun ca kin bhāmatī-rītyā sādhana-catuṣṭaye pūrva-pūrvasya uttarottara-hetutvena mumukṣaiva adhikāri-viśesanam anyat taddhetu-bhūtam? kim vā vivaraṇaika-deśokta-rītyā mumukṣā-vat vivekā lirapi adhikāri-viśeṣanam? ādye mumukṣānamtaryam eva atha-śabdārthah syāt na catūṣtayānamtaryam. anyathā viveka-hetvānamtaryam apī tad-arthah syāt. antyepi tat kim sāmarthyāder iva anvaya-vyatirekābhyām gamyam. kim vā gṛha-dāhāder iva

sāstrāt? nādyaḥ, samādy-abhāvepi mumuksā-mātreņa vicāradarsanāt. nanu saḥ vicāraḥ, sūdra yāga-vat na phala-paryamtaḥ tat-paryamtas tu samādy abhāve nāstīti cen na. tathāpi virāgasama-damādi-mumukṣāsu satīṣu vivekābhāvena phala-paryamtavicārabhāvādarsanāt. nāntyaḥ. vivekāder api vairāgyādi-dvāraiva vicāra-hetutvasya nyāyyatvāt parīkṣya lokān iti śruti-siddhatvāc ca mumukṣāvad adhikāri-viseṣaṇatvāyogāt. na hi yāge svarga-kāmanā-vat taddhetu-bhūtam api adhikāri-viseṣaṇam.

The opponent's (Śamkara's) concept of mumukṣā also does not hold good. According to him mokṣa is nothing but ātman and ātman is ever established. For this reason with reference to it there can be no desire. [It may be said—Mokṣa is not mere ātman. It is akhamḍākāra-vedānta-janya-carama-vrtty-upalakṣita—indicated by the last mental state produced by Vedānta having as its content akhanḍa, the partless. It is not there before it occurs. Therefore desire to have it is a necessity.—This position also is not tenable.] For ātman which is indicated (upalakṣita) by vrtti (mental state) ought to be established even before the last vrtti, just as it must be established after that vrtti.

Further what is mumuksā? Is it the desire that I ought to be liberated? Or is it the desire that only the Cit aspect of the self ought to be liberated? The former alternative does not hold good. According to your position the object of 'I' has nothing to do with mukti ['I' is not ātman. So mukti presupposes its destruction'] The second alternative also does not hold good. [This alternative is based on the supposition that though what is called 'I' (ahamartha) is different from Cit it can have the desire for the liberation of Cit. To illustrate this point we may cite a Sruti text 'vaisvānaram dvādaša-kapālam nirvapet putre jāte.' This statement enjoins that after the birth of a son the father ought to conduct a sacrifice called vaisvānara. Next there is the statement of result—'yasmin jāte etām iṣtim nirvapati pūta eva tejasvā annāda indriya-vīrya-pašumān bhavati.'—(This sacrifice after the birth makes the son pure, attractive, giver of food, possessor of able senses and owner of cattle.)] In this connection

^{. &}lt;sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion of this topic see Nyāyāmṛtam, fourth

the father conducts sacrifice, the son enjoys the fruit. Similarly in the present case what is called "I" may desire for the liberation of cit.—This supposition is met as follows: The analogy does not hold good. The father who conducts jāteṣṭi sacrifice in his own interest desires that his son ought to be pure, etc. But in the present case the pure cit does no good to what is called 'I'. Hence the desire of 'I' for the liberation of Cit cannot be compared to the desire of the father. So to hold that 'I' desires the liberation of Cit is not relevant to facts. Further 'I' as desiring the liberation of Cit is never experienced. In fact, just the opposite desire is experienced. Knowledge therefore ought to lead to a result not intended.

[The author says]—Further, according to Bhāmatī, is it held that the previous disciplines lead to the later ones and consistently with this, is mumukṣā alone the attribute of the person in question, while the other three form the background of mumukṣā? Or as it is accepted following a tradition of Vivaraṇa that just like mumukṣā, viveka etc., also are the attributes of the person? If the former alternative is accepted, then the meaning of atha ought to be only mumūkṣānamtarya (the state of being after mumukṣā) but never catuṣṭayānamtarya (the state of being after the fourfold discipline). If this remark is not appreciated, then the background of viveka etc., also ought to be stated along with viveka etc. (So if the four-fold discipline is interrelated, then Samkara's statement viz., yathokla-sādhana-sampattyā-namtaryam, the state of being after the fulfilment of the discipline stated above, becomes unwarranted.)

In case the latter alternative is accepted the question arises—How do you know that the four-fold discipline is an attribute of adhikārin, the person in question? Is it determined by means of the methods of agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka) just as the power to do karma i.e. sacrifice is determined. [It is said in connection with the performance of sacrifice that only one who has the ability (sāmarthya) etc., can perform sacrifice and one who lacks it cannot do it. In the same manner, in the present case also is it possible to hold ('if there is four-fold discipline then there is jijnāsā and if there is no discipline then there is no jijnāsā?] Or is it [the fact of four-fold discipline being the attribute of

adhikārin] determined on the basis of Śāstra, just as grha-dāha etc. are known through Śāstra. Prakāśa explains this idea—'yasya grhān dahati agnaye kṣāmavate puroḍāśam aṣṭā-kapālam nirvapet iti kṣāmavatyām iṣṭau grha-dāho nimittam adhikāri-vīšeṣaṇam yathā śāstrād avagamyate tathā mumukṣā-vad vivekādirapi adhikāri-višeṣanam kim śāstrād gamyam ity arthah.

(With regard to the sacrifice called kṣāmavatī, house-burning being an attribute of adhikārin becomes the cause and this fact is known only through Śāstra viz., yasya grhān etc. Similarly are viveka etc. with mumukṣā which form the attribute of adhikārin known through Śāstra?)

The next alternative does not hold good. For even in the absence of Sama etc., by mere mumukṣā discussion is seen to take place. Against this it might be supposed that discussion which is caused by mere mumukṣā is like the sacrifice conducted by a śūdra. It does not lead to the result. Without śama etc., there can be no discussion that leads to the result.—In answer to this supposition, the following may be noted: even though śama, dama etc. and mumukṣā are granted to be present, if there is no viveka, the discussion that leads to the result is not observed. [Hence there is no point in the supposition.]

The second alternative does not hold good. For it is reasonable to hold that viveka etc., cause discussion only through vairāgya etc. This is supported by Śruti also parīksya lokān karma-citān brāhmano nirvedam āyāt. (Prakāša explains this:-lokān visnu-loketarān karmāpāditān asārānityatayā parīksya vairāgyam prāpnuyāt.)

(The worlds other than the world of Visnu are caused by karma. They are essenceless and transcient. Having known this truth by means of examination one ought to have detachment.) [This Śruti shows how viveka is the cause of vairāgya.] For this resaon viveka etc., cannot be the attributes of adhikārin. This may be illustrated. The desire for svarga is the cause of sacrifice [and is therefore an attribute of adhikārin]. But the cause of the desire cannot be an attribute of adhikārin. (Therefore the former alternative alone subsists.)

What is to be noted with reference to this discussion is this. At the commencement of this discussion viveka etc., were

introduced as the attribute of adhikārin who has mumukṣā. But the whole discussion shows how viveka etc., cannot be taken to be an attribute of adhikārin. This may be illustrated by taking for example a sacrifice called jyotiṣṭhoma. One who celebrates this sacrifice is adhikārin. The desire to attain svarga is his attribute. But that which is the cause of this desire is not his attribute. Similarly mumukṣā may be the attribute of adhikārin in connection with jijāāsā. But the cause of mumukṣā is not his attribute. So to speak of four-fold discipline as the attribute of adhikārin is unwarranted.

VIII

At this stage the upholder of Śamkarā's position may demand a satisfactory explanation of the position of Siddhānta, the position of Madhva. In answer to this demand T.C., says: asmākam tu mate yathā śāstram vivekāder adhikāri-viśeṣaṇa-varāgyādi-hetutvam. śamādes tu adhikāri-viśeṣaṇatvam iti viśeṣaṇāmām catuṣṭayatvam iti paroktam na yuktam.

(According to our position, siddhānta, Šāstra is the only guide to determine that viveka etc., cause vairāgya etc., the attributes of adhikārin. [Prakāśa explains—parīkṣyeti śruteh vivekasva vairāgyādi-hetutvam—As the Śruti text parīkṣya etc., explains viveka is the cause of vairāgya etc.] So Samkara's position that Śama, etc., form the attributes of adhikārin and the attributes of adhikārin are four cannot be justified.

T.C., clarifies the position further.)

kecit tu nityānitya-vastu-vivekādīni na brahma-mīmāmsādhi-kāri-višeṣaṇāni. tesām tat-sādhyatvena anyonyāśrayāt. na ca brahma-iñāna-phalam eva nityam anyat anityam iti vivekaḥ vaišeṣikādi-śāstrāmtarāt. prathamam eva adhyayana-vidhi-vaśyatayā puruṣasya śāstrāmtarānuvakāśāt. tatrokta-nityānitya-vivekasya vedānta-viruddhatvāc ca. nāpi itihāsa-purāṇādinā, vicārāt prāk tena tad-aniścayāt. anvathā brahma-niścayopi tenaiva syāt. śama-damādīni tu nididhyāsanāmgāni "tasmād evam vit śānto dānta uparatas titikṣus samāhito bhūtvā ā'many evātmānam paśyet" iti śrutau evam-vit-śabdena śāstra-janya jñānam anūdya paśyed-iti nididhyāsanāmgatayā teṣām vidhānāt.

na tu vicārāmgāni. ihaiva vicāra-šāstre "śama-damādy-upetaḥ syāt" ity atra tad-vidhānāt ity āhuḥ.

tanna. " yas tu ādau śraddhayā siddham punah nyāyena sādhitum'' iti nyāyena "anityatvāt sa-duhkatvāt na dharmādyāḥ param sukham, mokṣa eva parānamdaḥ" ity-ūdītihāsādinā vā "nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena" ity-ādi śrutitaḥ āpātato vā, śrutimūla-hitaiṣipitrādi-vākyena vā, śravanena vā mananātmaka-vicārāt prāg api śraddhā-mātreņa nityānitya-viveka-siddheh. anyathā tvan-matepi apaśūdram adhikāre jnāte aśūdrasya etac-chāstra-vicāre pravrttih pravrttau-ca etac-chāstreņa apašūdram adhikāra ity anyonyāsrayas syāt. tathā adhyayana-vidhāv api adhīte svādhyāye "asṭavarşam brāhmaṇam" ity-ādi-vākyena aṣṭa-varṣatvādeḥ adhikāri-viseṣaṇatva-jñānam, tad-jñāne ca adhyayane pravṛttih iti anyonyāśrayah syāt. tathā brahma-jñānasya anamta-sthira-phalatva-niścaye tadarthino brahma-vicare niśśamka pravrttih vicāreņa ca tan-niścayah syāt. phala-jñānam sambhāvanātmakam vivekopi tathāstu. yady api tvan-mate pūrva-pravrttena karma cet vicāreņa karmaņām alpāsthira-phalatvam niścitam, tathāpi, na tan-niścaya eva phalarthino brahma-vicare pravrtti-hetuh. bhinna-vişayatvāt. ati-prasamgāc ca. nāpi karmaņām alpāsthira-pha atva-niścaya-sahito brahma-jñānasya āpātato anantasthira-phala-samdehah taddhetuh. anyasyanupayatva-niscayena tato nivṛtti-mātra-siddhāv api tusya upāyatvāniscaye tadupeyārthinā tatra niśśamkam apravytteh. evam vid iti vākyena śamādīnām nididhyāsanāmgatvepi "prašānta-cittāva samānvitāya prāvoca tām tatvato brahma-vidyām" ity-ādi-vākyāvagatam sravaṇāmgatvam ca na viruddham. kim ca "parīkṣya-lokān karma-citān brāhmaņo nirvedam āyāt. nāsty akrtah krtena. tad-vijnānārtham sa gurum evābhigacchet." ity-ādau vivekādīnām śravanāmgopasatteh pūrva-bhāva-śruteh katham śravanānamtara-bhāvitvam? na ca nityānitya-viveka-mātram vicāra-phalam. yena tad-vaiyarthyam syāt. tasmāt atha-śabdasya adhikārānamtaryam evārthah. tadarthatvam ca sva-mata eva yuktam na tu paramate ity abhipreiya āha bhāşya-kāraḥ "adhikārānamtaryārthas ceti."

(Some others hold that nityānitya-vastu-viveka, etc. do not form the attribute of adhikārin of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. For they result from the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. So to make them the attributes of adhikārin is vitiated by the fallacy of mutual dependence. [Without viveka etc., there is no mīmāmsā and

without mīmāmisā there are no viveka etc.] There is difference between two ideas: (1) the result of the knowledge of Brahman is nitya. (2) that which is other than this is anitya. This difference is not given by the Śāstras, Vaišeṣika etc. [In fact to speak of other śāstras in connection with Brahma-Mīmāmisā is irrelevant.] At the very commencement of study adhikārin is subordinated to adhyayana-vidhi, positive injunction of the study of Veda. This injunction governs the study of adhikārin and it gives no room for the study of other śāstras.

[One may suppose that other sastras also speak of nityānityaviveka.] But this viveka is totally different from the viveka expounded by Vedānta. Nor can it be held that viveka etc., are made familiar to us by Itihāsa, Purāṇas etc. Prior to discussion (vicāra) viveka etc., can never be obtained. To suppose that they are obtained from Itihāsa and so on is not correct, because in case they are obtained by means of Itihāsa etc., there ought to be the knowledge of Brahman also by the

same means.

Further, sama, dama etc. are the pre-suppositions of nidid-hyāsana. For the Sruti (Translation.) 'Therefore one who knows this having been sānta, dānta, uparata, titikṣu and samāhita ought to see ātman in one's own self,' by the words evam vit 'one who knows thus', states the knowledge produced by Sāstra and next mentions by the words 'ought to see,' (paṣyet meaning nididhyāsana, meditation) and fixes Sama etc., to be the presupposition of nididhyāsana. Therefore they are not the presupposition of discussion. In this vicāra-ṣāstra, itself, the same idea is stated as 'The adhikārin ought to have sama, dama etc.' This is what they say.

This does not hold good. The reasons are the following: It is said that 'what was known by love to begin with was justified by reason', owing to some circumstance such as—(1) By means of Itihāsa etc., stating that Dharma etc., do not lead to absolute peace because they are transcient and mixed with misery. (2) By means of the apparent meaning of Śruti 'Mokṣa being characterized by no action is not obtained by means of action'. (3) By means of the directions given by the father etc., who are interested in bringing about the peace recommended by Śruti. (4) By means of study—even before discussion which is no other than manana, there may appear

śraddhā (interest) and merely by this there may be nityānityaviveka. This conclusion is obligatory. If you do not accept this, your position at every stage becomes vitiated by the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyōnyāśraya). For example in the light of your interpretation of Apaśūdrādhikaraņa, a non-śūdra only after knowing by means of Apa-śūdrādhikarana that he has adhikāra, ought to introduce himself to discuss Sāstra. But only after he studies Sāstra he can understand that a Sūdra has no adhikāra. Similarly with regard to Adhyayana-Vidhi, after the study of Veda on the basis of the statement 'After the close of eight years, . . . Brāhmana' there is the knowledge of completion of eight years and so on as attributes of adhikārin and after obtaining that knowledge one is introduced to the study of Veda. In the same manner after making it definite that what results from the knowledge of Brahman is endless and permanent, in order to obtain it a person with conviction introduces himself to the discussion of Brahman and after discussion, that idea becomes definite to him. [In order to remove this difficulty] if it is held that if the knowledge of the result is taken to be of the character of probability, then viveka also ought to be of the same character.

With regard to your position an idea may be noted. You hold that before the discussion of Brahman there is the discussion of karma. With this there is the definite idea that what results from karma is insignificant and transcient. But this definiteness itself is not enough to introduce a person who desires enduring result to the discussion of Brahman, because the two have nothing to do with each other. Further to insist on this leads to all sorts of conclusions. [If the discussion of karma is supposed to lead to the discussion of Brahman, then Prakāša says 'vātsyāyanādāv api pravṛtti-prasangāt.'— Then it ought to lead also to the discussion of

Vatsyayana, the author of the science of sex.]

There may be another supposition.—That which leads to the discussion of Brahman may be the doubt that the knowledge of Brahman leads to a result which is endless and stable, when this doubt is coupled with the definite idea that the result of karma is insignificant and transcient. Even this supposition does not hold good. For if something is definitely known not to lead to the required result, then there is the rejection of that

thing. Only this much may be granted. But if something is not known to lead definitely to the required result, then there cannot be a serious attempt to have the discussion with regard to it. It is true that by the expression of evam vit, sama etc., are given as the presupposition of nididhyāsana. Yet in the light of the statement—'He explained correctly the science of Brahman to that student who has equanimity of mind as well as peace', to hold that sama etc., are the presuppositions of study (śravana) presents no difficulty. Further the statement 'Having determined that the worlds other than the world of Visnu result from karma, a Brāhmaṇa ought to have detachment; for moksa which is characterized by no action is not attained by action. In order to obtain knowledge he ought to go to the teacher, etc.'-explains how viveka etc., are presupposed by the approach to the teacher and this approach is presupposed by the study. If this is how viveka etc., stand how can they be taken to be after study? Nor can it be held that only the discrimination between nitya and anitya is the result of discussion. Though it may be there even before discussion, discussion is not in vain, [because discussion aims at giving us the knowledge of the truth of Brahman.]

Therefore the afterness of adhikāra is the meaning of the word atha. This meaning can be justified only in Siddhanta, but never if the position of others, Samkara and so on is accepted. This is the idea of Bhāsyakāra when he says 'the

meaning of atha is the state of being after adhıkāra.')

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER X

ADHIKĀRA IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

THE QUALITY OF ADHIKĀRA
DETERMINES JIJÑĀSĀ

1

So far T.C., has shown how the four-fold discipline does not help jijñāsā and thus it has prepared the ground for justifying the position of Siddhanta that only adhikara makes jijnasa possible. All that T.C., notes is taken by its author to have been implied by the statement of T.Pr. 'mukty-arthi-matrasya brahma-jijñāsāyām pravṛtti-nirasana-paratayā' etc. An appreciation of these ideas makes adhıkārin dispense with the concept of four-fold discipline as leading to jijnāsā. In this circumstance he becomes eager to know the exact nature of adhikāra that helps Brahma jijnāsā. On the basis of this background T.Pr., introduces the question about the nature of adhi-kāra and its various aspects. The desire to know the various aspects of adhikāra has a definite purpose to serve. It is not mere curiosity to know the details of adhikāra. In it is involved the intention of knowing the ideal (uttama) aspect of adhikāra. Without this intention the question about aspects becomes irrelevant especially in connection with understanding the nature of adhikāra.

Further to understand the ideal aspect of adhikāra is obligatory in the present circumstance. Four-fold discipline has been dismissed because it is seen not to help jijñāsā. What is called adhikāra in the special sense is understood to lead to jijñāsā. This means that adhikāra and jijñāsā are intimately related. They, therefore determine each other. There is jijñāsā just to the extent that there is adhikāra. Different degrees of adhikāra therefore ought to lead to the corresponding degrees of jijñāsā. This means that the highest degree of adhikāra ought to give the best of jijñāsā. The highest aspect of adhikāra can be fixed only when all the aspects of adhikāra are properly

evaluated. The idea of the best aspect of adhikāra gives us the ideal form of jijāāsā.

In order to help this discussion Bhāṣyakāra i.e. Madhva presents different aspects of adhıkāra. We have so far seen the different levels of adhıkāra on the basis of birth.

T.Pr. continues the topic. "asya sacchūdrādau vyāpteḥ prāyikatvāt arucyā prakārāmtarena adhikāri-svarūpam āha TATHĀ iti. Because this applies to sacchūdra etc., and it does not therefore in some cases bring about jijāāsā, Bhāṣyakāra having been dissatisfied with the definition states the nature of adhikārin in a different manner as TATHĀ.

Bhasya

"TATHĀNYO GUŅA-PŪRVAKAĻ

BHAKTIMĀN PARAME VIŞŅU YAS-TU ADHYAYANAVĀN NARAĻ ADHAMAĻ ŚAMĀDI SAM-YUKTAĻ MADHYAMAĻ SAM-UDĀHRTAĻ Ā-BRAHMA-STAMBA-PARYAMTAM A-SĀRAM CĀPI A-NITYAKAM VIJÑĀYA JĀTA-VAIRĀGYO VIŞŅU-PĀDAIKA-SAM-ŚRAYAĻ. SA UTTAMO ADHIKĀRĪ SYĀT SANYASTĀKHILA-KARMAVĀN ITI."

[Further there is also adhikāra which is defined on the basis of quality. That man who has devotion to Viṣṇu, the Highest and has the study of Veda, adhyayana, is adhikārin of the lowest rank, adhama. The person who has the qualities Sama etc., is one who is somewhat higher, madhyama. But one who has realized that of the things beginning with Brahmā and ending with an insect, everything is essenceless and absolutely transcient and has the detachment caused by this realization, (vijñāna) and further has only one support namely Viṣṇupāda i.e. Viṣṇu as He is, is the best because He is one who has given up all that he does i.e., has given up doership in the sense that he has realized that Viṣṇu is the doer of all.]

Commenting on this T.Pr. says: "atra adhyayana-labdhāpi viṣnu bhaktih anyāyādhyayana-nivrtyartham pṛthaguktā. tathāca haribhakti-pūrvaka-adhyayanavatvam sāmānyato brahmavidyādhikāra ityuktam bhavati. samādi samyukta ity ādau pūrva-sangrahah. pūrvatra ca uttaroktānukarṣaś ca kartavyah. na caivam sāmkaryam. uttaroktāprācuryena a-sāmkaryāt. brahmādy-asāratā-nāma teṣām a-sarvottamatvam tat-padādīnām mokṣāvaratvam ca jūeyam."

(With reference to the present discussion the following may be noted. Devotion to Visnu is however the result of the study of Veda; yet it is stated separately in order to avoid the study that is not based on devotion and that does not lead to devotion. What is stated on the whole is this: The study of Veda on the background of devotion to Hari is the content of the fittedness that helps Brahma-vidyā in all cases of adhikārin. In defining madhyama as śamādi-samyukta the previous idea namely that which defines adhama must be included in the definition. Similarly in defining the lower stages the definition must be so formed as to include the later ideas. This does not cause confusion, because in the lower stages the ideas that define the later stages are not intense. The state of Brahmā and so on being essenceless ought to be taken to mean the state of thier being non-supreme, as well as the state of their stations being inferior to Moksa.)

In understanding T.Pr., and through it Bhāṣya, the following must be kept in mind. As we have already seen Adhikāra stated by Bhāṣya-kāra as forming the background of Brahma-jijñāsā is profoundly different from the Sādhana-Catuṣṭaya (fourfold discipline) of Samkara. This is evident in the very setting of adhikāra with its different grades or stages. The four-fold discipline is in the first place inconceivable and in the second, it does not lead to jijñāsā. But adhikāra is perfectly conceivable and it necessarily leads to jijñāsā. We shall now apply these ideas to the several items of qualities of adhikāra. These qualities are devotion to viṣṇu (Viṣṇu-bhakti), study of Sāstra (adhyayana), engaging the self in understanding Viṣṇu (Samādi), detachment (Vairāgya) resulting from the knowledge of asāratā, essencelessness and anityatā, transcient nature of Brahmā, etc., Absolute dependence on Viṣṇu (Viṣṇu-pādaika-samśrayatva) and complete abandonment of doership (karma-sanyāsa).

Viṣnu-bhakti prior to adhyayana is of the nature of interest (śraddhā) that makes proper adhyayana and through it the development of other qualities, śama etc., possible. We have seen how T.C.'s. criticism of Śādhana-Catuṣṭaya explains that Viṣnu-bhakti is possible only in this sense. It is this Viṣnu-bhakti that forms the background for a proper course of adhyayana. Adhyayana without this background is called anyāyādhyana (improper adhyayana) and it does not help knowledge. Further

it must be noted that Visnu-bhakti does not signify anything sectarian or anything based on faith. It signifies the outlook that is the indispensable presupposition of adhyayana. The word Vișnu signifies the complete and absolute truth. This will be clear shortly. Visnu-bhakti finds its culmination in visnupādaika-samsrayatva. This in its turn helps karma-sanyāsa, sacrifice of doership in favour of Visnu. Adhyayana that does not fall in with this process is anyāyādhyayana. It is in other words waste of energy in wrong directions. If the process starts with visnu-bhakti, adhyayana makes visnu-bhakti firm. Sama, dama, etc., in this connection are such that they emerge from adhyayana and make in their turn visnu-bhakti firmer. Just as adhyayana without the background of viṣṇu-bhakti is anyāya (waste), sama etc., without the background of visnu-bhakti is only empirical in character. Therefore sama, etc., which are aspects of adhikāra must be interpreted in terms of viṣnu-bhakti. For this reason Bādarāyaṇa in Bhāgavata interprets sama as "samo mannistatā buddheh." (Sama is the state of mind fixed in me i.e. Viṣṇu). The ordinary meaning such as peace is only an insignificant item of this meaning. With the present meaning, sama is the same as santi occurring in such passages as Tesam śāntih śāśvatī netaresām (Kāṭaka as well as Brāhmī-sthiti as expounded by the Bhagavad-gītā.)

With the growth of viṣṇu-bhakti the realization of asāratā and anityatā of Brahmā and so on becomes nearer and easier. With this realization viṣnu-pādaika-samśrayatva becomes possible and actual. The adhikārin who is fixed to Viṣṇu in this manner can easily have karma-sanyāsa. Sanyāsa of karma consists in dedicating all actions that take place in an indivdual to Viṣṇu as their real agent. This process constitutes adhikāra. This may not be, to start with, the result of the knowledge of Brahman. But it is to start with in the form of śraddhā, interest; and in this form it is the necessary background of jijñāsā of Brahman. Itihāsa, Purāṇa and advice of elders may introduce us to śraddhā. The possession of adhikāra is indicated by the fact that Viṣṇu becomes sanidigha, the object of legitimate doubt. This state of mind as it is already shown

makes jijñāsā of Brahman (Viṣṇu) indispensable.

In the light of the foregoing ideas, it is easy to understand how adhikāra is conceivable and how it makes jijñāsā indispensable. Sādhana-catuṣṭaya is neither conceivable nor is it the presupposition of jijnāsā. Nityānitya-vastuviveka has nothing to do with visnu-bhakti. If at all it occurs, it occurs at the end of adhyayana but not as the presupposition of adhyayana. In the scheme of sādhanacatustava, there is no room for adhyayana. For this reason, the scheme becomes non-intellectual in character and in this circumstance how this is the background of the knowledge of Brahman becomes unintelligible. For the same reason vairāgya, śama, dama, etc., of four-fold discipline do not result from adhyayana and they cannot therefore transcend empirical values. To hold that they help jijnasa becomes irrelevant. Under these conditions mumuksā does not signify anything higher, nobler and transcendent. At best some empirical level may be conceived as moksa. It is evident how it does not help jijñāsā. So sādhana-catustaya and Brahma-jijñāsā are irrelevant to each other. The fact that Samkara insisted on sādhana-catuştaya creates more problems than those that are supposed to have been solved by it.

Further there is very little to say in favour of sādhanacatustaya because, however serious the discussion appears to be, the whole scheme begs the question, as without the study of Sāstra it cannot be attained. But there is every reason to justify adhikāra. It has as its content the whole course of adhyayana as well as the course of ethical and spiritual discipline resulting from adhyayana emerging from an outlook consistent with Brahma-jijnāsā. This outlook is the same as viṣṇu-bhakti, culminating in viṣṇu-pādaika-samśrayatva characterised by karma-sanyāsa. The whole process of adhikāra is thus an expression of an outlook that forms the background of jijnāsā. This is not an unfamiliar idea to philosophy. Only that person who has a philosophical outlook takes interest in philosophy. Without the proper outlook there is no philosophy. So far, there is no room for dispute, from whatever point of view—oriental or occidental we judge the position. What is the nature of the outlook and what are its different aspects are the questions

that demand answer. In occidental philosophy whatever attempt is made to answer these questions satisfactorily, in the East there are definite attempts. In fact Samkara's sādhanacatuṣṭaya itself is a case of this attempt. It is true that he holds that no adhikāra is presupposed by Brahma-jijñāsā. But he would have justified his position if he had not insisted on sādhana-catuṣṭaya. So what is implied by Samkara, much against his will, is carried on by Madhva to its culmination in his

scheme of adhikāra leading to jijnāsā.

Further there is a contradiction in Samkara's position. He definitely holds that the word atha of the Sūtra does not mean afterness of adhikāra but only afterness, ānantarya. Next he says that this is the state of being after sādhana-catuṣṭaya. He ought to have shown how sāndhana-catuṣṭya is different from adhikāra and what this adhikāra which he rejects is. Hiş rejection of adhikāra is based on the thought that adhikāra is irrelevant to Brahma-jijūāsā. But how he does not explain. His commentators attempt to justify him. But we have seen how they are not successful. Further there is nothing to prevent us from taking sādhana-catuṣṭaya itself to be adhikāra. But in this case self-contradiction in the position is evident. An attempt to remove contradiction leads to the position justified by Bhāṣya-kāra (Madhva).

Further as has been already shown there is obvious distinction between sādhana-catuṣṭaya and adhikāra. While there is no justification for sādhana-catuṣṭaya, adhikāra has every justification. One fails to see how Samkara could ignore this fact and try to uphold a position that does not contribute anything

to jijnāsā and in fact makes jijnāsā itself impossible.

Further as Madhva has already shown the Smrti, Gāruda explains how the word atha used in this Sūtra means adhi-kārānamtarya. He quotes the passage of Gāruda not as an authority to support his meaning. As Bhāṣya-kāra he never forgets the fact that he is expounding Brahma-Jijñāsā-Šāstra. He makes this point clear in his very first statement "sūtrārtha ucyate". By this statement he intends to state that while what other Bhāṣya-kāras say is not the meaning of Sūtra, what he says is the only meaning of Sūtra. How should he justify this? It is not enough if he shows what he says is reasonable. Whether it was actually meant by Sūtra-kāra still remains

a problem. In order to avoid this difficulty he quotes from the other works of Sūtra-kāra. All works that go by the name Smṛti that expound the doctrines of Sruti are the works of Sūtra-kāra. If the words that occur in the Sūtras are interpreted in the Smrtis, then to ignore what is said in them is not to do justice to Sūtra-kāra. Ignoring it one can never arrive at the correct meaning of the Sūtras. This observation holds good with reference to all quotations of Bhāṣya-kāra. In the present connection in the light of the passage from Gāruda he presents the Sūtra-kāra's meaning of atha as adhikārānamtarya. Next there appear the questions—what is adhikāra? What are its different aspects? In answer he gives Sūtra-kāra's position from Bhāgavata-Tamtra, another work of Sūtra-kāra. The very fact that a certain thing is said by Sūtra-kāra implies that it has the meaning justified by the Sūtras. So whenever Bhāṣya-kāra quotes from other works of Sūtra-kāra he intends to show the justification underlying the passage. He actually makes use of this justification in different connections. The author of T. Pr. brings all these expressions together so as to make the position in question intelligible.

III

By the critics of Madhva this method does not seem to have been properly observed. They mistake him for a theologian. A theologian is one who holds a position on the basis of some statement which he takes as an authority. He does not hold the position because it is rational and therefore indispensabl: from the point of view of reason. Nowhere is this charge against Madhva so prevalent as it is in the discussion of present day writers who take interest in Indian thought. The reasons may be many. It may be due to the fact that Indian philosophy is written in Sanskrit which is not now in use: It may be due to the fact that the Sanskrit of Indian philosophy i.e. Darśanas is different from the Sanskrit with which Sanskritists in general are familiar: It may be due to the fact that during recent times Indian philosophy is tolerated because it supports religion or faith in which the individual in question is somehow interested and for this reason nobody is serious about how it is made use of so long as his faith is not disturbed: It may be due to the fact that some one religious leader

who has a large following is taken to be the best philosopher and other philosophers are for this reason ignored: It may be due to the fact that India's own philosophy is not so far properly appreciated in India itself and consequently it has become the fashion of the day to gauge everything Indian from the point of view of foreign sentiments: It may be due to the fact that the principle of evaluation of Indian thought is laid down by some foreigner and Indian writers of the present day are mechanically adopting it without studying its application to Indian environment: It may be due to the fact that some foreign scholars have not found much to appreciate in Indian thought: or it may be due to the fact that Indian scholars have so far failed in their duty to make all the points of view of their philosophy available to the present day thinking world. The present day conviction is that while Samkara is out and out a philosopher, Madhva and so on are only religious leaders developing their religious ideas by opposing Samkara and his philosophy. Owing to this circumstance particularly Madhva is not taken to deserve any serious thought. This kind of judging things has its root gone so deep that it has misled even some followers of Madhva. They appreciate him merely as a leader of religion or theology. Under these conditions there is no wonder that all his writings are more or less consciously or unconsciously condemned as mere theology, even by those from whom a response of a different type may be expected.

Madhva is far from being a theologian or a religious leader. That he is identified as a theologian or leader of a religion seems to be purely due to degeneration in outlook and the resultant failure to appreciate Sāstra properly. In particular quarters there are even attempts to replace Sāstra by the statements supposed to have been made by persons who go by the name jāānins or aparokṣa-jāānins according to the conviction of the particular groups of people. Even where Sāstra seems to be respected it is rare to find that it is appreciated as philosophy. It is more or less, as a rule, appreciated as theology

or religion.

But the truth is entirely different. Madhva, the Bhāṣya-kāra is out and out a philosopher. As a philosopher he is at least no less than Samkara. He allows no theology and no religion. The elements of theology and religion are serious defects of

philosophy according to him. While Samkara in expounding brahma-jijñāsā makes jijñāsā itself impossible by holding that the subject matter of jijñāsā is asamdigdhai.e. svaprakāśa, self-evident and by insisting upon four-fold discipline as the background of Sāstra, Madhva, by showing that the subject matter is samdhigdha and insisting on adhikāra as necessary presupposition of jijñāsā, makes jijñāsā indispensable. The distinction between the two positions becomes more and more defined as

we go on studying Sāstra.

When the facts are these most of the present day Indian expositions emphasise Samkara at the cost of Madhva. This is a kind of narrowness in outlook. It has marred the growth of Indian philosophy. Misled by this narrowness philosophers of the world in general identify Indian philosophy with Samkara. Samkara's system is taken to be the only Vedanta system. Success of Samkara has become the success of Indian philosophy and failure of Samkara has become the failure of Indian philosophy. But Foreign scholars in majority have no sympathy with Samkara's māyāvāda, as this vāda makes the world we actually live in illusory and asserts the reality of something that cannot be studied, known and spoken of. The failure of māyā-vāda, they think, because of their identification of Indian philosophy with Samkara, is the failure of Indian thought as such. In my work, "The Dvaita Philosophy and its place in the Vedānta," I have shown how an appreciation of Madhva as his works reveal him makes the rewriting of the history of Indian Philosophy a necessity. It is hoped that the urgency of this rewriting will be felt by the reader as he goes on with the present study.

Instead of condemning Madhva as theologian, let us study what he gains on the side of philosophy by quoting the different texts of Bādarāyaṇa. His very conception of the subject matter of jijñāsā as Sandigdha, of adhikāra as making jijñāsā indispensable and his definition of jijñāsā as the study of Sāstra with application as it will be explained shortly and the very setting in which he introduces Brahma-Mīmānisā clearly indicate that he is never led by authority in any sense of the term. As I have already shown in my work "The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedānta" he sees that the position of Sūtra is justified by means of pure reason. This is

clear from the way in which he introduces the topics. We may take for example the meaning of atha. First he gives the meaning as "atha-śabdo mamgalārthaḥ adhikārānamtaryārthaś ca". This signifies that he has arrived at this meaning purely philosophically. This is substantiated by the very fact that his commentators expound the further philosophical justification of this meaning. In this connection they examine the meaning given by other Bhāṣya-kāras and show how they are defective. This is illustrated by the discussion presented by Candrikā by way of interpreting T.Pr. If the meaning given by Madhva were theological as the modern scholars would say, then there would have been no occasion for his commentators to give philosophical justification of the position even supposing that they did it as followers of Madhva. They would have in fact taken for granted the correctness of the meaning because it is based on an authority. But they have never thought of this possibility. The whole discussion presented by them is nothing but an amplification of the philosophical justification underlying their master's position.

After having philosophically justified the meaning of atha and its place in Brahma-jijñāsā, Madhva shows that, that is the meaning of atha according to Sūtra-kāra. The philosophical justification itself indicates that this is what Sūtra-kāra meant. For jijnasa i.e. philosophy is the universe of discourse in the present connection. So philosophical justification is an aspect of jijñāsā and is therefore really the justification of Sūtra-kāra. Madhva recognises this fact by quoting from Bādarāyaṇa i e. from Gāruda. In this passage the reason for holding that atha is mamgalārtha and adhikārānamtaryārtha is presented. It is mamga -lartha because it is the expression of Para-Brahman i.e.. Atman in the sense of Vișnu i.e. Gunapūrņa. Maingala that is different from this is inconceivable. This is the position which Madhva has indeed practised in course of his thought. A reference to one of his works, Tattva-Samkhyāna illustrates this point. He begins this work as svatantram asvatantram ca. In answer to an objection that the work does not commence with mamgala Jayatīrtha brings out that the mention of Svatamtra is the highest form of expressing manigala. He says kim tatonyam mamgalam nāma (what else can be called mamgala against it?)

Madhva shows that mamgala as the meaning of atha can be

understood and appreciated only by one who has adhikāra. Hence the same work is taken to mean adhikārānamtarya. The use of the same word to mean both the things signifies that the two cannot be separated and one is intimately connected with the other and one gives colour to the other and one is definite in so far as the other is significant. The author implies all this by qualifying Brahmā the teacher of the passage as sattama and by the expression tathaiva ca in "ānamtarye adhikārasya mamgalārthe thathaiva ca." Further in this passage adhikāramamtarya comes first and mamgala next. But Madhva mentions mamgala first and adhikārānamtarya next. All this signifies the full recognition and appreciation of the mutual relation of mamgala and adhikāra. While this passage follows a logical order in stating them, Madhva brings out this order by showing that adhikāra is implied in mamgala.

IV

Further Madhva's quotation has another purpose to fulfil. He has shown that Sūtra is required to determine the meaning of verbal expressions as such. This is the meaning of "sabdajātasya sarvasya yatpramāņas ca nirņayah." This signifies that the world of sound beginning with the expression of this principle itself is in need of getting its meaning determined by Sūtra. The principle itself being of the nature of artha (the meaning aspect of sabda) determines the meaning of the sound aspect of Sūtra. So in every Sūtra there are two aspectssound and meaning. Of the two the latter governs the former. For logically without the latter, the former is impossible. Taking its significance from the latter, the former determines the latter. This is the meaning of the fact that arthābhimānin, (The presiding deity over artha) is superior to śabdābhimānin (the presiding deity over śabda.) As it will be clear later on presiding deity is one which is the door-way of reality of that, over which it presides. "abhimānī khalu abhimatasya sattādeḥ prayojakaḥ." N.S.

So Madhva quotes from Güruda also because he has to show that Sütra defines the meaning of the passage. If the passage says adhikāra first and next mamgala, following the spirit of the word atha in the Sütra as it is implied by the order "a" and tha, Madhva, puts mamgala first and adhikāra

next. He intends to show that consistently with this meaning the passage of Gāruda must be understood. Sūtra intends to put mamgala first also because it is in a relative sense logically prior to adhikāra. Adhikāra in its qualitative aspect starts with viṣnu-bhakti and this would be impossible in the absence of auspicious disposition. With reference to the word atha 'a' means Viṣnu. This meaning can be enjoyed only by a mind which is already in possession of mamgala. These considerations show how mamgala is prior to adhikāra at every stage though adhikāra in its turn makes mamgala

more explicit.

Next if the question occurs what this adhikāra is, then the answer is signified by the same word atha, in the capacity of its meaning by its parts a and tha, Vișnu as well as the fact that It is the principle of sthiti, existence. These ideas are the principles on which the items of adhikāra are based. Corresponding to Vișnu, there is Vișnu-bhakti the starting point of adhikāra. Sama, dama and so on, vairāgya, viṣṇu-pādaikasamsrayatva and akhilakarma-sanyāsa are the expressions of sthiti (existence) of Vișnu, the principle of all existence. These ideas presented by atha stand for the truth that Visnu is the source of all existence, sarva-sattā-prada. Adhikāra is only an expression and the appreciation of this truth. Further without adhikāra this truth cannot be understood. So the passage from Bhāgavata-Tamtra which presents adhikāra comes to have definite meaning when it is interpreted consistently with what atha, a word of Sūtra means. This is the reason why Madhva quotes this passage.

Further in this passage several items as well as stages of adhikāra are stated. There are two aspects: (1) adhikāra as determined by birth. With regard to this T. Pr. notes that it is too wide or too little. All that birth indicates is that a person who is mukti-yogya i.e. who deserves mokṣa is adhikārin in connection with Brahma-Vidyā. But T. Pr. draws distinction between mukti-yogyatva and adhikāra. It holds that while mukti-yogyatva may or may not lead to jijūāsā, adhikāra necessarily makes Brahma-jijūāsā indispensable. Mukti-yogyatva is governed by birth and in spite of birth there may not be Brahma-jijūāsā. (2) The background that makes jijūāsā possible is something more than this. It is in this case determined qualitatively.

The background that is qualitative admits of three stages—(i) adhama (the lowest) (ii) madhyama (medium) and (iii) uttama (the superior). These are only the distinction of three stages in the scale of adhikāra. This signifies that one who is found in the lower stage today, may be seen to develop the qualities of the next higher stage tomorrow. He thus grows in the same process till in so far as he can, he develops adhikāra in the superior sense. This meaning is inevitable, for, as it will be clear shortly, without vairāgya, viṣnu-pādaika-samisrayatva and karma-sanyāsa emerging from it, there is no hope of obtaining the knowledge of Brahman from Sāstra. There is knowledge corresponding to adhikāra. Since the whole course of adhikāra is a regular process no stage is an end in itself. Every stage is of the nature of being transcended by a higher stage in a more and more complex form.

So far it has been stated that purity of jijnasa as well as knowledge obtained from it is judged from the the standpoint of the highest point of adhikāra. In this connection it is not meant that every individual necessarily has or comes to have the very highest point of adhikāra. As he may have no adhikāra, he may have adhikāra of any stage. In a given case, of the several elements that mark adhikāra that which is dominant decides the stage of adhikāra. If viṣṇu-bhakti and adhyayana are dominant, then the stage is adhama (the lowest). If sama etc., are dominant then the stage is madhyama. If vairāgya emerging from the knowledge that the whole world other than Viśnu is asāra and anitya and viṣnu-pādaika-samsrayatva are dominant, then the adhikāra is uttama. To fix adhikāra in these different grades indicates that in a given case however dominant particular elements be, there is knowledge corresponding to adhikāra in its uttama, superior aspect. So the statement of different grades is in a sense an emphasis laid on superior aspect of adhikāra. This means that the exposition of adhikāra is governed by a unity of purpose.

One may suppose that this exposition can as well be taken to mean that there are different kinds of adhikārins and they understand the truth according to their own capacity (yogyatā). But this interpretation does not justify the demand that Sūtra makes. The word atha has in view only that adhikāra that is consistent with Brahma-jijāāsā. There are not different kinds

of jijnasa, for there are not different kinds of knowledge. Knowledge is one. Even though it is different in different adhikārins it is one in the sense of being of the same nature. Jijnāsā is one, adhikāra is therefore one. This is the circumstance given by the Sūtra and this decides the meaning of the exposition of the adhikāra by Bhāgavata-Tamtra. This passage without the application of the principle presented by Sūtra (Sūtra-nyāya) would mean different grades of adhikāra, each grade being left to itself with nothing to unite them. In this case the passage becomes bereft of unity of purpose. To ignore the unity of purpose in a passage is finally to hold on its basis nothing definite. To stress different grades for their own sake ends in asserting without justification contradictory ideas about truth. In the absence of a unifying principle, from the point of view of adhama stage, knowledge that does not pre-suppose sama etc., may be taken to be a true case of knowledge. From the point of view of madhyama stage knowledge that does not pre-suppose vairagya resulting from the knowledge of asāratā and anityatā of the world and viṣnupādaika-samsrayatva may be taken to be a true case of knowledge. In these circumstances nothing has been definitely fixed by Sāstra. With reference to the knowledge resulting from Brahma-jijñāsā, there must be the definite contributions from all the elements that mark adhikāra according to their order of importance in the scale of the process of adhīkāra. It is only then the given case of knowledge is knowledge in the true sense and it is this knowledge that is expected to result from Brahma-jijnāsā.

v

In the light of the foregoing considerations we may briefly define the several concepts that are made use of in expounding the process of adhikāra. In this process viṣnu-bhakti comes first and it is the lowest point of the process. This implies that the whole process is characterised by viṣnu-bhakti. What is then this viṣnu-bhakti? It is wholesale devotion to Viṣnu. In this connection some consideration seems to be necessary. At present, people are generally familiar with Viṣnu as a deity or as the highest deity. It is not the devotion to this deity, that is meant by the expression. What is considered to be the highest outside Sāstra is not the highest in the world of Sāstra. With reference

to the discussion of Sāstra Viṣṇu is Nārāyaṇa. At the very outset Madhva has defined Nārāyana as absolutely complete, defectless, object of knowledge, object of attainment and the very source of knowledge-Gunapūrna, Nirdosa, Jūeya, Gamya and Guru. Devotion to Visnu means devotion to these truths. The third truth namely Jueya indicates that devotion to these truths consists in seeing as a rule that every case of knowledge is really of that which is absolutely perfect and defectless, the attainment of which is the only aim of all the endeavour of adhikarin. This is the position that Bhāṣya-kāra makes clear and owns as his own in the very opening passage of the Bhāṣya. His position obviously involves nothing sectarian, nothing religious and nothing theological. This is the position that is the expression of the very ideal of philosophical knowledge. After Veda he calls the ideal Visnu. Devotion to this ideal is called visnu-bhakti.

How does an adhikārin come to have this viṣṇu-bhakti? His answer is that in the case of the person in whom it is found it marks the very disposition of the mind. If a favourable position is given to that mind the devotion that is latent in it becomes patent. This disposition may or may not be universal. In some cases of persons there is or may be viṣnu-bhakti just

as there is the absence of it in other cases of persons.

One who has the innate disposition which is characterised as viṣṇu-bhakti is qualified to study Veda i.e. philosophy in the sense recognised by Śāstra. The person who is not devoted to Visnu, makes no distinction between true knowledge that is expected from Sastra, and the knowledge that is different from it. Nor has he any standard by which he can evaluate knowledge. So visnu-bhakti determines adhyayana. Without it adhyayana has nothing to justify it. For it never leads to knowledge. It is this adhyayana that is called anyāyādhyayana, illegitimate study by T. Pr.

If adhyayana comes from visnu-bhakti, then in its turn, it fixes adhikārin to Viṣṇu more firmly. This state is called sama. The other virtues that follow sama will be defined shortly. With the rise of sama, adhama stage of adhikāra is transcended. Commonly sama is taken to mean peace or calmness. But the meaning it enjoys in Sāstra implies that peace or calmness in the real sense is the result of the state in which mind is fixed to Vișnu. Without this stage there is no peace. What is commonly called peace is only arrest of mental activities and it never helps knowledge as it is itself of the character of indolence.

Sama resulting from adhyayana, the expression of vișnubhakti qualifies adhikārin to evaluate the world other than Vișnu. To a person who is not devoted to Vișnu and whose virtues, study and so on have not emerged from devotion to Visnu, things of the world become attracting. He becomes naturally fond of particular beings and their stations. It is a person of this disposition that develops his devotion, owing to some interest or other, to particular deities, or to their stations. But a person who is devoted to Vișnu in the said manner and whose virtues develop from this devotion, because of his devotion to Visnu and other virtues following devotion, is never attracted by the things of the world, however great and exceptional they may appear to be. He is now in a position to examine these things, because all things of the world whether they are considered to be individuals or to be in group fall short of Visnu. With sufficient examination a person realizes that they are anything but pūrna, nirdoṣa, jñeya, gamya and guru. That which is pūrņa, nirdoṣa, jñeya, gamya and guru, source of knowledge is supreme (sarvottama). That which falls short of this is nonsupreme (asarvottama). The fact that something is asarvottama is the indication of the fact that it is asara, essenceless. However great its position in the empirical world be it is not gamya, something to be obtained. For that which is the object of attainment, gamya is pūrņa nirdosa jneya and guru. This attainment is called moksa. The position of the worldly objects is not gamya and is therefore below moksa. The person who has devotion to Vișnu and so on, has in view the attainment of Sarvottama, Vișnu i.e., Brahman, and for this reason he is never attached to the things of world.

The things of the world in this passage are designated as ābrahma-stamba-paryarita. A with Brahmā means commencing with Brahmā. Stamba is an insignificant insect. It signifies the lowest point of existence. This passage has in view the whole world other than Viṣṇu. As it will be clear later on the world according to Śāstra commences with Śrī-tattva or Laxmī. For this reason the word Brahmā in the present passage means Srī-tattva. From the empirical point of view

one thing of the world may be taken to be higher than other things and the position of that entity may be considered to be more important. But from the point of view of Sarvottama everything that falls short of It is practically the same with other entities taken to be inferior to It. Similarly from the point of view of mokṣa the position of an entity however important it may be considered to be is below mokṣa and it is for this reason practically the same with other positions. So the test of being asāra of an entity is in fact, that it is not Sarvottama, and the test of being asāra of a position is the fact that falls short of mokṣa.

VI

A careless reading of asara as being asarvottama and mokṣāvara gives us an idea that T. Pr. by interpreting asāra in the said manner actually modifies its tone. Sāra is essence. Asāra is essenceless. But it may be supposed that the present work with its expressions asarvottama and mokṣāvara elevatesthe essenceless far too high. Sometimes giving this meaning to the passage, on its basis, all sorts of imaginations that characterise popular misconceptions are developed as being sanctioned by Sastra. But in fact there is absolutely no room for this kind of interpretation. This interpretation is thoroughly inconsistent with the fact of detachment taught on the basis of asarata. If asarata is modified, then detachment also becomes modified and this circumstance isinconsistent with visnu-bhakti in its full sense. Inability to transcend empirical level of thinking is the cause of wrong interpretation. Empirically the essenceless is taken to mean something very low. Asarvottama and mokṣāvara are taken to mean at times the very highest objects of the world. In this circumstance while interpreting the former in the latter sense there is naturally the idea that real meaning of the former is modified by the interpretation. But judgements from empirical points of view have no place in Sāstra. For in the world other than Vișnu, one thing is as much other than Vișnu as some other thing. Whatever difference between these two things be empirically, in their relation to Vișnu they stand on the same level. In fact it is this truth that is powerfully expressed by T. Pr. by the expressions asarvottama and moksavara.

A note on the discussion on this point regulates the method

of interpreting T. Pr. and with it Bhāṣya and Sūtra. All these works are no doubt in Sanskrit. But the special character of this sanskrit is what one ought to understand. This sanskrit closely follows Veda. To keep the Vedic background in mind is obligatory in interpreting this Sanskrit. The construction of sentences and so on may be similar to those that are found in popular Sanskrit works. But the concepts that are dealt with are purely Vedic in their implications. So we must interpret these concepts on the basis of their Vedic meaning. To interpret them from the point of view of popular Sanskrit never helps the knowledge as that interpretation cannot transcend the empirical level. Hence the interpretation of the concepts must be governed by adhikāra, viṣnu-bhakti and so on. Interpreting the word asara on the basis of adhikara it is easy to see how it detaches one from even the highest things of the world and thereby fixes one's attention to only that which is sarvottama the attainment of which is moksa itself.

Anityakani in the passage presents another attribute of the things of the world defined as asāra. Anitya means transcient. Ka as attached to anitya makes the meaning of anitya much lowered and this signifies that the thing in question is practically nothing. This means that relatively from particular empirical points of view however great the duration of a particular position be, say the position of Srī-tattva or the position of Catur-mukha, from the point of view of Viṣnu it is

nothing and is therefore anityaka.

With the realization of these truths adhikārin is naturally detached from all the things of the world. It is this detachment that is called vairāgya. It consists in the realization of asāratā and anityatā of all things of the world. It is only this vairāgya that leads to the intense devotion to Viṣnu and this is called viṣnu-pādaika-samsrayatva. Vairāgya is not abandonment of the world. It is not non-possession. It is not self-torture. It is entirely different from what the other systems of thought consider to be vairāgya. Vairāgya according to Sāstra is detachment from wrong views. It is thus purely intellectual. It is therefore purely spiritual in character.

Visnu-pādaika-samsrayatva signifies the state of being devoted to Visnu as the very principle of existence as such. With this adhikārin is prepared to take nothing as being outside

or independent of Visnu. His devotion to Visnu is such that he readily appreciates everything, seeing everything through

Visnu and therefore seeing Visnu everywhere.

Further everything consists in action. To see Vișnu everywhere is to see that It is the source of all actions. This is akhila-karma-sanyāsa. Sanyāsa is not abandonment of karma. It is actually having karma at the same time tracing it to its source, Visnu. Karma seen in this manner is not taken to have been determined by individual efforts. It is not taken to have a necessary relation to a result in which an individual is interested. Nor is it taken to be the work of an individual. It is rather something of which the individual and various other things which are supposed to have made it possible are all different aspects. All these things are in fact the attributes of karma. The following is the difference between the common idea of karma and karma in karma-sanyāsa. Commonly karma is taken to be the effect of the operation of various things including the individual doer. According to this conception the things are logically prior to karma and karma is therefore attributed to them. With it various other ideas that are supposed to govern the idea of karma, such as free will of the individual agent, result, the particular capacities of various things that are supposed to help karma, are also attributed to the things considered to be prior to karma. But the implications of karma-sanyāsa is totally different. According to this, karma is prior to things and the things are attributes of karma. It is karma that gives rise to the so called individual doer. It is karma which gives rise to the idea of a result. It is karma that determines the capacities of various things, that are supposed to help it. It is thus karma that is the creator of individual doer, result, and various entities that are supposed to help karma. The common sense karma is the result of several things. But karma of karma-sanyāsa is the source of several things. An appreciation of this truth is necessarily the result of vairagya and viṣṇu-bhakti. Visnu-bhakti as applied to karma ends in realizing not only that karma is the maker of all but that Visnu is the source of karma. Karma is existence. Vișnu is the principle of existence. Vișnu is therefore the author of all karma. Vișnu is Sarva-kartā: All-doer. It is the realization of this truth, viz., the truth of Vișņu as Sarva-kartā that is karma-sanyāsa.

In the light of the foregoing ideas the following is briefly the process of adhikāra. As it is already indicated, to start with, it is in the form of disposition. This disposition is purely intellectual in character. It helps the understanding and appreciation of the truth that Viṣṇu is Sarva-kartā. This state of mind is totally different from mere dedication of all karma to Vișnu. If the authorship is owned by the individual, then dedication is false. In fact dedication in the presence of owning authorship adds another item of authorship namely the authorship of the act of dedication. So karma-sanyāsa is purely a case of disposition. From this disposition emerges the study of Sastra and from this results the knowledge of Visnu, the author of all. This gives a definiteness to visnu-bhakti, the starting point of adhikāra and this makes the rest of the process more refined. With the refinement of adhikāra in this manner, the study of Sāstra gains more and more comprehensiveness. This is how knowledge grows endlessly.

The unity of all the items of adhikāra in the process of their growth is expressed by T. Pr. in the passage beginning with uttarokta, etc. Commenting on this passage Bhāvadīpa

"tatas ca ayam arthah, samānādhikaraṇānām adhyayanaśamādi-viṣṇu-pādaika-samśrayatvādīnām madhye yasya adhyayanam pracuram anyad apracuram sah adhamah, yasya viṣṇupādaika-samśrayatvam eva apracuram adhyayana-śamādike-tu pracure sah madhyamah, yasya viṣṇu-pādaika-samśrayatvādikam eva pracuram adhyayana śamādiketu apracure sah uttamah iti. bhāṣye sanyasteti viṣṇvarpitety arthah."

(To sum up the whole consideration the following is the position. Of adhyayana, sama etc., and viṣnu-pādaika-samsra-yatva which are found in the same person, if adhyayana is dominant and the other two are not dominant, then that person is adhama. But in the case of a person in whom viṣnu-pādaika-samsrayatva is not dominant and adhyayana and sama, etc., are dominant then that person is madhyama. Further in the case of a person in whom viṣnu-pādaika-samsrayatva etc., alone are dominant and adhyayana and sama etc., do not dominate the former, then that person is uttama. The word sanyasta that

occurs in the *Bhāṣya* "Sanyastākhila Karmavān" means karma which is viṣṇvarpita, that which is understood to have Viṣṇu as its source.)

It may be noted that though this passage speaks of different adhikārins, it does not lose sight of unity of the different grades. If there were no unity, then to speak of comparison and the determination of the dominant aspect would be impossible. It is in fact on the basis of unity the determination of different grades is made. With the same idea T. Pr. introduces Bhāṣya.

"nanvatra brahma-vidyāyām ityanuktah kutoyam adhikārah tatraividhyasca brahma-vidyāyām ity ata āha-ADHYAYANETI."

(A question may be put. In the passage quoted adhikāra is not said to belong to Brahma-Vidyā. How can then it be held that with reference to Brahma-Vidyā this is adhikāra and that is of three grades. In answer Bhāṣya-kāra says—

BHĀṣYA—"ADHYAYANA-MĀTRAVATAḤ NĀVĪŚEṣĀD ITI CA UPARI" [(Adhikāra) occurs to a person who has made a full study (of Brahma-vidyā). Knowledge etc., are not the same in all.

Thus there is a later passage.]

Bhāvadīpa presents a brief exposition of this idea-tṛtīye iti adhyāye cathurtha-pāde ity-arthah. mātreti kārtsnyam ucyate. yathā-śakti kṛtsnādhyayanavato adhikāritā ity uktyā kutoyamadhikārah brahma-vidyāyām iti samkā apāstā. sāca adhikāritā devādīnām avišesāt na bhavati. avišesāt jñānāder api avišesaprasangāt. nāviśeṣād ity anena tat-traividhyam ca kuta iti śamkāapāstā iti bhāvah. śrutyā iti vispastam vivaksita-sarvārtha-lābhāt smṛtih pūrvam uktā iti bhāvah." (Tṛtīye-in the third) means in the fourth quarter of the third chapter. With reference to the expression of Bhāṣya—"adhyayana-mātravataḥ" mātra means entirety. As it is stated in this passage that the state of being adhikārin occurs to a person who according to his capacity has made a full study, the doubt that what is stated in Bhāgavata-Tamtra may not be adhikāra with reference to Brahma-Vidyā is removed. [The Idea is this-"adhyayana-mātravatah" is a Sūtra that occurs in the third chapter. With reference to Brahma-Vidyā it holds that entire adhyayana is adhikāra. The statement "yas tu adhyayanavān narah" states the same idea. From this it follows that adhikāra stated here refers to Brahma-Vidyā].

Next Bhāṣya says 'aviśeṣāt'. Bhāvadīpa presents the meaning.—The state of being adhikārin occurs to deva etc. in a superior sense. The passage na-avisesāt stands for avisesāt na bhavati. This means avisesena na bhavati. This means ekarūpā na bhavati. The reason is given as višesāt. This means knowledge etc. ought to be identical; but they are not.' 'What is meant is this-If adhikāra is identical, then there ought to be no difference between knowledge etc., of devas and the knowledge etc., of others. This fact removes the doubt that adhikāra may not have three grades with reference to Brahma-Vidyā. The whole idea is that with reference to Brahma-Vidyā there are both adhikāra and grades of adhikāra. The reason suggested is the fact of superior or ideal knowledge. Unless adhikāra and its grades are granted, superior or ideal knowledge can not be explained. Bhā-Tam brings out all these ideas. Therefore it is quoted first. This is suggested by the word śrutyā.)

Bhāvadīpa makes the meaning of Brahma-Vidyā clear as "brahma-vidyāyām śravanādi-rūpāyām" (Brahma-Vidyā means Śravana, manana and nididhyāsana—Study, interpretation and

application). This will be made clear shortly.

Adhikāra that is defined and classified in the Bhāṣya is what is justified by Sūtra-kāra himself in the third Chapter. The word atha in the first Sūtra must therefore be taken to recognize i.e. to have in view all this. Consistently with this circumstance the position of Bhā. Tam. is determined. This is how Sūtra is nirnāyaka, determiner and the other texts are nirneya, to be determined. Further the same Sūtra, adhyayanamātravatah shows how adhyayana makes jijnāsā- indispensable.

VIII

After having shown that adhyayana is adhikāra, which makes jijnāsā indispensable, T. Pr. introduces that samādi also is adhikāra with reference to Brahma-Vidyā—" samādi samyuktatā ca brahma-vidyāyām eva adhikārah iti srutyā āha sāmta iti" (Bhāṣya-kāra says on the basis of Sruti that the fact that a person has sama etc. also is adhikāra only with reference to Brahma-Vidyā). The passage of Sruti is Bhāṣya.

BHĀṣya "śāmto dāmta uparatah titikṣuh samāhito bhūtvā ātmany evātmānam pasyet." [After having been devoted to Truth i.e. Viṣṇu, having controlled body and organs, having self-satisfaction, having the capacity to overcome the evil influence of the opposite occurrences on the mind and having obtained the correct knowledge of things, one ought to see the supreme self in one's self.]

T. Pr. makes the meaning of this passage clear "śamto bhagavan-niṣṭha-buddiḥ. dāmto nigṛhītemdriyaḥ. uparato viṣay-ālam. buddhimān. titikṣuḥ dvamdva-sahiṣnuḥ. samāhito yathā-vastu-jñānādimān. śāmtādir bhūtvā paramātmānam sva-sthitam vidyāt iti teṣām tādarthyam uktam bhavati. upanīto adhīyeta ityādivat. atra ātmani ityādyuktyā madhyamādhikāritvam

sūcitam. rsayo amtah-prakāśāh iti śruteh.

Sāmta is the person whose attention is fixed on Bhagvān i.e. Visnu. Dāmta is the person who has controlled his senses. Uparata is the person who knows that he is no longer attracted by objects of the world. Titikşu is one who defies the effects of opposites on him. [By the word sahisnu T.Pr. does not mean endurance. For endurance in no virtue. It is the expression of helplessness. Bhāṣya-kāra in his Bhāṣya on the Gītā gives the meaning of titikṣasva as viphalīkuru (defy). Consistently with this Bhasya titiksu or sahisnu in the present context must be taken to mean one who defies evil.] Samāhita means the person who has the correct knowledge of the thing in question and the details connected with correct knowledge. Having been Sāmta and so on a person ought to understand the highest Atman to be in his own self i.e. to be the Self of his self. [It is possible to take ātmani to mean 'within the individual self' but this meaning is irrelevant in the present connection. Adhikārin is the present context. Consistently with this context there is propriety in taking ātmani to mean Paramātmani. This interpretation presents the idea of Svatamtra, the Self-established and therefore the Self of the other selves. This knowledge is obviously demanded by adhikāra. As it will be made clear shortly Sūtra-kāra as a rule takes Atman to mean Paramatman.] This explains how the state of being śāmta and so on are required for obtaining this knowledge. This may be illustrated taking for example 'A person ought to study (sastra) after undergoing the initiating ceremonies (Upanayana).' In the passage given by Bhāṣya-kāra there is the expression atmani and so on. By this is indicated that the passage has in view the adhikārin who is madhyama. This conclusion is inevitable because of Śruti.—'The Rsis are those that have enlightenment as the principle of their existence'). As it will be clear later on with regard to this passage, amtah in the Vedic sense means the inner principle. Amtah means amtah-sthitah i.e. amtaryāmin. This is the recognition of the principle as avasthita, self-established i.e. Svatantra.

With regard to this passage the following may be noted. 'śāmtādir-bhūtva paramātmānam sva-sthitam vidyād iti tesām tādarthyam uktam bhavati.' This passage is highly significant. It explains how the different items that enter into the body of adhikāra are connected by logical necessity. Consistently with the spirit of this passage we have to understand samta, dāmta etc., in a logical order. Sāmta expresses attention fixed on Bhagavan. From this emerges control of senses, the idea given by dāmta. Control other than this is merely a case of suppression. Hence it is not control in the proper sense. For in this case there is control only in so far as there is suppression. When once there is some slackening there is no longer control. This is the fate of control spoken of in other systems of thought, Bauddha and so on. But in the present case control comes from the attention fixed on Bhagavan. This is the attention that presupposes disowning the senses on the part of the adhikārin, as the necessary condition of realizing that Bhagavān is the actual owner of the senses. It is the sense of ownership that is the root cause of all evil caused by senses. If once the ownership is understood to belong to Bhagavān, then no evil is caused. This is how senses are controlled. Further repression and knowledge of Bhagavan as the owner of all are totally different in their implications. Repression is itself a misery and its source is misery and its result is bound to be misery. Hence the so called control effected by repression has nothing to help the spiritual discipline and is therefore no con rol at all. But the knowledge of Bhagavān as the owner of all is the outcome of the appreciation of the Truth, that Bhagavān is the principle of all. An appreciation of this truth, intellectual in character, is the expression of inner joy viz., mamgala. The possession of this knowledge itself is a joy. For with it no

evil thought occurs to mind and therefore no misery enters into feeling. Further the result of this knowledge is a further understanding of Bhagavān and with it the corresponding development of the self. So this knowledge has the scope of incessant and infinite growth. So control of senses coming from attention fixed on Bhagavān has its origin and existence in joy and it ends in infinite joy, mangala. Further it must be noted that when attention is fixed on Bhagavān the senses are naturally controlled. Dissipation of attention or distraction is the cause of non-control. Hence from śāmta follows dāmta.

From dāmta comes uparata. As śāmta the person enjoys Bhagavān. This enjoyment is signified in the fact of attention fixed on Bhagavān. This state has caused control of senses. With this control the attention on Bhagavān becomes more firmly fixed. When the person is in possession of this attention his whole object of enjoyment is Bhagavān and Bhagavān itself. Consequently he is never attracted by the things of the world. He is practically withdrawn from the objects of the world. He has become uparata. So from the state of being dāmta the state of uparata emerges.

From uparata comes titikşu. In the case of a person who is withdrawn from the world of objects and whom nothing of the world attracts, there is nothing to upset him. The difference between misery and happiness has no meaning to him. He is not dejected by misery nor is he elevated by happiness. He has defied the effect-creating aspect of objects.

This is the state of being titikşu.

From titikju emerges samāhita. The distinction between misery and happiness is subjective. What is misery to one is happiness to another. So the object itself is not the source of misery or happiness. The source is rather the subjective disposition. As the distinction between misery and happiness becomes more and more pronounced the person comes to have hatred and attachment. With this state of mind he is never in a position to see things correctly. But when he becomes titikju he is naturally free from all prejudices, hatred and so on; and there is nothing to affect his judgement. In this state he understands things as they are. He evaluates them correctly and appreciates them correctly. So from the state of being titikju comes the state of being Samāhita.

To understand, evaluate and appreciate a thing properly is to understand, evaluate and appreciate the truth of Bhagavān in everything seen or known. For him everything becomes only an expression of Bhagavān. It is understood to exist in Bhagavān. In contrast Bhagavān is understood to exist in it as its principle. This is the truth of the self-established nature of Bhagavān. The person at this stage has the full appreciation of this truth. He sees everything through this truth. This is what is called prakāša, enlightenment. With the possession of this a person is called Rsi. This is the state of cultural unity in which are found the elements of śāmti, dāmti, uparati, titikṣā and samādhāna with their full operation. It is this enlightenment at the start that distinguishes an adhikārin who is madhyama. It must be remembered that throughout this discussion Bhagavān means Viṣnu and Viṣnu is equivalent to guṇa-pūrna, nirdoṣa, jñēya, gamya and guru.

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HARIH AUM

CHAPTER X

UTTAMĀDHIKĀRA ALONE RESULTS IN BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

1

T. Pr. introduces adhikāra that is uttama as making Brahma-Vidyā indispensable.

"sārāsāra vivekādy-api brahma-vidyāyām eva adhikāra iti

śrutyā darśayati—parīkṣya iti."

(The distinction between the essenceful and essenceless also is adhikāra only with reference to Brahma-Vidya). Bhāṣya-kāra shows this as the thought underlying Śruti as—Bhāsva:

PARĪKŞYA LOKĀN KARMA CITĀN BRĀHMAŅO NIRVEDAM ĀYĀT. NĀSTYAKŖTAĻ KŖTENA. TADVIJÑĀNĀRTHAM SA GURUM EVĀBHI-GACCHET SAMITPĀŅIĻ ŚROTRIYAM BRAHMA-NIŞŢHAM.

T. Pr., comments upon this.

lokān visnuloketarān karmā-pāditān asārānityatayā parīksya vairāgyam prāpnuyāt. sa ca moksād itaratra nirvinnah vijñānā-rtham gurum evābhigacchet. yasmān nitya-pumartho moksah karmādinā na sidhyati tasmād-ity arthah. atrāpi vijñāna padena uttamādhikāritvam sūcitam. devādīnāmtu yadjñānam vijñānam iti kīrtitam ity ukteh."

(A brāhmaṇa is one who is devoted to Brahman. (brahma aṇati iti brāhmaṇah). Having by means of examination understood that the locations other than the location of Viṣṇu i.e. the things other than Viṣṇu are the creations of karma and are therefore essenceless and transcient, he must have detachment. He must be never attracted by the things other than mokṣa (viṣṇu-prāpti). In order to have knowledge, holding in hand samit, a piece of wood, he ought to go to a teacher (Who is devoted to Sruti and through it to Brahman i.e., who is devoted to Brahman as studied by Sruti). For, mokṣa is eternal good (puruṣārtha) that ever occurs to man. It is never obtained by means of karma etc., (in the sense in which they are understood with reference to the previous passages.) With

reference to this passage also the word vijñāna indicates that the person to whom reference is made here is superior (uttama) adhikārin. This is supported by the statement. "The knowledge that distinguishes divinities etc., is called vijñāna.")

With reference to this passage the following may be noted. The position, that the places (lokas) other than that of Visnu are the creations of karma is highly significant. This position is profoundly different from what we ordinarily think of karma. Usually we think that karma (action) is an attribute of things. We take things as positive entities and attribute karma to them. So, our view is that karma is the creation of things in the sense that it is made actual by the things. But the present position shows that this is a wrong view of karma and it is due to our judging things without adhikāra. But with adhikāra entirely different truths are disclosed. If a non-adhikārin takes karma to be the result of things, an adhikārin takes things to be the creation of karma. His knowledge i.e. the knowledge of adhikārin is correct knowledge and it is called samādhāna by the Upanisad quoted by Bhāsya-kāra, and yathāvastu-jñāna by T. Pr. This interpretation makes it necessary for us to apply it to all circumstances in which Bhāṣya-kāra speaks of karma to be the origin of anything. Owing to the popularity of some religious ideas it seems possible to interpret this passage in a different manner.

Karmāpāditān may be taken to mean that a person enters into the non-Vișnulokas which are already there by means of the karmas that one observes, just as a person goes to a place through a vehicle. For example we may take a person that goes to a loka called Svarga by performing a sacrifice (karma) called fyotistoma. This view is based on the doctrine of karma advocated by Pūrva-Mīmāmsā. But in Brahma-Mīmāmsā this view has no place. For in the first place Sastra does not allow doership to a jīva and therefore to speak of a person as the agent of any performance is irrelevant; and in the second, Brahma-Mīmāmsā considers nothing of the world to be the cause of anything. These points will be clear later on in Janmādhikaraṇa. Further even apart from these difficulties the Upanisadic words are lokan karmacitan, the literal meaning of this, being, 'The lokas made or created by karma'. This meaning can by no means be ignored. To take lokas in the sense that they are prior to *karma* is to ignore the literal meaning for no reason. Further this sense does not explain how *vairāgya*, detachment is caused if it is known that a person enters into the *lokas*, *Svarga* and so on by performing sacrifices like *Jyotiṣtoma*. In fact it fosters all sorts of desires which

ordinarily we do not have.

But the meaning that the lokas themselves are the result of karma accounts for how this knowledge gives rise to vairāgya. The following is the explanation. We have so far known that karma creates lokas. We have to know what this karma is. Evidently it is not the karma of the individual. For the individual himself is a loka created by karma. In all cases karma is prior to the things of the world. Then whose karma is it? The only answer available is that it is the karma, action of Bhagavān. This meaning alone is consistent with the ideas, sāmta and so on which determine the meaning of this passage.

If all the things of the world result from the karma of Bhagavān, then it follows that they have no independent status. They are asarvottama and moksāvara in the language of the same work. They are thus asāra and anitya. These attributes are the indications of the fact that they are the creations of karma. The process of this determination is what is called parīkṣā (examination). By this determination a person is naturally detached from the things of the world. So only the present interpretation shows that there is necessary relation between examination and detachment—Parīkṣā and vairāgya or nirveda.

Further it is stated that mokṣa is nitya-pumartha and it is not realized by karma and so on. What is mokṣa? It is nitya-pumartha. What is then nitya-pumartha? What is pumartha? What is the significance of qualifying it as nitya? In answer to these questions the following may be noted. Pumartha is something that a person aims at realizing. Commonly it is said to be dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa—right doing, wealth, fulfilment of desire and freedom from bondage. But according to Brahma-Mīmāmsā none of them is pumartha. For according to Sāstra pumartha is gamya, to be attained and gamya is Nārāyaṇa. So adhikārin's pumartha i e. mokṣa is Nārāyaṇa. To qualify pumartha as nitya indicates that it is indispensable. What are commonly called puruṣārthas are not puruṣārthas in

fact, because $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$, the real pumartha is indispensable in all circumstances. Dharma is called Pumartha because of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. Artha is pumartha because of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. Kāma is pumartha because of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. Even the so called mokṣa is pumartha because of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. This implies that they may be dispensed with. But $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is indispensable. At times making no difference between $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ and attainment of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ Upaniṣads define mokṣa as $Brahma-pr\bar{a}pti$ i.e. $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana-pr\bar{a}pti$.

For these reasons the question how moksa is realized is equivalent to how Nārāyana is realized. Nārāyana is realized by means of knowledge and not by other means viz. karma and so on. Knowledge is therefore the only means. Karma and so on are no means. They are only the expressions of

absence of knowledge.

If this conclusion is properly appreciated another implication of the same passage suggests itself. The world is the creation of karma of Nārāyaṇa. This is proved by the fact that it is asāra and anitya. But the truth of Nārāyaṇa is totally different. It is sāra and nitya. It is not therefore the creation of karma. Nārāyaṇa is Tejas, illumination i.e. knowledge. Therefore It is attained only by knowledge and by no other

means, karma and so on.

The correctness of this interpretation of this passage can not be doubted. For the context is the characterization of uttamādhikārin. Further it is only this interpretation that makes vijñāna necessary which adhikārin feels needed as it is clear from the following passage—'tad-vijñānārtham etc.' Other interpretations never lead to this idea. To hold that of the two means jñāna and karma, karma leads to the other lokas while jñāna leads to m)kṣa may apparently seem to satisfy some. But the bifurcation of the two is by no means justified and the idea that karma leads to something has no place in Sāstra. These positions will be justified by Sūtra-kāra himself in proper places. Further a conception of mokṣa which is in any sense different from Nārāyana does not require knowledge of Nārāvaṇa to realize it. This also will be established by Sūtra-kāra Himself.

Further a reference to the method of popular discussions of these ideas may not be out of place. In these discussions thought is never made to go beyond the apparent meaning of passages. To prove the validity of this apparent meaning much energy is wasted in quoting passages after passages from different texts just to show that karma has its own place, significant enough in the scheme of knowledge, knowledge without karma is useless and bhakti (faith) is more important than knowledge and it makes the other two, jñāna and karma unnecessary and so on. As Sūtra-kāra himself considers these points in detail, it is enough to note the following in the present connection. Discussions of this nature do not help jijñāsā. If by quotation things can be proved, then there is no poverty for passages if only we are interested to prove something. For the literature of Sruti and Smrti is so vast that all sorts of contradictory judgements seem to be proved or disproved by quoting passages. In different contexts, in order to present different shades of meaning of the same truth different expressions are made use of in this literature. If once we fail to appreciate the circumstances of thought we are naturally led to depend upon the apparent meaning very seriously. In this case the apparent meaning of one passage naturally contradicts the apparent meaning of another passage. If the circumstance is this, no single idea is obtained by means of this literature. But to keep in mind all ideas that are apparently presented is an impossibility. So a man falls back upon some view which is of advantage to him placed in a particular position of life. Having once favoured a view owing to some interest external to philosophy, he emphasises all that seems to support his view so that the people who look upon him with veneration for some reason or other really think that what they are given is something that forms the very heart of Sruti and Smrti. This is the nature of discussion we usually have with regard to the ideas connected with Sāstra.

Obviously these discussions do no good either to the persons involved or to the subject matter. For however prolonged the discussions be the participants do not go a step further from the point with which they started the discussions.

This is so far the method as well as the use of popular discussions. But Sāstra has not ignored them and finds a place for them. These discussions are called vādi-vipratipatti. This may put an observer in doubt as regards the true position expounded by Sruti and Smrti. Sometimes the observer himself tries to overcome the contradiction between the apparent meanings of passages. At times two contradictory positions may appear to be equally reasonable. These cases of contradiction lead to doubt; and we have seen how doubt leads to pūrva-pakṣa to Sāstra.

In order to meet pūrva-pakṣa contradiction between twostatements or two positions or two reasons which causes pūrvapaksa must be removed. This is done by dismissing one and retaining the other. To do either there must be sufficient ground, the ground being reason itself. That which is dismissed is considered to be invalid and that which is retained is considered to be valid. This distinction applies to the contradiction between two reasons and positions. But with regard to the contradiction between two statements, the distinction may or many not apply. If of the two statements one is valid and the other invalid the distinction applies. At times even though the two statements are valid they may be considered to be contradictory. The reason for this is the fact that a wrong meaning is attributed to the statements. In thiscase the contradiction that is supposed to be between two statements is really between two meanings. The contradiction is removed by determining the correct meaning of the statements. In such cases as these the determining factor is some reason or nyāya. The expression of this reason is called Sūtra. It is called nirnāyaka while that which is determined by it is nirneya. Unless the reason presented by Sūtra is applied to the circumstances given no decision can be arrived at. Supposing under a particular circumstance we seem to understand the correct meaning of a statement even without the help of Sūtra, it must not be supposed that we really know the correct meaning. For we have not in this case got over the possibility of the contradictory meaning. When once contradiction becomes possible with all the assurance we might have had at the beginning, doubt enters into our mind and pūrva-pakṣa results from it and the help of Sūtra to remove it

becomes absolute. These considerations show that it is only through $S\bar{u}tra$ that we can have approach to the considerations about Brahman. An approach to them independently of $S\bar{u}tra$ never gives us correct knowledge that is really free from contradictions. This point becomes clear as we go on with our study and it is the necessary implication of the fact that

Sūtra is nirnāyaka (the determining principle).

If this is the position of Brahma-Mīmāmsā then in its scheme there is absolutely no place for quoting passages from Sruti and Smṛti independently of Sūtra in the interest of upholding some view. In fact to uphold any view other than the view of Brahman is irrelevent to Sāstra. Similar to the habit of quotations there are several other practices in vogue which in spirit ignore the importance of Sāstra. One of them is the habit of stating Brahma-Mīmāmsā as one item of several works that go by the name of Sāstra. It is evident that the mind which forms the origin of this habit has never made itself familiar with Brahma-Mīmāmsā as the nirnāyaka of all other considerations. Reciting Puranas for their own sake, invocation to God or making use of several divine attributes for its own sake, repeating particular formula Vedic or Purānik, meditating on particular forms of God, interpreting particular portions of Veda or of Smrti according to one's intelligence, worshipping several forms of God in various manners and so on are other forms of practices. The person who develops interest in any of these is never seen to recognise the importance of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. These practices may or may not give a place to Sāstra in their scheme of spiritual discipline. Further they may or may not be the outcome of Brahma-jijnasa and they may or may not lead to jijñāsā. They are justified only in so far as they are outcome of jijñāsā, lead to jijñāsā and their very essence is jijñāsā itself. Otherwise i.e. if they are in any way independent of jijnāsā if they do not lead to jijnāsā and if jijnāsā does not form their essence, then they are never justified. In this case they are as good or as bad as any other activity connected with mundane affairs.

There is another tendency among some of those that actually profess that their very purpose in life is the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This is the tendency of studying Śāstra more from the point of view of commentators. Brahma-Sūtras are Brahma-

Mīmāmsā. Beginning with Bhāsya-kāra all those that explain the position of Brahma-Sūtras are commentators. The tendency to judge Brahma-Sūtras through Bhāṣya and so on does not help correct understanding of Sūtras. This is the process of making things topsy turvey. Brahma-Sūtras are nirnāyaka of all. Then, to fix the meaning of Brahma-Sūtras from the point of view of Bhāsya and so on is irrelevent. Further how can we know the meaning of Bhāsya if the standpoint of Brahma-Sūtras is unknown to us? So to study Brahma-Sūtras from the point of view of Bhāṣya and so on is erroneous. Rāghavendra Tirtha says in Tattva-manjari, a commentary on Madhva's Anu Bhāşya "sūtrārtham hṛdi kṛtvaiva bhāsyārtham samprakāśyate"-(the meaning of Bhāṣya is explained only from the point of view of the meaning of Sūtras). How different our ordinary idea that Bhāsya decides the meaning of Sūtra is from the true position of Sāstra?

III

How then do we know the meaning of Sūtras? What is the function of Bhāṣya? In answer to the first question the following may be noted. The meaning of Sūtra has two aspects-(1) the verbal meaning, (2) the application of the verbal meaning to all items of experience to which it can be applied. The former is easy and the latter is difficult. The former presupposes knowledge of language and the latter critical and cultural background. Bhāṣya-kāra is one who satisfies these two requirements in an ideal manner. An insight into these points reveals to us the truth that both in understanding the literal meaning of Sūtra and in applying it to several aspects of experience it is Sūtra that must lead us even though we are studying Bhāsya. Without this leading no study of Bhāṣya is possible. The significance of the distinction between the interpreted and interpretation, vyākhyeya and vyākhyāna consists in appreciating this truth.

If we are really true to this truth, we do not fail to understand the correct meaning of Sūtra. Even for execution the process of this understanding is simple and natural. The operation of the process is cut off or obstructed by our own meaning if we commence our study with a prejudice, viz., attachment to or idealisation of particular commentators and so on. Rāghavendra Tīrtha shows in the passage just now

quoted that a student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā ought to be free from these defects and take the whole lead from Sūtras themselves even when he is required to interpret Bhāṣya.

In answering the former question the latter question about the function of *Bhāṣya* is partly answered. Jayatīrtha in his N. S. presents the function of *Bhāṣya* as well as *vyākhyāna*, (interpretation) in general.

"nāvayavārtha-kathanādikam eva vyākhyānam api tarhi uktasya sthāpanam api." (The function of vyākhyāna is not exhausted by merely stating the verbal meaning and so on and it consists in establishing what is stated).

The former part of this passage means giving out the correct verbal meaning: if it is needed, presentation of grammatical justification: if there is a different reading, showing its defects and so on. It is clear that in doing this, Sūtra which is vyākhyeya leads the thought and the thought of these things does not take place irrespective of Sūtra. The latter part is the language of the application of meaning of the Sūtras to all items of experience. This application is the meaning of establishing the position of Sūtra. Establishment consists in showing that there is nothing in experience to oppose or sublate the teaching of Sūtra. In doing this, experience in all its aspects is studied; the different items of experience are evaluated; and those that seem to oppose the position of Sūtra are judged. The process of judging them consists in finding out if they really oppose the position of Sūtra. If they really oppose Sūtra, then it follows that the real position of Sūtra is not understood as in this case Sūtra ceases to be the nirnāyaka of all. If the true position of Sūtra is found out then it necessarily follows that it has no opposition in the whole field of experience however rich it may appear to be. Even with reference to the process of finding out the real meaning of Sūtra it is Sūtra that ought to lead our thought. If the possibility of opposition to Sūtra from experience is removed, then the application of Sūtra-teaching to the whole field of experience becomes evident. The significance of this consists in the fact that the whole field of experience points to the truth of Brahma Mīmāmsā. This is how the truth of Brahma Mīmāmsā is realized to be absolute.

All these ideas are implied by Madhva himself when he

says: "TADARTHA-NIRŅAYĀYA BRAHMA-SŪTRĀŅI CAKĀRA." (He [Sūtrakāra] composed Brahma-Sūtras in order to determine the

meaning of the several branches of them, Vedas.)

If the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā does not appreciate these things he can never hope to understand Śāstra. He is hopelessly misled by experience and from the standpoint of this he tries to decide the meaning of Śāstra, and as the result he misses the very thing he has to gain from the study of Śāstra. In order to avoid this trouble Bhāṣya-kāra fully recognises the nirnāyaka character of the Sūtras in the course of his whole teaching. His attitude is very clearly expressed in Anu-Vyākyhyāna as "ato naitādṛsam kimcit pramāṇatamam iṣyate." (There is nothing other than the Brahma-Sūtras that can be considered to be pramāṇa-tama, the highest pramāṇa.)

The same is his position when he says "TADARTHA-NIRNA-YĀYA BRAHMA-SŪTRĀŅI CAKĀRA." This is the statement of reason the reason being the nirnāyaka nature of the Sūtras. This proves the fact that the Sūtras are pramāṇa-tama. Thus Madhva's Anu-Vyākhyāna marks the continuity of thought from his Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya. This is the significance of anu. Anu means that which follows. So Anu-Vyākhyāna follows Bhāṣya. This explains the fact of identity of purpose of the two works. Similarly all the works of Madhva, 37 in number have an identity of purpose. All of them must be interpreted consistently with Bhāṣya i.e. the teaching of Sūtra, because the Sūtras are nirṇāyaka. Against this truth the prevailing practice of concentrating attention on some work, such as Tātparya-Nirṇaya and so on can never be justified and this practice can never help knowledge.

IV

Having expounded the truth that the unmodified recognition and appreciation of the fact that the Brahma-Sūtras are nirnāyaka with reference to the evaluation of every item of experience and sources of knowledge, Madhva notes that the positions other than Brahma Mīmāmsā are either due to some prepossession which he calls durāgraha or illusion, bhrānti. He says in Anu-Vyākhyāna—durāgraha-grhītatvāt vartamte samayāh sadā. (There are samayas, positions other than Brahma Mīmāmsā because of the constancy of durāgraha, prepossession)

and in Anu-Bhāṣya—bhrānti mūlatayā sarva-samayānām ayuktataḥ. (As all samayas' philosophical systems are unjustifiable because they originate from illusion). Throughout the course of his thought he illustrates how Śamkara's position i.e., Ātmaikatva-vidyā is just that which is the negation of Brahma-Mīmāmsā and in this connection he shows how all other samayas become finally reduced to Ātmaikatva-vidyā.

To appreciate these ideas one must be free from prepossessions. Otherwise they stand ever missed and in this circumstance even Atmaikatva-vidyā, supposing it is correct, stands unconfirmed, because it is then vitiated by viparīta-bhāvanā, the idea that the opposite may be correct and asambhāvanā, the idea that it may be impossible. Hence in either case an evaluation of Madhva's point of view i.e.,

Brahma-Mīmāmsā becomes indispensable.

Further it must be kept in view that a careless translation of Atmaikatva-vidyā may do much harm. This term is purely technical. It is the name that Samkara gives to his distinct position. Hence to translate it as the doctrine of oneness of Atman is wrong. For the same reason on the basis of wrong translation to translate Madhva's position as the doctrine of maniness of Atman is equally wrong. Wrong translations and their cofollaries are the causes of popular misconceptions about Indian thought among scholars.

Having arrived at a position which is so far indicated Śamkara concludes in his Bhāṣya: asya anarthahetoh prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāntāh ārabhyamte. yathācāyam arthah sarveṣām vedāntānām tathā vayam asyām śārīraka-mīmāmsāyām pradarśayiṣyāmah. vedānta-mīmāmsā-śāstrasya vyācikhyāsitasya

idam ādimam sūtram—athāto brahma-jijnāsā.

(In order to put an end to this cause of misery to expound Atmaikatva-vidyā all upaniṣads are commenced. We show in this Sārīraka-mīmāmsā just that position that what is stated now is the meaning of all Upaniṣads. Of the Vedānta-mīmāmsā-sāstra which is to be established this is the first Sūtra—athāto

brahma-jijñāsā).

This statement is profoundly significant. It indicates how far Samkara is faithful to Brahma Mīmāmsā. His position may be highly original. But this is irrelevant to present purpose, namely the exposition of Brahman as *Srutyukta*. It is this fact

that explains the distinction between the view-points of Samkara and Madhva. While Madhva insists on the deciding, nirnāyaka, nature of the Sūtras, Śamkara is silent about it. Samkara introduces the Sūtras as mere vicāra, enquiry. There is a world of difference between vicāra and nirņāyakatva. Further at the hands of Samkara even vicāra is not allowed to have its full scope. This is evident by the fact that he, prior to vicara has already pronounced the judgement in his concept of Atmaikatva-vidyā. In addition he shows his enthusiasm in establishing this position. At this stage one wonders why he did not develop his position quite independently of the Sūtras. This is how his Bhāṣya is sublated by the very deciding (nirnāyaka) nature of the Sūtras. While the Sūtras propose to decide the meaning of Veda as such Samkara concentrates only on Upanișadic statements (Vedānta-vākyas), ignoring at the same time the rest of the Vedas. Further as an author of Sūtrabhāsya he is expected to find out the meaning of a Vedic passage after applying to it the principle of reasoning presented by the Sūtra in question. But he is silent about this and in fact supports his thesis by means of quotations from the Upanisads.

But with Madhva things are entirely different. He clearly recognizes the reason presented by a Sūtra and applies it to the Vedic passages that seem to be independent of that reason and determines the meaning of these passages and illustrates the correctness of his process of thought by a reference to Smrtis. For example jijnasyatva, the state of being the subject matter of enquiry is the principle of thought presented by the first Sūtra—athāto brahma-jijnāsā. But the apparent disposition of certain Vedic passages seems to negate jijnāsā. He shows the dispensability of the apparent meaning as well as the indispensable character of the meaning of the passages when jijñāsyatva is applied to their subject matter. Thus while for Samkara the subject matter of Vedic teaching remains self-evident (svaprakāša) for Madhva it is ever jijnāsya, the subject-matter of unadulterated enquiry having nothing empirical in it and being purely transcendent, Vedic in character. While Samkara denies the nirnāyaka nature of Sūtra Madhva brings out the richness of Sūtra in this direction. These points become clear as we proceed with our study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

T. Pr., modifies Parīkṣya as asārānityatayā. This presents two ideas—1. By means of examination a student (adhikārin) must determine that all things of the world are asāra and anitya; and 2. Having determined that things are asāra and anitya; he must decide that all things are the result of karna. These two ideas occur only to that student who is really devoted to Brahman. Sruti calls him Brāhmaṇa. The result of examination is vairāgya. It is detachment from all things other than Mokṣa i.e., Viṣṇu. So the two expressions viṣṇu-loketarān and mokṣād itaratra stand for the same idea. Thus attainment of Mokṣa, that of Viṣṇu and that of Brahman are only the different expressions of the same truth.

In the course of the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā with reference to every context the application of this point must never be forgotten. This application avoids many difficulties caused by popular conceptions of moksa, such as, moksa is the full enjoyment of all sorts of pleasures without restriction and so on. One who is attracted by these ideas can never appreciate the place of vairāgya in the scheme of Brahma-jijñāsā. If a person understands that mokhṣa is Viṣnu itself, all

other conceptions of moksa cease to attract him.

Further in following these discussions the manner in which Sāstra has become indispensable must also be remembered. Sāstra became indispensable because of Pūrva-pakṣa originating from Samkara's system of thought. The removal of Pūrva-pakṣa gives rise to Siddhānta. The relative character of these two gives a particular disposition to Sāstra. Bhāvadīpa defines a topic (adhikaraṇa) of Sāstra as viṣayo viṣayas caiva pūrva-pakṣas tathottaraḥ prayojanam ca pamcaite prāmco adhikaraṇam viduh. (The ancient Scholars understood that a topic consists of five aspects, the statement of a position, doubt with regard to its validity, negation of its soundness, establishment of the position and its contribution to Sāstra.)

These five aspects of adhikarana tell us the process presented by adhikarana. They are indispensable stages of thought-process. They are specially emphasised in Brahma Mīmamsā to obtain absolute clearness of thought. A clear conception of them results in the consciousness of irreconcil-

able distinction between 'negation of the position in question' (Pūrvapakṣa) and 'the establishment of the position' (Uttarapakṣa). To appreciate this distinction is to remove all possibility of confusion. Confusion of the two in any sense makes 'contribution of Uttarapaksa to Sāstra impossible and the course of thought a mere waste. Hence Pūrvapaksa and Uttarapaksa shine relatively in contrast with each other. Further a modified or a half-hearted appreciation of Uttarapaksa will, in the end, be reduced to Pūrvapakṣa. To have found out this truth is the distinct contribution of Madhva to Indian Logic. Madva illustrates this truth by specially drawing the student's attention to the contrast between his position and Samkara's position. In this connection he points out that Samkara's position is so comprehensive that it gives finality to all positions that are not consistent with his position (Siddhanta or Uttarapakşa) to whatever Darsana they may be considered to belong. He illustrates thereby how absolute his position is.

This may require a word of explanation. The commonsense view of things is totally different from what Madhva thinks. With reference to the growth of a case of knowledge commonly it is supposed that a wrong view of things is gradually transcended by degrees. For example the knowledge that is definitely wrong at one stage with some modification in the direction of correctness is transcended and to that extent its wrongness ceases to exist. Commonsense holds that this constitutes the growth of knowledge. But Madhva points out that this view of knowledge does not apply to Brahma Mīmāmsā at all. In this connection he distinguishes between two cases of knowledge. 1. Knowledge which is incomplete: and 2. knowledge which involves elements of wrongness. The former has the capacity to grow. The latter because of the wrong elements in it develops in the wrong direction. It is for this reason no case of knowledge at all. . Take the case of pūrnatva. To recognize that one's knowledge of pūrnatva is incomplete tends to grow in the right direction. In this process the lower standards become transcended and the higher ones are attained and the knowledge of pūrnatva gets itself more and more purified and therefore has become consistent with complete knowledge. But to have wrong elements in the knowledge is not to give room for the growth

of knowledge. In spite of the general desire for the growth, as there is no attempt to remove wrong elements these elements themselves grow in place of the growth of knowledge and finally there is the negation of knowledge. With reference to pūrnatva, for example, if one adopts an empirical standard to understand it, though at the outset there may be the appearance of knowledge, finally the empirical becomes all in all and there is the negation of the transcendent.

Thus of the two cases of knowledge incomplete knowledge has the tendency to grow and the knowledge with wrong elements causes degeneration in the knower. If the distinction of the two is correctly appreciated, it is not difficult to find out that the same analysis holds good with reference to empirical knowledge also.

VI

Madhva shows that this distinction leads to very important considerations. On the one hand it makes it necessary to examine carefully every given case of knowledge whether it involves wrong elements. To be conscious of these elements is to overcome them. On the other it helps the recognition of the fact that it is only the correctness of knowledge that allows further correctness. This leads to the idea of an enduring nature of mental history without a beginning and end in time. On the basis of the former consideration Madhva develops the theory of avidyā (non-knowledge) and on the latter the theory of vidyā (knowledge) in order finally to find out the position of Śruti expounded as 'vidyām ca avidyām ca yas tadvedobhayam saḥ—avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayā amṛta maśnute.'

(One who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge simultaneously, having transcended bondage by means of a conscious recognition of non-knowledge as non-knowledge, attains immortality by means of knowledge). Further on the basis of the latter consideration Madhva develops his theory of muktiyogya, the jīva that is fitted to have Brahma Mīmāmsā and attain immortality. This is the philosophy underlying the relative importance of Pūrvapakṣa and Uttarapakṣa together. These are the two units of thought that constitute Sāstra. To separate each from the other in the sense of having each

independently of the other is to lose Śāstra. This is the reason why Iśāvāsya holds that to adopt Pūrvapakṣa i.e. avidyā is evil; but to adopt Uttarapakṣa i.e., vidyā independently of Pūrvapakṣa is greater evil. It concludes therefore that both must be studied simultaneously so that Pūrvapakṣa is dismissed from mind and Uttarapakṣa is established. Unless Pūrvapakṣa is consciously dismissed Uttarapakṣa is not established.

With reference to Brahma Mīmāmsā these two units of thought may be definitely stated. In defining pūrvapakṣa against uttarapakṣa Madhva reduces all those positions that stand against Sāstra either explicitly or implicitly to a position to what Samkara may call Atmaikatvavidyā, the science of non-duality of ātman as interpreted by him. After showing how this position is fallacious both from the standpoint of empirical reasoning and from the standpoint of Vedic reasoning he formulates a position which is free from the defects that vitiate the former position i.e., Atmaikatvavidyā. The position that he formulates is called uttarapakṣa. This is the content of Brahma Mīmāmsā. So according to Madhva in the course of Sāstra there are only two positions, Atmaikatva Vidyā and Brahma Mīmāmsā that are considered and evaluated.

This fact must be steadily kept in view if the student of Brahma-Mimāmsā has to understand anything worth understanding from it. Whenever a position is suggested to him he must be able to classify it either under pūrvapakṣa or under uttarapakṣa. With this discrimination alone he can hope to

proceed with his study of Sāstra.

The foregoing ideas that characterise Sāstra are what are actually meant by Madhva when he says Sūtrārtha ucyate (What actually Sūtra means is expounded). The student realizes the truth of this statement as he goes on with his study. Madhva discusses the details connected with these problems in Anuvyākhyāna as "bandha mithyātvam naiva muktirapekṣate." (Mukti never presupposes mithyātva of bandha, bondage). N.S., a commentary on Anu. Vy. presents several readings and implications of this passage. It introduces this passage as "evam tāvat svamatena Sūtram vyākhyāya tat-parišuddhaye pareṣām bhāṣyam dūṣayati.

(Thus so far having expounded the Sūtra, 'Athāto Brahmajijnāsā' as it was intended by Sūtrakāra, Madhva, in order to justify his exposition points out the defects of Bhāsya of

others, as bandhamithyātvam and so on).

In continuation of the same discussion Madhva shows how Veda attributes in no manner Brahmanhood to jīva. (na brahmatām vaded vedāh jīvasyahi katham ca na). In concluding the exposition of this topic N.S., says "jīva-brahmanorekatvam sārīraka-mīmāmsā-visayo na bhavati iti tadupapatyartham bandhamithyātva-varṇa-namasangatamity uktam." (The nonduality of jīva and Brahman is not the subject matter of Sārīraka-mīmāmsā i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Therefore to suppose that in order to justify it there is the exposition of bandha-mithyātva is irrelevant).

The present work does not intend to discuss these points in detail. The passsages that are quoted are enough to indicate how Atmaikatva-vidyā is totally foreign to Veda and therefore to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. The detailed discussion connected with this topic forms the subject matter of Uttara-prasthāna i.e., Anu-vyākhyāna. The discussions of Anu-vyākhyāna are of advanced nature and they presuppose a know-

ledge of Pūrva-prasthāna i.e., Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

With reference to Sāstra it has been already noted that Pūrvapakṣa is Atmaikatva vidyā and Uttarapakṣa is the exposition of the truth of Viṣṇu i.e., Guṇapūrṇa, Nirdoṣa, Jñeya, Gamya and Guru. These two positions are therefore diametrically opposed to each other. An appreciation of this fact makes it necessary for us to understand 'that which is different from Viṣṇu as well as the ideas connected with Viṣṇu' viz., Saṃkara's position as well as the ideas connected with it. A recognition of this idea does not stop only at this point. If Sāstra is examining a position which is commonly taken to be different from Atmaikatva-vidyā, then the student of Brahma Mimāmṣā must have an eye to see that after all there is in Sāstra the examination finally of Atmaikatva vidyā. For the position in question to whatever Daršana it may appear to belong is a near or distant aspect of Ātmaikatva-vidyā.

VII

So if the history of philosophy of the whole world, oriental or occidental is taken into consideration, the student of Śāstra is expected to bring it under two heads—Brahma-Mīmāmsā

and non-Brahma Mīmāmsā. The necessity for the practice and application of this discrimination becomes more and more felt as the student proceeds with his study. This discrimination and application is actually demanded by Madhva in Anu. Vy. "samsārinonyam sarvesam sarvasaktim anaupamam cetanācetanasyāsya sattādeḥ tadadhīnatām—nāngī kurvanti ye teṣām sarveṣām ca samā ime."

The defects that are so far mentioned as vitiating Samkara's position equally vitiate all those positions that do not hold that Viṣṇu is beyond jīva, the immanent principle of all, all power, and all transcendent and that that the world of spirit and matter has existence etc. made and maintained by Viṣṇu.

N.S. adds "na kevalam sorveşām svarūpeņa anangīkurvatām ime doṣāḥ kimtu tamamgīkṛtyāpi jīvādyanyatvādi viśeṣanāni tasya anangīkurvatāmapi. tathātve phalataḥ tasya anīśvaratvāditi.'

(Not only these defects or fallacies vitiate the positions of those that do not hold the concept of *Iśvara*, but also they vitiate the position of those that having recognised *Iśvara* do not recognise Its attributes such as that It is beyond *jîva* etc. If the attributes of *Iśvara* are not recognised, then as a result It ceases to be *Iśvara*.)

This addition explains evidently how comprehensive the application of Madhava's observation is. The one point which we have to appreciate with reference to this discussion is that all positions that are opposed to Madhva's thought, however different they may appear to be in themselves or from Samkara's position, end finally in Atmaikatva-vidyā.

In following these discussions it must be kept in mind that the individual expounders of ideas are not important. Madhva is only dealing with types of thought that can never be reconciled to each other and can never be treated independently of each other. To understand this is to understand the process of the growth of knowledge, the aim of the study of Sāstra. A knowledge of these facts is indispensable in studying Madhva. Without this knowledge one is left in bewilderment and does not understand which expression of Madhva means which. Supposing we dispense with Madhva what happens? The answer is clear. We idealise particular thinkers without evaluation. If in studying particular philosophers we become familiar with

particular ideas and appreciate them according to our taste, by studying Madhva without any prepossession we are able to understand the ideas given by other philosophers in their proper setting. This is a difference between understanding mere ideas and understanding them in their whole setting and with their final aim. Irrespective of our attainment of the final position, understanding of this nature is on its own merit a case of spiritual joy.

As we are familiar with these ideas it has become inevitable for us to understand by ātmaikatva an expression of T.Pr., mokṣāditaratra. With reference to this the student of Śāstra is required to be nirvina i.e., completely detached from all the ideas that directly or indirectly support ātmaikatva, non-duality. This must not be mechanical detachment. It must be the result of parīkṣā; careful examination involving the process of the determination and application of the concepts, asāra and

anitya.

All these ideas may, to some people of common-sense, appear to be ingenious. But a student of Sāstra is endowed with adhikāra. He can understand and appreciate that after all the study of Sastra is finally justified by its significance purely adhyātma, spiritual in character. More than its application to the objects external to the self, Sāstra applies to self and the ideas that characterise the self. Sāstra is needed for internal purification. Purification in the external sense is only an insignificant aspect of internal purification. Parīkṣā i.e., examination is the language of this purification. When Socrates says 'Know thyself,' as the motto of philosopical knowledge, he comes very near Brahma-Mīmāmsā. He comes only near because the implication and content of his motto and those of Brahma-Mīmāmsā are profoundly different. In the latter emphasis is on Brahman and in the former on the individual self. Emphasis on the individual self has the chance of leading to ātmaikatva-vidyā; while the emphasis on Brahman necessarily makes Brahma-Mīmāmsā possible. In fact every philosophy worth the name is justified in so far as it satisfies the demands of the details implied by these distinctions. In fulfilling these requirements Sastra comes to have two aspects. Corresponding to them there are two phases of life—1. The phase consisting of elements that are the different expressions of pūrvapakṣa, and 2. The phase consisting of the elements that are the expressions of uttarapakṣa. At a given stage of life both these phases may appear to be equally valid. But it is inevitable for the student of Sāstra to discriminate between the two, so that he may properly appreciate one against the other.

VIII

T.Pr., shows further that a person who is detached from the things that are not relevant to the truth of Visnu ought to go to a teacher, in order to obtain vijñāna, the knowledge that establishes vairāgya and helps the appreciation of truth. The idea that he ought to go to a teacher has a great significance. Ordinarily a person who meditates upon the problems philosophical in character is said to be a philosopher. But the significance of Sastra is totally different. A person may meditate upon problems and what he thinks may be taken to be philosophy. But it never touches truth. This is the inevitable implication of the very starting point of Sastra that the subject-matter of Sastra is samdigdha, doubted. However much a person may meditate upon problems supposed to be very great, he cannot realize what he is expected to realize from the study of Sastra. For however deep his meditation be the standard of his evaluation comes from his previous experience. They are therefore empirical and they cannot help the knowledge of the transcendent. If they appear to help the person, then the subject-matter becomes necessarily asamdigdha, certain. We have already seen how this position is irrelevant to Sāstra. If the subject-matter is samdigdha, then naturally he ought to understand it only with the help of a teacher. This teacher is necessarily one who can introduce him to the transcendent truth. Truth does not become transcendent because the attribute transcendent is given to it. But it is transcendent, because it is expounded only by Sastra the considerations of which are determined to transcend all that is empirical.

In the passage quoted by Madhva, this teacher is qualified as *Śrotriya* and *Brahmaniṣṭha*. *Śrotriya* is one who is devoted to *Śruti*. *Brahmaniṣṭha* is one who is devoted to Brahman in an exclusive sense. Combining these two ideas there results

the idea of one who is devoted to Brahman as expounded by Sruti. This Brahman is characterised as Srutyukta. It has a definite implication. According to it Brahman, the subjectmatter of jijnāsā is not some indefinite concept which may be interpreted according to an individual thinker's likes and dislikes. If it were the product of likes and dislikes it would never transcend the empirical and it is therefore not Srutyukta. Srutyukta is therefore necessarily transcendent. This does not mean that it has nothing to do with the empirical and the empirical is therefore super-imposed on it. If it were so. then to find it out by the process of transcending the empirical would be irrelevant. Hence it follows that it is the origin, principle or ground in a transcendent sense of all that is empirical. The empirical is defined by Sruti as jmāni bhūtāni. (Tai. Up.), These beings, spirit and matter.

All that is meant by these considerations is that Sruti is the only source of knowledge of Brahman. Applying this idea to philosophy in general, we see that there are two senses in which philosophy can be understood (1) philosophy resulting from inner meditation on the basis of experience and (2) philosophy which is no other than understanding, appreciating and assimilating the reason underlying Sruti including the evaluation of the former type of philosophy and seeing its futility. The former is obviously empirical and the latter is with reference

to every detail supernormal and transcendent.

These points may be illustrated. We observed two views with regard to the subject-matter of Sastra-pūrvapakṣa and uttarapaksa. Pūrvapaksa upholds that Brahman is the same as ātman which is self-luminous. This is Ātmaikatva-vidyā. It has obviously nothing transcendent about it. Supposing it is true, it is nothing but the self in bondage. This view holds that it is asamdigdha. It illustrates how beyond the empirical

there is nothing in it.

Uttarapakṣa upholds just the opposite view. Truth according to it is Srutyukta and is therefore supernormal and transcendent. With reference to this truth even the self in bondage comes to have an element or is understood to have an element which is supernormal and transcendent. This is understood only when it is realized to be the work of

Brahman.

Hence according to the view of pūrvapaksa no mukti is possible, because all that is given is nothing beyond the empirical. But according to the view of uttarapaksa to recognise mukti is a necessity, because if the empirical self is understood to be the work of Brahman by means of Brahma-Mīmāmsā there is necessarily the recognition of it as having the aspects supernormal and transcendent in character. If philosophy is required to get the philosopher what Katha upanișad calls śreyas, i.e., mukti or Brahmaprāpti, then it is inevitable to hold that only Brahma-Mīmāmsā is philosophy in the proper sense of the term. The philosophies that are other than Brahma-Mīmāmsā are only so called. They can have only a relative value. This explains how Brahma-Mīmāmsā is indispensable. It occurs indispensably to one who has adhikāra-vairāgya and visnubhakti. So far vairāgya is defined as getting rid of wrong views.

IX

T.Pr., illustrates how Viṣṇubhakti is adhikāra as—viṣṇubhaktirapi brahmavidyāyām adhikāra lti śrutyā āha—Yameti (on the basis of vairāgya, viṣṇubhakti constitutes adhikāra. Bhāṣya expounds this by stating Śruti as Yame etc.)

Bhāṣya-" yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ || tasyaiṣa ātmā

VIVRNUTE TANUM SVĀM."

Whom He chooses He is obtained by him alone. To him

this Atman shows Its Self.

T.Pr., interprets this passage esah visnuh yam vṛṇute tena labhyah tasya prasanno bhavati. tataśca tasya adhikāriṇah sva-svarūpam prakāśayati ity arthah. atra vṛṇute ityanena bhaktatvam sūcitam. (Eṣaḥ Ātmā means this Viṣṇu. tena labhyah means tasya prasanno bhavati. It becomes pleased with him whom It chooses. Consequently to him who has thus become adhikārin It reveals Its Self i.e., body consisting in absolute ānanda and jñāna. This is the meaning of the upaniṣad. By the word vṛṇute, accepted or chosen, adhikārin's devotion to It is indicated). Svām tanūm vivṛnute is interpreted as svarūpam prakāśayati. Hence tanūm is not taken to mean body in the ordinary sense. It is taken to mean svarupa, its distinguishing feature consisting in gunapūrna, nirdoṣa, jñeya, gamya and guru. This means that Madhva's position is not theistic as it is taken

to be by some modern writers on Madhva. That that Madhva's outlook is not theistic is proved by the fact that he understands by the word tanum svarupa even though it was open to him to understand by it body. Following this position Jayatirtha commences T.Pr., as śuddhānandoru samvidyutibala bahulaudāryavīryādideham. In this passage he uses the word deha as a synonym of tanu. Deha therefore means svarūpa. Further consistently with the verb vrnute its object yam is taken to mean bhakta, devoted. This implies that bhakta is one who is accepted by Visnu. Bhakta is presented as adhikārin as tasya adhikāriņah. Visnu's svarūpa is further explained as sva-svarūpam. In this compound term sva means svatantra. Svarūpa being qualified by sva signifies that svatantra constitutes that which is Visnu. Thus the meaning of Visnu has nothing religious or theistic in it. It is purely a philosophical concept. It is the one principle of all characterised as svatantra by Sruti. T.Pr. recognises this truth by mentioning it as the very first word as śuddha and drawing its implication as uru. Śuddha means svatantra and uru means pūrņa. In this passage, 'suddhanandorusamvit etc. suddha and uru i.e., svatantra and pūrna show the absolute and transcendent character of ānanda, bliss, samvit, knowledge and so on. T.Pr., presents these ideas at the very outset so as to indicate that these are the ideas that are expounded in course of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. All these considerations clearly show how Madhva's exposition is purely philosophical and it tolerates nothing non-philosophical. The present day writers, in general, have somehow missed this fact and present him as teaching religion, theism and so on. Without a serious attempt at studying Madhva to condemn his philosophy calling it religion does no good to Indian thought. Samkara is a Vedanta philosopher. But to hold that he is the only philosopher of India is to do no good to Vedanta thought. There is a regular growth of Vedanta philosophy from Samkara to Madhva. As I have explained in the concluding chapter of my work 'The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedānta,' while Śamkara's position may be regarded as thesis, Rāmanuja's as antithesis, Madhya's thought is synthesis. Madhya examines the previous positions, recognises their truth-value in so far as it operates in those positions, observes wherein they have gone wrong,

arranges all wrong ideas, sees that in spite of their mutual opposition which is only apparent they are all reducible to one single position that has the spirit of Samkara's Mayavada, explains how this position is a failure of thought and expounds the Vedic Truth which shines supreme against all other schools of thought. Indian philosophy in general and Vedānta in particular thus find their culmination in Madhva. The previous philosophers with their philosophical expositions make Madhva not only possible, but a necessity. This is the truth implied by the relative position of pūrvapakṣa and siddhāmta in the exposition and growth of Sāstra. To appreciate these ideas one must be free from all prepossessions and evaluations sectarian in character. Things must be judged according to the actual discussions that are taking place in Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Madhva notes in a different connection that a mere possibility of an opposite idea is enough to dispel a particular conviction. There may be persons with confirmed views. But even they at least to strengthen their conviction are required to study Madhya in his true colours. A conviction strengthened is more than the original conviction. Strengthening is the process of the emergence of a fresh philosophy. In the present connection to criticise Madhva and to suggest a new philosophy which has in it a complete satisfaction of all the demands he makes in his philosophy is, if it is possible, really welcome in the interest of the Indian philosopical literature. In this case if Samkara leads pūrvapakṣa against Madhva, Madhva may lead pūrvapakṣa against a new philosophy. Thus pūrvapakṣa is not a term of abuse. It is a necessary element in the growth of uttarapaksa.

x

One of the main reasons why Madhva is not correctly understood by most of the modern writers seems to be the following. Taking a single example into consideration, if Madhva calls the first and the only principle of all Viṣṇu following the Vedic sense, modern writers when they come across the word Viṣṇu while they are reading Madhva, without hesitation seem to jump to the conclusion that Viṣṇu means a popular deity having all merits and defects like those of human beings, in a magnified sense. For their own fault they

condemn Madhva as a theist and so on, and if at all they continue the study of Madhva they do it in such a manner as to confirm their condemnation further. This attitude, especially on the part of the writers on Indian Philosophy has finally been the cause of losing the very essence of Indian culture. Further according to Indian tradition nahi jñānena sadršam pavitramiha vidyate. (Apart from knowledge there is nothing pure or sacred in the universe.) Philosophy is required for obtaining inner purity. It must not be taken to be the cause of fight between individuals or communities. If individual and communal differences disappear then only, a successful social life is possible. It is only a universal and intensive study of philosophy especially Brahma-Mīmāmsā that can put an end to differences and make social life possible.

To effect this end Indian philosophy in general studies individual against society and society against individual and arrives at the conclusion that if an individual is benefited by the society in which he is born, it is the individual in his turn that constitutes his society and if he has the necessary development within himself it is he that moulds his society in particular ways. Thus there is a sense in holding that the individual is a creator of social environment. This is how the Buddha built a society in terms of certain ethical ideas, Samkara built a society in terms of certain Vedic ideas and Madhva has built a society in terms of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This society is first the mental construction of each philosopher. It becomes actual given a proper environment.

All this shows that individual purity is the aim of life, individual or social. Adhikāra is the same as this purity. It is the result of the grace of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇubhakti is the culminating point of adhikāra.

T.Pr., defines bhakti further and introduces Bhāṣya. sā ca bhaktih viṣṇau sarvādhikā, anyeṣvapi yathāyogyā brahma-

vidyopayoginītyetat śrutyā āha YASYA iti.

(This bhakti is supreme with reference to Viṣṇu, and with reference to others only that much as they help Brahmamīmāmsā in a given case. Madhva shows that this is the meaning of Sruti as) Bhāṣya—

YASYA DEVE PARĀ BHAKTIḤ YATHĀ DEVE TATHĀ GURAU TASYAITE KATHITĀHYARTHĀḤ PRAKĀŚAMTE MAHĀTMANAḤ | ITYĀDI ŚRUTIBHYAŚCA. 12 (It is that great man who has supreme devotion to deva and also to guru just as he has devotion to deva to whom all these

things that are expounded become known.)

With reference to this passage the following points must be noted. We must remember first 1. Madhva's position that guru and devatā are one and 2. sarvottama according to him is the absolute and complete principle of all that exists. The one implication of this idea is that one who has supreme devotion to Visnu has no occasion to have devotion to any other being. Consistently with this fact the passage in question must mean that it is not enough that if one is devoted to Vișnu as Deva, but one ought also to be devoted to Vișnu as Guru. This is the meaning of the first half of Bhāṣya. It presents the idea that if a person is devoted to Visnu both as Deva and as Guru only then he can follow Sāstra. Deva is the principle, spiritual in character of all existence. It is the same as sarvasattāprada. Guru is the principle of all knowledge. It is jñānaprada. Jñāna in this connection means the knowledge called *Brahma-Mīmānisā*. Deva and Guru are thus the aspects of the same truth. This will be made clear in proper context.

From these considerations it follows that Sastra speaks of bhakti only in the sense of mental preparation for appreciating the truth of Brahman. Bhakti in Sastra is thus different from bhakti in the popular sense. Bhakti in the popular sense is a case of intensive faith. It is thus anti-intellectual. It has no place in Sāstra. In fact it makes Sāstra impossible. It is therefore not an item of adhikāra. Bhakti as adhikāra expresses itself in the study of Sastra, adhyayana. Adhyayana is an evidence of bhakti. But there are different kinds of adhyayana right, nyāya and wrong, anyāya. The former is the sign of bhakti and the latter is that of its absence. The evidence for the right kind of adhyayana is sama and so on. The evidence for sama and so on is vairagya and the evidence for vairāgya is viṣṇupādaika-samśrayatva. The evidence for viṣṇupādaika-samśrayatva is karmasanyāsa. Karma-sanyāsa is in its turn the origin of viṣnubhakti. This bhakti is the origin of adhyayana. This is thus a process endless in character. In this process there is the growth of adhikāra. Adhikāra results

in jijnāsā.

Devotion to Visnu in the exclusive sense does not imply that adhikārin has to show disrespect to things other than Visnu. Devotion to Vișnu and disrespect for other things are contradictory. Devotion to Visnu means devotion to the whole of Its creation. This does not mean dualism in devotion. Both cases of devotion are the expressions of the same devotion. Devotion to Visnu is the same as devotion to the thing to which Visnu gives existence and knowledge. Devotion in any other sense is impossible. Vișnu cannot be abstracted from Its creation. Vișnu as It is is the giver of reality to all. To conceive Vișnu in a different manner is not really to conceive Visnu. But it is to conceive something impossible, something unreal and something imaginary. This is the reason why T.Pr. defines devotion to Visnu as sarvādhikā. This term means that devotion to Viṣṇu must involve conscious recognition that it is the same as the creative principle of all. Hence the two expressions, Visnau sarvādhikā and anyesvapi yathā yogyā signify the same truth. Viṣṇubhakti as adhikāra ought to be understood with reference to all these ideas.

XI

With reference to the universal application of adhikāra T.Pr., feels a difficulty and finds answer to it in Bhāṣya.

nanu adhyayanavatāmeva brahma-vidyādhikāritve trivarnetareṣām adhyayana-vidhurāṇām jñānābhāvena mokṣābhāvah syāt iti āṣamkām pramāṇena pariharati—Vyoma Samhitāyām iti.

A difficulty is felt—'If it is held that only those that have studied Veda have adhikāra with reference to Brahma-vidyā, then it ought to follow that those that do not belong to the first three Varṇas, orders of Vedic society (Brahma, Kṣatra and Vaisya) do not have mokṣa, because they cannot have knowledge. Bhāṣyakāra removes this difficulty on the basis of pramāṇa as Bhāṣya—

VYOMASAMHITĀYĀM CA

ANTYAJĀ API YE BHAKTĀḤ NĀMAJÑĀNÄDHIKĀRIŅAḤ STRĪ ŚŪDRA BRAHMA BANDHŪNĀM TANTRA JÑĀNE ADHIKĀRITĀ EKADEŚE PAROKTETU NA TU GRANTHA-PURASSARE

TRAIVARNIKĀNĀM VEDOKTE SAMYAK BHAKTIMATĀM HARAU. [Vyomasamhitā says—Those that have devotion i.e. adhikāra, even though they have no varna can obtain knowledge through names. Women, Sūdras and Brahmabandhus [those that are only related to Brāhmaṇas] can obtain knowledge through Tamtra,

Panicarātra and so on. They are expected to study a portion of these works only and that too indirectly when these works are taught to others. But they should not study the entire works. The members of the first three Varnas only if they are wholly devoted to Hari can obtain knowledge through the teachings of Veda.]

T.Pr., presents the meaning of certain expressions of

Bhāsva:-

amtyajāl varnabāhyāh. bhaktāh iti adhikārakathanam. Tamtram pamcarātrādi. adhyayanābhāvena vaidika-jñānānadhikāritvepi trivarņetareṣām nāmādi-jñānādhikāritvāt mokṣaprāptiriti bhāvah.

(Antyajāh means those that are outside the four-fold Varņa. By the word bhakta adhikāra is stated. Tamtra means pamcarātra, etc. Though those that fall outside the three Varņas may be supposed to have no knowledge because they cannot study Veda, yet they may be supposed to have knowledge through name etc., and thus finally obtain mokṣa. This is the intended meaning of the passage.)

The expression adhyayanābhāvena vaidika-jñānānadhikāritvepi presents the meaning of adhikāra as capacity to know. Absence of adhyayana also is explained by the absence of

capacity to know.

T.Pr., cites exceptions to the rule so far stated as—sapatnim me parādhama ityādau strīnāmapi vedādhikāradarsanāt katham tesām anadhikārah ityatah apavādamāha—ĀНՍҢ iti.

(The Sruti texts such as sapatnīn me parādhama—' put an end to my second', statements made by women imply that women also can study Veda. How is then to deny adhikāra of them justified? In answer Madhva stated ĀHUḤ etc., as.)

BHĀŞYA:—ĀHURAPYUTTAMASTRĪŅĀM ADHIKĀRAMTU VAIDIKE YATHORVASĪ YAMĪ CAIVA ŚĄCYĀDYĀŚCA TATHĀPARE.

(They say that women of superior talents have adhikāra to study Veda. Ūrvasī, Yamī', Sacī and many others may be taken as example.)

T.Pr., explains tathāpare as tathāpare munistriyah narādikulajāśca. (Tathāpare means women belonging to munis, those that are wholly devoted to Visnu as the only Tattva in the absolute (parama) sense, as well as the women belonging to the community of men etc.).

It may be noted that in these passages the emphasis is not

so much on birth but on superiority of cultural outlook as forming the background of adhikāra. A detailed discussion of these ideas may be postponed to a later section as Sūtrakāra himself considers these points in all details under Apaśūdrādhikaraņa and so on.

XII

T.Pr., concludes the discussion that took place so far as evam athasabdam samksepavistarābhyām vyākhyāya atassabdo hetvarthah ityuktam vyanakti—YATA iti.

(Having thus interpreted the word atha both in brevity and in detail, Bhāṣyakāra brings out the implication of his own statement 'ataśśabdo hetvarthale' as YATAḤ etc.)

BHĀṣYA:—YATO NĀRĀYAŅAPRASĀDAMRTE NA MOKṣAḤ NA CA JÑĀNAM VINĀ ATYARTHAPRASĀDAḤ ATO BRAḤMAJIJÑĀSĀ KARTAVYĀ.

(As there is no moksa without prasāda (icchā-višesa, the releasing will of Nārāyaṇa) and further there is no prasāda in the sense defined without knowledge, enquiry into Brahman is indispensable).

T.Pr., brings out the ideas contained in Bhāṣya as—sukhameva me syāt duhkham manāgapi mābhūt iti sarvābhimata mokṣasya nārāyaṇātyartha- prasādamamtareṇa asambhavāt atyarthaprasādasya ca brahma-jijñāsām vinā anudayāt atyarthaprasādadvārā mokṣasādhanāparokṣajñānotpādikā brahma-jijñāsā kartayā ityarthah.

(Mokṣa is desired by all. This fact is the implication of the general desire 'I ought to have only happiness but not even a bit of misery.' Mokṣa defined in this manner is impossible to obtain without Nārāyaṇa's prasāda, grace in the sense of will to release. [Atyartha qualifying prasāda brings out the idea that this will is immediately followed by mokṣa.] Atyarthaprasāda does not take place without Brahma-jijñāsā. The whole meaning is this—Enquiry into Brahman is indispensable. This enquiry is such that it produces aparokṣajñāna, immediate apprehension. This apprehension is the means for mokṣa. It produces mokṣa through atyarthaprasāda).

Certain implications of these passages may be noted. Atha and atah put together present the idea that adhikāra is the language of a disposition of mind conducive to the study of Sāstra. This disposition is the capacity to follow Sāstra as well as the preparedness to take up the study. Hence

adhikāra is the expression of qualitative merit. It is the presupposition of the study of Sāstra. In the case of one who has this quality the study of Sāstra becomes indispensable. As has been shown either Samkara's mumukṣā or Ramanuja's mokṣābhilāṣa does not explain the indispensability of Sāstra. What applies to Samkara applies to Rāmānuja as well. Sāstra comes to have its significance with Madhva's concept of adhikāra.

This concept of adhikāra is directly presented by the Sūtra. In the light of this concept of adhikāra Bhāsyakāra understands various passages of Sruti and Smrti which state adhikāra. In this connection he systematizes the statements of adhikāra. He cites first the passages that define adhikāra on the basis of birth. He points out how to rely on them does not solve the problem as they do not explain the background of Brahmajijñāsā decisively. Therefore as the second item he cites the passages that define adhikāra on the basis of quality (guna). He points out that relatively these passages offer a more satisfactory solution. Further he indicates that adhikāra on its qualitative basis is a growing process and in this process definite stages can be distinguished. Following these stages from the lower to the higher he arrives finally at the concept of Uttamādhikāra. He observes in this the real element that makes Brahmajijñāsā indispensable. In the idea of indispensability is involved the idea of one's capacity to understand to whom adhikāra is attributed. He further studies how in the concept of Uttamādhikāra the elements of the previous stages of akhikāra are necessarily present as they form the background of Uttamādhikāra. He notes further that without Uttamādhikāra Sāstra is not understood. After showing that the study of Sastra and Uttamadikara are intimately connected he defines the Vedic conception of different orders of society, Traivarnika and outside Traivarnika. He considers whether strī, Sūdra and Brahmabandhus can have adhikāra. He points out that with adhikāra, they become Uttama i.e. adhikāra gives particular individuals a distinction which others of the same class cannot have. As it will be clear later on Uttama-disposition is a product of adhikāra and in its turn it moulds adhikāra. The present discussion must therefore be understood in the light of this position.

Further Bhāṣyakāra holds that even those that stand outside the fourfold Varna can have devotion, bhakti. Bhakti is the same as adhikāra. The fact that this has occurred to the persons in question is indicated by the knowledge of Nāma, name. It may however be noted that these ideas are highly suggestive. In any case adhikāra is a matter of inference

from adhyayana, actual study and its intensive merit.

It may be noted further that all the foregoing ideas are shown to be the meaning of atha. The exposition of this meaning is concluded with the meaning of atha. The whole position signified by atah is presented in a logical order and this order is shown to be absolute. Further this order is the order of the growth of the spiritual principle in adhikārin. In this growth several stages are distinguished as 1 prasāda, 2 adhikāra, 3 jijnāsā, 4 jāna, 5 atyarthaprasāda and 6 mokṣa. It is also indicated that no single stage can be independent of other stages. Madhva notes that the indispensability of these stages cannot sufficiently be emphasised. He says in Anuvyākhyāna "Jijnāsotthajñānajāt tatprasādādeva mucyate." (One is released only by means of prasāda of Brahman which results from the knowledge caused only by jijnāsā.)

Atha and atah, the first two words of the first Sūtra, 'athāto Brahmajijnāsā,' illustrate thus the indispensability of

Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

In closing this discussion the following may be noted.

Madhva with his philosophy of mangala, adhikāra, and prasāda has shown not only how the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the only case of spiritual joy but how it is the very content of life itself and how this life is the life divine being in itself a free gift of Brahman (Viṣṇu). With his Philosophy of jijñāsā, Madhva has removed all that is sectarian, dogmatic, pessimistic and religious from knowledge and made knowledge shine supreme against all that is laukika, empirical. With his study of the comprehensiveness of adhikāra, he holds that Brahma-Mīmāmsā occurs even to those that are Varna-bāhyas, those that stand outside Trivarna. He has made Sāstra available to all, and has thus achieved social solidarity and social reconstruction. With his philosophy of adhikāra he insists that true scientific thinking with reference to all aspects of life must necessarily be the outcome of Brahma-Mimāmsā.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XII

JUSTIFICATION OF BRAHMA MĪMĀMSĀ

1

In order to remove the difficulties presented by $p\bar{u}rvapak\bar{s}a$ and justify the necessity for the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ the author of $Bh\bar{a}sya$ cites the aphorism.

AUM ATHATO BRAHMA—JIJÑĀSĀ AUM

T. pr. removes the difficulties raised by $p\bar{u}rvapak$, as as to justify the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ as follows:

'yad-uktam asamdigdhatvāt na brahmano visayatvam iti tat brahma-pada-prayogena parāstam. tathā hi. bhavedetat asamdigdhatvam jijnāsyasya yadi tat svaprakāša-jīvābhinnam syāt. nacaitadasti. jijnāsye brahma-pada-śravanāt tadvijijnāsasva tad brahmeti. brahma-šabdaš ca pūrnagunatām vakti. atha kasmāducyate brahmeti brhamto hi asmin guṇāh iti śruteh. thathā ca katham tasya jīvābhedah. jīvasyālpaguṇatvena anubhavāt. naca brahmani guṇādhyāsah, paramārthato abrahmatva-prasamgāt. dešādyaparicchinnatā brahmatā iti cenna. ukta-śrutivirodhāt. dešādyaparicchedena jīvabhedasiddeh, jīvānutvasya ca vakssyamāṇatvāt. ato jīvasya svaprakāšatvepi tadbhinna-brahmanah samdigdhatvāt visayatva-siddheh, mokṣākhya-prayojana-sadbhāvāt, tata eva adhikāryādi sambhavāt brahma-jijñāsā kartavyeti.

(In the course of pūrvapakṣa it is said that Brahman is asamdigdha and therefore it does not form the subject-matter. This is refuted by the use of the word Brahman in the Sūtra. The same is amplified. The subject-matter of jijnāsā, philosophy, would be asamdigdha if it had been non-different from jīva which is self-luminous. But this is not the case. In the Sruti text, 'Reflect on It, It is Brahman,' there is the use of the word Brahman as applied to the subject-matter of jijnāsā. The word Brahman expresses the state of having attributes that are complete. For the Śruti text runs as, 'Then why is it

called Brahman? In It attributes are indeed complete.' If this is the real circumstance how can It have the non-duality of jīva? (Never), for jīva is experienced as having attributes incomplete by nature. The superimposition of attributes on Brahman cannot be maintained, because it leads in fact to the negation of the state of being Brahman. To hold that the state of being Brahman consists in the state of being unlimited from the standpoint of space, etc., does not hold good. For this position is sublated by *Śruti*. Further this position rather supports the distinction of jīva from Brahman as the latter is considered to have no limitation from the point of view of space, etc. Further in support of the same position the state of jīva being infinitesimal in size will be established later. Therefore even though we hold that jīva is self-luminous, Brahman being different from it, is samdigdha and it can be the subjectmatter. For this reason and as the purpose of the knowledge of philosophy is moksa, release from bondage, and for the samereason, as there can be the person who is qualified to study this Sāstra as well as (the mutual relation of these three conditions,) brahma-jijñāsā, i.e., philosophy, is indispensable).

In the foregoing discussions, we saw how pūrvapakṣa illustrated that brahma-jijñāsā, in other words, philosophy, is: impossible and concluded that a study of philosophy does not deserve even commencement. But the thesis of pūrvapakṣa itself has become a huge study. The observations made there, whatever their immediate solution and the manner of their use be, give rise to great many problems. Pūrvapakṣa would have exhibited more wisdom if it had summarily disposed off philosophy without giving any reason for the disposal. But quite in contradiction to its spirit, it unconsciously began philosophising. It mentioned certain considerations: Brahman is the same as ātman, ātman is the same as jīva, jīva is the same as knowledge and knowledge is self-evident and so on, and tried to support them with great precaution and ability. This circumstance indicates that Brahman which is supposed to be self-luminous did require the philosophy of pūrvapaksa to make it evident. This itself is a powerful proof in favour of the necessity for philosophy. No doubt, pūrvapakṣa holds that the considerations it makes use of have only a negative significance. But in truth this is: only a clever way of putting a positive idea, for by this socalled negative method pūrvapakṣa proves a positive idea that jīva is Brahman, it is self-luminous and so on. So in language, conception and method pūrvapakṣa betrays itself

and points to an absolute necessity for philosophy.

A criticism of pūrvapakṣa is therefore inevitable. It is provoked by pūrvapakṣa itself. The positions it takes up give rise to many problems pressing for solution. Philosophy which is the same as the criticism of pūrvapakṣa is thus an intellectual necessity. So in the course of philosophy whenever a position is stated or criticised, the persons that are supposed to uphold the position or its criticism are not important. Any reference to their personality is irrelevant to philosophy. Philosophy is justified in so far as it is an intellectual necessity. It is the necessity for knowledge. The urge that gives rise to philosophy is thus purely internal. It is adhyātma, coming from within. Nothing outside is responsible for it. Even pūrvapakṣa in so far as it forms the background of intellectual urge is internally determined. Even supposing that there is no body to uphold it, one may still have the same pūrvapakṣa. So a student of philosophy is required to judge the problems of philosophy purely from introspective point of view. In the course of this study, purely intellectual in character, the necessity for having definite conceptions leads to the mention of particular doctrines. The inter-relation of these doctrines with other matters allied to them, makes sometimes the mention of the propounders of the doctrines necessary. To mistake these expressions for what they are not does not help philosophy, as they incite emotional approach to the subject-matter. This is a defect that a student of philosophy must avoid at all cost. An appreciation of these ideas is indispensable in the study of the present text, T. pr.

This text starts with the idea of commencement of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It questions the justification for the commencement, observes things that do not seem to favour the commencement, sees that as against these things the commencement is impossible and in reaching this conclusion enjoys the emergence of philosophy by criticising that which

stands in the way of philosophy.

Pūrvapakṣa has ignored all this in taking Brahman of the Sūtra 'athāto brahma-jijnāsā' to mean jīva. T.Pr., brings out this mistake as follows.—Pūrvapakṣa considers Brahman to be asandigdha on the basis that it is identical with jīva which is self-luminous. But the identity of Brahman with jīva is impossible. The word Brahman as used in the Sūtra means a definite thing. About this aspect no doubt can be entertained. The word Brahman is used along with jijnāsā as brahma-jijnāsā. Brahman in this expression is therefore the subject-matter of jijnāsā. In order to fix its meaning we must understand the circumstance in which Śruti introduces Brahman as the subject-matter of jijnāsā.

Taittirīya-Upanisad mentions the necessity for jijāāsā. In this connection it names the subject-matter of jijāāsā Brahman. The passage is the following, "yatovā imāni bhūtāni jāyamte, yena jātāni jīvamti, yatprayamti abhisamvišamti, tad vijijāāsasva tad brahma". (From which all these creatures are born, by which those that are born live, in which (they) disappear into which they enter, enquire into it. That is Brahman.) The question is put by Śruti 'atha kasmāducyate brahmeti?' (Then why is Brahman called so?) The answer is given-brhamtohyasmin gunāh.' (The attributes that are found in It are complete.)

This is how Sruti presents itself. If a person who studies Brahma-Mīmāmsā knows this circumstance, then how can he disregard it, especially when he is required to interpret Brahman of brahma-jijūāsā? If he knows this circumstance and consistently with it if he interprets the term Brahman, how can he think of the non-duality of jīva? Where is the occasion to hold that Brahman of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is not different from jīva? For jīva is given as alpaguṇa. Alpaguṇa is that which is incomplete, dependent or defective. So far the position is this: It is the experience of all that jīva is alpaguṇa. Sruti presents Brahman as pūrnaguṇa. Under this circumstance how can any one think of holding that jīva and Brahman are non-different? Pūrvapakṣa somehow takes them to be non-different. If it is said that its position is inconsistent with the fact that jīva is alpaguṇa and Brahman pūrnaguṇa, it does not take the objection

seriously. Instead of meeting the objection it attempts to retain the position of non-duality at any cost. This circumstance throws a light on the disposition of pūrvapakṣa. The mind at the background of pūrvapakṣa previous to its introduction to-Sāstra has somehow conceived that jīva is self-luminous and is therefore self-established and there is nothing that is independent of it. In this special circumstance it is introduced to Šāstra as athāto brahma-jijnāsā. It does not study the implications of jijñāsā seriously. But it feels that the subjectmatter of study must be the highest because there is the use of the word Brahman. It already knows that the self-luminous jīva is the highest. It confuses the two. At this stage having taken Brahman to be equivalent to the self-luminous jīva and therefore asamdigdha, pūrvapakṣa finds it difficult to take it to be the subject-matter of jijñāsā. So having actually begun the study of Sāstra it has practically denied Sāstra. It further feels that it is fully justified in doing so. Taking experience in its empirical sense to be the sole authority, it holds that its position that the self-luminous jīva is ultimate can never be disputed. Encouraged by this circumstance it never hesitates to deny Sāstra. Having once done it, it has committed itself to a conviction. If there is any objection to its position it attempts simply to brush it aside. In this connection, if it is necessary, it even employs arguments that are seemingly convincing.

Thus there are now two positions-1. the position that there is no need for Sāstra and 2. the position that there is need for Sāstra. Of these two we have now to find out which is relative and which is absolute. In fixing this the following may be noted: The supposition that there is no need for May be noted: The supposition that there is no need for $S\bar{a}stra$ requires justification. This justification is $S\bar{a}stra$ itself. One may give it any name. But it does not cease to be a process of thought. This process is not in essence different from philosophy i.e. $S\bar{a}stra$. So to deny philosophy, philosophy is required. This supports the need for philosophy. So the need for philosophy is absolute. It is proved by the denial of philosophy itself

denial of philosophy itself.

Without any regard to these ideas pūrvapakṣa in the interest of upholding non-duality becomes dogmatic. It recognizes the experience that jīva is alpaguna as well as the teaching of *Śruti* that Brahman is *pūrnaguṇa*. It sees that there is contradiction between the two. But it is interested in removing this contradiction at all cost. It abstracts alpaguṇa i.e. guṇa that is alpa from jīva and pūrṇaguṇa i.e. guṇa that is pūrṇa from Brahman. It assumes that there is contradiction only between alpaguṇa and pūrṇaguṇa. On the basis of this assumption it further assumes that Brahman, the substantive and jīva, the substantive are non-dual. It holds that this is the reality of jīva and thereby concludes that alpaguṇa and pūrṇaguṇa are not real and they appear because they are superimposed i.e. alpaguṇa is superimposed on jīva and pūrṇaguṇa is superimposed on Brahman. Being predisposed to this supposition or assertion, pūrvapakṣa imagines that *Śruti* superimposes pūrṇaguṇa on Brahman and makes the statement, brhamtohyasmin guṇāḥ (In It attributes are complete.)

III

T. Pr., having referred to this position of pūrvapakṣa namely, that pūrnaguna is superimposed on Brahman, observes that after all pūrvapakṣa has made Brahman an impossibility. The impossibility of Brahman is in fact the inevitable implication of the non-duality of jīva and Brahman. If Brahman and jīva are non-different in the manner explained by pūrvapakṣa, then what follows is that there is no Brahman and jīva is no other than itself. Since Brahman which is held to be non-different from jīva is colourless being devoid of all attributes, there is nothing gained by holding that jīva is non-different from it. At this stage to make good the failure, pūrvapakṣa attempts to interpret pūrnaguna. In place of explaining the difficulty, it has recourse to negative description. It holds that Brahman is that which transcends, without implying anything positive, the limitation by space, limitation by time and limitation by things different from it. It hopes that Brahman in this sense can conveniently be held to be non-different from jīva giving no room for the idea of futility. But at this stage the position of pūrvapakṣa becomes irrelevant. Brahman which is private may be considered to be limitless in this sense. But Brahman the subject-matter of jijnasa is totally different. It is the conception given by Sruti. By Sruti it is defined as pūrņaguņa and the negative description does not apply to it.

To define it negatively is therefore sublated by Sruti which illustrates that brahman is pūrņaguņa. Further the Brahman that pūrvapakṣa has in view is limitless. By defining Brahman in this manner pūrvapaksa has unconsciously made its own position of non-duality an impossibility. If Brahman is limitless, how can jīva which is given as alpaguņa be nondifferent from it? Even supposing that alpaguna, the attribute of jīva is removed from jīva and the conception of only the substantive aspect of jīva is arrived at, how can this jīva be held to be non-different from Brahman which is definitely limitless? Further jīva can never be taken to be limitless. If it were limitless it would have never been mistaken for jīva as alpaguna. In order to be alpaguna, at least in appearance, it must only be an infinitesimal point (anu) being limited by all things external to it. So the non-duality of jīva and Brahman is a myth.

Having observed all this, T.pr., concludes that though it is assumed that jīva is self-luminous, Brahman is different from it and Brahman is for this reason samdigdha and it can

therefore be the subject-matter of philosophy.

T.pr., further shows that only the knowledge obtained through Sāstra can have a purpose to serve. Supposing that the position of pūrvapakṣa is true, there is already the non-duality of jīva and Brahman. But nothing is gained by this. In spite of this truth bondage, sanisāra is not avoided. So this means that it can never be avoided. Hence by the adoptation of the position that pūrvapakṣa upholds, no purpose is served. But Sāstra gives us the knowledge of Brahman. This is the knowledge of pūrnaguna. The aim of this knowledge is the realization of pūrnaguna. As it will be clear later on, this realization consists in the attainment (prāpti) of pūrnaguna i.e. Brahman. With this attainment bondage disappears.

Further T.pr., shows that the fact that there is subject-matter of Sāstra and the knowledge of this subject-matter serves a definite purpose implies that there are persons who are in need of this study. If the subject-matter is samdigdha, then there is naturally the desire to know it definitely. If there is a purpose to serve through the knowledge of the subject-matter, the need for studying Sāstra is naturally emphasized. With the rise of this desire and emphasis on knowledge, there

appear persons who are after this knowledge. But supposing that the position of pūrvapakṣa is true, there is neither subject-matter nor any purpose to serve and this means that there is nebody who is really intersected in knowling it

nobody who is really interested in knowing it.

T.pr., next observes that there is mutual relation of the subject-matter, purpose and the person who is after this knowledge. They are related in such a manner that without any one of them the other two are impossible. This is proved by their very presence.

In the light of all these considerations T.pr., arrives at the conclusion that brahma-jijñāsā is indispensable (kartavyā).

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XIII

EVALUATION OF BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PÜRVAPAKSA AND SIDDHÄMTA

Note—To follow the details of this discussion pre-supposes a clear understanding of Madhva's exact view-point.

I

The language and thought of Pūrvapakṣa indicate that the author of T.Pr., has practically reduced Advaita Vedanta to pūrvapakṣa to Brahma-jijñāṣā. This requires elucidation. For, Advaita-Vedanta is so far given as nothing but the exposition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Both the Advaita-Bhāṣya and commentaries on it make a serious attempt to illustrate how Brahma-jijnāsā according to Advaita interpretation has the subject-matter, etc. So to make it pūrvapakṣa to Sāstra needs explanation. To meet this demand, Advaita-Bhāṣya with its commentaries might first be cited and examined. The manner in which the discussion is conducted in the works of Advaita Vedanta shows that Advaita Vedanta is actually leading the position indicated by pūrvapakṣa. Madhva sees nothing strange in this circumstance. He observes that all other Darsanas, Nāstika and Astika including the other Vedanta Schools that appeared before Madhva logically lead to Advaita Vedanta irrespective of their chronological order. For this reason in the works that expound Madhva's thought there is constant examination of Advaita position. This very circumstance makes the study of Madhva an indispensable aspect of Indian thought, because there is in it a careful evaluation of all other systems of thought.

Further the manner in which the discussion takes place in Madhva's Works shows that even supposing that Samkara did not appear before Madhva or Madhva did not know Samkara the disposition of pūrvapakṣa would not have altered. It is in

this sense the position of Advaita happens to be pūrvapakṣa even to Sūtra. This point will be clear as we go on with this study.

study. Šamkara in his *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* introduces *brahma-jijñāsā* as

follows:

śāstrīyetu vyavahāre yadyapi buddhipūrvakārī na aviditvā ātmanah paraloka-sambamdham adhikriyate, tathāpi na vedāmtavedyam asanāyādyatītam apeta-brahma-kşatrādi-bhedam asamsāri ātmatattvam adhikāre apekṣyate anupayogāt, adhikāra-virodhāt ca. prāk ca tathābhūtātmavijnānāt pravartamānam śāstram avidyāvadviṣayatvam nātivartate. tathāhi—brāhmaņo yajeta ityādīni śāstrāņi varņāśrama-vayovasthādi-višesādhyāsam āśritya pravartante. adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiriti avocāma. tadyathā—putra bhāryādişu vikaleşu sakaleşu vā ahameva vikalah sakaloveti bāhyadharmān ātmani adhyasyati; tathā dehadharmānsthūloham, kṛśoham, gauroham, tiṣṭhāmi, gacchāmi, langhayāmi ca iti; tathā indriyadharmān—mūkah kāņah klībah badhirah andhoham iti; tathā antahkaraṇa-dharmān—kāma-samkalpa-vicikitsādhyavasāyādīn. evam ahampratyayinam aseṣa-svapracāra-sākṣiṇi pratyagātmani adhyasya tam ca pratyagātmānam sarva-sāksiņam tadviparyayeņa antahkaraņādişu adhyasyati; evam ayam anādiranamtah naisargikodhyāsah mithyā-pratyaya-rūpah kartrtva-bhoktrtva pravartakah sarvaloka-pratyaksah. asya anartha-hetoh prahāṇāya ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāmtāh ārabhyamte. yathā ca ayamarthah vedāmtānām tathā vayam asyām śārīraka-mīmāmsāyām pradarsayişyāmah. vedāmtamīmāmsā-sastrasya vyācikhyāsitasya idam ādimam sūtram " athāto brahma-jijñāsā."

(With reference to the usages required by Sāstra, because one does things only after one is in possession of the required knowledge, a person is not in a position to adopt the usages without knowing how his self is related to the other world (namely, the world called Svarga to which the person in question is supposed to go after death.) But the real self (ātmatattva) is understood only by means of Vedānta. It transcends desire for food, etc. It is devoid of distinctions Brahma, Kṣatra and so on. It is ever released from bondage. So the question of fittedness i.e., the question whether the person is in a position to receive knowledge, does not apply to

this means of knowledge viz., the knowledge of Ātman. For fittedness has nothing to do with it. Further this knowledge of 'Atman' sublates fittedness as such. Prior to the knowledge of Ātman as presented above, whichever appears in the name of Sastra is not different from that the subject-matter of which is the outcome of nescience. The same may be illustrated. The Sastras "A Brahmana ought to sacrifice," etc., originate from the superimposition of the details, Varna (a sect) Asrama (a stage of life), age, stage, etc., on Atman. Superimposition, we say, means the apprehension of that with reference to that which is not that. The same may be illustrated. If the son, wife etc., are healthy or unhealthy, a person superimposes on his self all these external circumstances and judges 'I am healthy or unhealthy'. Similarly he superimposes the properties of the body as 'I am fat,' 'I am lean', 'I am fair', 'I stand', 'I walk', 'I jump', and so on. Similarly he superimposes the properties of the organs as 'I am dumb', 'I am blind', 'I am impotent', 'I am deaf', 'I am born blind'. Similarly he superimposes the states of amtahkarana (the psychic factors), as desire, intention, doubt, certainty, etc. Having superimposed that which is the object of the apprehension 'I' thus determined, on the self-luminous, self-established, and ever-witnessing Atman, he likewise in the reverse order superimposes Ātman, the all-witnessing principle on the states of amtahkarana. Thus the process of superimposition is beginningless, endless and spontaneous. It is of the nature of wrong knowledge. It is the origin of doership and enjoyership. This is the immediate experience of all. In order to put an end to this which is the cause of all pain and to get us the knowledge of the non-duality of Atman, all Vedantas (Upanisads) have appeared. How this is the purpose of all Vedāntas we illustrate in the course of this Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā. The subject-matter of our interpretation is Vedānta-Mīmāmsā-Sāstra. Of this, the first Sūtra is this- 'āthāto brahma-jijnāsā' -(After therefore desire to know Brahman.)

Against this passage the following may be noted. No doubt this passage is intended to introduce brahma-jijñāsā as indispensable. But in fact it makes brahma-jijñāsā an impossibility. For it is after all an account of how there is the mutual superimposition of aham and pratyagātman. Aham is

individual self and pratyagātman is Brahman. The fact of mutual superimposition implies that both are equally familiar. If they are not familiar, then the mutual superimposition is not possible. But in this passage mutual superimposition is taken to be the source of the world of experience. From this it follows that pratyagātman or Brahman which is an aspect of mutual superimposition is taken to be as familiar as aham 'I'. Brahman is thus made asandigāha. So this

position makes brahma-jijñāsā an impossibility.

This conclusion illustrates how Samkara's several suppositions that the experience of evil can be got rid of, that it is got rid of by Atmaikatva-Vidyā (the knowledge of the oneness, i.e., non-duality of Atman) and that the source of this knowledge is Vedānta, become mere assertions, for pratyagātman (Brahman), because it is an item of mutual superimposition, is already known. The knowledge of Brahman therefore does not require to be produced by Vedānta. When it is known to be the very presupposition of superimposition, it cannot be raised to the level of vidyā, knowledge produced by Sāstra. It is thus the very cause of evil; and to hold that the knowledge of it removes evil is not sound.

Hence mutual superimposition is not consistent with the spirit of brahma-jijñāsā. It is something which is forced on Sāstra. Samkara unconsciously seems to admit this fact when he says, 'yathācāyamarthah sarveṣām vedamtānām tathā vayamasyām śārīraka-mīmāmsāyām pradarśayiṣyāmah.' (How this is the purpose of all vedāmtas we illustrate in the course of this Sārīraka Mīmāmsā.) With all its apparent meaning this statement is not without its subjective element. This implies that Vedānta may not give this meaning. It is the author that makes it yield this meaning. An examination of this point illustrates how this Bhāṣya does not justify the Sūtras, for its author has arrived at some conclusion outside the Brahmasūtras and to substantiate it further, he is attempting to show that which he thinks is the position of Sūtras.

II

As though Samkara himself is half aware of these difficulties in his position, he tries to remove them in concluding the Bhāṣya on the first Sūtra as-

tat punah brahma prasiddham aprasiddham vā syāt. yadi prasiddham na jijnasitavyam. athaprasiddham naiva sakyam jijnasitum iti. ucyate-asti tavat brahma nitya-śuddha-buddhamukta-svabhāvam sarvajñam sarvaśaktisamanvitam. brahmaśabdasya hi vyutpādyamānasya nityaśuddhatvādayah arthāh pratīyamte. brmhateh dhātoh arthānugamāt. sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitva-prasiddhih. sarvohi ātmāstitvam pratyeti 'na nāhamasmi' iti. yadi hi nātmāstitva-prasiddhih syāt, sarvo lokah 'nāhamasmi' iti pratīyāt. ātmā ca brahma. yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddhamasti, tato jñātameveti ajijñāsyatvam punarāpannam. na, tadvišesam prati vipratipatteh. dehamātram caitanyavisistam ātmeti prākrtāh janāh lokāyatikāsca pratipannāh, indriyānyeva cetanāni ātmetyapare. mana ityanye. vijnānamātram kṣaṇikamityeke. śūnyamityapare. asti dehādi vyatirikta-samsārī kartā, bhōktā ityapare. bhoktaiva kevalam na kartā ityeke. asti tadvyatiriktah isvarah, sarvajñah sarvasaktiriti kecit. ātmā sah bhoktuh iti apare. evam bahavah vipratipannāh yuktivākya-tadābhāsasamāsrayāh samtah. tatra avicārya yatkimcit pratipadyamāno niššreyasāt pratihanyeta anarthamceyāt. tasmāt brahma-jijnāsopanyāsa-mukhena vedāmtavākya-mīmāmsā tadavirodhi-tarkopakaraņā nissreyasa-proyojanā prastūyate.

(Further a difficulty may suggest itself. Brahman the subject-matter of jijnāsā ought to be familiar or unfamiliar. If it is familiar then it cannot be the subject-matter of jijnāsā. If it is not familiar then it is not possible to enquire into it. This difficulty is met as follows: In the first place it must be recognised that Brahman is existent, is characterised as enduring, pure, spiritual and ever liberated and is omniscient and has all power. By analysing and interpreting the word Brahma, endurance, purity, etc., are understood to be the meaning of the word, because these things form the literal meaning of the root brinhati. Further the existence of Brahman is familiar as It is the self of all. Every person indeed knows the fact that atman (self) exists. The form of knowledge is 'It is not true that I do not exist'. If the existence of self were indeed not familiar, then every person ought to have the knowledge, 'I do not exist'. Atman is Brahman. An objection may follow-Thus in the world of experience if Brahman is

familiar as ātman, then it means that Brahman is familiar and for this reason it again follows that it cannot be the subjectmatter of jijnāsā.—No; (the objection does not hold good. The conclusion on which the objection is based is not true.) For there is dispute with regard to the particulars connected with it (Brahman). [The following are the points of dispute.] Only the physical body as giving rise to consciousness is ātman. This is what commonsense people as well as Lokayatikas hold. Only the organs (imdriyas) are conscious and they are ātman. This is the theory of others. 'Manas is ātman'. This is what still others hold. 'Only consciousness (vijñāna) which is momentary is ātman.' This is the position of others. 'The void is ātman.' This is the position of some others. 'There is ātman distinct from body etc., and it is subject to bondage and is doer, and experiencer.' This is the supposition of others again. 'It is only experiencer but not doer.' This is the surmise of particular people. 'There is *Iśwara* distinct from atman, the individual experiencer and he is omniscient and omnipotent.' This is the assertion of some others. 'He is the self of the experiencer.' This is the imagination of some others. Thus there are many disputants who take their hold on the fallacious reasoning and teaching. In these circumstances one who accepts or believes in something without examination ought to be ever removed from the good and is sure to suffer evil. Therefore by way of stating brahmajijnasā, the desire to know the intended meaning of the statements of Vedanta, helped by reasoning that is not inconsistent with it, enquiry into the meaning of Veda is introduced in order to bring about niśśreyas, the ultimate good.)

Against this Bhāṣya the following may be noted. In the whole passage the only point of justification of his position that Samkara gives is 'tadviseṣamprati vipratipatteh.' His idea seems to be that though Brahman is said to be familiar we have to understand that it has several aspects and out of these aspects something is familiar while something else is not familiar. Though there need not be jijñāsā with reference to the familiar aspect, there is the need for jijñāsā with reference to the aspect that is not familiar. His position at this stage ought to be that the aspect that is not familiar is samdigaha

(doubted) and therefore it forms the subject-matter of Brahma-

jijñāsā.

Which is this aspect? In answer Samkara cites different theories of self (ātman) and concludes that to accept any one of these theories without examination is dangerous. The examination he recommends, he calls, vedāmta -vākya -mīmāmsā, the desire to know the intended meaning of the statements of Vedānta.

Samkara's explanation at this stage creates confusion. According to this explanation Brahman is the subject-matter of jijnāsā. Brahman is further confined to ātman. But ātman is said to be an aspect of Brahman that is not familiar. In case that Brahman is the same as ātman that is unfamiliar, to talk of Brahman as self-luminous or svapracāra -sākṣin or as an element of mutual superimposition becomes irrelevant. Mutual superimposition (itaretarādhyāsa) is the subject-matter of Adhyāsa-Bhāsya. Therefore it follows that Adhyāsa-Bhāsya is not consistent with the Brahma-Sūtras. Further the supposition that Brahman is svapracāra-sākṣin or self-luminous makes Brahma-jijnasa devoid of subject-matter and therefore im-

We started this discussion with a view to finding out the upholder of pūrvapakṣa to Sāstra. We can now find out who this person is. In the light of the foregoing ideas he is one who is led by Adhyāsa-Bhāsya and holds that Brahman is the same as the self-luminous self (jīva or ātman). One who holds this view has made brahma-jijnāsā, devoid of subject-matter and therefore impossible. In other words Adhyāsa -Bhāṣya negates brahma-jijīāsā. T.Pr., illustrates this point by framing the pūrvapakṣa based on Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya.

It may further be noted that Samkara mentions two views of Brahman: Brahman as self-luminous and Brahman as ātman, the individual self which is differently defined by different thinkers. According to Samkara the former is certain (asamdigdha) and the latter (samdigdha) doubtful. They can therefore never be brought together. But the commentators

of Samkara try to bring these two together:

 $T\bar{a}tparya$ - $Camdrik\bar{a}$ (T.C.,) a commentary on T.Pr. states the position of $Bh\bar{a}mat\bar{\imath}$, a commentary on Samkara- $Bh\bar{a}sya$ with a view to defining the view point of T.Pr.

Bhāmatī:—Pratyagātmana eva brahmatvāt tasya ca ahamiti prakāśamānatvena asamdigdhatvāt na viṣayatvam. nāpyavidyā nivṛttiḥ prayojanam. uktarītyā ātmani bhāsamānepi tadanivṛtteḥ. na ca vācyam aham pratyayah sthūloham kartā bhoktā duhkīti gṛhṇāti tadviparītaśca vedāmtapratipādyaḥ samdigdha iti viṣayādi-siddhiriti. vedāmtānām adhyayana-vidhyāpādita- prayo janavadarthāvabodhānām api prabalāham- pratyaya- bādhitatvena japa- mātropayogitvena avivakṣitārthatvāt upacaritārthatvādvā. tathā ca vedāmta-vicāro nārabdhavya iti pūrvapakṣah.'

Bhāmatī Bhāmatī first states pūrvapakṣa against siddhāmta it upholds. (Pratyagātman itself is Brahman. It is selfluminous as 'I'. Therefore it is asamdigdha (not doubted). For this reason it is not the subject-matter. Nor is the removal of nescience (avidyā) the purpose. For as it is already explained though 'I' is self-luminous avidyā is not removed. Against this it may be supposed "'I' apprehends the facts that 'I am fat,' 'I am doer,' 'I am enjoyer,' 'I suffer.' But what is expounded by Vedānta is just the opposite. Therefore the latter is samdigdha (doubted). From this it follows that Sāstra has subject-matter etc." This does not hold good, for though it may be supposed that the Vedantas reveal things that lead to the realization stated by the injunctions connected with the study of Veda, the whole position is sublated by 'I' the experience of which is stronger than any realization. The statements of Vedanta under this circumstance may not be useless. They may be used only for repeated recitation, for they do not present things intended and they present the things that are superimposed. Hence an enquiry into Vedanta does not deserve commencement. This is pūrvapakṣa).

This pūrvapakṣa notes that certain statements of Veda may be used for repeated recitation. This is a case of unwillingness to attribute seriousness to Veda. It is to hold that Veda contains both philosophy and non-philosophy. It is clear how this view is totally different from that of Madhva for whom the whole Veda is nothing but pure philosophy.

Bhāmatī presents siddhāmta, the position it upholds— 'siddhāmtastu—vedāmtavākyaiḥ jūānānamdaikarasādvitīyodāsīnasvabhāva ātmā upakramādibhiḥ pratipādyate. na ca kriyāsamabhihārena īdrgātma-tattvamabhidadhati tatparāni samti yuktam upacaritārthāni iti vaktum. pratyakṣam tu sambhāvita-doṣam apauruṣeyena nirdoṣena āgamena bādhyate. tena vedāmta-vedyaḥ śuddhaḥ ahampratyaye na bhāti iti viṣayādisiddhiriti.'

(With the application of the ideas characterising opening (upakrama), closing (upasamhāra) etc., to the statements of Vedānta these statements are seen to expound the truth of ātman. This truth is the essence of knowledge and bliss. It is secondless and absolute. The fact that these statements repeatedly present ātman of this character proves that they are wholly devoted to this presentation. It is not possible to make them mean something secondary. For Pratyakṣa i.e., normal experience is subject to fallacy. For this reason it is sublated by the verbal testimony. Verbal testimony is defectless. It is not composed by any author. Hence it follows that pure ātman, which is expounded by Vedānta is not present in the experience 'I'. Sāstra has, therefore, subject-matter etc.)

Having cited this siddhāmta of Bhāmatī Tātparya-Camdrikā examines it.

"tanna. tathāhi—suddho na bhāti iti korthah? kim ātmasvarūpe kincidbhāti kincinnabhātīti? kim vā ātmasvarūpameva na bhātīti? yadvā anātmāpi bhātīti? ādye abhāsamāno amsah sarīrādibhyo bhedo vā kartītvabhoktītvādyabhāvo
vā brahmātmābhedo vā dvitīyamātrābhāvo vā? ātmabhinnah
satyascet apasiddhāmtah. abhāvādvaitamtu anyatra nirastam.
mithyā cet na tatvāvedaka-sāstra-vedyah. ātma-mātratve tu
dvitīya pakṣāmtarbhāvah, tathāpi kalpitena bhedena agṛhīta iva
bhātīti cenna. tattvato gṛhyamāne adhiṣṭhāne bhedakalpanāyāh
agṛhītattvāropasya ca ayogāt, na ca mithyābhūtenāpi tena
upalakṣita ātmā sāstra-vedyah sa ca satya iti vācyam. svaprakāsatvena nitya-siddhātmāvabodhanārtham upalakṣanoktyayogāt.
upalakṣane eva tātparye ca aprāmānyāpātāt.

ata eva na dvitīyah. tasya svaprakāšatvena abhānāyogāt. svaprakāšasyāpi avidyāvašāt abhāne avidyādeh duhkhādeśca

prakāšo nasyāt. tasya caitanya-prakāšādhīna-prakāšatvopagamāt. etena svaprakāšatvāt sphurati caitanyam avidyāvṛtatvācca na sphurati; na ca virodhaḥ; sphuraṇasya tāttvikatvāt; asphuraṇasya ca atāttvikatvāt; evam ca na kopi doṣaḥ; sphuratvāda-jñānādisādhakatvasya asphuratvāt viṣayatvasya ca sambhavāt iti nirastam. sphurati asphuraṇāropāyōgasya uktatvāt. na ca svarūpacitaḥ prakāšepi tasyāḥ ajñānāvirodhitvāt virodhinyāśca vṛtterabhāvena avidyāvṛtatvāt samdighatvam iti yuktam. svarūpacito ajñānāvirodhitve tadvedye duḥkhādau ajñāna-prasaṃgāt vannnate ayam ghaṭaḥ ityādyaparokṣa-vṛtterapi ghaṭādyava-cchinna cidviṣayatvācca. śravaṇādi-janita-samskāra-sahitāmta-hkaraṇa-vṛtti-nāśyatve ca mithyā-rūpyādau tadadarśanāt satye bhramarādidhyānanivartya-kīṭatvādau ca taddarśanāt ajñānasya satyatvām syāt.

na trtīyah, anātmano adhikasya bhāve api ātmano asamdigdhatvena avisayatva-tādavasthyāt. adhisthāne tattvatah sphurati anātmāropāyogācca. etena yathā sadjādayah gāmdharvaśāstrābhyāsāt prāk api sphuramtah tadrūpeņa anullikhitāh na śrotreņa vyajyamte; vyajyamtetu šāstra-vāsitena tena; evam vedāmtavākya-janya-brahmaikyākāra-vāsanāvāsitāmtahkaranena bhāvābhivyaktih na prāk iti bhāmatyuktam nirastam. tatra prāk asphuratah paścācca sphuratah sadjatvādi-jāti-bhedasya iva prakrte tasya abhāvāt. etenaiva tatvamasi iti vākyād yadyapi ātmano brahmatvam jñātam tathāpi vādi-vipratipatyā samsayāt tatra jijnāsā iti bhāmatyuktam nirastam. cinmātre dharmini niścite tanmātraikye samsayāyogāt. yuktam ca apauruseyasyāpi āgamasya samkita-tātparya-bhramarūpadosasya yajamānah prastarah ityaderiva pratyaksa-virodhena pratitartha-pracyavanam. uktā ca tvayāpi tatvamasi vākye pratyakṣāvirodhāya lakṣaṇā. tasmāt paramate svarūpamātrasya svaprakasatvena nitya-siddhatvāt anyasya ca ajñāna-kalpitatvena ajñāna-vişayatvāyogena ajñānāsambhavāt ajñāto visayo ajñāna-nivṛttih phalam ajñānī ca adhikārī na yukta iti śāstram anārambhanīyameveti bhāmatīmatam tāvad ayuktam."

(The explanation of $Bh\bar{a}mat\bar{i}$ as to how the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ is justified does not hold good. The following is the reason. What is the meaning of the idea, that pure $\bar{a}tman$ is not luminous i.e. not familiar, not given? Does it mean that of the content of $\bar{a}tman$ a part is luminous while the other part

is not luminous? Or does it mean that ātman as such is not luminous? Or does it mean that non-ātman is also luminous? In case the first alternative is accepted, which is this part which is not luminous? Is it the fact of distinction from body etc.? Is it the absence of doership and enjoyership etc.? Is it identity of Brahman and ātman? Or is it the absence of other things as such? If what is different from atman is real, then the position is inconsistent with what is already accepted i.e., what the author of Bhāmatī intends to prove. The position called abhāvādvaita is refuted in a different connection.1 If that which is different from ātman is mithyā then it does not form the subject-matter of Sāstra which is intended to give rise to the knowledge of that which is real. If it (what is supposed to be different from ātman) is nothing but atman, then the position comes under the second alternative. It might be supposed that though it is the same as ātman, owing to the superimposition of difference between the two it appears as though it is not apprehended. But this supposition is not correct. If that which is mistaken is apprehended as it is given, then there is no room either for the superimposition of difference or for the superimposition of the state of being not apprehended. It may be supposed that the supposed part of atman which is not apprehended is different from ātman and it is mithyā: ātman is only indicated by it: this ātman is the subject-matter of Sāstra: and it is real (satya). But the supposition is not correct. For ātman is self-luminous. It is therefore ever self-established. Hence to hold that its apprehension is to be acquired and this is acquired by means of something which indicates it is irrelevant. If the purpose of Sāstra is to present something (upalakṣana) that indicates ātman without defining it, then Sāstra ought to cease to be the source of correct knowledge.

¹ Some followers of Advaita believe that only to posit a positive entity (bhāva) along with Brahman affects advaita but to posit absence of attributes along with Brahman does not affect advaita. This position is refuted by the same author, the author of Camdritkā in his another work, Nyāyāmpta. In this work he shows that in the absence of something, there must be the properties, the state of being absent etc., and they ought to be positive. He concludes therefore that to posit an absence is as good as positing a positive entity. For an absence is not in essence different from a positive entity.

For the same reason, the second alternative, that ātman itself is not luminous, does not hold good. For atman is self-luminous and it is therefore impossible to hold that it is not apprehended. If it is supposed that ātman is self-luminous, but owing to avidyā (nescience) it is not apprehended, then there ought to be no apprehension of either avidyā, etc., or bondage, etc. For the author of Bhāmatī holds that both these things are illumined by the illumination of caitanya, i.e., ātman. For similar reason the following supposition also is falsified. The supposition is: 'There is the apprehension of Caitanya, because it is self-luminous. There is no apprehension of it, because it is obscured by avidyā. These two positions are not contradictory. For apprehension (of *Caitanya*) is real and non-apprehension is unreal. This position removes all difficulties. For it is possible to hold that in so far as there is apprehension Caitanya illumines nescience etc., and in so far as there is non-apprehension it becomes the subject-matter of Sāstra.'—The reason for this is already stated and it is that it is not possible to hold that non-apprehension can be superimposed on that which is apprehended. It may be further supposed—'There is the apprehension of Caitanya as Caitanya. But Caitanya is not opposed to nescience. Vrtti knowledge is opposed to nescience. But vrtti is absent. Hence Caitanya is obscured by nescience. For this reason it is doubted (samdigdha.)'-But this supposition does not hold good. For if Caitanya as Caitanya is not opposed to nescience, then there ought to be nescience with regard to bondage etc., apprehended by it i.e., bondage etc., ought to be obscured by nescience because Caitanya which reveals bondage etc., is not opposed to nescience. (Further vrtti itself which is supposed to remove nescience ought to be obscured by nescience.) For according to Bhāmatī the vṛtti of perceptual character, for example 'This is a jar' has as its object the Caitanya that underlies jar etc. Further for the following reasons nescience

¹ In Advaita two types of knowledge are spoken of—svarūpa and vṛtti. The former is knowledge in the real sense and the latter is a state of amtalkaraṇa and it is called knowledge on the basis that it removes nescience that obscures Caitanya and thereby helps the manifestation of Caitanya. [For a detailed information see my articles on Caitanya, Adhyāsa, and Ajñāna published by the Mysore University Journal 1927-28.] and D.P.V. pp. 35-41.

ought to be real. Nescience is supposed to be destroyed by the vrtti (state) of amtahkarana helped by the impression (samskāra) produced by śravana etc., i.e., the understanding of the correct meaning of Śruti and so on. But this supposition does not prove that nescience is mithyā. For vrtti is not seen to destroy the silver which is mithyā, i.e., superimposed on things like a shell. But when by the constant thought of a bee a worm abandons the state of being a worm, vrtti is seen to destroy this state. This state is of the character of nescience and it is real, i.e., it is not of the nature of silver that is superimposed. This means that nescience destroyed

by vrtti ought to be real.

The third alternative also does not hold good. [This alternative is that which is not atman is also apprehended.] For there may be the apprehension of that which is not ātman, but this does not alter the position that atman is asamdigdha (not doubted). For this reason the same objection that ātman cannot be the subject-matter stands. Further if ātman which is supposed to be mistaken is really self-luminous, then there cannot be the superimposition of that which is not ātman. For this reason, namely for the reason that ātman which is to be the subject-matter of Sāstra is asamdigdha, another supposition of Bhāmatī becomes falsified. The supposition is this-'sadja' etc., the various steps of musical tone are familiar even before the practice of the science of music. But, as they are not understood in terms of sadja etc., they are not recognized as sadja etc., by the organ of hearing. If the same organ is helped by the practice of music, then they are recognized as sadja etc. Similarly identity of Brahman can be recognized by the amtahkarana i.e., vrtti, helped by the impression resulting from the knowledge of the non-duality of Brahman which is produced by the statement of Vedanta. But before the occurrence of this knowledge the non-duality of Brahman is not recognized.' It may be noted against this supposition that only with reference to the instance of sadja etc., the observation stated in the supposition holds good. For sadja etc., are not recognized before the practice of music and

¹ Indian science of music distinguishes between seven steps of musical sound both in ascending and in descending order. These steps are called şadja, rşabha, gāmdhāra, madhyama, pamcama, daivata and niṣāda.

they are recognized after the practice. The reason for this is the fact that sadja etc., admit of their apprehension in different degrees. This is because sadja etc., consist of aspects that happen to be the objects of different degrees of knowledge. But with reference to the non-duality of Brahman to talk of degrees of knowledge or of different stages of aspects is irrelevant.

For the same reason, another supposition of Bhāmatī becomes falsified. The following is the supposition: 'By means of the statement "That thou art", ātman is recognized to be Brahman. Yet this truth appears to be doubted, because of the contradictory theories of opponents. In order to remove this doubt jijnāsā is necessary.' This supposition is not correct, for when the substantive Caitanya as such is not doubted, there can be no doubt as to its non-duality as substantive Caitanya. Further, though Agama may be apauruseya, still a defect may be attributed to it. This defect is the fact of supposition that the passage in question intends to signify something which is illusory. This defect, namely, the state of signifying something illusory is sublated by perception. An instance may be given. There is a Sruti text, 'yajamānah prastarah'. Yajamāna is one who conducts sacrifice and prastarah is a quantity of sacred grass. By the statement quoted, both are given as identical. But their identity is sublated by perception. For this reason, this meaning of Sruti is dismissed. Similarly in the present case also, the idea of the intended meaning of Sruti may be dismissed. The correctness of this observation is in fact recognized by you (the author of Bhāmatī) also, in attributing a secondary meaning to the statement 'That thou art', in order to remove the opposition of perception. Therefore according to the opponent's position Caitanya as such is self-luminous. For this reason it is self-established. Anything other than Caitanya is a product of nescience. Therefore it is not an object of nescience. Hence nescience itself is impossible. So it is wrong to hold that, that which is not known is the subjectmatter (visaya), the removal of nescience is the result (prayojana) and one who has nescience is in need of jijnāsā (adhikārin). From this it follows that Sastra does not deserve commencement. Hence the position upheld by Bhāmatī is incorrect.)

In order to meet the difficulty, if what is different from

ātman is taken to be real, then it is dismissing the position already acknowledged.

IV

Next Candrikā quotes the position of Vivaraṇa, another commentary on Śamkara-Bhāṣya and shows how it fails to justify the commencement of jijñāsā.

etena na pratyagbrahmaikyam visayalı kartṛtvāderviruddhadharmasya satyatvena aikyāyogāt, nāpi tannivṛttilı prayojanam, jñānasya ajñāna-mātra-nivartakatvena satyasya jñānāt nivṛtyayoga iti prāpte satyam kartṛtva-bhoktṛtvādi-prapamcasya satyatve viṣayādi na sidhyata iti. prapamcastu mithyaiva. ata eva bhāṣye adhyāsa-varṇanam iti vivaraṇābhipretam adhikaraṇam api nir-

(The position taken by *Vivaraṇa* also becomes falsified.—[*Vivaraṇa* first states the position opposed to it and next states its own position. The position that is opposed to it is this.]—'The subject-matter of *Sāstra* cannot be the identity of Brahman and Ātman, for, the properties of doership, etc., are real and they are opposed to identity and identity for this reason becomes impossible. Nor can it be held that the destruction of bondage consisting in doership, etc., is the aim of *Śāstra*. For knowledge destroys only non-knowledge and that which is real is not destroyed by knowledge.'

If this opposition appears [against it Vivarana advances its own position]—It is indeed true that if the world of doership, enjoyership, etc., is real, then there cannot be the subject-matter, etc., for Śāstra. (But the case at present is different.) For the world is indeed mithyā. It is only for this reason that in the Bhāṣya there is the exposition of superimposition. This is the position that Vivarana intends to show as the content of Jijīāsādhikarana. The following is the reason why this position is wrong:—)

kartrtvādi-visistasya sambhāvita-dosena atatvāvedakena pratyakṣānumānādinā mithyā-bhede grhītepi tātvikābhede mānāmtara-virodhābhāvena tattvam-pada-mukhyārthatvāya tallakṣite cinmātre abhedāprasaktyā tattvamasi-vākyāvaiyarthyāya ca visistasyaiva nirdoṣayā srutyā tāttvikābheda-bodhana-sambhavena viṣayārtham adhyāsasya avaktavyatvāt. na ca viruddha-dharmasya sadāsatve bhedah tāttvika eva syāditi vācyam, asyāpi anumānasya śruti-viruddhatvena atāttvika-viṣayatvāt, nāpi prayojanārtham taduktih, setvajñānākāryasyāpi pāpasya setu-jñānāt nivṛtteh, vistṛtam ca etat anyatra, tasmāt na vivaraṇa-matamapi yuktam,

(With regard to the thing qualified by doership, etc., difference which is mithyā is indeed apprehended by pratyakṣa, anumāna, etc. These pratyakṣa, anumāna, etc., are not certainly above the possibility of invalidity. Therefore they are incapable of giving rise to the knowledge of truth. So with regard to non-difference there is no opposition of any other pramāņa. Therefore in order to obtain the primary meaning of the words tat and tvam (that and thou), pure cit is taken to have been indicated by these words. (This is the position of Vivarana.) But with reference to this, namely, pure cit, the question of non-duality does not apply. Hence in order to justify the statement of *Sruti*, tattvamasi (That thou art), because *Sruti* is defectless, it is quite possible to hold that it gives rise to the knowledge of the non-duality of the things qualified (denoted by 'that' and 'thou') and in this case the exposition of adhyāsa i.e. Adhyāsa-Bhāsya becomes irrelevant. Against this conclusion the following might be said. 'If the opposite attributes are always there, then it necessarily follows that difference between jīva and Brahman is real.' But this does not hold good, for this kind of reasoning also is sublated by *Sruti* and therefore what the reasoning presents is not real. Nor can it be held that the exposition of Adhyāsa illustrates how (the knowledge obtained by Śāstra) has a purpose to serve. (Its purpose consists in the removal of nescience. This means that bondage is the product of nescience and it is therefore not real. In order to illustrate this point there is the exposition of adhyāsa.) For though the sin in question is not the effect of the ignorance of setu¹ it is destroyed by the knowledge (perception) of setu.

[The idea is that in the present case also the opposite properties possessed by jīva and Brahman may not be the

¹ This idea is based on the Smṛti-śetum dṛṣṭvā samudrasya brahma-hatyām vyapohati. Setu in this connection means the bridge constructed by Rāma of Rāmāyaṇa.

products of nescience and still they may be destroyed by the knowledge caused by *Śruti*. In this case the exposition of superimposition becomes irrelevant.] The same position is explained in detail by the same author in a different work, *Nyāyāmṛta* under the topic *Jūāna-nivartyatvānyathānupapatti-bhanga*. (Therefore the position of *Vivaraṇa* also is not

correct.)

The foregoing ideas clearly show how Samkara's Adhyāsa-Bhāsya is out of place in the scheme of Brahma-Sūtras. This fact leads to conclusions of great significance. It shows (i) How the Bhāsya which starts from Adhyāsa-Bhāsya can never hope to do justice to the Sūtras; (ii) How the non-duality of Brahman and Atman being self-luminous can never be the subject-matter of Sāstra however clever the interpretation given to it be; (iii) How there is the need for Sāstra only in case the subject-matter is samdigdha, and (iv) How the starting point of jijnāsā (philosophy) is the presence of a thing

that is samdigdha.

At this stage a question arises: Of all the ideas that go against Sāstra, why does the author of Sūtra-Bhāṣya or of T. Pr., make Samkara's position alone pūrvapakṣa to Sāstra?1 In answer it may be noted at the outset that it is not any prejudice on the part of the author that is responsible for the formation of pūrvapakṣa. It is indeed logical necessity that forces him to state only this to be pūrvapakṣa. The position to be established is brahma-jijñāsā. It is therefore the content of siddhāmta. That which is opposed to it is pūrvapakṣa. Apart from personalities or their positions, what is it that is conducive to Brahma-jijnāsā? is the question. The only answer is that it is the idea that the subject-matter of jijnasa is samdigdha. This idea is the logical background of jijnāsā. That which is opposed to this idea is the idea that the subjectmatter in question is asamdigdha and this makes jijnāsā an impossibility. We shall state the same position in terms of Brahman. If Brahman is samdigdha, then brahma- jijnāsā is possible. But if Brahman is asamdigdha, then brahma-jijnāsā is impossible. The latter is therefore pūrvapakṣa to the former. Of all the Darsanas which is that which gives room for the

 $^{^1}$ How $Adhy\bar{a}sa$ theory is $p\bar{u}rvapak_{\bar{s}a}$ to $S\bar{u}tra$ itself will be clear in the following passages.

idea that Brahman is asamdigdha? The only answer to this question in the light of the existing Darśana literature, is that it is something akin to the subject-matter of Adhyāsa-bhāṣya of Śamkara. For the content of Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya is the assertion that Brahman being identical with Ātman is selfluminous i.e. asamdigdha.

Further, as it will be made clear later on, all positions that are in any degree opposed to brahma- jijnāsā ultimately lead to the identity of Brahman and Ātman. This explains how by taking this identity to be pūrvapakṣa, the author of Śāstra has in view all that is opposed to Śāstra as forming the details of

this pūrvapakṣa.

The last point may require clarification especially in the case of a student of Modern Philosophy. The definition of $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$, philosophy, in the light of the foregoing ideas is this: $Jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ is that the subject-matter of which is saindigdha to start with and the aim of which is the knowledge of this subject-matter. The history of European Philosophy presents several definitions of Philosophy. But if the spirit of these definitions is supposed to be different from the spirit of the above definition of $Jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$, the philosophic mind is dissatisfied and this state of mind can be transcended only by a comparative study of the western position with reference to the position of $Brahma-M\bar{i}m\bar{a}m\bar{s}s\bar{a}$.

V

EVALUATION OF BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ FROM THE STAND-POINT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Prof. Patrick in his Introduction to Philosophy examines certain well-known definitions of Philosophy. A critical study of these definitions may help us in the present connection. In the preface to this work he says, "The purpose of Philosophy is to impel thought, not to satisfy inquiry with a system." How this purpose characterizes Brahma-jijñāsā is obvious. For it is only jījñāsā in its complete sense that can satisfy this demand. This point will be amply clarified by the author of T.Pr., in the Anandamayādhikaraṇa.

Further in the first chapter entitled "what is philosophy," Patrick notes "But what is philosophy about? It does not

seem to have for its theme a perfectly definite group of facts." We may see how near his remarks are to Brahma-jijnāsā which insists on the samdigdha nature of the subject-matter. He strengthens his position further as, "It is just possible that it may turn out to be an advantage that philosophy does not have a perfectly definite group of facts for its subject-matter, such as stars, rocks, plants and mental processes." We may add to this list Brahman which is self-luminous, for by holding that it is self-luminous in the sense defined by Samkara, it is reduced to the level of definite facts such as

stars, etc.

Further on the basis that one gets tired sometimes of studying facts and longs for meanings and values, "Philosophy is defined as having just this for its task to try to answer these insistent and persistent questionings of the human mind as to the use, meaning, purpose and value of life. Philosophy has been defined as the cultural study of meanings and values, or still more concisely, as the interpretation of life." Against this Brahma-Mīmāmsā insists that meaning, value, and interpretation of life must be in terms of Brahman, that is, they must be the expressions of the truth of Brahman and they must never be laukika (mundane). For meaning, etc., in the mundane sense are asamdigdha and they are samdigdha only when they are aspects of Brahman. With a clear recognition of this distinction, laukika and non-laukika or vaidika, philosophy becomes Mokṣa-Sāstra, i.e., the Sāstra which interprets life in terms of meaning, etc., in their complete and absolute sense, i.e., in the sense of Brahman. The knowledge of meaning, etc., in the laukika sense is not negated in this study, but it is transcended. Hence, Moksa-Sāstra is fuller and richer than Philosophy in modern thought. The employment of the same words, meaning, etc., in both indicates that modern thought is perhaps moving in the direction of Moksa-Sāstra which is the same as Brahma-jijnāsā.

Plato says, "that the philosopher is the spectator of all time and all existence and that he is one who sets his affection on that which really exists." Matthew Arnold suggests that "Philosophy is the attempt to see life and see it whole." Patrick understands this to mean seeing life steadily, with neither prejudice, nor bias, nor half-knowledge. With reference to this definition it may be noted that the same is the language of Brahma-Mīmāmisā. But it insists that life must be seen as an expression of the fullness of Brahman as conceived by Brahma-Mīmāmisā, for, all other explanations fall short of this demand. This point will be clear as we go on with the study of Brahma-Mīmāmisā.

There are other definitions of Philosophy. Philosophy is "the attempt by use of scientific methods to understand the world in which we live." This definition is far removed from Brahma-jijnāsā. The method of jijnāsā as we have already seen and will see as we go on is something far above what is called scientific method. Further the attempt to understand the world by means of scientific methods yields only some

called scientific method. Further the attempt to understand the world by means of scientific methods yields only some scientific conception of the world, but it can never hope to give the knowledge that can be produced by jijnāsā.

An explanation of the same definition is further presented. "It is observed that in attempting to understand the world, philosophy aims at combining the results of the special sciences into some kind of consistent world-view and this has always been the aim of philosophy from Thales to the present time". Against this, it may be noted that as it is already shown, the combination of scientific knowledge does not rise to the level of the knowledge of *Brahman*. The sum total of scientific knowledge does not go beyond scientific

knowledge

Further, the ideas that govern modern outlook are stated. Apart from permanence and change of the physical world "our interests now are with another kind of changing world—changing social customs, changing political relations, changing morals, changing religion and changing literary standards. But this kind of 'world' is quite as much in need of interpretation as the other—and so philosophy remains with us; only now it becomes the interpretation of life, its value and meaning, its source and its destiny. Hence evolution, progress, knowledge, the ways of the mind, problems of conduct and society have come into the foreground; but it is as true as ever that philosophy is an attempt to understand the world we live in". Against these ideas that attempt at defining philosophy, we may note that with all their immediate application to the facts that govern modern life, they do not

make philosophy independent of our subjective interests. Even supposing that life characterized by these ideas is interpreted, the interpretation can hardly be called philosophy as Brahman which is samdigdha is untouched by this interpretation. If this interpretation is supposed to cover Brahman then it becomes irrelevant to mention evolution, etc., as forming the subject-matter of philosophy. For to have Brahman that is samdigdha as the subject-matter of philosophy is to transcend all that is laukika and in this connection evolution, etc., that are supposed to characterize life are certainly interpreted with all their limits. Hence Brahma-jijnāsā as philosophy is far higher. It has in view all that is modern and goes beyond it to study that which is really samdigdha.

There are several other definitions, "To ask big questions like, 'can we any longer hold a religious view of the world? Is there any god at all? What is right and what is wrong? What are the limits of knowledge?' and so on, reflect upon them, to study them in a scientific way and to try to answer them, this is philosophy." "Philosophy is an unusually persistent effort to think clearly" (James); "Philosophy is completely unified knowledge" (Herbert Spencer). "Philosophy is an attempt to gain unity in our thinking" and so on.

But all these definitions fail to comprehend the true subject-matter of philosophy, namely Brahman as samdigdha.

There are still other definitions—"Philosophy is wonder which has turned to serious and reflective thought." Patrick explains this idea as, "Some children and some grown-ups are very thoughtful and reflective; they wonder what the world is, how it came to be, what is it made of and what it is for. When their wonder becomes serious and reflective inquiry, they are philosophers." If we examine this definition from the point of view of Brahma-jijñāsā, we see that it is only partly correct. All these elements are no doubt present in jijñāsā. But the definition fails to explain how wonder becomes serious and reflective inquiry. Wonder must introduce the person in question to contradictory ideas with regard to the subject-matter of Philosophy. In the presence of these ideas the subject-matter becomes sandigdha, and there arises the intellectual necessity to transcend this state

and in this circumstance there arises serious and reflective inquiry. Hence wonder is not the immediate origin of Philosophy and immediate origin is the fact that the subject-matter is saidigdha.

Another definition is based on the literal meaning of Philosophy. This word has a Greek origin. Sophia means wisdom. Phileiu is a verb and it means to love. So Philosophy is love of wisdom. This definition is vague. In a special sense philosophy may be identified with brahma-jijnāsā. In this term

jijñāsā stands for love of wisdom.

At present the word philosophy is used in a very broad sense. Though at the outset it was identified with Metaphysics, it now covers a wider ground. Metaphysics is applied to the problems of the world, of reality, of God, of purpose, of causality, and of mind. Philosophy is applied to all these as well as to Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge, Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics. This is so far as modern thought is concerned. All these form the aspects of brahma-jijñāsā and for this reason Philosophy may be taken to be the correct

translation of jijñāsā.

Further, with reference to the discussion connected with definitions of Philosophy, an important point must be kept in mind. If philosophy and Brahma-jijnāsā are recognized to be one and the same, then the subject-matter of philosophy must be sandigdha. Shortly it will be clear that this Brahman is not the object of relative knowledge, however complete it may appear to be. Philosophy in this sense is the source of absolute knowledge. The source of this knowledge is called Veda or Sruti. So Brahman the subject-matter of Philosophy is that which is expounded by Sruti. It is Srutyukta. If from this point of view, language is interpreted, then all the words that form the bodies of the seveal definitions stated above mean only Brahman. In this case the whole is Brahman. The whole view is the view of Brahman, i.e. view from the point of view of Brahman. Value is Brahman, purpose is Brahman, origin is Brahman and so on.

If this is the outlook that forms the background of the several definitions, then every definition applies quite well to Brahma-jijñāsā. To illustrate this point we may cite a circumstance. A Vedic Passage says, devānām dhanam jāānam, manuṣyānām suvarnam. (Treasure in the divine sense is knowledge and in

the human sense gold.) If we take this passage as giving two view-points, the language for both is the same. If the word treasure is stated instead of interpreting it abruptly we must first find out the outlook that governs the language. Similar is the case of language, purpose, aim, value and so on. So it is not bare language that gives us truth, but it is the language with the outlook behind it. An effective function of this truth is inevitable specially in philosophical discussion identified with Brahma-jijñāsā. All this means that philosophy that is not Brahma-jijñāsā is simply so called. It is hollow. It is not backed up by proper outlook. So before examining a definition we must first see if that definition is the expression of the outlook of Brahman. With this disposition the philosopher becomes Srotriya and Brahma-niṣṭha, one who is after the knowledge of Brahman as expounded by Sruti.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XIV

SELF-ESTABLISHED CHARACTER OF BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

We have so far arrived at the conclusion that Brahma-jijnāsā is indispensable. But in the Sūtra there is no expression corresponding to 'indispensable'. The word indispensable in the present exposition is taken to be an English equivalent to the Sanskrit word kartavyā. The Sūtra ends with Brahmajijñāsā but not with Brahma-jijñāsā kartavyā. If the word kartavyā is taken to have been understood, then we have introduced into Sūtra something which is not already there. That it is not already given may mean that there is no objective necessity that we have to understand only that particular word. If it is a question of the disposition of the Sūtra being dependent upon our understanding, then we are not bound to understand only 'kartavyā'. We may as well understand 'akartavyā'. Akartavyā as applied to Brahma-jijñāsā means that jijñāsā is not indispensable. So the disposition of the Sūtra itself is not definite. Under this circumstance, there is no point in meeting pūrvapakṣa which feels the necessity for criticising that which is supposed to have formed the background of Sūtra.

With these ideas in mind the author of T. Pr., introduces the discussion as-nanu kartavyeti padamatra na śrūyate. yadyadhyāhārah tarhi nakartavyetyadyāhārah kim nasyāt. adhvāhārasva niramkusatvāt. itvata āha—YATRA iti. (A difficulty suggests itself. In the body of the Sūtra the word kartavyā is not given. If there is the understanding of the word, then why is there not the understanding of the word na kartavyā? The scope of understanding has no limit. To meet this difficulty Bhāṣyakāra says YATRA etc.)

Bhāsya-

YATRA ANAVASARO ANYATRA PADAM TATRA PRATISTHITAM vākyamveti satām nītih sāvakāše na tadbhavet. ITI BRHATSAMHITĀYĀM.

T. Pr.; presents the meaning of this passage.

yatra vākye mahāvākye vā yatpadam vākyam vā vinā anyatra arthāmtare anavakāšah arthāmtarasya aghaṭanā tatra vākye mahāvākye vā tadeva padam vākyam vā pratiṣṭhitam prāptam nānyaditi satām nyāyah. yat padam vākyam vā vināpi padāmtarena vākyāmtarena vā vākye mahāvākye vā sāvakāše arthāmtare ghaṭanāvati tadeva padam vākyam vā niyamena pratiṣṭhitam na bhavatīti nyāyāt kartavyapadam eva adhyāhāryam.

T. Pr., presents the sense of Bhāsya. YATRA is taken to mean vākye mahāvākye vā (with reference to a sentence or a complex sentence). 'Yatpadam vākyam vā vinā' (without a particular word or a sentence) is understood. ANYATRA means arthamtare (for an extra idea). ANAVASARAH means arthamtarasya aghatanā (no room for having an extra idea.) TATRA means vākye mahāvākye vā (with reference to that sentence or complex sentence.) PADAM means tadeva padam vākyam vā (only that word or sentence.) PRATISTHITAM means prāptam (becomes indispensable.) Na anyat means (no other). SATĀM NĪTIḤ means satām nyāyāt (because it is the principle of thought adopted by men of wisdom.) Yatpadam vākyam vā vināpi padāmtareņa vākyāmtarena vā vākye mahāvākye vā (Even without this word or sentence by another word or a different sentence with reference to a sentence or complex sentence) is understood. Sāvakāše means arthāmtare ghaṭanāvati (if the given meaning gives room for another meaning). NA TADBHAVET means tadeva padam vākyam vā niyamena pratisthitam na bhavati (that word or sentence is not necessarily understood). T. Pr., concludes as iti nyāyāt kartavyapadameva adhyāhāryam (as this is the principle of thought only the word kartavyā must be

Bhāṣya makes use of the word satām. This must not be taken to mean an appeal to emotion. Emotion has no place in jījñāsā. The word satām has high intellectual significance. The author of Bhāṣya himself says in the Māndūkya Bhāṣya—

prabhavah sarvabhāvānām viṣnureva nasamsayah ittham satām niscayassyāt anyathātvasatām bhavet.

(Without doubt Vișnu and Vișnu alone is the source of all things that exist. This conviction occurs only to men of wisdom

i.e., it is only they that can understand this truth. The others understand differently i.e., they fail to understand this truth.)

This is the Bhāṣya of the Upaniṣadic statement—

prabhavassarvabhāvānām satāmiti vinišcayaļi sarvam janayati prāṇah cetomišūn puruṣaļi pṛthak.

(The conviction that (Deva) gives rise to all things that exist occurs only to men of wisdom. $Pr\bar{a}na$, the vital principle called purusa produces all. He produces spirits, the entities that have consciousness in a different manner.)

Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha, a commentator following Bhāṣya says harireva sarvabhāvānām cetanācetana-padārthānām prabhavah utpādakah iti niścaya-rūpam jñānam satām eva, asatām tu anyathā iti bhāvah. harih sarvam acetanam svarūpena janayati. cetanān

prthak jadavailaksanyena janayati ity arthah.

(Hari alone without the assistance of anything else is the maker of spirit and matter. This truth can be understood only by the men of wisdom. From this it follows that others fail to understand this. . . . Hari produces all material objects as material objects (without creating spirits as accompanying them). He produces spirits in a manner different from the manner in which He produces material objects. [This difference consists in the fact that He creates them along with body, a

material object.] This is the meaning.)

Some implications of this passage may be noted. The expression harireva brings out the idea that Hari is the whole cause of all. Nothing else is therefore the cause of anything. Nor is there anything or any aspect of anything uncaused. If there were any, then that thing or aspect becomes an aspect of the cause and in that case the expression harireva becomes meaningless. Cetanācetana-padārthānām indicates that in point of production both cetana and acetana are the same. These two are no doubt different from each other. But the fact of production is not thereby modified. The expression niścayarūpam jñānam explains that the understanding of this truth must be well-founded and therefore definite. In this understanding there should be no element of faith, no element of carelessness and no element of any idea of anything that is different from Hari. The expression satāmeva has a great significance. This word satām is commonly taken to mean

good people-good in the ethical sense. But this meaning is irrelevant to the present context. This is the context of knowledge. Satām implies sadbhāva or sādhubhāva. This connotes enduring nature. Correct knowledge is the only thing that endures. It is therefore sat or sādhu and satām means men of wisdom. Jaanam satāmeva gives the idea of occurrence. It is not something made or something achieved by means of effort. It is something spontaneous. This does not mean that it is the nature of knowledge to occur. In understanding the meaning of the word atah of the Sūtra we have seen how knowledge is a case of prasada. It is something divine having its source in Brahman. To modify this position in any sense is the work of a wrong idea or a wrong conviction, conscious or unconscious. It is the idea or conviction that something other than Hari i.e., something that belongs to the world is partly or wholly responsible for the occurrence of this knowledge. This is partly or wholly to deny Hari, as the only cause of all. This explains how wrong knowledge characterizes men of non-wisdom. Those that deny Hari, the cause of all are necessarily determined to be evil, because partly or wholly, consciously or unconsciously having denied Hari they assume doership and independence and consequently they are led to believe that they represent Hari partly or wholly, or consciously or unconsciously. To the corresponding degree they feel identity with Hari. Thus they cease to be devoted to Hari and they become devoted to themselves. They make much of their station in life. They assert their importance, superiority, spirituality and divineliness. To the same extent they have nothing to control them, regulate them and improve them. While a good life turns its face towards future their life turns towards past. They make much of past glory and explain the future in terms of the past. But with good men past does not guarantee future. Past is past. Future has its origin in Hari's prasada. If they are conscious of the past it is in terms of Hari's prasada. Evil is self-destructive and good is self-constructive. Evil has no ideal and good moves towards an ideal. This ideal is completeness itself. Evil is therefore non-enduring and good is all-enduring. Non-enduring is illusion and enduring is knowledge. He to whom knowledge occurs is sat. He to

whom knowledge does not occur is asat. This is the meaning of the expression asatām tu anyathā.

In interpreting this passage the possibility of an error may therefore be avoided. The error is caused by the tendency to formulate the distinction between the good and evil outside Brahma-Mīmāmsā and mechanically to apply it to the present case. In the case of those that have this tendency this erroneous meaning is unavoidable. If the mistake is once committed, the person persists in maintaining it. In support of his thesis he refers to grammar, dictionary, popular usages, the traditions of other Daršanas and so on. He does not care to see that these various branches of learning do not take their birth in the interest of Brahma-Vidvā. They are not therefore governed by Brahma-Mīmāmsā. However noble they may appear to be, their interest is comparatively secular in character. Hence to adjust Brahma-Mīmāmsā to the needs of those branches of learning is indeed to neglect it and finally to deny it. This does not however mean that the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā must develop disrespect to the scientific learning as such. He must have that much of respect to them to grasp the whole truth contained in them. This is no ordinary respect. It is the respect that even an avowed scientist is incapable of conceiving. A scientist may have only that much of respect to his science that consists in a vain attempt to make that science and perhaps only that science to be everything, even at the cost of all other sciences. A respect of this sort is finally the negation of education. Hence the respect shown to it in general is in fact illegitimate and the ideas based on it are all illusions.

But the respect which a student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā has to give a science is profoundly different in character. It consists in appreciating its truth-value and in perceiving how and why it is necessary and to what extent it falls short of truth and how to depend only upon it does not help spiritual discipline. This point may be illustrated by taking for example Grammar. The science of Grammar is called Vyākaraṇa. Its origin is Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Spontaneity in the relation between word and its meaning and complete balance between word and its meaning are the demands made by Brahma-Mīmāmsā. The truth that Veda is apauruseya presupposes spontaneity in the relation between

word and its meaning. To find out the only meaning of Veda and calling it Brahman presupposes a conscious recognition that there is complete balance between word and its meaning. A word is complete without any attribute and the meaning is complete without any modification. The truth of these ideas is never modified throughout Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Grammar makes use of these ideas. But their empirical import is made much of. Word-meaning-relation is reduced to Svabhāva-vāda of the type of Cārvāka and the balance of the word and its meaning to human measurement and its relative character. Grammar thus originated grows purely according to empirical demands. Further the aim of Grammar is purity of popular usage. The aim of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is Brahman. How can the two go together? Yet owing to the sameness of the background they appear to thave an affinity. An erroneous tendency takes advantage of this circumstance and tries to adjust Brahma-Vidyā to popular usages. This accounts for the ready popularity of erroneous views.

II

On the basis of these wrong ideas some traditional views are developed. "kāṇādam pāṇinīyam ca sarva-sāstropakārakam (The sciences expounded by Kanāda and Pāṇini i.e. Vaišeṣika and Vyākaraņa respectively help the study of all śāstras.)" is one of such traditions. It is obvious how it is misleading. If Pāṇini is studied and on that basis Sāstra is to be interpreted, then Sastra is lost, because the student fails to understand the significance of the attempt to find out Brahman as the meaning of every aspect of Veda. Even though he seems to understand it he never attaches primary value to it. He rather takes Pāṇini to be primary and Bādarāyana to be secondary in importance. The reason is that Pānini is readily appreciated and Bādarāyaṇa is abstract as he supports no secular interest. The study of Kanāda suffers from another difficulty. He gives six ultimate categories of reality. The student who has already studied it feels a difficulty in bringing this ultimate world under the complete direction of Brahman. Even though he seems to do it he does not do it without mental reservations. Following Kanada he holds that an effect has several causes and Brahman is one among them. So the study of these sciences does more harm than good. In some cases the misleading nature of these sciences may go to such an extent as to replace the very content of Sāstra. But to remove this difficulty, to disregard them is to miss particular Pūrvapakṣa to Sāstra and thereby miss to measure and determine the real strength of Sāstra consisting in successfully meeting that Pūrvapakṣa. All this consideration is to remind the student of the independent character of Sāstra and ask him to interpret every circumstance in Sāstra consistently with the truth of Brahman, the Allgoverning principle.

The exposition of *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* is therefore independent of other sciences however important they may be in their own spheres. To see this distinction clearly is to put an end to the tendency to subject *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* to other sciences.

Supposing that the meaning governed by this tendency is accepted what happens? The answer is evident. This meaning presupposes that a person is good or evil irrespective of his capacity to understand the significance of Sāstra. But the capacity to understand Sastra constitutes the ethical excellence of the person. Ethical excellence is impossible in any other manner. Each virtue must be the direct outcome of knowledge. Otherwise it is only a semblance, an imitation. No spirituality forms its basis. It is therefore non-enduring and is easily replacable if only the question of advantage appears. What is the status of the man before the occurrence of knowledge? It must be something akin to the ethical excellence he may have after obtaining knowledge. It is the disposition conducive to knowledge. In the language of Bhāsya it is adhikāra which is at the same time manigala. It is the persons that have this disposition and so on that are signified as satām. Others are naturally of different dispositions. They are therefore signified as asatām.

While the intellectual activities of the persons belonging to the former class are prompted by vairāgya and viṣnubhakti those of the persons belonging to the latter class are prompted by the absence of vairāgya and viṣnubhakti. The people of the former class find naturally no satisfaction in empirical sciences and they soon catch hold of Sāstra. The others even though they are somehow made to study Sāstra they give empirical meaning to it and run their activities in opposite

direction. The Bhagavadgītā says on the basis of these ideas that there are two types of creation—daiva and āsura, dvau bhūtasargau lokesmin daiva āsura eva ca. So the student of Sāstra is expected to be completely vigilant so that he is not

led by the thoughts of asura nature.

The Māmdūkya and its Bhāṣya have a definite purpose in bringing in the ideas jñāna and sadbhāva together. To separate them is the cause of all wrong thinking. Sadbhāva separated. from jñāna is blind and jñāna that is not identical with sadbhāva is empty. Both lose their content and significance. Jñāna abstracted from sadbhāva loses its indispensability. Sadbhāva abstracted from jñāna ends in asadbhāva. Further jñāna and sadbhāva must not be taken to form component parts of a whole. To take them so is to uphold the same abstraction. For the whole is neither jñāna nor sadbhāva and these two as component parts are different from each other. What is therefore meant by the expression jñānam satāmeva is that jñāna and sadbhāva form an identity. In this identity jñāna does not suffer in its nature, rather sadbhāva becomes intellectual in character. Understood thus sadbhāva becomes both the origin as well as the development of knowledge. To make use of modern language ethics and religion in their purely technical sense are only the extension of philosophy. In their usual sense they are opposed to philosophy and they are therefore falsified by philosophy. Ethics is usually taken to mean the science of conduct and religion a case of faith. In these senses they are opposed to philosophy. Hence they have a chance of developing independently of philosophy. Even though philosophy is made their basis they develop independently and the duality between the two is not removed.

Modern thought cannot get rid of this difficulty. In its origin it is out and out empirical. Whether it is idealism or realism, empiricism or rationalism modern thought has its origin in pratyakṣa and anumāna arising from it. Pratyakṣa as defined by Brahma-Mīmāmsā comprises the knowledge caused by the external sense-organs, manas and sākṣī, the witnessing principle in the knower. Anumāna arising from this knowledge is naturally confined to the sphere of this knowledge. Beyond this modern thought has no source. In this circumstance if internally thought demands certain things that go in the name

of philosophy the external life demands certain behaviours in the name of ethics or religion. In most cases each is opposed to the other, but only in certain cases they seem to be reconciled. But they are only reconciled and the duality between the two is never removed. In this circumstance however unified they may be made to appear, in reality philosophy is philosophy, ethics is ethics and religion is religion. Each is independent of the other, as each would have been possible without the others. To imagine certain truth no ethics or religion is required and to imagine certain rules of conduct or to entertain certain faith requires no philosophy. This is so far as the origin of these imaginations are concerned. After imagining them one may justify them by the semblance of philosophy. In any case they are independent of one another.

III

But the case of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is quite different. It recognises nothing empirical. Pratyakṣa and anumāna have no significance in it. But it does not negate them. It studies them fully and shows their utter helplessness with regard to truth beyond the scope of experience. For this reason its study of these two pramānas is fully exhaustive. This is a study of which modern thought is incapable. Modern thought being purely of empirical character has its origin in these two pramāṇas. It is therefore unable to see the limitation of these pramānas. The idea is this. The two pramānas are just confined to themselves. They have nothing in them to transcend themselves. No other pramāņa is accepted to see their defects. Even Kant's conception of Nouminon is a variety of empirical' philosophy. For it is only something suggested by the empirical analysis of the phenomenon. There is no separate pramāņa to prove that the Numinon is transcendent, alaukika. The use of the idea or the word does not mean the attainment of transcendent pramāņa. Similarly Bradley's Absolute is as empirical as his conception of self-contradiction. Self-contradiction does not necessarily take us to the truth of the Absolute. It may mean the failure of correct observation. Owing to this failure complete harmony in Nature might have escaped from the notice of the philosopher. Even granting the truth of all the ground-work of Bradley there is no non-empirical pramāna to prove the non-empirical Absolute. Similar is the consideration with regard to all philosophies that talk of transcendent truth. In all these philosophies the word transcendent is an empty word with nothing to justify it. In the light of all these ideas it may be concluded that modern thought is incapable of conceiving the truth that is at the same time philosophy, ethics and religion. Without this, peace of spiritual character is an impossibility.

The same defect may be found with reference to particular philosophies of India. Take the case of Buddhism and Jainism. There is absolutely no room made for transcendent knowledge in these systems of thought. In Buddhism there is complete disregard to philosophy and yet there is every talk of ethical perfection. Jaina philosophy is purely empirical. Even its conception of kevala-jääna is only an extension of empirical

knowledge. There is nothing transcendent in it.

Among the Astika Daršanas Nyāya Vaišesika Sāmkhya and Yoga by their respective conceptions, padartha-jñāna (knowledge of the categories of reality) and prakṛti-puruṣa-viveka (discrimination between prakrti and purusa) deny the exclusive importance of Veda though they recognise it as pramāna. Hence their talk of transcendent ideas are unfounded. Pūrvamīmāmsā seems to give all importance to Sruti. With great ability it proves that other pramanas are incapable of apprehending things that lie beyond sense-perception. But quite in contradiction it holds that the apprehension of the general features of such things is caused by anumana which is characterised as samanyatodṛṣṭānumāna. Further without a serious attempt at finding out the real meaning of Veda the popular idea that one reaps the fruit of one's doing is made in it the main theme of Veda and it is called karma or dharma. Thus the whole position comes to have only an empirical importance.

Even the Vedānta schools, Advaita and Višistādvaita fail to do justice to the purely transcendent character of truth. In Advaita Caitanya is the one truth. No doubt it is said to be transcendent. But it is also asserted that it is something conceivable through a careful analysis of the three states—waking, dream and dreamless sleep. It is something that can be proved by showing contradiction with reference to all things experienced in various manners. The things that

are objective, non-spiritual and limited in different ways are unreal. From this it follows that the real is just that which is not unreal. The real is Caitanya. In the light of these ideas it is easy to see that there is nothing transcendent in Caitanya, because it is something determined empirically. Having conceived it in this manner there is next the attempt at finding some Sruti to support it. To do this four statements of Śruti-aham brahmāsmi, tattvamasi and so on are employed. Though their apparent meaning is identity, identity is somehow reduced to caitanya, caitanya is presented as the only theme of Sruti and to do this these statements are considered to be valid against the rest of Veda. Against all this the point that a student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā must bear in mind is this. Veda is apauruseya. If it is not so it need not be taken seriously, because in that case it must be dependent upon somebody's pratyaksa. If Veda is apauruseya then it is valid as a whole. Some portion of it being valid and some other portion invalid make Veda inconceivable and a contradiction in terms. Even this distinction is nothing but empirical. It has become necessary just to satisfy some empirical requirement. In the course of Sruti teaching some statements are no doubt characterised as mahāvākyas. But this must not be taken to mean negation of Sruti itself. It ought to support Sruti at least in its own interest. So mahāvākyas of Sruti are entirely different from the mahāvākyas of Advaita-Vedāmta. The former establish Śruti and the latter negate Sruti.

The contribution of Visiṣṭādvaita-Vedāmta towards Veda is still worse. Its conception of Ubhaya-Vedāmta consisting of Veda and non-Veda on equal grounds is an outspoken denial of the importance of Veda. Further its division of Veda into karma-kāmḍa and jñāna-kāmḍa and attempt at reconciling the two are unwarranted. All this points to the empirical interest

of the system.

The foregoing ideas present an aspect of the spirit of Madhva's criticism against the systems of thought other than Brahma-Mīmāmsā. His one point is that the Transcendent and non-transcendent must never be confused. This means that the respective pramānas must never be confounded. From this it follows that Śruti and non-Śruti must ever be kept distinct in mind. Any modification in this direction means

confusion. For this reason the rigour of Madhva's logic knows no limit. Whatever be the fate of the accepted ideas of truth Madhva with wholesale devotion to truth works out the problem and attains to the Vedic truth. This is the only content of his Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

Madhva is, so far, somehow not known properly to the modern students of Indian philosophy. One at least of the reasons seems to be the ever-persisting empirical interest of modern outlook which makes it unable to appreciate the non-empirical reasoning embodying Veda. Consciously or unconsciously owing to this defect exclusive interest in particular philosophies mostly in that of Samkara is persistently developed even at the cost of the possibility of evaluating what is taken to have been understood from the Vedic thought as expounded by Madhva.

Instead of understanding Madhva, there are on the other-hand baseless observations and assertions by most of modern writers all tending to show inherent defects in the very setting of his thought. The words he uses are misinterpreted. His doctrines are laughed at. Ideas that are never his and that are entirely opposed to his philosophy and the very ideas that are explicitly condemned by him in clear language are superimposed on him. He stands condemned in many quarters for the exposition of these very ideas that are superimposed on him. This way of looking at things has also become a tradition-

The influence of this tradition has become so great that some in the name of Madhva have really believed in it and have made serious attempts to meet any opposition against it. Their enthusiasm has gone so far as to make them believe that Madhva is no more than what they or his opponents take him to be. This belief has become so firm that they refuse even to suppose the possibility of understanding Madhva in a different light. To add to this confusion a peculiar circumstance has also arisen among some followers of Madhva. While Advaita and Visistadvaita have somehow remained unattained by popular mind, Madhva at the cost of himself has been made unnecessarily popular. His thought and language are Vedic. This is particularly ignored. It is ignored to such an extent that particular followers of Madhva really think that to associate Madhva with Veda is to pollute him, because as they think

Veda supports Advaita. In these quarters Vedic karmas are no doubt observed but without the use of the Vedic hymns. By the adverse critics of Madhva these circumstances are fully made use of. Madhva is attacked by them on these grounds. The followers of Madhva sincerely think that it is their duty to defend their master against these attacks. The best defence according to them is to uphold the ideas which are superimposed on him and for which he is rightly criticised. Madhva's theme is forgotten. Useless controversy has occupied the whole attention. The number of the students of Madhva's thought is dwindling. The students study Madhva with the definite conviction that such and such a thing is the truth he taught. Thus even before study they know the entire content of study. have no doubt about it. In case doubt occurs Madhva should not be referred to, because the conviction of the student may be disturbed. There are ready popular ideas in vernacular languages, mostly in Kannada and they decide everything. In this direction the persons called Haridasas have done much service, it is believed. They are supposed to have reduced the very essence of Madhva to popular songs and so on. They have even called these songs veda and their meaning vedārtha. In the presence of them Madhva is practically dispensed with. In some capacity or other if a student happens to go through Madhva's works and finds that some popular idea is opposed to Madhva then it is almost invariably Madhva that has to suffer but not the popular idea. If it is not possible to interpret Madhva's idea conveniently, its importance in his thought is said to be secondary, amukhya. This is how the spirit of theological controversy is ever kept green. Whatever be the value of these circumstances, a genuine student of Madhva needs to be careful that he is not prejudiced by them. The justification of the present volume lies also in this direction.

I

Madhva's one position is that the whole Veda is the one pramāna with regard to the highest Truth. He never makes distinction between Veda and Veda. Every detail of Vedic literature is equally important as the rest of the Veda for him. A syllable, a word of Veda is as much Veda as the

whole Veda. By Veda certain passages may be called mahāvākyas. Madhva does not take this to mean that the rest of Veda is useless. Nor is it correct to take it in this light. It naturally means an emphasis on certain conclusion arrived at. This conclusion must not be evaluated independently of the rest of Veda. This is what Samkara has not done. Because of this circumstance he had to conclude that the rest of Veda is invalid and to maintain this position all sorts of ideas had to be imagined. Samkara's is no ordinary mind. If he takes up a position he certainly sees that men in general are easily convinced. But is he correct? is the question. An emphatic 'No' is the answer. If such expression is interpreted in the light of Veda whatever conclusion may be attained to no part of Veda can be dispensed with as invalid. Thus Madhva sees that the whole Veda is valid.

Owing to this reason Madhva is called by some a hopeless theologian. His philosophic acumen is seriously questioned. To study him is supposed to remove what little philosophy a student may possess. While on the other hand Samkara's rejection of Veda at least in part is made much of His rejection of Veda in some part is attributed to his philosophical insight. A student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is expected to free himself

from such misleading ideas.

Is Madhva a theologian? Let us have a correct idea of the term theologian before applying this term to Madhva. A theologian is he whose thought is led by authority. According to this definition Samkara is equally a theologian, because the mahāvākyas form the main source of the formulation of his thought. Akhamda-sākṣātkāra, the immediate apprehension of Brahman which is akhamda is a case of śabda-pratyakṣa, the pratyakṣa knowledge caused by verbal testimony called mahāvākyas. The rejection of the other portion of Veda is his own creation to support his own ideas of truth. Further on the basis of the fact that his position is his own creation if one explains that he is not a theologian, then he ceases to be a Vedāntin as he develops his thought independently of Veda.

But the case of Madhya is totally different. For him Veda is never an authority. Nor is it a revelation. It is the highest pramāņa, the one source of correct knowledge. His commen-

tator Jayatīrtha expounds his position as nahīdam āgamatayā pramāṇam. tarhi nyāya-sūtratva-hāniḥ. (The statements that Madhva interprets are indeed not the source of knowledge in the capacity of being an authority. If they are not so then they cease to be the language of reason.) This is stated with reference to the Brahma-Sūtras. But what applies to the Brahma-Sūtras applies to Veda as well. For Madhva Veda is not the statement of conclusion, but it is the statement of reason, non-empirical in character. Hence the question of theology is irrelevant to Madhva.

Authority or revelation is not what is called sabda-pramāņa in the apauruseya sense. In the concept of sabda-pramāņa in this sense there is a clear recognition that without this sabda the meaning it gives is never known even in part. This meaning or an aspect of it becomes known only after sabda is known. Sabda in this sense is thus the proximate cause of the knowledge of the meaning in question. It is a pramāṇa. It is no less indispensable than the eye for example, with regard to the knowledge of colour. Before one has eye to see, one cannot have any idea of colour. Even though others may make statements about colour the person who has no eye and who never had eye is not in a position to make out anything by those statements. These are the things implied by the recognition of the fact that the eye is pramāṇa with regard to the knowledge of colour. Just in the same manner sabda in the apauruseya sense is pramāṇa with regard to the knowledge of the reality that lies beyond sense-perception.

Revelation and authority are not pramāṇa. They give certain information. No body denies them. What is the nature of the information they give? It is not the information of the entirely unknown things. It is the information of those things that are already known in some form or other. Supposing that they deal with unknown things, unknown in the sense that the things are never conceived, the so-called revelation or authority becomes quite unintelligible and it ceases to be revelation or authority. If a believer in revelation says that he has revelation with regard to the nature of God, then what in the light of the foregoing ideas we have to understand is that that person is making himself believe that that he has already in mind i.e., what he has already imagined in his mind is

given by revelation. If the circumstance in which he is made to believe in this manner is removed, then also he has the same ideas in his mind. He may then say that these ideas are only the result of his imagination or of his thinking. The socalled revelation is at best the skill of a person living in a society of those that readily respond to that skill. The same is the story with all of those people who call themselves bhaktas, aparokṣa-jñānins, devotees or realisers of God independently of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. They imagine something and give it names. If they are to support them there is ready wit to imagine extraordinary, abnormal or supernormal things. If all this is ever possible, if revelation is a fact and God is an object of perception, then there ought to be no doubt in any circumstance with regard to the validity of the revelation and the reality of God. Instead of removing doubt they in fact cause doubt. There is nothing in revelation to justify its validity. The person to whom it is attributed may be great. But what has his greatness anything to do with the validity of the statement called revelation? He may not speak deliberate lie; but the possibility of ignorance and delusion cannot be removed. Further one may believe, sincerely too, that one has the perception of God. But how can that one guarantee the validity of one's perception? In fact the man who has revelation and the man who has perception themselves may at some time or other have doubt and they have nothing to remove it.

The case of Veda is different. It is apauruseya. It is sabda, dhvanyātmaka and varnātmaka, inarticulate and articulate. It is a case of pure sabda-sakti, the power of sabda that causes knowledge of things. It is not vitiated by any authorship, human or divine. It is the very presupposition of every verbal activity. Unless there is conscious or unconscious recognition of the power of sabda there can be no attempt at fixing the meaning of sabda in any manner. Veda is thus the expression of sabda-sakti in its fulness. Not to have been able to recognise it is not its fault. It is rather the fault of the philosopher in question. The fact that it is the presupposition of all verbal activities must be carefully interpreted. It is not a revelation. It is the very presupposition of revelation. Without it no revelation could have ever taken place. Every person who thinks that truth is revealed to him may

have no idea of Veda. But he somehow makes use of the ideas that are directly or indirectly handed down by Veda. He has the belief in śabda-śakti. But he does not practise it and attaches his own meaning to sabda. To do this he has already the idea of the thing he wants to understand from the revelation he has. We may take for example the idea of God and the revelation connected with this concept. Only the person who has the idea of God can have the revelation of the matter connected with God. Otherwise even supposing that he has that revelation how can he recognise that it is that particular revelation? If he can recognise it then what is the source of his idea of God? If there is a source and there is the idea, then where is the need for a revelation? The source of the idea of God must be at some stage or other apauruseya i.e., Veda. All these ideas will be amply discussed and substantiated in the course of Brahma-Mīmāmsā under Devatādhikaraņa and Navilaksanatvādhikarana and so on.

V

In conclusion of the discussion it may be noted that it is those persons that have the knowledge of all these ideas that Madhva signifies as satām. He brings in all these ideas under the expression viniscaya. He does not use some word that stands for knowledge in general. His selection of this word has a great significance. Srīnivāsa Tīrtha means by it niścaya-rūpam jñānam. Niścaya-rūpam qualifying jñānam indicates that knowledge must have satisfied all the tests of validity and attained the status of indispensability. Indispensability implies completeness of knowledge. Completeness of knowledge consists of conscious rejection of non-knowledge with its positive effect illusion and of conscious recognition of correct knowledge with its comprehensiveness. The knowdedge of this character is what is meant by niścaya-rūpam jñānam. In recognition of all these ideas this knowledge may even be called conviction. The conviction of this sort is not common to all knowers even supposing that they know things correctly. For they only know things in so far as they can. Their capacity is limited. Their knowledge is incomplete. It has not reached the ideal. Ideal knowledge is complete knowledge. In later

discussions of Bhāṣya Madhva points out that the possessor of this knowledge is Brahmā, the ideal knower. Following this teaching Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha means by satām brahmādi-devānām, the divinities Brahmā and so on. It may also be noted in this connection that Madhva's works other than his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya must be interpreted in terms of Bhāṣya. Independently of this method of interpretation he cannot be understood

as is evidenced by the present discussion.

Srīnivāsa Tīrtha illustrates further that Hari's production of the world with reference to every item of things has one meaning only. The meaning of production does not differ from thing to thing. He explains how there is the creation of cetana just in the same sense as the creation of acetana. In both the cases creation is wholesale. If a material thing is produced then there is the production of all the aspects and the items of the thing. He shows how the common idea that when a thing is produced there is something that has endured all along and that is going to survive the destruction of the thing is erroneous. A detailed examination of these ideas is conducted by Madhva under Janmādhikarana. Madhva's position is definitely that production is wholesale. Having understood this truth Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha applies it to the case of cetana also.

Prior to Madhva with reference to the production of cetana the ideas handed down by several Darianas are:
(i) There is no cetana apart from acetana: (ii) The so-called cetana is only a name given to certain psychic factors in their collocation, samphāta: (iii) An organism consists of cetana and acetana; while cetana endures acetana undergoes constant change including birth and death: and (iv) With reference to the same organism while even cetana in its empirical sense perishes

the basis, adhişthana called caitanya endures.

Srinivāsa Tīrtha shows that Madhva's view is totally different from all these positions. Madhva holds that the whole organism is as much a product as acetana is. There is nothing in an organism that is not produced. Nothing has endured in it and nothing is going to endure.

Madhva's criticism against the other positions is the

following:

of cetana? How can acetana enable the idea of cetana?

Cetana is consciousness. To attribute it to body, the physical aspect of the organism does not solve the problem. It gives rise to fresh difficulties. How can the physical have the non-physical attribute? Even to suppose that it has is unconsciously to distinguish between the physical and the non-physical. It is not to reduce the latter to the former.

(ii) Cetana may be a name given to the collocation of several psychic elements. But the psychic is not the physical. Unless there is a unifying force there cannot be the collocation. That force is the psychic of the psychic and it is cetana.

(iii) If cetana is supposed to endure how is it made to endure is the question. That process itself is its production.

(iv) To confine cetana to the empirical is unwarranted. The so-called adhisthāna itself may be conveniently called cetana. If it is not cetana then how can it be the basis of the empirical? So the empirical may be denied. But cetana cannot be denied. Then how has this cetana become the basis of the empirical? This process itself is the explanation of the production of cetana.

So in any case cetana cannot be denied and it cannot be maintained to be productionless. In an organism the production of the body can be observed. But even as cetana is inferred its production is inferred. The proof of production

is the production of the body.

Having established this idea Madhva distinguishes between the production of the physical body and the production of cetana. The production of the physical is not through the production of cetana. It takes place independently of the latter. But cetana is not produced by itself. It is produced through the production of the body, dehadvārā. To understand by this expression only the birth of the body is wrong, because the verb janayati has cetana as its object but not the body. This is the position that Srīnivāsa Tīrtha expounds in his commentary. The whole idea is that production in all cases is wholesale.

Complete knowledge, however, presupposes a full recognition of all these ideas in all their details. To do justice to it Srīnivāsa Tīrtha means by satām the divinities Brahmā and so on. They are characterised in this passage as those that have the definite knowledge that Iśvara is the very source of the reality of all things that exist. This is the position developed

van the Māmdūkya-Bhāṣya. The source of this Bhāṣya is Brahma-Mīmāmsā itself. In this work the divinities are characterised as uttamāadhikārins. In a previous passage of this work Brahmā is addressed as sattama. On this basis Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha understands by satām brahmādi-devānām, the divinities Brahmāand so on. All this consideration signifies the correct manner of interpreting Madhva as well as the practice of those that understood Madhva.

In the light of these ideas the translation of the passage of T.Pr., under consideration is:

"with reference to a sentence or a complex sentence, if without a word or a sentence there is no occasion to understand an extra idea, then with reference to the same sentence or complex sentence only that word or sentence comes to have its place. This is the method of interpretation of Brahmā and so on."

T.Pr., presents the sense of the rest of Bhāṣya. The translation of this passage is "even though the word or sentence referred to in the previous passage is excluded and if by a different word or sentence with reference to a sentence or complex sentence room is made for an extra idea which is not indispensable then only that word or sentence does not necessarily have its place." T.Pr., concludes the discussion as "Because of this rule only the word Kartavyā, 'is indispensable', ought to be understood."

As it is already explained with reference to understanding the word kartavyā it must be noted that this word is understood so as to make it a part of the Sūtra, not because it is demanded by the method of interpretation practised by Brahmā and so on, but because it is demanded in answer to the necessity created by the disposition of the Sūtra itself. The Sūtra is athāto brahma-jijāāsā. (Then therefore Enquiry into Brahman.) Obviously this is not a proposition, because it is not in the form of a sentence. It does not therefore give a complete sense and for this reason it is unintelligible. To make it a sentence either kartavyā or akartavyā must be understood. With kartavyā the whole Sūtra is athāto brahma-jijāāsā kartavyā. (Then therefore enquiry into Brahman is indispensable). This whole meaning is called arthāmtara by T.Pr. Evidently this meaning cannot

be had without understanding kartavyā. The word kartavyā therefore becomes pratisthitam or prāptam i.e., a part of the Sūtra as a sentence.

But if the word akartavyā is understood the sentence of the Sūtra becomes athāto brahma-jijāāsā akartavyā. (Then therefore enquiry into Brahman is not indispensable). This whole meaning is now arthāmtara, extra meaning. But this meaning unlike the former meaning is sāvakāša, not absolute. It gives room for its opposite. It is therefore not intelligible. T.Pr., presents the reason for this non-intelligibility as:

na kartavyetyädeh adhikārakathanādinā ayogāditi bhāvah.

(For na kartavyā and so on, as there is the statement of fittedness, adhikāra and so on, there is no place viz. there is no room for understanding na kartavyā as it is not relevant to the statement of adhikāra etc. This is the intention of the author.)

The idea is this. The word atha of the Sūtra says adhikāra. Atah presents the desire of Nārāyaṇa as the cause of jijñāsā. These and similar circumstances that are stated so far and that will be stated hereafter give no room for understanding akartavyā. For this reason the meaning obtained by understanding words like na kartavyā is sāvakāśa. This word gives room for its opposite. Therefore na kartavyā is not prāpta. It cannot be understood. This shows how kartavyā alone stands to be understood, because in spirit it is a genuine part of the statement of Sūtra. This explains the self-established character of Sūtra i.e. of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XV

METHOD OF EXPOUNDING BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

I

The following points may be noted in connection with understanding the relation between Sūtra and the method of interpretation presented by Bhāṣyakāra. Consistently with the truth that Sūtra is nirnāyaka of all ideas and the fact suggested by Bhāṣya 'jñānam samsthāpya bhagavān' (Bhagavān having fixed knowledge) we must understand that this Sūtra requiring only the understanding of kartavyā becomes the origin of the very disposition of intellect. It is this disposition that is called the principle, nyāya of thought. This fact implies that the understanding of a word as forming a part of Sūtra is not governed by will, but is indeed governed by intellectual necessity. In the present connection apart from understanding kartavyā no other understanding can make the position intelligible. The words such as atha meaning adhikāra are the indication of this truth. Though in the process of our reasoning we start with the idea given by atha and so on, and on its basis determine that only the word kartavyā can be understood, in the actual process of the facts as they take place the understanding of kartavyā is the origin of the ideas presented by atha and so on. So understanding of kartavyā has ontological priority to all other circumstances. The same circumstance explains how the same understanding required by Sūtra is the origin of satām nyāya or nīti, the way of thinking of the men of wisdom. So from the point of view of the final stage of interpretation it is not that because of nīti that the understanding of the word kartavyā takes place but because of this understanding that there is nīti, the method of interpretation. This circumstance illustrates how Sūtra is nirnāyaka in an unmodified sense. By quoting this nīti Bhāsyakāra intends to show how every principle of thought has its origin in Sūtra. T. Pr., brings out this intention by adhikārakathana, stating the reason for this understanding and thereby

indicates that the order of facts is quite the reverse. To illustrate this point the inference of fire from smoke may be taken. The order of fire and smoke as facts is just the reverse from how they enter into the body of inference. By means of similar considerations with reference to every quotation from Bhāṣya-kāra the distinction between nirneya and nirnāyaka must be clearly understood.

Bhāṣyakāra understands the following idea between the two words of Sūtra, atha and atah

BHĀṢYA—YATO NĀRĀYAŅA-PRASĀDAMŖTE NA MOKṢAḤ

(Because there is no release unless there is the grace of Nārāyaṇa)

In order to justify this understanding he said:

BHĀṢYA—TAMEVAM VIDVĀN AMŖTA IHA BHAVATI NĀNYAḤ PAMTHĀ AYANĀYA VIDYATE.

(One who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal. For the realization of this result there is no other way.)

This passage is taken from Purusa-Sūkta. The apparent meaning of this passage is that from knowledge there is moksa. This idea does not stand by itself. For knowledge is an attribute of adhikārin. Giving mokṣa is an attribute of Nārāyaṇa. Therefore the two, knowledge and mokṣa have not the same location. For this reason to hold that knowledge causes moksa is not possible. Further another Sruti says 'ajñānām jñānado visnuh jñāninām moksadasca sah' (Visnu is He who gives knowledge to those that are devoid of knowledge and moksa to those that have knowledge). This Sruti also gives apparently an incomplete meaning. There is, further, difference in the implications of the two *Strutis*. The former text tamevam etc., apparently means that knowledge causes moksa. The latter text apparently means that Visnu gives moksa to one who has knowledge. How knowledge is related to moksa is not explained by both the texts. Hence they are in need of the application of Sūtra which is nirnāyaka. The idea that is nirnāyaka is presented by atah meaning by means of prasāda'. The understanding of 'nārāyana-prasādamīte' by Bhāsyakāra only makes the idea presented by atah complete. Applying then the meaning of atah to the former Sruti, tamevam etc., we get the whole meaning of the passage.

Similar is the consideration with regard to the latter passage. This passage is remembered in this connection just to show how the meaning of the former passage is modified by the latter and thereby to illustrate how it is in need of application of nirnāyaka. With these ideas T.Pr., says—

"atra jäänänmokso näma ananyathopapatyä prasädädevokto bhavati"

(with reference to this passage the statement that 'from knowledge mokṣa is caused,' as it cannot be justified otherwise results in stating that mokṣa is caused only by prasāda, Grace.)

The apparent statement of *Śruti* is jūānānmokṣa (From jūāna follows mokṣa). But with the application of nirṇāyaka namely the meaning of ataḥ, *Śruti* is actually taken to state prasādānmokṣa (from prasāda follows mokṣa).

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A note on the method of this interpretation illustrates how Sruti by itself is not taken to produce any knowledge. In fact it is shown throughout the discussion that Sruti left to itself is unintelligible. One who believes in the apparent meaning of Sruti has not really understood anything. Merely on the strength of words that form the parts of *Sruti* one imagines some idea as being presented by *Sruti*. As this idea cannot be justified, it does not enter into the system of thought. Taking for example the apparent idea obtained by the present passage that from knowledge moksa follows, one is really unable to put the two together and this inability sublates the idea that 'from knowledge moksa follows.' This circumstance illustrates how Śruti with its apparent meaning does not operate as pramāņa on one's mind. Sruti becomes pramāņa only when nyāya, principle presented by Sūtra is applied to it. In the present case this nyāya is that which is presented by atah. only from prasāda mokṣa follows is this nyāya. Applying this to Sruti we get the idea that moksa results from prasada.

What is then the status of jñāna presented as the cause of mokṣa by Śruti? The answer is that knowledge does not cease to be the background of mokṣa. But it is not the cause proper.

Further it is the background in the sense that it is only an indication of prasada and prasada is the immediate cause of moksa. The fact that it is an indication is also the result of prasada. This is the idea that results from the application of nyāya presented by atah to "sa hi sarva-mano-vrtti-prerakah samudāhrtah." (It is indeed His grace that is the cause of every mental state as such). All these considerations imply that the whole background throughout its process is at every stage the result of prāsāda. Corresponding to prasāda there are states. As prasāda of Nārāyaņa becomes more and more explicit the adhikārin enjoys higher and higher stage of discipline and finally he attains to moksa as the result of the whole discipline. Sruti states from the point of view of adhikārin what he enjoys leads to mokṣa. But in truth what he enjoys is the language of prasada of Narayana. Thisis the truth presented by Sūtra. Applying this to Sruti Bhāsyakāra shows how Śruti really states that from prasāda adhikārin obtains mokṣa. The propriety of all these considerations is justified by the statement of T.Pr., tatra jñānān-moksonāma etc. These circumstances powerfully illustrate how Bhāṣyakāra's position is profoundly philosophical.

Bh. D., presents the further justification of the same idea

by way of commenting on T. Pr., as-

ananyathopapatyā ananyathā prasādātyāgena jñānasya mokṣa-janakatvopapatyā ityarthah. ato yathārtha-bandhasya vinā viṣnu-prasādatah anivrtteh tadartham hi jijñāsātra vidhīyate iti anubhāṣyoktarītyā anādi-satya-bamdha-nivrtti-rūpāmṛtatvākhya-mokṣasya prasādam vinā jñāna-mātrena alabhyatvāt prasādadvāraiva jñānasya mokṣa-jananopapatyetyarthah. yadvā tam vidvān evacāmṛta ityanubhāṣya-vyākhyāvasare sudhāyām yadyapi tamevamiti parama-puruṣa-prasādo na śrūyate tathāpi yamevaiṣa iti vākyānurodhena tatrāpyanusamdheyam. nimittena naimitti kopalakṣaṇāt, mumukṣu-sambamdhi-sādhanāvadhāraṇāya na sākṣāduktih ityuktadišā ananyathopapatyā ityarthah.

(The meaning of ananyathopapatyā is this:—Ananyathā means prasādātyāgena (without ignoring prasāda.) upapatyā means jñānasya mokṣa-janakatvopapatyā (as it is reasonable to hold that jñāna is the cause of mokṣa.) As it is said in Anu. V. "Therefore without the grace of Viṣṇu as there is no destruction.

of bondage which is real, in order to destroy it, enquiry in this Sūtra is enjoined," mokṣa which is the same as immortality the content of which is the destruction of beginningless and real bondage cannot be obtained without Prasada, by mere jñāna. Therefore only through prasāda jñāna gives rise to moksa, as this alone is reasonable to hold. This is the meaning of the passage [from T.Pr.] Further in N.S. in connection with commenting on Anu. V., that 'Only that person who knows Him is immortal' it is said—by Sruti, tamevan the grace of the supreme purusa is not stated. Yet in the light of another Sruti, yamevaisa (Whom alone he) the grace must be understood with reference to the meaning of Sruti in question also. For, the idea of nimitta, indicating element, jñāna in the present case leads to the idea of naimittika, that which is indicated, prasada in the present case. In order to fix the discipline that can be attributed to the person who is in need of moksa Sruti did not make a direct statement of the idea of prasāda. The meaning of the word ananyathopapatyā is thus in the direction defined so far.)

III

In understanding these ideas it is obvious how the principle, nyāya presented by means of atah meaning from the Grace of Nārāyana is leading the whole thought presented by Sruti. A note on this fact gives us the idea that nyāya presented by Sūtra is not something imposed on Sruti but it is indeed the principle of thought that leads Sruti-thought. To one who has no knowledge of nyāya, principle, Sruti is naturally unintelligible. Though by mere force of words some meaning is obtained, it is evidently not the meaning of Sruti. For this reason mere Sruti is nirneya. Sūtra bringing to light the principle of thought leading the meaning of Sruti-text is nirnāyaka. Bhāsyakāra after studying the principle presented by Sūtra applies it to several texts of Śruti to which the principle in question must be applied. After the application of this principle the Sruti-text operates as pramāņa i.e. it gives rise to the knowledge intended by it. It is Sruti as a rule qualified by this circumstance i.e. as meaning only that thing which is justified by Sūtra that Bhāṣyakāra gives as pramāṇa with reference to the knowledge in question. To present Sruti only in

this special circumstance is obviously to present $S\bar{u}tra$ itself as $pram\bar{a}na$. In fact it is the point at which Sruti and $S\bar{u}tra$ become one and the same. If once this point is appreciated, then to state that Sruti is $pram\bar{a}na$ does not disregard $S\bar{u}tra$ and to state that $S\bar{u}tra$ is $pram\bar{a}na$ does not ignore Sruti. One is the statement of the other. If in this circumstance $S\bar{u}tra$ is taken to be the highest $pram\bar{a}na$ it is indeed to take Sruti as the highest $pram\bar{a}na$. Brahma-Mīmāmsā is thus the expression of the complete harmony between Sruti and $S\bar{u}tra$ and it is therefore characterised by $Bh\bar{a}syak\bar{a}ra$ as $para-vidy\bar{a}$, the Science of Sciences. Unless the student keeps in mind all these ideas, he cannot follow $Bh\bar{a}syak\bar{a}ra$. As has been shown in Dv. Phi., $Bh\bar{a}syak\bar{a}ra$ is never led by Veda, rather Veda is led by him. . . . He is thus the philosopher of philosophers. This circumstance also explains how it is wrong to regard $Bh\bar{a}sya$ as theology.

What happens if Bhāṣyakāra did not mention Śruti and in its place mentioned only Śūtra? If he did not mention Śruti then it simply follows that the difficulty that Śūtra is imposing on Śruti the ideas that are foreign to it is never removed. In this case the reasons for taking Śūtra as Pramāṇa are never justified and the actual circumstance that led to the composition of Śūtra is entirely ignored. It is therefore doing no justice either to Śūtra or to Śruti.

IV

We may now study what Bhāṣyakāra gains by quoting Śrutitexts in this special circumstance. His primary interest is to show that the position arrived at by Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the same as has been arrived at by the whole Veda. But the apparent meaning of a single passage of Veda is totally opposed to this truth. To hold that these two positions Veda and Sūtra are different is not consistent with the circumstance in which Sūtra appeared. Further to disregard Sūtra and maintain the apparent meaning of Veda may seem to be a possibility. But in this case the meaning of Veda becomes sublated by Sūtra. Sūtra is reason. That which is sublated by it becomes untrue. So, to retain the apparent meaning of Veda against Sūtra is in fact to hold that Veda is untrue—apramāna. In order to avoid this difficulty and with the idea of showing that Sūtra and Śruti are the same in the sense that the positions they

maintain are perfectly identical, Bhāṣyakāra in illustrating every nyāya, reason presented by Sūtra, quotes Śruti which

in fact is the expression of the same nyāya.

But to make this aspect of Brahma-Mīmāmsā familiar to a student is rather a difficult task. The main reason for this circumstance is that outside Brahma-Mīmāmsā a situation similar to this is not experienced. A student who feels a difficulty in understanding that this is the method followed by Bhāṣyakāra must by himself try to bring together the two passages (1) tamevam vidvān amrta iha bhavati and (2) atra jāānānmōkṣo nāma ananyathopapatyā prasādādevokto bhavati. The former tells us that jāāna leads to mokṣa. The latter tells us that prasāda leads to mokṣa. But the latter is presented as the meaning of the former. The justification of this position implies the truth of the foregoing considerations.

So, by quoting *Sruti* Bhāṣyakāra substantiates the fact that *Sru.i* is pramāna. This is a point of gain. Further Bhāṣyakāra in studying a nyāya presented by *Sūtra* applies it to all *Śruti*texts to which it can be applied. In the present connection the nyāya presented by *Sūtra* is that mokṣa in every case is the result of prasāda. This applies to all *Śruti* and *Smrti* texts that speak of mokṣa and its cause. Bhāṣyakāra selects *Śruti* and *Smrti* texts four in number including the one which is already considered and shows how nyāya presented by *Sūtra* is applied to them. T. Pr., after having explained the first of the four passages with the application of nyāya

expounds the other passages.

So far, the fact that jūāna is the language of prasāda is stated. T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya which gives the reason for it as:

jñānena bhagavat-prasādaḥ ityetat kutaḥ iti tatrāha priyohīti.

(How is it meant by iñāna prasāda of Bhagavān? If this question occurs in answer [Bhāṣyakāra] states PRIYOHI, etc.)

BHĀṢYA—PRIYO HI JÑĀNINOTYARTHAM AHAM SA CA MAMA PRIYAḤ

(I am intensely dear to the person who has knowledge. He too is dear to me.) This passage is from $Bh.\ G.$

If the previous passage tells us that there is mokṣa from jñāna, this passage tells us that jñāna consists in understanding Bhaga-

vān to be intensely dear and the person in question being taken by Bhagavān as dear to Him. This means that jñāna is not the immediate cause of mokṣa. For this reason the apparent meaning of the previous passage tamevam etc., is incomplete and it is wrong to hold that jñāna is the cause of mokṣa. Further priya is the language of prasāda. This indicates that the passage in question holds that prasāda is the cause of mokṣa. The two passages together give us the idea that whenever jñāna is stated as the cause of mokṣa what is really meant is prasāda.

V

Against the foregoing considerations one might at this stage still suppose that it is quite possible to hold a reverse position, namely, the position that whenever we are told that Prasada is the cause of moksa what is really meant is that jñāna is the cause. But this position is sublated by Sūtra with the meaning of atah namely 'moksa' comes from Nārāyaņa'. Further if jñāna were to give moksa then in place of enquiry into Brahman there ought to be enquiry into knowledge. In this case the contradiction between the two passages of Śruti, tamevań-vidvān and tad-vijijnāsasva tad brahma is obvious. There is contradiction between these two texts because while the latter insists upon enquiry into Brahman the former emphasises knowledge. The inner contradiction between these two texts can be removed only by the application of sūtra-nyāya. Nor does the idea to hold that one Sruti is pramana and the other apramana help the situation, as there is still contradiction between two texts. In fact by holding that one Sruti is pramana and the other apramana the contradiction is more emphasised and in this circumstance the position that jñāna gives mokṣa is never justified. The mind never accepts the position that jñāna is the giver of moksa against any kind of contradiction. In the interest of making the position of jñāna more prominent the other Sruti texts may be dismissed as apramana but there is still an aspect of mind which equally prominently points out that after all it is some prejudice in favour of knowledge and against Brahman that is the cause of the rejection of other Sruti-texts as apramana. In the presence of this aspect of mind, mere verbal discussion may take place; but one who has committed to this position never enjoys inner conviction. This is how a verbal discussion never gives peace.

The method of discussion in Sastra is therefore profoundly different. This may be illustrated by taking for example the method of discussion of Nyāya-Vaišesika especially of the new school, Navīna-Nyāya. This system prescribes certain ways of reasoning and arguing. The prescription is governed by the ideas assumed to be true by this system. Freedom of thinking does not form the basis of argument. The argument which does not make use of certain expressions and methods of putting things and things themselves as accepted by this system is considered to be wrong. To think on the valid basis of the propriety of the laws of thinking not defined by this system is considered to be illegitimate. For example to think of an object as an identical whole is wrong according to this system. It must be thought of only as Nyāya-Vaišeṣika thinkers present it. The distinction between the substantive and attributive aspects and so on must never be modified. But these ideas themselves are not beyond question. The discussions based on these assumptions are nothing but verbal and it does not touch reality.

VI

The reasoning and argument adopted by Siddhāmta i.e. Brahma-Mīmāmsā are expressions of absolute freedom of thought. They are never governed by any assumption. Their scope is never limited by any circumstance. This is the character of Vedic reason and Vedic argument. These expressions are commonly mistaken for reason and argument bound by Vedic authority. This itself is a mistake. In the first place Veda is not authority and in the second place to hold that reason or argument is bound by Veda is contradiction in terms. If Veda is an authority reason and argument are not required; and if reason and argument are required Veda as an authority becomes modified. But Veda is the only pramāṇa with regard to the knowledge of Truth. To say that reason or argument is Vedic is to recognise that it is governed by the laws of knowledge of truth but not the laws prescribed by an accepted system of thought. Knowledge is its own system. Reason and argument are only expressions of knowledge. A full recognition

of this truth gives rise to Veda and hence with its attainment all this becomes Vedic in character. Discussion based on this has spontaneity. It is an expression of Perfection. Other discussions are governed by individual interest. Hence they are not conducive to peace, śāmti or sukha. The reason employed by non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā is empirical because some empirical interest governs it. With it even though Śruti is believed to be pramāṇa, contradiction in it cannot be removed. To remove the contradiction requires a different approach

altogether.

The contradiction between Sruti-texts can never be removed unless both the texts are made equally pramana. The process of making them pramāņa consists in applying sūtra-nyāya to them. To consider that jijnāsā is one thing and jñāna is something else never helps the conclusion that both the texts are pramāṇa. If according to sūtra-nyāya jñāna and jijñāsā are taken to be the expressions of the same truth, then both the Sruti-texts necessarily become equally pramāṇa. If in this manner Śruti, tamevam is realised to be pramāna then it follows that it is never opposed to enquiry into Brahman. In fact it is the language of this enquiry. From this position it necessarily follows that it is not knowledge that gives moksa but it is Nārāyaņa. As Śruti has been shown to be pramāna if it says that jñāna gives mokṣa it is in fact illustrating that Nārāyaṇa is the giver of mokṣa. The reason is that jñāna is the language of jijñāsā, which is His prasāda.

Bhāṣyakāra illustrates all these ideas by quoting tamevam etc., and T.Pr., gives the gist of the whole position. He further emphasises how this is the only position that Sruti upholds. He illustrates this truth first by studying the fact that Smrti after Sruti has adopted the same position. In recognition of this point he mentions Smrti, priyohi, etc.

VI

A note on the method adopted by Bhāṣyakāra removes a misconception. A person who is new to this thought may as well suppose that Bhāṣyakāra having changed the meaning of *Sruti* in support of his position quotes *Smrti* forgetting at the same time the fact that *Sruti* as *pramāṇa*

is stronger than Smṛti. But Bhāṣyakāra in fact means that this Smrti substantiates the absolute truth-value of Sruti.

T.Pr., brings out all these ideas as:

na kevalam arthanmoksasya prasadaika-sadhyatvam kimtu śrutam iti tām śrutimcāha yam iti

(The position that moksa is caused only by prasada is not merely the implication of the passage, priyohi, but it is given as the actual position of Sruti. To illustrate these points [Bhāṣyakāra] states next the Sruti text also as YAM iti.)

Bhāṣya:—yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ

(By him whom this [ātman] accepts. It is understood i.e. realised)

The significance of moksa as being caused only by prasāda ought to be noted. 'Only by prasāda' is the meaning of 'only by knowledge' mentioned by Sruti, tamevain etc. The Smrti, priyohi etc., illustrates how the idea 'only by prasāda' is not something that is conceived to meet a new demand. But it is the actual teaching of Sruti and adopted by Smrti. This circumstance is enough to indicate that the apparent meaning of tamevam is misleading. Unless it is taken to be equivalent to prasada being the only cause of moksa it cannot be maintained. When once it is known that the idea of prasada is something adopted by Smrti there is naturally the desire to understand that it is the actual position of Sruti. To satisfy this desire Bhāṣyakāra presents that Sruti which embodies the truth that prasada is the only cause of moksa.

In the light of these considerations we have two sets of Sruti statements—one apparently stating that iñana causes moksa and the other stating that prasada causes moksa. The latter idea is expounded by Smrti. Hence the latter set is stronger than the former. But the fact that is stronger is not itself enough to decide the truth. For even the strength it enjoys against the former Sruti-text is only apparent, because it appears as though it dismisses knowledge and makes therefore

spiritual discipline itself a mere waste.

This defect is removed by the application of sūtra-nyāya stated by BHĀSYAKĀRA as:

NA CA JÑĀNAM VINĀ ATYARTHA PRASĀDAĻ ATO BRAHMA-JIJÑĀSĀ KARTAVYĀ

(Nor is there the highest point of prasāda without knowledge. Therefore enquiry into Brahman is indispensable).

This Nyāya is not only applied to passage like yamevaiṣa vṛṇute but also to passage like tamevaṁ vidvān. This application to the former text shows how prasāda presupposes jñāna and to the latter shows how jñāna transcends its verbal meaning, knowledge and stands for prasāda. In this circumstance opposition between two texts disappears and one becomes the expression of the other. This is how the application of sūtranyāya brings out the unity of thought underlying Śruti. This explains how intimate the relation of Sūtra to Śruti is. If the significance of this relation is understood, then Sūtra and Śruti do not appear as two different factors and they become the expressions of one and the same truth.

By way of substantiating this point N. S. says vedādītikartavyatā-rūpasya asya pṛthak-prāmānyānabhyupagamāt (Because this Sūtra namely Brahma-Mīmāmsā determines the meaning of Veda and so on, prāmānya, the state of being the proximate cause of correct knowledge that is different from the prāmānya of Veda and so on is not attributed to it.) Independently of

Veda and so on Sūtra is not pramāņa.

VIII

The idea is that Brahma-Mīmāmisā and Veda are not two cases of pramāna as one is the language of the other. They are pramāna as being completely identical with each other. Just as Brahma-Mīmāmisā is not pramāna independently of Veda, Veda because of its apparent meaning is not pramāna independently of Brahma-Mīmāmisā. In conclusion of a similar discussion N. S., says vinā vicārena śrutyarthasya adyāpyanirnītatvena samisayāspadatvāt (Because without vicāra i.e. Brahma-Mīmāmisā the meaning of Śruti even after all this discussion is by no means fixed and the apparent meaning gives room for doubt). So, Sūtra and Veda operate as pramāna only when they form a single body. Nyāya presented by Sūtra is not independent of Veda. It is nyāya underlying Veda. The position stated by Veda is not independent of sūtra-nyāya because it is the expression of this nyāya.

Hence it is wrong according to Sāstra to interpret Sruti and Smṛti independently of Sūtra. This also is the implication

of Veda as pramāṇa. Unless this implication is fully recognised the different expressions of Veda cannot be brought together. This has been illustrated by the foregoing considerations. In fixing the meaning of a Sruti-text another Srutitext is taken to be stronger. But this distinction is only tentative. When the meaning of the two texts is finally fixed the distinction vanishes and the two texts become equally pramāṇa. They have in fact become one and the same text from the point of view of jijāāsā. The foregoing considerations have

illustrated this point also.

T.Pr., having adjusted tamevam vidvān to yamevaisa vrnute presents the final meaning of the latter as yamātmā prasannah san vrnute . . . prāpyata ityarthah (only by him whom Paramatman being pleased accepts He is realised. This is the meaning). prasannah san is apparently not actually stated by Sruti. But because of sūtra-nyāya, that prasāda causes mokṣa it is taken to be the implication of ātmā vṛṇute. Ātmā means Svatamtra, Independent; vrnute means accepts. To put these two together independently of sūtra-nyāya does not yield any meaning. For, Svatamtra being non-relative has nothing in it to cause acceptance. Sūtra-nyāya, yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamrte na moksah . . . atah. (As there is no moksa without prasāda of Nārāyaņa . . . therefore) illustrates how causing moksa is an aspect of Nārāyaṇa. The same is the meaning of Atmā meaning Svatamtra. For the same reason the purpose of acceptance is moksa. All this is justified by tamevam vidvān interpreted with the application of sūtra-nyāya. T.Pr. presents the resultant meaning in the present passage as ātmā vṛṇute is equivalent to atma prasannah san vrnute. Sutra gives the idea that prasada is the expression of Independence. Hence in the Śruti-passage vṛṇute explains ātmā. With the recognition of this meaning this passage makes the whole Upanişadic teaching in which it occurs significant as expounding the truth of Svatamtra. This is the teaching of Kāthaka. Therefore its subject-matter is Svatamtra. It is therefore Nārāyaṇa. N.S. says-prasado nama icchā-visesah (Prasada means a will.) Bhāsyakāra in another connection says svecchānusāritāmeva svātamtryam (Acting up to one's free will independently of other things is indeed independence). Hence prasada is an expression of independence, the truth of Atman.

We have so far seen that prasāda is the language of jñāna and jñāna is that of prasāda. This means that the same cause is called by these two words. The same cause is called jñāna in a particular context and prasāda in another context. The same prasāda characterises adhikārin as jñāna. To illustrate this point Sruti says tamevam vidvān. As stating that Nārāyaṇa is the cause of mokṣa, jñāna is called prasāda. This is the reason for which the different passages of Sruti and Smrti with their different apparent meanings, are brought together so as to show that all of them expound the same truth, namely, the truth of Nārāyaṇa. This is the reason that is called sūtranyāya.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XVI

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE CONCEPTS OF BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

]

The concepts of the cause of mokṣa as they are so far defined are highly complex. Commonly jñāna, for instance, is applied to several mental states. Without reference to a context the meaning of the word is not definite. According to several contexts it may mean knowledge obtained from study or by reflection in a non-Vedic sense, an idea presented by a verbal testimony upadeśa or āgama, faith or conviction in an ordinary sense, intuition or realization in a popular sense and even the knowledge obtained by scientific thinking or by a process of thinking recognized as philosophy in a non-Vedic sense. None of these meanings holds good in the case of jñāna mentioned as tamevam vidvān etc. Bhāṣyakāra himself has already indicated this in several connections as dvāpare sarvatra jñāna ākulībhūte etc. (When in Dvāpara jñāna became defective etc.)

The considerations we are having so far have created a special circumstance. Jñāna has been taken to mean prasāda. This is prasāda of Bhagavān which is defined as Svatamtra. Prasāda consists in the act of Its accepting a person. Its act of accepting a person is determined by nothing external, because It is Svatamtra. All this necessarily means that on the part of adhikārin nothing is needed. In fact he never knows when, where and why prasāda takes place. Stating the same in terms of knowledge he does not know when, where and why knowledge which is the same as prasāda takes place. In fact he does not know what this knowledge is. In this circumstance even the emphasis on adhikāra becomes out of place. Just as jñāna or prasāda takes place of its own accord, adhikāra also may occur of its own accord.

Against all these difficulties the discussions that took place so far become meaningless. Supposing further that these discussions are absent, even the student of Sastra becomes perplexed at this juncture. It is in this special circumstance that devotees, men of wisdom, persons of saintly character, teachers of the truth of God, teachers of morals, teachers of the other world or of life after death and the discipline leading to the betterment of this life, literature that expound these several ideas, poetry, philosophy, all outside Brahma-Mīmāmsā, appear, develop and catch the attention of people. Jayatīrtha characterises these ideas in N.S., II. 2-1 as anādikālato anuvṛtta-pratīti-sumdarāṇām (having their continuity from the beginningless time and attractive enough by their mere appearance). If in these expressions or in the literature connected with these words, phrases or sentences of Sruti and Smrti and even Sastra are used, then these cases of knowledge become more specially attractive and against them the study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā becomes a dream. Even the effort to reinstitute this study becomes the origin of all sorts of oppositions. This circumstance helps the organisation of oppositions to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This gives rise to particular śāstras or philosophical systems. originate to justify particular interests of men. Men who are attracted by these interests naturally safeguard them by giving whole-hearted support to the philosophies that justify their interests. From this circumstance emerges the idea of tendency of the times. Even in philosophy considerations become governed by the tendency of the times. As a result particular religious practices, convictions, faiths, communities with their differences, upadesa-bheda, mata-bheda, ācāra-bheda, sampradāyabheda and even śāstra-bheda appear and distract people further who are already distracted. Consideration of truth for its own sake becomes a sin against the tendency which is allowed to dominate. There appear expounders of particular ideas in which groups of people are interested. These are called either mūla-kāras, original expounders or vyākhyāna-kāras, commentators. They command a certain following. In the presence of these circumstances even to think of Brahma-Mīmāmsā becomes an impossibility. If at all it is recognised in any quarter purely because this literature is still living in written works, it is taken to be one among many sastras or philosophical systems or religious organisations which are equally important if not more important. When even Brahma-Mīmāmsā is mentioned its place is entirely ignored and there are expressions such as "This truth or position is proved by Purāna, Itihāsa, Smṛti, Śruti, Brahma-Mīmāmsā, Dharma-Sāstras, Bhagavadgītā and so on." If Brahma-Mīmāmsā is somehow recognised to be a system of thought, it is presented as one among many systems as "six systems of Indian Philosophy including Uttara-Mīmāmsā" and so on. Even those that profess to recognise the special importance of Brahma-Mīmāmsā hold this position not because they have understood that this contains the highest system of thought but because a teacher or a commentator in whom they are interested says that Brahma-Mīmāmsā is Śāstra. In adopting these ideas the exclusive prominence of particular commentators is never forgotten. For it is these commentators that have constructed strong fortification of particular thought for safeguarding it. This circumstance gives rise to the age of commentators. Commentators become more important than Sastra on which they comment. Under these conditions the process of thought is this. If Bhāṣya is required then it means that Bhāṣya decides the meaning of Sūtra. Hence Sūtra must be understood in the light of Bhāṣya. From the point of view of the student therefore Bhāsya is more important than Sūtra. Whatever be the fate of Sūtrakāra, Bhāṣyakāra ought not to be ignored, because he deserves every respect as he has given the world Sūtra with its special meaning. The interpretation of Bhāṣya may present certain difficulties. Hence a Tīkā is needed. So Tīkā with its author, Tīkākāra becomes practically more important. If the interpretation of Tīkā presents difficulties then Tippaṇī, a commentary with its author becomes needed and in turn it becomes more important. With all these conditions a person to interpret these things is needed without whom the existence of the whole literature is purposeless. Hence the interpreter becomes a teacher—a guru. He gives the eye of knowledge to the student. For this reason whatever the theoretical aspect be, in practice, he deserves and demands first and foremost respect. The necessity for practical life gives colour to all these circumstances and in their presence common sense decides everything. The ideas that are supposed to be anādikālato anuvṛtta and pratīti-sumdara reign supreme. There is no wonder if these ideas themselves are presented, expounded and substantiated in the name of Śruti and Śmrti or Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In the course of their degeneration expositions in vernacular poetry and prose accompanied by all appreciation appear. All these totally negate Śāstra. They are obviously the outcome of the weakness of the mind.

III

In expounding Samaya-Pāda of Brahma-Mīmāmsā Bhāṣyakāra in Anu. V., presents the leading ideas that characterise these circumstances, with a view to giving a discipline to the student of Sāstra so that he is not misled by any circumstance, because the ideas connected with it appear to be anādikālato anuvrtta and pratīti-sumdara. His refutation of wrong knowledge or wrong theories never presuppose that he starts with the belief of making them entirely non-existent. On the other hand he admits anādi-kālatonuvṛttāḥ samayāhi pravāhataḥ na cocchedopi kasyāpi samayasyetyato vibhuh bhrāmti-mūlatvametesām prthagdarśayati sphuṭam. (The systems of thought that are opposed to Brahma-Mīmāmsā are enduring from the beginningless time and they come to prominence again and again. Of them not even a single system can be erased. For this reason the Almighty [Badarayana] shows clearly that they are caused by illusions). The idea is that there are illusions so long as there are men. Next he gives the reason why they endure as: daurlabhyāt śuddhabuddhīnām bāhulyādalpavedinām tāmasatvācca lokasya mithyājñāna-prasaktitah vidveṣāt parame tatve tattva-vediṣu cānisam anādi-vāsanāyogāt asurānām bahutvatah durāgraha-nimittatvāt vartamte samayāh sadā (men of straightforward and honest thinking are rare. Men of half knowledge are common. People are distracted. There is spread of wrong knowledge. There is hatred to Brahman, the Truth Absolute and to the expounders of this Truth. This hatred is caused by the tendency developed from the beginningless time with beginningless disposition. There are in great number persons, asuras who take joy in wrong thinking. There is prejudice created by this circumstance. For this reason samayas, philosophical systems always endure.)

The interpretation given by N.S., may be indicated—
śuddha-buddhīnām yathārtha-jñāna-svabhāvānām mokṣa-yogyānām. alpavedinām bhramādhiṣṭāna-svarūpa-mātra-vidām. tarhi
rājādirloko nivārayiṣyati ityatah uktam tāmasatvāditi. tata eva
kupamdita-nimitta-mithyā-jñāna-prasaktitaśca . . . nanu puruṣārtha-kāmāh katham vidveṣa-nimittād-āgrahāt anyāyam pravarta
yamti ityatah uktam. anādīti. vāsanā-vaṣāt tebhyah tadeva rocata
iti bhāvah.

('Of those of pure intellect' means 'of those who are of the nature of apprehending things as they exist as well as of those that are fitted to obtain mukti.' 'Of those of half knowledge' means 'of those that apprehend only that much of some little aspect of reality which only serves as the basis of illusions'. If there is the supposition that men like a king and so on remove the circumstance in which illusions take place, then Bhāṣya-kāra says 'no', because these people are generally distracted i.e. engaged in mundane affairs. For the same reason there is the spread of wrong knowledge owing to the activities of kupamditas, those that are ill-educated. How can those that want to attain good, puruṣārtha tread on evil ways for the reason of their prejudice caused by hatred? In answer to this it is said owing to beginningless tendency only the path they follow is pleasing to them. This is the idea of the passage.)

What Bhāṣyakāra intends to emphasise by the exposition of these ideas is stated by N. S., na caitāni kāraṇāni svarūpato-pyanādau vede sambhavamti iti (Nor do these causes occur in Veda as it has by nature no origin in any person's intellect). N. S., continues yadyevam tarhi eteṣām sudṛdhanīrūdhānām samayānām sarvathotsādanasya ašakyatvāt vyartheyam nirākṛtiḥ ityatah āha tathāpi iti. (If the circumstance is this, then the entire removal of these Samayas which are very well established is an impossibility and for this reason the refutation of them has no purpose to serve. To remove this difficulty [Bhāṣyakāra] says in Anu, V.,) tathāpi śuddha-buddhīnām īśānugraha-yoginām—suyuktayah tamo-hanyuh āgamānugatāh sadā. iti vidyā-patih samyak samayānām nirākṛtim cakāra nija-bhaktānām buddhi-śāṇatva-siddhaye. (Yet in the case of those of pure

intellect who have obtained the Grace of the Lord, the sound reasons consistent with Veda, as a rule, remove non-knowledge of all kinds. To achieve this purpose the Lord of learning, Bādarāyaṇa completely refuted Samayas in order to bestow sharpness of intellect on those that are devoted to Him).

IV

In the light of this discussion the purpose of Sāstra made clear by N.S., may be presented.

keşāmcit pumsām taih taih samayaih āhitān ajñāna-samsayaviparyayān āgama-sahitābhih yuktibhih tattva-jñānamutpādya apanetum, ku-samayaih anāhitājñānānām brahmādīnām. . . ku-samayāhitājñāna-nirasana-proyojanābhāvepi jñāna - vaisadyaprayojanasya vidyamānatvāt idamādaranīyam iti bhāvah.

(In the case of particular persons particular Samayas cause ignorance, doubt and illusion. For removing them there is given rise to the knowledge of Brahman, (Tattva) by means of the reasons that are in keeping with Veda But in the case of Brahmā etc., who are not affected by non-knowledge caused by wrong systems of thought the purpose consisting in removing non-knowledge caused by wrong systems is not indeed relevant. Yet there is the realisation of the purpose which is no other than extension and vividness of knowledge. For this reason, Sāstra ought to be entertained by them also. This is the gist of the passage in question.)

It is clear from the foregoing ideas that the only aim of the criticism by $S\bar{a}stra$ is the removal of wrong knowledge in some cases, and extension and vividness of knowledge in some other cases of persons. For this reason criticism of wrong thoughts is an absolute necessity in the discussion characterising $S\bar{a}stra$. In the course of these discussions refutation of persons and establishment of cults are never intended. A person who distinguishes between these two aspects and makes the whole discussion purely impersonal alone can appreciate these points and derive benefit from his study. This means that the whole exposition of $S\bar{a}stra$ is never meant for those that are unable to have this discrimination. It is needless to say that the present work also follows the same method of exposition as no other method can satisfy the demand mentioned above. The whole discussion here

forms the process of self-purification on the part of the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It is as a rule weakness of mind that

makes one feel difficulties in following Sāstra.

The foregoing considerations also illustrate that if in a given case sūtra-nyāya does not operate or there is no attempt to understand sūtra-nyāya governing a given position of Śruti or Smṛti, then it always follows that the person in question is suffering from some durāgraha (non-śāstraik interest) or bhrāmti, illusion caused by that interest. The tendency that develops in this circumstance stands in the way of obtaining knowledge from Śāstra. It is the duty of the student to see that he is free from these defects. In the presence of these defects even though he feels that he has understood something and expresses what he understands in the Śāstraik language his position is never consistent with Brahma-Mīmāmsā and it is rather an aspect of some Samaya. This is what Bhāṣyakāra intends to point out in his discussion in Anu. V.

Bh.D., observes that all these ideas are signified by T.Pr., interpreting 'tenaiva prāpyah' as 'prāpteh prasādaika-sādhyatva-sphoraṇāya eva-kārasya tenaivetyanvayamāha—tenaiva prāpya iti—na tu karmathenetyarthah' (In order to emphasise that going to Bhagavān is effected only by prasāda, T.Pr., takes eva with tena and says tenaiva prāpyah. The meaning is that by karmatha, one who is engaged in karma superimposing doership

on one's self Bhagavān is never attained to.)

The significance of this conclusion that karmatha, he who is engaged in karma has nothing to do with Brahma-Mīmāmsā and in fact he is opposed to it must be carefully understood. This understanding consists in seeing that Brahma-Mīmāmsā admits of no religion and it demands from the very start a serious study of Sāstra with ever-increasing interest in the subject.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XVII

JIJÑĀSĀ IS KNOWLEDGE IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

I

In order to avoid all sorts of imaginations with regard to the nature of knowledge *T.Pr.*, introduces Bhāṣyakāra's definition of knowledge as:

jijnāsayā jnānam ityetat kuta iti tatrāha-ātmeti

(Knowledge in this connection is that which is produced from enquiry. What is the justification for this? In answer Bhāṣyakāra says ĀTMĀ etc.)

внаяча—атмачаяе drastavyaн śrotavyo mamtavyo nididhyasitavya ityadi śrutismrtibhyaн.

("O [Maitreyi!] Ātman ought to be apprehended i.e. realised, understood, discussed and meditated upon." This and similar *Sruti* and *Smrti* texts are the justification.)

T.Pr., gives the interpretation of this Śruti-text as: darśanārtham śravanādi-rūpa-jijñāsā kartavyetyarthah.

(In order to have apprehension or realisation enquiry which is no other than *sravana* etc., i.e. understanding etc., becomes indispensible. This is the meaning of the *Sruti*-text).

Bh. D., brings out the significance of T.Pr., as:

jñānapāde "aihikamaprastuta pratibamdhe taddarsanāt" ityatra 'darsanārtham sravņādi vidhīyate' iti bhāṣyam hṛdi kṛtvā āha—darsanārtham iti—etena brahma-jijñāsetyatra brahma-jiñānāya kāryeti vedārtha-viṣaya- sravaṇa- manana- nididhyāsana-rūpā jijñasā-vacana-vyaktih sūcitā. uktam ca 'jijñāsyoyam vidhīyate' ityatra sudhāyām, jñāna-vidhau hi brahmaņo aprādhānyam syāt. brahma-jñānoddesena jijñāsā-vidhānāt kuto aprādhānyam iti. uktam ca nyāyāmrte tṛtīya-paricchede brahma-jiānāya brahma-vicāraḥ kartavya iti na vacana-vyaktiḥ. tathātve brahmaņo vidheya-viseṣaṇatāpātāt. kimtu brahma-jiānāya veda-vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ ityeva vacana-vyaktiḥ.

yadyapi brahma-para-veda-vicāra eva brahma-vicārah. tathāpī na brahma-vicāra-rūpeṇa vidhānam. kimtu veda-vicāra-rūpeṇa thathā ca śrutiḥ "tasmādenam sarva-vedānadhītya vicārya ca jñātumicchet" ityādi. vyaktam cedam sarva-vedāmta-naya-bhāṣyādau. śravaṇam nāma upaniṣad-bhāṣyādirūpopadeśa-janya vākyārtha-jñānam. mananam śruta-vākyārthe yuktyanusamdhānam. nididhyāsanam tu niramtaram tadviṣaya-cimtanam. śravaṇam śabdajam jñānam; upapatyanucimtanam matih; niramtarā cimtā nididhyāsanamucyate ityukteh. atra manana-mātrasyaiva nyāyanibamdhana-rūpa-śāstrārambhopayogitayā kartavyatve vācyepi śrotavyo mamtavyo nididhyāsitvyah iti bhāṣyokta-śrutimanurudhya tritaya-kartavyatayokteḥ anekadhā tātparya-candrikāyām vyaktam.

(In Jūāna-pāda under Sūtra, "aihikamaprastuta-prati-bamdhe taddarśanāt", Bhāṣya says that śravaṇa etc., are enjoined in order to effect apprehension. Having this in mind T.Pr., said darsanārtham and so on. From this the intended meaning of the statement 'brahma-jijñāsā' is indicated as 'In order to obtain the knowledge of Brahman as the meaning of Veda, jijñāsā, enquiry which is no other than śravana, manana and nididhyāsana is indispensable.' The same is expounded in N.S., under Bhāsya, "Vișnu is enjoined as the subject-matter of enquiry". In this connection if knowledge is enjoined, then Brahman becomes unimportant. On the other hand with a view to obtaining the knowledge of Brahman enquiry is enjoined. Therefore how can Brahman be unimportant? The same is further explained in the third Pariccheda of Ny. Amr., as: "The intended meaning of the statement, brahma-jijnāsā is not that in order to obtain the knowledge of Brahman, enquiry into Brahman is indispensable. If that were the meaning, then Brahman will be only an attribute of that thing which is enjoined. But the meaning is 'with a view to obtaining the knowledge of Brahman enquiry into Veda is indispensable. Enquiry into Brahman is indeed the same as enquiry into Veda expounding Brahman. But even then there is no injunction with regard to the enquiry into Brahman but with regard to the enquiry into Veda. The same is the teaching of Sruti. "Therefore one ought to desire to know It, Brahman after the study of all the Vedas and enquiry into them and so on."

All this is clearly expounded by Bhāṣya and so on under Adhikarana, Sarva-Vedāmta, [third chapter, third quarter.] Śravana is the knowledge of the meaning of vākya, statement, produced by the teaching of Bhāsya on the Upanisads and so on. Manana is application of reason to the meaning of vākya, statement, the subject-matter of śravana. Nididhyāsana is incessant reflection on the same subject. The same is the meaning of the passage-"sravana is the knowledge obtained by verbal testimony. Mati, manana is application of reason. Incessant reflection is nididhyāsana." What we have to note with reference to this discussion is this. Obviously only manana is useful in commencing Sāstra which is no other than nyāya-nibamdhana, fixing nyāya, reason and therefore only manana ought to have been stated as indispensable. Yet in the light of the Śruti quoted by Bhāṣya, śrotavyo mamtavyo nididhyāsitavyah the collocation of the three is enjoined as indispensable. The several implications of this injunction and thereby its indispensability are brought to light richly by T.C.)

I

T.C., studies the expression, Brahma-jijāāsā. For the purification of thought it reviews the meaning attributed to it, by those that uphold opposite schools of thought.

atra paraih brahmano jijnäseti şaştī samāsah na caturthī samāsah şaştīca karmani na tu sese. sesa-şaştī tu sāmānya-dvāreneti kuṣṛṣṭih. seṣa-ṣaṣṭī-pakṣe tad-vijijnāsasveti sākṣāi-jijnāsā karmatva-pratipādaka-śrutyananugamaśca iti seṣa-ṣaṣṭī nirākṛtā. tadayuktam. parapakṣe vicāra-janya-jñānākarmano brahmano vicāra-karmatvāyogāt. aparokṣa-vṛtti-vyāpyasya phala-vyāpyatva niyamācca.

(With reference to the interpretation of 'Brahma'-jijñāsā by others i.e., Māyāvādins the position indicated by śeṣa-ṣaṣṭī is refuted as—[The compound term, brahma-jijñāsā must be split up as "of Brahman+jijñāsā", "brahmaṇo+jijñāsā" following ṣaṣṭī-samāsa, but not as "for Brahman+jijñāsā", "brahmaṇe+jijñāsā" following caturthī-samāsa* Ṣaṣṭī is possessive case and

Vrttikāra holds this position. This is opposed to tādarthya-samāse prakṛti-vikṛti-grahaṇam kartavyam. (In the case of caturthī-samāsa there ought to be the idea of prakṛti and vikṛti. It does not give the sense of śeṣa.)

it gives the idea of subject-matter, karma. In case śeṣa-ṣaṣṭī is accepted only on the basis of general concept of relation, [the state of being the subject-matter of jijñāsā becomes conceived.] But it is not straightforward. Further the position based on śeṣa-ṣaṣṭī is not consistent with Śruti, tad-vijijñāsasva which states that Brahman is the direct subject-matter of

jijnāsā. For this reason śesa-sastī is refuted.

This refutation is not justified. For according to Māyāvāda Brahman is not the object of the knowledge produced by enquiry. It cannot therefore be the object of enquiry. Further Brahman is admitted to be the object of the mental state characterised as aparokṣa-vṛtti. Consistently with this it must be admitted to be the object of the result of this vṛtti, [the result being vṛtyupahita-caitanya, caitanya indicated by vṛtti.] The idea is that if it is not the object of the resultant knowledge namely caitanya, then to hold that it is the object

of vrtti is meaningless).

If the interpretation given to brahma-jijnāsā does not hold good what is then the interpretation? In answer to this question Prakāśa suggests the possible interpretation and points out its defect as follows: How is the compound word split up according to Siddhāmta? Brahma and jijnāsā are respectively concrete and abstract nouns and therefore they cannot be identified. To take Brahma in the objective case is not relevant to jijñāsā. To take Brahma in the instrumental case does not yield the idea that Brahman is the object. To read the passage as "for Brahman+jijñāsā" is already shown to be defective. To read it as "For Brahman+jijñāsā" does not help the conception that Brahman is the object. The splitting up of the passage as 'In Brahman + jijnāsā' does not hold good because this does not fix the idea that Brahman is the object. In case 'of Brahman+jijñāsā' is accepted only jijnāsā of Brahman becomes stated but not jijnāsā of pramāņa. If seṣa-ṣaṣṭī is adopted, then on the basis of the general concept of relation, sambamdha-mātram śesah directly or indirectly all that is connected with Brahman namely pramāṇa, Brahman and so on become the object of jijnāsā. But this position is opposed to N.S. karmani sastiparigrahāya jijñāsyoyam vidhīyate ityuktam. (In order to accept possessive case signifying object Bhāṣyakāra said 'It as jijñāsya is enjoined').

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Against this difficulty the author of T.C., brings the discussion to a close upholding sega-sastī as:

svapakşe karmani şaştyāmapi pramāna-sādhana-prayojanādiparikara-yuktasyaiva brahmano jijnāsā-karmatvāt na pramānādivicārasya apratijnātatā-prasangah. kṛdyoga-lakṣaṇā ca ṣaṣṭī samasyate iti pratiprasavāt.

(According to siddhāmta though the grammatical rule, karmani ṣaṣṭī, possessive case signifying object, is followed Brahman is the object of jijāāsā certainly along with accompaniments, pramāṇa, sādhana, prayojana (Proof, reason, and purpose) etc. For this reason there is no room for the supposition that enquiry into pramāṇa etc., is not stated as the object of injunction. This is according to the rule krdyogalakṣaṇā ca ṣaṣṭī samasyate. Hence the opponent's position is not free from opposition as ṣaṣṭī which is related to kṛt becomes the object of samāsa.)

Prakāśa explains this idea as—brahma-jijnāsāyām pratijnātāyām lakṣaṇa-pramāṇamamtareṇa tasya abhāvāt pradhānabrahma-jijnāsayaiva arthāt pramāṇādi-jijnāsāpi labhyate iti bhāvah. ata eva parikara-yuktasyeti parikara-prayogah, uktam ca sudhāyām "tasyāḥ vināpyabhidhānena lābhāt" ityādi.

T.C., aims at illustrating that (if brahma-jijñāsā is ordained then, as this jijñāsā cannot be had unless there is the jijñāsā of lakṣaṇa pramāṇa and by the mere statement of jijñāsā of Brahman which is of primary interest the fact of jijñāsā of pramāṇa etc., also follows. This is the idea. Just to imply this circumstance there is the use of the word parikara as parikarayuktasyaiva. This is just the idea stated in N.S., as "That the idea of jijñāsā of pramāṇa etc., follows even without the statement of it and so on.") The grammatical objection that possessive case does not allow this interpretation is nullified by another principle krdyogalakṣaṇā ca ṣaṣṭī samasyate as ordained by kartṛ-karmanoḥ kṛtī.

III

Having so far prepared the ground T.C., presents the meaning of $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ as:

yuktyanusamdhānātmaka-mananāparanāmako vicāro jijnāsā. sudhāyām jijnāsā nāma yuktyanusamdhānātmaka-vicārāpara-paryāyam mananam ityuktatvāt. nyāyanibamdhanātmaka-šāstrāram bhanītyatvasya nyāyānusamdhāna-kartavyatokti-mātreņa siddheś-ca. na tu aupadešika-vākyārtha-grahana-lakṣaṇa-śravaṇasya ukta-rūpa-śāstrasya ārambhanīyatve hetuḥ.' 'śravaṇajam jñānam pūrva-vṛttam' iti sudhāyām mīmāmsātah tasya pūrva-vṛttatvena-uktatayā śāstrasya ārambhanīyatvam vināpi tatkartavyatā-siddeḥ. śravaṇādi-rūpa-jijñāsā kāryeti ṭīkāyām atadguṇa-samvijñāna-bahuvrīhiṇā vicāra evoktaḥ, ata eva vicārepi tatprayogāt iti uttara-gramthaḥ.

(Jijnāsā means vicāra, enquiry which is no other than manana consisting in application, anusamdhāna of reason. For Sudhā says "jijnāsā is manana which is the same as vicāra consisting of application of reason." Further the position expressed by Sudhā is justified as the necessity for the commencement of Sastra which is nothing but the expression of reason arises by the mere statement of the indispensability of the application of reason. Further the indispensability of śravana which is no other than the understanding of the meaning of the statement by means of instruction cannot indeed be the cause of the necessity for the commencement of Sastra of the said character. As Sudhā says 'knowledge produced by śravana is the pre-supposition,' of mīmāmsā i.e. vicāra and for this reason even without Sastra there is the idea of the indispensability of śravana. So, in the Tīkā i.e., T.Pr., by the statement 'jijnāsā which is no other than sravana and so on is indispensable' by means of atadguņa-samvijnāna-bahuvrīhi consisting in taking only that to be the meaning of the passage, sravanādi which is actually meant by ādi, what is actually stated as the meaning of jijñāsā is vicāra itself. Just to indicate that this is the meaning intended there is the following passage, 'Because it [the word jijñāsā which is sannamta (having at the end the suffix san)] is used in the sense of vicāra also.')

Prakāśa summarises the whole idea signified by T.C., as: jijñāsā-śabdasya tritayārthatvena triṣu kartavyatvānvayepi vicāra-kāryatvameva śāstrārambha-hetuḥ na tu itara-kāryatvamapīt-yarthaḥ.

(As the word jijnāsā means the collocation of the three śravana, manana and nididhyāsana, it follows that these three are indispensable. Though this idea is presented by the passage of T.Pr., in question the intended meaning is that only the indispensability of $vic\bar{a}ra$ is the cause of commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ but not the indispensability of the other two.)

IV

A question may occur. Pūrvapakṣa against the commencement of Sāstra holds that manana is impossible because the subject-matter and so on cannot be conceived. If the same difficulty affects śravana how is the inclusion of śravana justified? T.C., answers this question on the analogy of nididhyāsana.

yadvā yathāśravaṇa-nididhyāsane vihitavāt mumukṣuṇā kārye tathā mananamapīti dṛṣṭāmtatayā tayorupādānam. na tu śāstrārambha-hetutayā. athavā nididhyāsanasya akartavyatve tadanga-mananasyāpi tathātvāt paramparayā nididhyāsana-kartavyatā ārambhanīyatve hetuh.

(yadva from the previous considerations emerge the following ideas. Just as śravana and nididhyāsana are indispensable as they are enjoined by śruti, manana also is indispensable to one who desires mokṣa. These two [śravana and nididhyāsana] are mentioned only as analogy; but not as the cause of the commencement of Sāstra. Athavā—From this follows th following idea. If nididhyāsana is not indispensable, then manana also which is its presupposition cannot be indispensable. This means that the indispensability of nididhyāsana is indirectly the cause of the commencement of Sāstra.)

The idea is that the indispensability of nididhyāsana is only that of manana which is the presupposition of nididhyāsana.

T.C., shows how the indispensability of *sravana* also is the cause of the commencement of *Sāstra* as it gives rise to manana.

tathā prativākyārtham ayam vākyārthah yuktah anyo vā iti samsayādi—nirāsaka—vicāra—sāstra—vyutpādya—nyāyāvatarānga—samdeha—kāranasya yatna—sādhyasya prativākyam ayam asya vākyasya arthah ityevam-rūpasya sravana-janya—jñānasya abhāve sāstrārambhāsiddeh, tatkartavyatāpi ārambhanīyatve hetuh eveti ārambhana-siddhyarthameva tritaya-kartavyatoktā.

(Similarly with regard to fixing the meaning of every statement there ought to be the establishment of reason resulting from Sāstra consisting of vicāra which removes the

doubt and so on which appear in the form, whether this meaning of the statement or some other meaning is justified. This establishment presupposes doubt and doubt must have cause. The cause can be had only with effort. The result of this effort is the knowledge caused by *śravaṇa* in the form 'This is the meaning of the statement'. Without this knowledge there cannot be the commencement of *Śāstra*. Therefore the indispensability of *śravaṇa* also is indeed the cause of commencement. Therefore in order to make the commencement possible, the indispensability of the collocation of the three is stated by T.Pr.)

So far it is shown in what sense the three, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana cause Śāstra. One point made clear in this connection is that manana or vicāra is the only genuine cause of Śāstra and the two other help the commencement of Sāstra only in so far as they lead to vicāra or make it significant. Śravaṇa leads to manana and manana makes nididhyāsana possible. So the whole process is the language of manana. The philosophical value of these considerations

cannot be overestimated.

T.C., studies the inner harmony of the different texts on the subject which apparently present contradictory ideas.

yastu sarva-šākhādhikaraņe tīkāyām śravana-manane kartavye iti prathama-sūtre uktam ityanuvādah. sah taduttarādhikaraņe nididhyāsanasya vicārayisyamānatvāt tatra tayoreva vicāryatvāt tadupayogitayā ekadešānuvādah. na tu prathama-sūtre tanmātro-ktyā. ata eva upāsanā nāma brahmajijnāseti trividhopāsanāyāh jijnāsātvam tatraivoktam. na ca ekasya jijnāsā-sabdasya śravanādyanekārthatvāyogah. icchārtho jijnāsā-sabdo vicāralakṣaka iti pakṣe doṣābhāvāt. manana-rūpa-vicārābhidhāyaka iti pakṣe śravanādau chatrivat lakṣanopapatteh.

(Under Sarva-Sākhādhikaraṇa i.e., in the Adhikaraṇa starting from "sarva vedāmta-pratyayam codanādyaviseṣāt" in the Tīkā there is the statement 'It is said under the first Sūtra that śravaṇa and manana are indispensable.' This is only a restatement, being part of what is said in the first Sūtra. For under the following adhikaraṇa nididhyāsana is the subject-matter of discussion, and under this adhikaraṇa only these two, śravaṇa and manana are under consideration. But this restatement does

not take place because in the first Sūtra only that much is stated. It is for the same reason in the same connection the three-fold discipline is given as jijnāsā by stating that upāsanā means brahma-jijnāsā. The supposition that the single word jijnāsā cannot have several meanings, śravaṇa etc., does not hold good. For, this difficulty does not occur if the position is that jijnāsā means desire and it stands, i.e., is lakṣaka for vicāra. [similarly] if the word means vicāra in the sense of manana, then the word stands for śravaṇa etc., following chatrinyāya) Chatrinyāya consists in the fact that the word chatrī is applied to the collocation of persons most of whom have chatra, umbrella and the rest of whom have no chatra.

In the light of this discussion it follows that the position of Siddhāmta is what is stated by T.Pr. If in other connection different ideas appear to have been given they must be interpreted consistently with the context in which they are given. But in all considerations the central point must never be ignored. How the central point given by T.Pr., cannot be ignored is illustrated by T.C. On similar lines of thought the apparent discrepancy felt with regard to other positions accepted by Siddhāmta must be removed. In any case it must be noted that the word jijīāsā has one meaning and it is manana or vicāra and there appear śravaṇa and nididhyāsana as being related to vicāra, the former supplying matter for vicāra and the latter being the full expression of vicāra.

V

With a view to illustrating further the truth that with reference to Siddhāmta there is absolutely no inconsistency T.C., continues the discussion. With regard to the present topic we have now been given three positions. (i) jijnāsa means icchā, desire and it stands for vicāra and similarly for the other two; (ii) jijnāsā means śravana, manana and nididhyāsana; and (iii) jijnāsā means manana or vicāra and finally stands for the other two. Of these three positions the opponent to Brahma-Mīmāmsā holds the first; Pūrva-Prasthāna i.e, T.Pr., upholds the second and Uttara-Prasthāna i.e., N.S., upholds the last. Thus there are two view-points upheld by the two Prasthānas. How is this difference justified? In answer T.C., says:

yadvā iha tīkāyām jijnāsā-vicāra-sabdābhyām sākṣāt pramāṇadvārāvā cittasya tat-prāvaṇya-rūpa-sravaṇādi-trayānugatā upāsanā vivakṣitā. na tu sudhāyāmiva mananamiti yuktā tīkā. sudhāyām tu sati manana-kartavyatve itarākartavyatvepi sāstrārambhabhāvāt tatkartavyataiva ārambhe heturiti mananameva jijnāsātvenoktam iti manana-vidhimūlam evedam sūtram samāna viṣayatvāt; na tu vivarna-mata iva sravaṇa-vidhimūlam. vistrtamcaitadanyatra.

(Yadvā = from the foregoing considerations emerge the following ideas. The statement of T.Pr., under consideration intends to state by the two words jijnasa and vicara directly i.e., by means of nididhyāsana or indirectly i.e., through śravana and manana, the disposition of mind consisting in prāvanya, bhagavadekanişthatā, the state of being fixed exclusively to Bhagavān which is in other words upāsanā, application that is common to the three i.e., that which brings about unity to the three śravaņa etc. [prakāśa presents the meaning of certain expressions. Sākṣāt means nididyhāsanena. pramāṇa-dvārāvā means śravaṇa-mananābhyām. tatprāvaṇyam means bhagavadekanisthatā.] This meaning is obviously different from manana, the meaning given to the two words by Sudhā. With the present meaning the statement of tīkā i.e. T.Pr., is perfectly justified. The following is the justification of the meaning presented by Sudhā. If manana is present even though the other two are not enjoined there is no absence of the commencement of Sastra. Therefore the indispensability of manana alone is the cause of the commencement of Sastra. For this reason only manana is presented as jijnasa. From this it follows that this Sūtra has its origin in the indispensability or enjoinment of manana. This is evident by the fact that the same is the subject-matter of both [manana and Sūtra.] But this Sūtra can never have its origin in the injunction of sravana as it is held by Vivarana. This aspect of the position is ellucidated elsewhere [in the third parichheda of Ny. Amr.])

VI

With reference to the unity of these passages the following may be particularly noted. Whether śravaṇa and nididhyāsana are taken to be the aspects of jijñāsā or not, in all cases it is manana that forms the origin of Śāstra. Śāstra is thus confined to

manana. Manana essentially consists in the idea signified by prativākyārtham ayam vākyārtho yuktah anyoveti samsayādinirāsaka-vicāra-śāstra etc. Prativākyārtham, with regard to the meaning of every statement there appears samsaya, doubt whether the meaning given or some other meaning holds good. That which removes doubt etc., is Sāstra. The significance of manana i.e., vicāra consists only in presenting the nyāya that removes the doubt. This explains how of all the three things it is manana that is the cause of Sastra. It is the cause in the sense that nyāya presented by it is the very content of Sāstra. This circumstance fixes the meaning of śravana and nididhyāsana. Evidently śravaņa and nididhyāsana in this connection are definitely those that are the expressions of manana. With no other meaning are they relevant to the present context i.e., the context presented by Sruti. It is for this reason that T.Pr., presents all the three as the meaning of

jijñāsā.

The same point explains at the same time how in this Jijnāsā-Sāstra there is absolutely no room for theology or religion in any form. T.C., on this point asks us to reflect on prativākyārtha, the meaning of every statement till manana i.e., vicāra decides the meaning. It is only at this stage the demand of Sāstra is satisfied. It may however be noted that the satisfaction of this demand never consists in finding out justification for what is already believed. The disposition of the mind before the whole process must be as a rule such that it must be quite possible for it readily to accept and adopt an entirely different meaning of the passage. This is the significance of the expression-ayam vakyārtho yuktah anyo vā (whether this meaning or something else is justified.) T.C., in the following passages defines this disposition as cittasya tat-prāvanyarūpā śravanādi-tritayānugatā upāsanā vivaksitā. The idea intended is that of upāsanā, meditation which forms the essence of śravana etc., the three-fold discipline being at the same time the disposition of mind characterised as bhagavadekanisthatā, the state of being fixed only to Bhagavān in entire exclusion of other entities. The same idea is further justified by N.S., showing at the same time how manana and manana alone is the origin of Sastra and thereby pointing to the fact that sravana and nididhyāsana are in essence not different from manana as one gives rise to manana and the other brings manana to its culmination and thereby justifying the passage of T.Pr., which means all the three by jijnāsā. At the close of this discussion prakāša significantly concludes tathāca jijnāsā-sabdasya-vicāra-mātrārthakatvam prāguktam yuktamiti bhāvah (In the light of the whole discussion the text aims at showing that the position which was stated in a previous passage that the word jijnāsā means only vicāra has every justification). It may also be noted how the whole discussion illustrates that the study of Sāstra is not speculative. It is life itself. It presents a discipline to life. With the adoption of this discipline alone Sāstra can be appreciated. Hence Sāstra is as much the science of life, as it is the Science of Knowledge. The life of discipline is that of knowledge and śravana, manana and nididhyāsana are different stages or aspects of this life.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XVIII

JIJÑĀSĀ MEANS VICĀRA IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

1

T.C., considers further that $vic\bar{a}ra$ alone is the real meaning of $jij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}s\bar{a}$. Without this consideration the fact that the word $jij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}s\bar{a}$ of $S\bar{u}tra$ means $vic\bar{a}ra$ cannot be determined and the discussion we had so far becomes irrelevant to $S\bar{u}tra$. Hence T.C., first discusses the position taken by other thinkers as:

'yastu pamchapādī-vivaraņayoruktam avayava-śaktyā jñānecchā vācino jijñāsā-śabdasya vicāre lakṣaṇayā prayoga-pratyayayoh upapattau na śaktyamtara-kalpanam. ananyathā-siddha-kāryāmtarābhāvāditi jijñāsā-śabdo vicāre lākṣaṇiko na tu rūḍhaḥ iti.

(Painchapādī and Vivarana hold the following position: "The word jijāāsā by the denoting power of its parts means desire for knowledge. In a secondary sense the same word may be used in the sense of vicāra and the usage as well as the idea of vicāra may be obtained by it. If this position can reasonably be held, then no other relation between the word and its meaning need be assumed. Nor is there any purpose to be served only by means of primary relation. Therefore the word jijāāsā means vicāra only in a secondary sense but not in the primary sense by usage." This position does not hold good.)

Supposing that this position were final, then there would have been no room for holding that vicāra characterises Śāstra. For, the word used by Sūtra is jijāāsā, and according to this position it primarily means desire for knowledge. In this case there is every reason to characterise Śāstra by desire and this ends in denying Vicāra-Śāstra as such. Further there is no necessity for assuming a secondary meaning. Śāstra which is through and through of the character of vicāra can never be based on this weak position, namely a secondary meaning of a word

which is of the most primary importance. Therefore T.C., refutes this position as:

yatah jijnāsā-sabdato hi icchām ajnātvaiva vijānate vicāram laukikāh, tena tatrāyam rūdha işyate. anyathā manţapādīnām grhādau syāt na rūdhatā. gamgā-sabdāt-tu tīrādih taddhīpūrvam prakāsyate. tathāhi. jijnāsā-sabdāt mīmāmsā-sabdādiva icchāpratītyabhāvepi vicārah pratīyate. anyathā bubhutsā-padādapi vilambena taddhī-sambhavānniyamena vicāre jijnāsā-padam na prayujyeta. svīkrtaścu tvayāpi "vicāra-sādhya-jñānecchā jijñāsāśabdat pratiyate. nopadeśa-matra-sadhya-jñana-vişaya." iti vadata vicāra-pratīteķ icchā-pratīti-pūrvakatvābhāvaķ. evam tadvijijnāsasvetyādau asminisca sūtre vidhau na lakṣaṇā . . . kim ca tvanmate jñāna-sāmānyecchāyāḥ kvāpyabhāvāt aparoksecchāyām ca jijñāsāśabdasya avayava-śaktyabhāvāt samudāya-śakteh kalpyatvāvisese vicāre samudāya-śaktih aparoksechāyām ca laksanā ityeva kim na syāt. etena jijnāsā-sabda-vācyayā icchayā ākṣipto vicārah iha vidhīyate iti vivaranābhipretam matāmtaram nirastam. vicārākşepasya bhāmatī-nirāsāvasare nirākarisyamānatvācca. tasmāt jijñāsā-sabdah vicāre rūdha eva.

(Those people of the world who have discriminating power understand vicāra by the word jijāsā without being conscious of icchā (desire). From this it follows that this word is by usage fixed to this meaning viz., vicāra. If this conclusion is not accepted then the words manṭapa etc., ought not to mean house etc., by means of usage. By means of the word Gamgā etc., the meaning bank etc., is understood only after the person becomes conscious of the river Gamgā, the primary meaning of the word. The same idea is further explained. By means of the word jijāsā just as by means of the word mīmāmsā though there is no consciousness of desire there is the consciousness of vicāra.

[Prakāša says that the example of mīmāmsā is taken to illustrate svārtha eva sano vidhānam, the use of suffix san is intended just to state the meaning of the root according to māna vicārane ityasmāt mānbadhādān sānbhyo dīrghaścābhyāsasya—The same idea is further supported as—ata eva vṛttau māneh jijfiāsā-yām sannityuktam iti bhāvah (It is stated in vṛtti that the suffix san fixes māna to the meaning of jijfiāsā). This passage illustrates how in these works jijfiāsā is taken to mean primarily

vicāra.] This is proved by the equation, "māna vicāraņe =

māna jijnāsāyām."

Disregarding all this if it is insisted that vicāra is the secondary meaning of jijāāsā, then as the same idea of vicāra may somehow result from the expression bubhutsā, the word jijāāsā ought not to be used as a rule to denote vicāra.

[Whenever $vic\bar{a}ra$ is meant by those that are expert in language only the word $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ is used. From this it follows that $vic\bar{a}ra$ is the primary meaning of $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$. A rule emerges from this discussion that whichever meaning comes to the mind immediately after the consciousness of the word it becomes the primary meaning of the word. $T.C_c$, further notes that this rule is tacitly admitted by the opponent also in so far as he becomes conscious of $vic\bar{a}ra$ after he becomes conscious of the word $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$.]

It is accepted by you also the fact that the word jijāāsā gives rise to the consciousness of vicāra without giving rise to the consciousness of icchā, desire. This is evident by the manner in which you state your position that by means of the word jijāāsā is meant the desire for obtaining the knowledge which is produced by vicāra; but this desire does not relate to the knowledge produced only by teaching, upadeša.

[Against this it cannot be supposed that bank etc., ought not to be considered to be the secondary meaning of the words Gamgā etc., and the relation of these two ought to be primary i.e. rūdhi. For it is already observed that in the case of these words bank etc., the meaning given becomes the object of consciousness only after there is the consciousness of the primary meaning. But the same fact does not apply to the present case viz., the case of jijāāsā meaning vicāra.]

Similarly there is no secondary sense with regard to vidhi, injunction as meaning of the passage "Enquire into it"

as well as the present Sūtra.

Further the position you advocate is not consistent with your other positions. You never hold that the word jijjiāsā means jjiānasāmānyecchā, desire for knowledge in general. If you hold that it means the desire for aparokṣa (immediate apprehension or realisation) then this desire is not the meaning that is literally meant by the parts of the word. So

you have to assume that the whole word means it. If so, i.e. if what you say is only an assumption, then why is it not possible to hold that jijñāsā as a whole word means literally vicāra and only in a secondary sense desire for aparokṣa? By the same consideration another position stated by Vivaraṇa becomes refuted and this position is "Herein is enjoined vicāra indicated (ākṣipta) by desire which is denoted by the word jijñāsā." Further in connection with refuting the criticism of Bhāmatī against vicāra the same position upheld by Vivaraṇa will be refuted. Therefore the word jijñāsā means vicāra purely primarily by usage.)

With regard to this passage the following may be noted. The example of how people understand vicāra by jijāāsā immediately after being conscious of this word must not be taken to signify that the author is basing his position on the manner in which commonsense people behave. He rather insists on the necessity for tracing common experience to its origin. His idea is that if jijāāsā does not primarily mean vicāra, then a common man can never understand vicāra immediately after he becomes conscious of this word.

II

T.C., considers Rāmānuja's position with regard to the meaning of jijāāsā.

"kecittu jijāāsā-sabdo rūḍhyā lakṣaṇayā vā vicāram nārpayati nāpyarthādākṣipati; kimtvicchārtha eva. tathāpīcchāyāḥ
viṣaya-vailakṣaṇyādhīnatvena avidheyatvāt. icchāmprati karmībhūtam iṣyamāṇam vicārātmakam tarkarūpam jāānam vidheyam.
yadyapi jijāsā kartavyeti pratyayārtha-bhūta-icchāyāḥ kartavyatvam bhāti na tu jāānasya. tathāpi "snātvā bhumjīta, prānmukho
bhumjīta" ityatra bhuji-dhātoḥ vidhipratyayāmtatvena bhojanasya
kartavyatve pratītepi tasya rāgataḥ prāptatvena aprāptayoḥ
snāna-prāmukhatvayoḥ vidheḥ tātparyam. na ca etāvatā bhujidhātoḥ snāne rūḍhih lakṣaṇā vā ākṣepakatā vā asti. evam ihāpi
icchāyāḥ avidheyatvāt vicārātmakam jāānam vidheyam. na tu
jijāāsā-sabdasya vicāre rūḍhyādiḥ ityāhuḥ." tanna.

(Some say "The word jijnāsā neither in the primary nor in the secondary sense presents vicāra; nor does it hint at vicāra. It simply means icchā, desire. Yet icchā is viṣaya-vailakṣanyā-

adhīna, dependent on the individuality of the object. For this reason it is incapable of being enjoined. So, what is enjoined is knowledge. This knowledge is tarka-rūpa, of the form of tarka, (reasoning) and it is vicārātmaka, of the essence of vicāra (cogitation). It is this knowledge that is desired and it is the object of icchā. Jijnāsā kartavyā is however the expression of Sūtra. In the word jijnāsā the suffix means icchā and the state of being $kartavy\bar{a}$ is attributed to it, but not to $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$, knowledge. This is the surface meaning of the expression. Yet taking similar cases of expression, for example,-" One ought to take food after having bath" and "One ought to take food facing the East," it is observed that in these cases the mark of injunction is laid on the root bhuji. From this results the apparent idea that the state of being kartavyā is attributed to taking food. But taking food is caused by attachment. Taking bath and facing the East are not caused in this manner. Therefore the injunction seeks to fall on these facts. But from this it does not follow that taking food is the primary meaning of the root, bhuji; nor is it the secondary meaning; nor is it the meaning indicated. Similarly in the present case also icchā cannot be enjoined and therefore knowledge which is of the character of vicara is the object of injunction. But from this it does not follow that the word jijñāsā primarily or in any other sense means vicāra." This is the position of Rāmānuja and it does not hold good)-

T.C., continues to discuss why Rāmānuja's position is wrong:

snānādikam hi prādhānyena apratītatvāt vidhātum yuktam. iha tu jñānam icchām prati karmatayā prādhānyena pratītam iti katham tadvirodhinī vidheyatā? na hi svarga-kāma-padena icchāviṣayatayā pratītah svargo vidheyaḥ. kim ca prānmukho bhumjītetyādau vidheya-prānmukhādeḥ āśrayam arpayitum bhuji-dhātuḥ sārthakaḥ. prakṛte tu vidheya-jñānam prati icchāyāḥ āśrayatvādya-bhāvāt tadvijijnāsasveti śrutau sūtre ca san-pratyayo vyarthaḥ kim ca jānāteḥ pramitau svārasyāt sanvācyāyāḥ icchāyāḥ ca pramiti-rūpa-phala-viṣayatvasya svarasatvāt na sannamta-jānāteḥ tarka-rūpa-jñāna-paratā. kim ca tvatpakṣe vicāra-kartavyatāyāḥ mānāntara-prāptatvāt śrotavya-ityādi-vākyavat sūtramapi anu-vādakameva syāt iti katham vidhāyakatoktiḥ. kathamiti aprāptisampādane tu śrotavya ityādirapi vidhiḥ syāi. tasmāt jāšā-

śabdasya ichārthatve vidhyasambhavāt, tadvidhyartham saḥ rūḍhyā vicāra-paraḥ.

(With reference to the expressions cited, for example, 'taking bath, etc., are not understood prominently. Therefore there is justification to enjoin them. But in the present case knowledge is the object of desire and therefore it is understood prominently. How can there be the injunction against it? This may be illustrated by taking for example the expression svarga-kāmo yajeta (One who desires svarga ought to sacrifice)]. By the word svarga-kāma, svarga is presented as the object of icchā and it is not that which is enjoined. Further with reference to the expressions like one ought to take food facing the East,' facing the East is what is enjoined. The root bhuji presents the purpose of this act. Hence its place in the expression is justified. But in the present case for the knowledge which is enjoined desire is not the purpose and there are similar difficulties. So its place i.e., the place of the suffix san in the expression of Śruti, tadvijijnāsasva and Sūtra, is meaningless. Further the root jānāti means by nature knowledge as knowledge. Icchā denoted by san has by nature knowledge as knowledge as its object. So, to hold that the word jānāti which is sannanta i.e. jijnāsā means that the idea of knowledge characterised as tarka is unwarranted.-

[Prakāša adds:-jūāna-sāmānye šaktasya jānāteh tarkajūāna-rūpa-višesa-paratvasya anucitatvādityapi dhyeyam. (Jānāti, the root in jijūāsā means knowledge as such. To confine it to a particular case of knowledge called tarka-rūpa i.e. the knowledge characterised as tarka is therefore not justified. This fact also deserves notice)].

Further according to your position the statement śrotavyah etc., is only a case of restatement [because the indispensability of vicāra is made known to you by means of a different pramāna viz., sati vicāre jñānam, anyathā na iti anvaya-vyatireka-rūpamānāntaram. (If there is vicāra then, there is knowledge, otherwise there is no knowledge.) This is the method of agreement and difference and it is that which is denoted by the word mānāntara. The word śrotavya only restates it.] Similarly for the same reason Sūtra also can be considered to be only a restatement. If

this is the correct implication of your position, then how is the expression that Sūtra is the statement of injunction justified?

[Prakāša introduces the following statement of T.C., as: nanu jijnāsā-mātra-prāptāvapi karma-vicārānantarya-višistam na prāptam ityata āha kathamciditi. (There is something to say in favour of the opponent's position. Though by means of other pramānas only jijnāsā is made familiar, the fact that it must follow karma-vicāra, enquiry into karma is not made familiar. Hence the fact that vicāra which is qualified as coming after karma-vicāra is enjoined by Sūtra. If this is stated against the previous conclusion, then T.C., says)

If in some sense unfamiliarity of what is enjoined is held, then srotavya etc., also ought to be considered to be a case of injunction. Therefore if the word jijāāsā means desire, then Sūtra cannot be an injunction. But Sūtra is a vidhi, injunction. Consistently with this fact the word, jijāāsā primarily i.e. by means of usage ought to mean vicāra].

III

With regard to this discussion the following may be noted. Rāmānuja's main position is that vicāra does not enter into the body of the meaning of jijnāsā and even if it is somehow connected with it, it is nothing but Tarka, reasoning in the usual sense. Consistently with this idea vicāra becomes foreign to Sūtra. To relate it to Sūtra may not be justified at all, if even without it Sūtra can be interpreted. In fact it is interpreted by Rāmānuja himself. If his is the only interpretation of Sūtra and with it the position of Sūtra cannot be justified, then it necessarily follows that Sūtra-teaching itself is fallacious. If so where is the necessity for bringing in a foreign idea in order to justify it? If Sūtra is pramāna then it must be so on its own merits. If it suffers from internal discrepancy it can never be made Pramāna by external circumstances. Further by confining vicāra to tarka the significance of vicāra is practically negated. It may however be noted that no tarka in the sense that Rāmānuja has accepted ever helps the knowledge of Brahman which is *śrutyukta*. This knowledge is obtained only by the evaluation, vicāra of the meaning of Sruti. Rāmānuja's tarka based on the empirical considerations never touches vicāra denoted by the word jijnāsā of Sūtra. Further it has already been shown how jijnāsā does not presuppose karma-vicāra. Further the position that śrotavya etc., is only a restatement of something that is already known brings down Śruti to the level of ordinary experience and in the presence of this idea Śruti can never work as the highest pramāna and the qualification of Brahman as śrutyukta loses all its significance. Hence the position of Rāmānuja never helps us in considering Brahman as expounded by Śruti.

IV

Further it must be kept in mind that all the points discussed so far in favour of Sāstra are necessarily the implications of T.Pr., and they are not things imagined by particular writers. To a general reader the truth of this position becomes clear as the works of Jayatīrtha are studied more and more widely. Prakāša recognizes that all that is discussed with reference to the meaning of jijāāsā is actually implied by T.Pr., as: uktam tīkārūdham karoti—tadetaditi (T.C., shows how all that is stated is implied in T.Pr., as tadetat etc.

T.C., tadetadāha na ca śravaņāderasanvācyatā iti.

(T.Pr., states all that which is so far discussed as: It does not hold good that, that *śravana* etc., cannot be denoted by san.)

The point is this. Jijnasā is the word presented by Sūtra. It is a compound word. Its root is jānāti and the suffix san is added to it. San, the suffix is generally taken by grammarians to mean icchā. For this reason to consider śravaņa etc., to be the meaning of jijnāsā has become difficult. Having all those positions that do not hold that jijnasa means vicara in view, T.Pr., points out in this passage the idea that governs all those positions. T.Pr., indicates that all those positions seem to have forgotten that they are expounding Sastra. They value certain ideas presented by works on Grammar more than the requirements of Sāstra and consequently in place of understanding Brahma-Vidyā as Sarva-Vidyā-Pratisthā they see that Sarva-Vidyā as Brahma-Vidyā-Pratisthā. T.Pr., cuts at the very root of this illusion by boldly asserting that śravana etc., are actually denoted by san, the suffix coming after the root jānāti and thereby emphasises the rule that it is Sāstra that must govern Grammar but not vice versa. The expression sanvācyatā of T.Pr., is equivalent to $icch\bar{a}rthaka$ -san-pratyayānta-jijīāsā-pada- $v\bar{a}cyat\bar{a}$. (The state of being denoted by the word $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ which is terminated by the suffix san, meaning $icch\bar{a}$, desire.) This is denied by T.Pr., by means of a in the expression $asan-v\bar{a}cyat\bar{a}$ and it is shown how the thing denoted by this word i.e. $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ is no other than sravana etc.

T.Pr., presents several reasons for its conclusion as: jijñāsitam susampannam iti vicārepi tat-prayogāt.

(Because the word is used also in the sense of vicāra in the passage jijāāsitam susampannam.)

Bh.D., makes the idea clear as:

jijnāsitam susampannam api te mahadadbhutam iti prathamaskamdhe. su-sampannam paripūrņam mahaduttamam āścaryatamam ca brahma te jijnāsitam vicāritam khalu iti nāradena vedavyāsam prati ukte vākye vicārepi prayogāt tasya tatra mīmāmsā-padavat rūdhirityarthah. yatra arthasya visamvādah pratyakṣeṇopalabhyate svara-samskāra-mātrārthā tatra vyākaraṇasmṛtiḥ ityukteḥ sādhutva-mātra-parā vyākaraṇa-smṛtiriti bhāvaḥ. tathā ca manana-rūpa-vicāre mukhyena jijnāsā-śabdena chatrinyāyena lakṣaṇayā tritayopādānam sūtre tadvijijnāsasvetyādi śrutau ca yuktam iti bhāvaḥ.

(Prathama-Skamdha [Bhāgavatam] says "By you is indeed enquired into that which is su-sampannam mahat and adbhutam." Su-sampannam means paripūrņam, that which is absolutely complete. Mahat means uttamam, that which is supreme, being the one origin of all. Adbhutam ca means āścarya-tamam ca, also the most wonderful, transcending all comprehension. 'This truth, Brahman is indeed vicārita, discussed by you. This is the statement made by Nārada to Vedavyāsa. [In this statement the word jijnasita is used in the sense of vicarita.] So the word jijñāsā is used in the sense of vicāra. This means that vicāra, just as it is the primary meaning of the word mīmāmsā, is the primary meaning of jijñāsā. This is the meaning of T.Pr. It is said "With reference to a word if the meaning given by Grammar is found to be irrelevant by direct observation, then the function, of *Vyākarana*, Grammar consists only in purifying *svara*, sound." This is the practice handed down through tradition. Hence Grammar in this connection refers only to the soundness of

the word. [From this it follows that with reference to Sāstra Grammar is respected only in so far as it is useful to it.] Therefore the word jijnāsā in its primary sense means vicāra in the sense of manana, [but not in the sense of tarka.] By this word occurring in Sūtra and in Śruti, tadvijijnāsasva, etc., following nyāya called chatri-nyāya expressed as chatriņo yānti [people with umbrella are moving] in a secondary sense, the collocation of the three śravana etc., is understood. This is the idea contained in the passage.)

In the above expression, 'people with umbrella' etc., by the word people is meant also those that have no umbrella as it is natural that in a crowd people with and without umbrella are both found. Similarly in the present case by jijnāsā is also

meant śravana and nididhyāsana.

Hence jijnāsā means vicāra in Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

(Penhama-Shamitha (Bhdgaratasi) say to is indeed enquired into that which is meanignment means and otherant. Susantpannant means pariturem, that which is absolutely The sumperson means naturally, that which is supreme, being complete. Malas means astronomy, that which is supreme, being the one origin of all. Adbiatait on means according to most wonderful, transcending all comprehension. This also the cruth, Brajanan is indeed richna, discussed by you. This is the statement made by Narada to Vedavyšsa. [In this estatement she word fifthesia is used in the sense of richnal Bo she word fifthesia is used in the sense of richnal to the primary meaning of the word minumes is the primary meaning of the word minumes is the primary meaning of the word minumes is the primary meaning of the word minumes of TV. It is said to the version of the contraction of the contraction, then the function of the word, then the function of the word, could be according each the function. off selection, Grammer consists only in parifying wore, sound. "This is the practice branch down through tradition. Sience Grammer in this connection refers only to the coundress of

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CHAPTER XIX

VICĀRA IS ENJOINED IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

I

At this stage one may put a question. Jijnāsā means desire for knowledge also. If so, how are we wrong if we understand desire by the word? T.Pr., answers: desire by the word? desire by

([We are wrong] because desire is incapable of being enjoined)

The idea is that vicāra alone as the meaning of jijnāsā is

T.C., examines the position of Bhāmatī in this connection.

bhāamtyām tu na jijnāsā nāma vicārah, icchāyām san-vidhānāt. na ca śāstra-pravṛtyanga-viṣaya-prayojana-sūcanena svārtha-paratvopapatteli vicāre laksaņā yuktā. evam ca mumuksānamtaram brahma-jijnāsā bhavitum yuktetyeva śrauto arthah. vicārastvārthikorthah. jñātumicchā hi samdigdhe vişaye nirnayāya bhavati. nirnayasca vicāra-sādhya iti icchā-nimittena vicārāksepāt. ārthike cāsminnarthe kartavya-padādhyāhārāt ityuktam. tadapi na. vicāre rūdheḥ uktatvāt. vyākaraņasya sādhutva-mātra-paratvāt. uktam hi yatrārthasya visamvādah pratyaksenopalabhyate svarasamskāra-mātrārthā tatra vyākaraņa-smrtih iti. bhavatītyādyadhyāhārasya svatah siddhatvepi anuvādatva-prasangāt. tadvijijnāsasveti śrutyanusāriņā ca sūtrena icchāyāh avidheyatvena lakşanayāpi vicārasya vidheyatvāt. vişayādyabhāvāt icchābhāvam vadamtam prati icchayā visayādi-sūcanoktyayukteśca, kim ca evam sati tāvanmātreņa nairākānksyāt nārthika-vicāra-kartavyatāparatā yuktā. sāstrārambhavat tasya phalatvenaiva siddheh. katham ca vicāram vinā icchāyāh anupapattih. yena vicārākșepakatā, na hi kāraņasya kāryam vinā anupapattiķ, na ca icchā vicāra-sāmagrī. phalecchāyām satyāmapi sādhanānanusthānadarsanāt. tasmāt bhāmatyuktam ayuktam.

(In Bhāmatī it is indeed said "Jijnāsā does not mean vicāra. For san is observed to occur in the sense of icchā. There is no

justification to hold that it (jijnasa) means vicara in a secondary sense, as [there is room for holding that san does not mean anything beyond what is meant by the root janati] and the word can have its primary meaning because it indicates the subject-matter and purpose of Sāstra which are the prerequisites of the same. So the verbal meaning of [Sūtra] is 'After the desire for mokṣa the occurrence of brahma-jijñāsā is proper.' Enquiry (vicāra) becomes the meaning of the word jijnāsā only by way of association of ideas. It is indeed true that the desire for knowledge with regard to a doubtful object leads to determination. But determination is the work of vicāra. Hence by desire vicāra becomes suggested. Consistently with this suggested meaning the word kartavyā is understood i.e. kartavyā is taken to relate to this suggested meaning. Therefore [jijñāsā does not mean vicāra."] [This is the position stated in Bhāmatī.]

This position also does not hold good. For it has been already substantiated that the word jijñāsā means vicāra by usage. [It might be supposed that this position is opposed to the rule of Vyākaraṇa—dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkādicchāyām vā.]

But Vyākaraņa [in this context] is respected only in so far as it justifies the formation of the word. It is indeed said "In case the meaning given is observed to be wrong, the Science of Grammar is respected only in so far as it helps the formation of the word in question.

(Prakāśa brings out the idea as:

ghatam jijnāsate, ghatam bubhutsate, ityādau icchārthakatvena sanah sāvakāsatvāt. atra ca icchā-bodham vinaiva vicāra-bodhena artha-visamvādasya prāgeva daršitatvāt. brahma-jijnāsā, dharma-jijnāsā ityādau sādhutva-mātra-paratvam vyākaranasya ityarthah. (With reference to the expressions 'He discusses ghata', 'He knows ghata,' the suffix san is not found to mean icchā. By these expressions without any reference to icchā vicāra is understood. The fact that there is thus difference in the meaning [of San] is already explained in [T.C.]. So, with reference to the expressions brahma-jijnāsā, dharma-jijnāsā etc., Vyākarana holds good only in so far as it helps the apprehension of the soundness of the word. This is the intention of the passage.) [The same idea is illustrated by T.C., as shown

by the passage from Bh.D., which is already quoted and translated on p. 277. This discussion shows how as a rule with reference to the discussion of Truth, sense is more important than a mere rule.]

It is true that the understanding of the words such as bhavati (occurs) follows naturally with reference to every expression. But to understand such words at the end of Sūtra is to make Sūtra only a restatement. But Sūtra is consistent with Śruti, tadvijijñāsasva. It is a case of enjoinment. Icchā is not something to be enjoined. Hence it follows that vicāra is enjoined by Sūtra accepting even a secondary sense if it is necessary. Further to the opponent who denies the subject-matter etc., and on the basis of this denial denies icchā, it is irrelevant to say that by means of icchā the subject-matter etc. are indicated. Further if what you say is true, then only by that much a complete sense is obtained by Sūtra and there is therefore no necessity for going in for the indispensability of vicāra which is only the meaning suggested. Just as Sāstra results from icchā, vicāra also may result in the same manner. Further how is icchā irrelevant without suggesting vicāra? Why should vicāra be accepted as a meaning by suggestion by icchā? Is icchā karaṇa (proximate cause) of vicāra or sāmagrī, a condition that makes vicāra inevitable? In the former case it is wrong to say that a proximate cause is irrelevant, without effect; and in the latter case icchā is not observed as a condition of vicāra that makes it inevitable. For though there is the desire for the result in question a person is not observed to have undergone the discipline leading to the result. Therefore what Bhāmatī says is not supported by reason.)

> enthol, tulge monañ inchena-idanine en seo blavath tat-svendo-ennan**n**tal-viourek tulakete.

T.C., shows that which it has expounded is what T.Pr., intends to substantiate as:

tadetadāha, bhavatītyādi-kathanasya vaiyarthyāt. sūtram ca śrutyanusārīti.

"To understand bhavati and so on at the end of Sūtra serves no purpose; and Sūtra is consistent with Sruti,"

T.C., studies the further implications of this discussion.

etena kaumudyām yasmādadhikārinām¹ brahma-jñānecchā sampannā tasmāt brahma-vicāraḥ kartavyah ityavāmtara-vākye 'śrutyā icchā-paratvepi mohā-vākye lakṣaṇayā vicāra-paraḥ iti ubhayaparo jijñāsā-śabdaḥ. ata eva vicāre lākṣaṇikopi viṣayādi-sūcaka iti yaduktam tadapi nirastam. yugapad-vṛttidvaya-prasaṅgāt. uktarītyā viṣaya-phalayoḥ anyathaiva sūcana-sambhavena jijñāsāśabdasya icchā-paratve mānābhāvācca. adhyāhāra-sāpekṣāvāmtaravākya-bhedādi-kalpanānupapatteśca. tasmāt jijñāsā-śabdo vicāraparaḥ, necchā-para iti.

(In the light of the refutation of Bhāmatī the position that Kaumudī mentions, "For the reason that to the persons that are fitted the desire for the knowledge of Brahman has occurred, enquiry into Brahman becomes indispensable. Though the word jijñāsā may apparently mean icchā with reference to this particular statement, yet with reference to the whole passage it means in a secondary sense vicāra; [Prakāša says: adhikārinām brahma-jñānecchā-bhavatīti avāmtara-vākyam, yasmādityādi mahā-vākya-pradaršanam. ('To the persons that are fitted the desire for the knowledge of Brahman has occurred') is the particular statement. The statement of Kaumudī beginning with yasmāt 'for the reason that,' is the whole passage]. Thus the word jijnāsā has both the meanings and for the same reason 'though it is taken to mean vicāra in a secondary sense it indicates subject-matter etc.' also becomes refuted.)

[Prakāśa makes the same position more intelligible as:

etena dharma-vicārānantaram sivārādhana-rūpa-dharmānuṣṭhānavisuddha-cittasya vivekādi-sampatyā brahma-jñānecchā bhavatīti śrautorthaḥ. tadiṣyamāṇam brahma-jñānam vicāramantareṇana bhavatīti tat-svarūpa-pramāṇādi-vicārah tadākṣiptortha iti śivārkamaṇi-dīpikoktam nirastam iti dhyeyam, vistarastu nyāyamauktika-mālāyām jñeyaḥ.

(It must be noted that by refuting Bhāmatī the position of Śivārkamani-Dīpikā: "After enquiry into Dharma to the person who has purity of mind obtained by the worship of Śiva occurs [the discipline] discrimination between the endur-

¹ It must be noted how adhikāra is not required for enquiry according to Samkara. So the use of the word adhikārinām is unwarranted in this passage.

ing and the non-enduring etc., and thereby follows the desire for the knowledge of Brahman. This is the verbal meaning. This knowledge which is desired does not occur without vicāra. Therefore enquiry into the nature of Brahman and into the nature of the source of the knowledge of Brahman is indicated by [the verbal meaning]" becomes refuted. The details of this refutation are given in Nyāya-Mauktika-Mālā.)

If the position presented by Kaumudī were true, then a word ought to have simultaneously two meanings and this is a psychological impossibility. As it is already explained the indication of subject-matter and result can be had in a different manner. Therefore to hold that the word jijnāsā means desire has nothing to justify it. Further there is no room for supposing distinctions like particular statement, whole passage and so on, as these distinctions cannot be had unless some foreign ideas are imported to Sūtra. [The idea is that a statement ought to be clear and definite in all its aspects and it is just what is not found in the statement of the opponent.] Therefore the word jijāāsā literally means vicāra but not icchā).

III

We have studied so far in the light of the explanation presented by T.C., showing at the same time fallacies that beset the interpretation that in any sense modifies the importance of vicāra by removing it in any manner from the word jijnāsā, how T.Pr., maintains that jijnāsā means nothing but vicāra consisting of sravana etc. The whole discussion is not a mere question of finding out the verbal meaning of the word jijnasa. Its significance is very profound. As has been already explained in my "The Dvaita Philosophy and Its place in the Vedānta", the philosophical value of a Vedānta is signified by how the propounder of the system interprets jijnasa. In the light of the foregoing considerations there are mainly two courses of interpretation. Jijnāsā may be taken to mean icchā or it may be taken to mean vicāra. The foregoing discussion has shown to us that both icchā and vicāra are the verbal or primary meaning of the word jijnasa. The selection of either therefore by a particular exponent shows the disposition of his mind. To mean icchā by the word makes vicāra forced on Sūtra however learnedly jijnāsā is made to refer to it. In this circumstance in some sense or other knowledge in question is separated from vicāra even though it is taken to be the result of vicāra. For knowledge in question is conceived independently of vicāra and subsequently it is artificially connected with vicāra, assuming at the same time that vicāra is the cause of knowledge. It may however be noted that this bifurcation at some stage or other gives a secondary place to vicāra and primary place to knowledge. It is exactly at this point various concepts like faith, instruction, etc., that are foreign to Sūtra are made to enter into Sāstra and gradually they become all in all and Vicāra-Sāstra becomes finally dispensed with.

If on the other hand without any reserve if the word jijnāsā is naturally taken to mean vicāra, then on the part of the person in question entirely different disposition is disclosed. For after having fixed this meaning to Sūtra he sees with reference to every circumstance the indispensability of vicāra. In his case the emphasis is on vicāra, but not on knowledge. It is vicāra that leads him, but not knowledge of some kind or desire for knowledge. In fact having appreciated the indispensability of vicāra, he is not conscious of any other possibility that stands on a par with vicāra. The philosophical insight is exhibited in the very selection of vicāra as the meaning of vicārā

Further even to speak of two alternatives in this connection is itself not justified especially when vicāra is one of the alternatives. The two alternatives must be mutually exclusive in their implications. It is obvious how vicāra as the meaning of jijñāsā is independent of icchā. But is icchā as the meaning of jijñāsā independent of vicāra? The answer is in the negative. Without vicāra of some value how can icchā be fixed as the meaning of jijñāsā? Icchā in fact presupposes vicāra and vicāra gives birth to the idea of icchā as the meaning of the word. So, to ignore vicāra at the stage of fixing the literal or primary

meaning of jijñāsā is a mistake.

Further to relate it to *icchā* in some manner or other is to make the whole position purely artificial. Further the position of those that hold that *jijñāsā* means *icchā* and that *vicārā* is the secondary meaning involves contradiction

in thought. If jijñāsā means icchā, then how can they be conscious of vicāra at least to hold that it is the secondary meaning? If they are necessarily conscious of vicāra in this connection whatever their subsequent suppositions be, it follows that they are made conscious of vicāra by the word jijñāsā. Further T.C.'s refutation of several positions that modify the importance of vicāra gives us the principle of discussion which helps us in meeting similar difficulties.

Further in the course of discussion we came across a note on the limit of influence of $Vy\bar{a}karana$ on the expression of $S\bar{a}stra$. A right appreciation of the implication of this limit tells us that $vic\bar{a}ra$ that characterises $S\bar{a}stra$ is bound by nothing external to it, be it a great system of thought or of language enjoying its own reputation. Further $vic\bar{a}ra$ is never tarka in the sense of empirical reasoning. It is enquiry into the meaning of Vedic statement, $veda-v\bar{a}kya$. $Vic\bar{a}ra$ is therefore the starting-point of $S\bar{a}stra$. It is the life of $S\bar{a}stra$. It is the goal of $S\bar{a}stra$. It is the expression of $pras\bar{a}da$ of $pras\bar{a}da$ of $pras\bar{a}da$. We find its culmination in attaining to $pras\bar{a}da$.

IV

T.C., further explains how jijāāsā i.e. vicāra is that of the meaning of the Vedic passages, veda-vakyārtha. Prakāša introduces the topic as:

evam sūtrāvayava-padānām arthali savistaram nirūpitali. sūtra-tātparyam ca nirūpitam tatra kecidāhuli. athāto dharma-jijnāsetyanena sakala-vedārtha-vicārasya uktatvāt, dharma-padasya vedārthopalaksakatvāt, brahma-jijnāsāyāli codanālaksanameva. "codanā-laksanārtho dharmah" iti dharma-rūpatvācca sarva-vedasya tatra vicāritatvāt, nedamārmabhanīyam iti asyāli sankāyāli svamatena parihāram cikīrsuli paroktam nirasyati yat tu paraili iti.

(Thus the meaning of the words that constitute the Sūtra was with sufficient elaboration explained. The intended meaning of the Sūtra was also substantiated. With reference to the position expounded some hold "By the Pūrva-Mīmānisā-Sūtra 'Then therefore enquiry into Dharma' the enquiry into the meaning of the whole Veda is contemplated. The word

Dharma stands for what the whole of Veda means. Therefore enquiry into Brahman is the subject-matter of command and for this reason consistently with the conception of Dharma as 'Dharma is that which is the subject-matter of command' the enquiry into Brahman is Dharma itself. Hence in expounding Dharma the whole Veda becomes considered. For this reason, this Śāstra namely, Brahma-Mīmāmsā has no necessity to appear." In order to meet this difficulty from the stand-point of Brahma-Mīmāmsā the author of T.C., shows [first] defects in the method employed by the opponents (followers of śamkara) with a view to meeting the same difficulty as:

yat tu paraih asya śāstrasya pūrva-tantrena gatārthatvam āśamkya tatra kāryanistha-vedabhāgo vicāritah, iha tu vastutatva-nistho vicāryate ityagatārthatvamuktam. tanna.

(Fearing that this Sāstra may be taken to have been included in Pūrva-Mīmāmsā it is held by others [the followers of śamkara] "By Pūrva-Tamtra that part of Veda which deals with kārya, that which is to be furnished is considered and by this Sāstra that part of Veda which deals with what is given as already furnished is considered and for this reason Brahma-Mimāmsā cannot be included in Pūrva-Mīmāmsā." But this position does not hold good.)

As I have already discussed in The Dvaita Philosophy and Its Place in the Vedānta, these thinkers by means of bifurcating the Veda into two parts, one being devoted to karma and the other to Brahman have practically introduced self-contradiction into Veda. Karma and Brahman are irrelevant to each other. Karma is negation of knowledge and Brahman is an expression of knowledge. Even supposing that there are two divisions of Veda, and the two things are dealt with by the two divisions we cannot hold that both the divisions are absolute. If they were, one part of Veda ought to sublate the other. In the presence of this contradiction, only one part can be true. If on the other hand one part is made subservient to the other, then it follows that somehow the whole Veda can be reduced to one meaning. In this case bifurcation of Veda becomes meaning less. So T.C., refutes the position of bifurcation as follows:

ihātatva-bhūtopāsya-savišeşa-brahma-vicārasya upāsanā-pāde tadvidhi-vicārasya ca ayogāt, na ca upāsanā manmate iva tvanmate mokṣa-sādhanam. yena phala-sādhanādiyukta-brahmavicāra-pratijñānāt tadvicārah samgaccheta. tvanmate upāsanāyāh mānasatvena vidyā-sāmyepi anitya-phalatvāt heyatvācca tadvākyānām atatvāvedakatvāt. udgīthādyupāsanānām karmāśritatvācca 'samudram manasā-dhyāyīta' ityādi-vākya-vihita-samudra-dhyānādivat karma-kāmda eva upāsanāyāh vicāro yuktah. nirvišeṣajñānārthatvāt upāsanāyāh iha vicāre ca yāgādi-nitya-karmaṇāmapi tadarthatvāt, mānasa-samkalpa-rūpatayā upāsanāvadvidyāsāmyācca tadvicāropi ihaiva syāt. tasmāt sarvasyāpi vedasya brahma-paratvāt sarvopi ihaiva vicāryah. karma-deva-mīmāmsayoh vedaikadeša-mātra-tātparya-viṣaya-karma-devatā-vicāra iti.

([If what you say were true then] the discussion of the qualified Brahman which is the subject-matter of meditation and which is not a fact cannot have a place in this Adhikarana. Further in the Upāsanā-Pāda, the section on meditation the discussion. of the injunction of the same cannot have place. Further according to your position what is called upāsanā, meditation is not the means for obtaining moksa as it is according to my position. How can then it follow that there is the discussion of upasana in the sense you hold, because there is the statement of the discussion of Brahman along with its result, its means and so on? According to your position as upāsanā is a state of manas (mind) it may appear to be intellectual i.e., it may appear to have the character of knowledge, yet its result is not enduring. [For this reason it has no place in this Sāstra which has in view the result enduring in character.] Further according to your position upāsanā is heya, something to be discarded. Hence the passages that present the idea of upāsanā are not those that present truth. [Therefore the consideration of these passages have no place in this Sāstra which is wholly devoted to the consideration of truth, tattva.] Upāsanā of udgītha etc., [according to aumityetadakṣaram udgīthamupāsīta etc., (The letter aum ought to be meditated upon as udgītha etc.,)] is dependent on karma. For these reasons upāsanā in the sense you have accepted ought to be discussed only in Karma-Kanda just as the meditation on the sea according to the statement 'The sea ought to be meditated on by means of mind'. In case you hold that upāsanā is discussed here because it helps the knowledge of the unqualified, then, [according to karmanā jñānamātanoti one furnishes knowledge by means of karma] as the nityakarmas consisting in yāga, sacrifice etc., are supposed to help knowledge they ought to be discussed here in this Šāstra alone, as they also are of the nature of intention, samkalpa, a state of manas and have their objects similar to that of meditation. Therefore [if the inclusion of Brahma-Mīmāmsā in Karma-Mīmāmsā were to be avoided i.e., if the individuality of Brahma-Mīmāmsā were to be recognised, then] you ought to hold that the whole Veda considers Brahman, the only subject-matter of the whole Veda without any modification and for this reason the whole Veda ought to be considered only in this Šāstra.

[Prakāša adds 'šabda-jātasya sarvasya yat pramāṇašca nirṇayah' iti smrteh iti bhāvah. (Śabda as such in every case has its meaning fixed by the standard given by Sūtra. Because of this teaching of smṛti [that which is stated by T.C., is correct.] This is the idea of T.C.) This idea is already explained in a previous passage. This passage being quoted in this connection shows with what seriousness the author of Prakāša adopts the rule the passage lays down. He refers to N.S., for further substantiation as: uktam ca sudhāyāmeva samādhānam. 'sa eva sarva vedārthah' ityadi-vyākhyāvasare. (The further substantiation of this position is presented by N.S., in connection with explaining An. V., as 'It alone is the meaning of the whole Veda.') What are then the fields of Karma-Mīmāmsā and Deva-Mīmāmsā. T.C., answers]

But in Karma-Mīmāmsā and Deva-Mīmāmsā there is the discussion of Karma and Devatā which form the subject-matter of the intention expressed only by particular portions of Veda.)

V

With reference to this discussion the following points may be noted. According to $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}-v\bar{a}da$, the subject-matter of $vic\bar{a}ra$ is saguna; but the truth is mirguna. This dualism is removed in $Brahma-M\bar{i}m\bar{a}m\bar{s}\bar{a}$. Herein that which is discussed is the very truth that admits of nothing higher and nothing equal. The statement against the opponent that karma or meditation based on karma ought not to be discussed in this $S\bar{a}stra$ clearly illustrates how in this $S\bar{a}stra$ nothing short of knowledge in its genuine sense does not find a place. A note on $Karma-M\bar{i}m\bar{a}ms\bar{a}$ and

Deva-Mīmāmsā shows how they are based on only particular portions of Veda abstracted from the rest of Veda. Therefore they cannot enjoy truth. Hence in this circumstance the discussion of the whole Veda with reference to a single truth taught by it is an absolute necessity. If the whole Veda is devoted to Brahman, then naturally the positions based on particular portions of Veda automatically disappear giving place to Brahman. In this circumstance, even to suppose that they are opposed to the whole position becomes irrelevant. For the very idea that they are based on particular portions of Veda itself is a powerful refutation of them. Karma or Deva-Mīmāmsā is refuted in this manner by the very fact of its being based on fractions of Veda. The same difficulty applies also to the conception of Brahman based on only the so-called mahā-vākyās or jñāna-kāmda. For the so-called mahā-vākya or jñāna-kāmda is nothing but abstraction of particular statements from the rest of Veda. If Veda is pramāņa, then it is pramāņa as a whole. It cannot be pramāņa with reference to one part and not pramana with reference to other parts. This bifurcation is purely arbitrary and the positions based on it however attractive they seem to be never satisfy the demand made from the whole point of view. So the bifurcation of Karma and Jñāna-kāmda never helps knowledge. If on the other hand the whole Veda is taken as presenting a unit of thought, viz., the conception of Brahman, then naturally the verbal or apparent meaning of any passage cannot be emphasised against the meaning of other passages. The meaning of one passage in this circumstance must necessarily be consistent with the meaning of other passages. This circumstance presupposes the principle that governs the inner harmony pervading the whole Vedic literature. Sūtra is the language of this principle. It is therefore nirnāyaka and the whole Veda is nirneya. It is this discrimination that is responsible for the whole of the present discussion connected with determining the meaning of several Sruti-texts, tamevam vidvān and so on. This is the truth made clear by Bhāṣya-"śавда-jāтаsya sarvaśya уат-рrамāṇaśca NIRNAYAH." Stating that Sūtra determines the meaning of all

An. V., sa eva sarva-vedārthah (It alone is the meaning of the whole Veda) and N. S., substantiating the position and Prakāsa's reference to this truth illustrate how by a student

of Brahma-Mīmāmsā the application of these truths to every idea presented to him in any manner is absolutely indispensable. To disregard these truths or to modify them is to get nothing out of Veda. When a person disregards these truths and still thinks that he is understanding something from Veda, he is profoundly deluded. He has some view adopted according to his individual interest and he supports it depending upon the apparent meaning of Vedic passages. In fact he is himself the creator of apparent meaning because of his subjective interest. It is on the basis of apparent meanings that the systems of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā and so on have appeared. This is how even the conception of Brahman based on particular portions of Veda do not carry us far. This is how the ideas caused by means of particular Vedic statements do not help Sāstra. Partial truth is no truth. It is in fact more dangerous than untruth. Half truths when they are not recognised as half truths usurp the place of whole truths and create illusions of all kinds. So T.C., insists upon the whole Veda as presenting a single truth viz., the truth of Brahman. This truth cannot obviously be decided by a single passage. For to decide it by a single passage is to emphasise one passage against the others. The truth must therefore be decided by a principle which speaks for the inner harmony of all the Vedic statements. The language of this principle is the Brahma-Sūtras. If this special circumstance of Sūtras is not properly appreciated, then there is room for the danger of taking Sūtras as authority and this is followed by all the difficulties connected with partial truths.

To take Sūtra as an authority is again to take it as a passage and emphasise it against other passages. It is never to take it as pramāṇa i.e., in the circumstance described above Sūtra never operates as pramāṇa and it is at best a support imagined for an idea which is already existent in the mind of the person. But in all these cases Sūtra is never nirnāyaka as it is only a support sought for with an interest. As nirnāyaka Sūtra must enter into the body of Veda and in this circumstance irrespective of the verbal or apparent meaning a Vedic passage must yield an idea that enjoys the inner harmony that pervades the whole Vedic truth.

It is this truth that is expounded by Brahma-Mīmāmsā and it is wholly unknown to *Pūrva-Tamtra* and so on. It is this circum-

stance that makes Bhāṣyakāra's position through and through original. It is original being at the same time as old as Veda. For it is the language of the inner harmony i.e., Sūtra, the expression of unity of thought of the whole Veda. His is the position that never disregards any passage of Veda however common-place its apparent meaning be and never emphasises a particular passage against other passages however high or true their apparent meaning may appear to be. For him, every Vedic statement is as important as any other statement. This outlook is not something adopted at will. It is the necessary outcome of a profound culture behind it. Whenever a Vedic passage comes to his thought it comes as a rule as an illustration of Sūtra-nyāya and he readily sees the whole Vedic truth in the meaning of the passage in question. He never allows Veda being abstracted from Sūtra. It is with this background he introduces the passages tamevam vidvān etc., with a view to arriving at the correct meaning of jijñāsā. If other thinkers start from the dictionary meaning of jijnasa, Bhasyakara sees whole Vedic culture behind it. This is one of the points of distinction between Bhāṣyakāra and his opponents. It is this outlook of Bhāṣyakāra that Brahma-Mīmāmsā presupposes and T.C., brings out as tasmāt sarvasyāpi vedasya brahma-paratvamiti. Therefore the whole of Veda has one subject-matter and it is Brahman. From all these considerations follows that it is vicara that is enjoined in Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

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CHAPTER XX

THE DISCUSSED IS BRAHMAN IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

I

T.C., in continuation answers a difficulty. Prakāśa presents this difficulty as:

nanu ca yadi brahma prasiddham na jijnāsitavyam. atha aprasiddham tarhinajijnāsitum sakyam iti āsamkya jijnāsā-dharmini tadupayukta-sāmānya-prasiddhi-viseṣa-pratipattī sva-matena dar-sayisyan paroktam anūdya nirasyati: yadapīti. (This is the difficulty-'If Brahman in question is familiar, then no discussion is necessary with regard to It. If It is not familiar, then no discussion with regard to It is possible.' After feeling this difficulty, in order to show, according to Siddhānta general familiarity and detailed knowledge with regard to the subject-matter of discussion, the author of T.C., states the position of the opponent and refutes it as yadapi.)

T.C., yadapi paraih brahmano jijnāsyatvārthameva pratyagarthe ahamasmīti pratyaktva-rūpeņa sāmānyena-pratipattih,cārvākādīnām ahamarthe dehendriya-manah-śūnya-brahmatvādi-vipratipatteh višesa-vipratipattešcetyuktam tadvyadhikaranam. pratyagartha eva brahmeti cedastu tāvat. tathāpi na tāvat bimbam brahma jijñāsā-dharmi, pratibimbe tu sāmānya-pratipatyādīti yuktam. pratibimba-mātre vipratipatyā bimbe-jijnāsādarsanena brahma uddiśya pratyagarthābhedādi-vidhānāya brahmanyeva tayoh vaktavyatvāt. nāpi dehatvādinā vipratipannah pratibimbah pratyagartha eva jijnāsā-dharmī; pratico brahmatvena jijnāsā ca brahma jijñāseti yuktam. loke niścitena dharmiņevāniścitena (prakāreņa) viśisya-vicāra-padāprayogeņa sūtre aśruta-pratyak-pada-kalpanāpātāt. dharma-jijnāsetyādāviva śrutasya brahma-padasya kasya katham vicāra iti prathamākāmkṣita-pradhāna-dharmi-paratvasambhave tattyāgena tadviparīta-prakāra-paratvāyogena śrutahānāpātācca. viruddhāmsa-tyāgena mukha-mātrasyeva cinmātrasyaiva abheda-svīkāreņa višistayoh bimba-pratibimbayoh abhedābhāvena brahmābheda-vidhānāya tasya uddesyatvāsambhavācca.

(In order to illustrate how Brahman is the subject-matter of discussion it is said by others that 'Brahman is made familiar in a general manner as pratyak, the pure subject in the experience 'I am' and there is also dispute about it as being distinguished from body, sense organ, and manas, and as being void or Brahman respectively held by Cārvāka and so on. But both the ideas, [general familiarity and idea of being disputed] are irrelevant to Brahman. [The idea is that general familiarity and the state of being disputed may be attributed to pratyagartha; but the conception of Brahman as being the subject-matter of the present discussion does not gain anything by this.] If you hold that pratyagartha itself is Brahman.

[The basis of this supposition is the statement 'ātmā ca brahma' (The self itself is Brahman) of Adhyāsa-Bhāsya. Bhāmatī adds the following having in view the Śruti text,

tattvamasi (That thou art) as:

tatpadārthasya sabdatah tvam padārthasya pratyakṣataḥ prasiddheḥ tvam padārthasya tatpadārtha-brahma-bhāvāvagamaḥ.

([With reference to the mahāvākya, tattvamasi, (That thou art)] 'That' is presented by the word 'that' and 'thou' is presented by immediate apprehension [and by means of this Sruti text,] the meaning of 'thou' is understood to be the same

as Brahman, the meaning of 'that'.)

With regard to this discussion of T.C., prakāša notes: pratyagarthasya brahmābhedaḥ yadyapi sūtra-brahma-padenaiva nirastah. tathāpi angīkrtya dūṣayati. (The position that the thing defined as pratyak is non-different from Brahman is however refuted by the word Brahma itself in the Sūtra; yet granting it [non-difference] for the sake of argument the author of T.C., refutes that position.)

then let it be so.

[Prakāša clarifies the position of refutation as—tattvampadārthayoḥ tattvamasītyanena abhedāvagamo hi tredhā. tatpadārtham bimba-bhūtam brahma uddišya tvam-padārtha-pratyagarthavidhānena vā tvam-padārthamuddišya tatpadārthābheda-vidhānena vā ubhayatra viroddhāmša-tyāgena aikya-mātra-vidhānena vā.
tatrādye jijnāsā-dharmi tat padārtho bramhaiva. tasya pratyagabhinnatvena jijnāsā brahma-jijnāsā. dvitīye pratyagartho jijināsādharmī, tasya brahmatvena jijnāsā brahma-jijnāsā. trtīye bimbameva

jijnāsā-dharmi. višesyam ekamiti tajjijnāsā brahma-jijnāseti pakṣa-

trayam hṛdi nidhāya ādyam nirasyati—tathāpi iti.

(The knowledge of non-duality of the meaning of tat and the meaning of tvain occurs indeed by means of "That thou art" in three ways. 1. Having held that Brahman is bimba, the source of reflection, as the meaning of 'that' attributing to it nonduality of the entity defined as pratyak, the meaning of thou; 2. Having in view the meaning of thou, attributing to it the non-duality of 'that'; or 3. Having ignored the contradictory attributes of the two and emphasising only non-duality. In the first case the subject-matter of enquiry is Brahman itself which is the meaning of 'that'. Enquiry into it as being non-different from pratyak is what is called Brahma-Jijnasa. In the second case the entity called pratyak is the subject-matter of enquiry. Enquiry into it as Brahman is what is called Brahma-Jijnasa. In the third case the source of reflection itself is the subject-matter of enquiry. As being substantive it is one only. Enquiry into it is what is called Brahma-Jijnāsā. Having kept these three alternatives in view, the author of T.C., refutes them as 'Yet etc.')]

Yet the supposition that Brahman which is considered to be the source, bimba of reflection is the subject-matter of enquiry and with reference to reflection, pratibinba there is familiarity in a general manner and so on is not justified. For, there is dispute [of Carvaka etc.] only with reference to the entity [which you call] reflection. From this it does not follow that there is enquiry into the source of reflection, bimba. Having in view Brahman, if non-duality of that which is pratyak is to be attributed to It, then familiarity in general and specific manner ought to be predicated of only Brahman. Nor does it hold good that reflection, pratibimba which is disputed as having the state of body etc., is what is called pratyak and it is the subjectmatter of enquiry and to consider this entity which is signified as pratyak as being Brahman is what is called Brahma-Jijnāsā. For in usual thinking just as there is no specific use of the word enquiry when the subject-matter is definite, there can be no specific use of the same word if the predicate which is to be considered is not definite. For this reason, in case the opponent's position is held, the word pratyak which is not given by Sūtra ought to be assumed as forming the body of Sūtra [i.e., in case pratyak is assumed as the subject-matter of jijñāsā it ought to

be assumed that the form of Sūtra is pratyak-jijñāsā in place of brahma-jijñāsā. To assume a word that is not given is a fallacy of thinking and it is called asruta-kalpanā]. Further as it is the case with reference to dharma-jijnasa etc. [by Sūtra, brahmajijñāsā] the word Brahman is given, śruta. This word becomes denotative of the subject-matter as it satisfies the first demand of the subject-matter of enquiry and that of the manner of enquiry. Against this fact ignoring that which is given, it is impossible to hold that enquiry refers to something different from it. Further to hold the same idea even against these difficulties is nothing but unnecessarily negating what is given. [This fallacy is called śruta-hāna.] Further [while we are considering face and reflection of face, mukha and pratimukha] by ignoring the opposing aspects of the two just as the nonduality of only the face-aspect is held; if the non-duality of only the cit aspect is held, then as there is no non-duality between the source of reflection and reflection with their individual attributes, there can be no occasion to think of the entity called pratyak with a view to attributing the non-duality of Brahman to it.)

Prakāśa explains the idea of T.C., as:

tathā ca pratyagarthe višeşya-bhūtam cinmātrameva uddešyam iti tatraiva sāmānya-prasidhyādi-daršanīyam; na tu višişte iti tatra tat-pradaršanam vyadhikaraṇam iti bhāvah. ayam doṣah ādya-pakṣepi samah. tatrāpi višiṣṭasya brahmaṇah uddešyatvāsambhavasya vaktum šakyatvāt. tathā ca brahmābhedetyupalakṣaṇam. pratyagarthābheda-vidhānāyetyapi grāhyam. tasya ityasya brahmaṇah ityarthah. tathā ca tat-šabdena tasya prasiddhyupadaršanam vyadhikaraṇam ityapi dhyeyam.

(Hence the following is the gist of T.C., 'In case the said position is held only the aspect of caitanya in the entity called pratyak becomes the subject-matter and therefore only with reference to it general familiarity and so on ought to be shown; but not with reference to the entity qualified [as having it as an aspect]. Therefore to speak of the familiarity of this entity is irrelevant.' The same defect is common to the first alternative also. For with reference to that alternative also the impossibility of Brahman, the qualified, being the subject-matter can be shown. So the expression, 'non-duality of Brahman' may be taken

to lead to another idea; and this idea is 'in order to establish the non-duality of the entity called pratyak.' In this case the word tasya means 'of Brahman'. So by the word tasya it must also be understood that it is irrelevant to show the familiarity with reference to it.)

11

T.C., has so far explained how the position accepted by the opponents does not do justice to the use of the word Brahma in the Sūtra. It continues the discussion further in order to show that the opponent's position does no justice to the second Sūtra, janmādyasya yatah (From which the birth etc. of this) as:

kim ca dharmini atadāropa-nivṛtyarthatvāt lakṣaṇasya uttara-sūtreṇa pratyagartha eva brahmatvena lakṣaṇīyam syāt. na hi vastutaḥ puruṣe idamtvādinā jñāyamāne sthāṇutvādyā-ropaḥ kara-caraṇādimān puruṣa iti puruṣa-lakṣaṇoktyā nivartate; kimtvayam puruṣaḥ ityādyuktyā. na ca jijñāsunā pratīco brahmatvam niścitam. yena brahmaṇi lakṣite pratīci brahma-lakṣaṇa-virodhyākāro mithyeti jñāyeta. nāpi lakṣaṇam pratīco sādhāraṇa-dharmatayā tena niścitam, yena brahmaṇi tat-kathana-mukhena brahmābhedo jñāpyeta.

(Further the purpose of definition in question consists in removing the superimposition on the subject-matter of jijnasa of that which is different from it. Therefore under the next Sūtra, [janmādyasya yataḥ] only the entity called pratyak in its capacity as being Brahman ought to be considered to be the subject-matter of definition, i.e., Brahman by itself ought not to be considered to have been defined; for in case Brahman is considered to have been defined, the entity that is the subjectmatter of the enquiry and the entity that is defined become different. [It may be supposed that that which is pratyak is Brahman itself. So if Brahman is defined, then there is the removal of the superimposition on that which is pratyak of that which is different from it. In order to meet this difficulty, T.C., says:] Supposing that the object that stands before us is a man and he is perceived only as 'this' [but not as man,] it is possible to super-impose the state of being a stump of a tree on it. But this possibility is not removed by the mere statement of the definition of man as 'man is one who has hands, feet, etc.,' but it is removed only by the statement such as 'this is a man'.

[So when the entity called pratyak is apprehended as 'I' it is possible to super-impose the identity of body, sense organs etc., on it and this possibility is not removed by the mere statement that the cause of the world is Brahman. In place of it, if in the second Sūtra it is stated that which is pratyak is Brahman, then only on the basis of this statement the possibility of super-imposition would have been removed. This idea against the opposition is given by Prakāśa—tathā ca pratīci pratyagarthe ahamtvādinā jñāyamāne dehendriyādyātmakatvāropah jagat-kāranam brahmetyādyuktyā na nivartate. kimtu pratyak brahmetyuktyā iti bhāvah.]

(For by one who has jijñāsā is not understood that the entity called pratyak is Brahman. How can then by the fact that Brahman is defined, there is the knowledge with reference to pratyak that all of its forms which appear to be opposed to the definition of Brahman are unreal? Nor is by this person i.e., one who has jijñāsā understood the definition [the state of being the cause of the world] to have been common to pratyak. How can then by stating it [this definition] with reference to Brahman, the non-duality of Brahman with reference to pratyak be made understood?)

Prakāša presents the intention of this statement as:

pratyagasādhāraṇa-dharmatayā jñātasya brahmaṇi kathane pratyag-brahmaṇoraikyam jñāpyeta iti bhāvaḥ. (If that which is understood to be the specific attribute of pratyak is attributed to Brahman then alone the non-duality of pratyak and Brahman would have been understood. This is the idea signified by the passage in question.)

III

With reference to these considerations the following may be noted. T.C., insists upon strict unity of thought. Unity of thought requires that there must be a passage from the first to the second Sūtra. The first ordains enquiry into Brahman. The second defines Brahman. The meaning of each Sūtra must be such that it does not interfere with the unity of these two Sūtras i.e., that which is considered to be Brahman, the subjectmatter of enquiry, ought to be such that justifies the definition

presented by the second Sūtra. Such an entity can be only that which is the cause of the whole universe with reference to every detail. Nothing other than Brahman can be this cause i.e., the state of being the cause cannot be attributed to anything other than Brahman. This is the significance of the unity of the first two Sūtras. So to speak of pratyak and so on as the subject-matter of enquiry is out of place in Sūstra. Granting that it can be spoken of, it is never possible to identify it with Brahman or Brahman with it, for the simple reason that Brahman is the cause of all this, whereas what is spoken of i.e., pratyak is not the cause. If we suppose that Brahman is the cause, then in a straightforward manner we ought to dispense with all other considerations including the ideas, pratyak and so on and retain Brahman itself as the subject-matter of enquiry, consistently with Sruti that has arrived at the conclusion that the cause of all is Brahman.

Further a note on these points indicates that the act of interpreting Sūtra tolerates no subjective interest. We cannot derive from Sūtra what we want to hold. Sūtra on the other hand requires a study purely objective in character. We are within the jurisdiction of Siddhanta i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā only in so far as there is an unmodified and conscious recognition of this fact. To modify the recognition of this fact in any sense forms pūrva-pakṣa to Sāstra and it never helps a correct understanding of the position of Sūtra i.e., Siddhānta. It is for this reason however cleverly entities other than Brahman, the cause of all, such as pratyak are introduced as the subject-matter of enquiry, they fall short of Brahman and the position based on these concepts stands as pūrva-pakṣa to Sāstra. An absolutely consistent insistence on Brahman, the cause of all alone helps understanding of Sūtra. Further T.C., illustrates how every item that enters into the body of Sūtra must be such that it must be consistent with the whole disposition of Sūtra in all its aspects. For example pratyak, pure subject or caitanya as the subject-matter of enquiry does not make the following Sūtra possible and therefore it has no place in the body of Sūtra. Brahman on the other hand as being distinguished from pratyak not only makes the following Sūtra possible but necessitates it. For without definition Brahman, the subject-matter of enquiry cannot be conceived. All these ideas will be made clear in the discussions that take place at the close of this Adhikarana and under the following Adhikarana, janmādyasya yatah. Further the state of being the cause of the world which forms the differentia of Brahman according to the second Sūtra must be admitted to be the differentia of Brahman, the subject-matter of enquiry. Otherwise there can be no unity of thought governing the first two Sūtras. In case pratyak is the subject-matter of enquiry this condition is not satisfied.

T.C., explains how the supporter of pratyak as the subject-matter of enquiry does not hold that the said differentia is attributed to pratyak as:

tvatpaksepi 'sarīrascobhayepihi bhedenainamadhīyate, prāņabhrcca, adhikamtu bheda-nirdesat' ityadau janmadi-sutroktalakşanasya jive nişedhāt.

(According to your interpretation also in interpreting the three Sūtras, śārīraśca...nirdeśāt the differentia of Brahman stated in the Sūtra, janmādyasya yatah is denied of jīva.)

The idea is this. If your position that pratyak is the subject-matter of enquiry were really intelligible to you, then your interpretation of the Sūtra cited above would have been entirely different from the interpretation you have now offered. There would have been no denial of differentia with reference to jīva which is the same as pratyak as what you call pratyak is jīva itself. Holding in one place that jīva is the subject-matter of enquiry and in another denying of jīva what is stated by Sūtra as the differentia of the subject-matter is inconsistent. This indicates that the nature of the subject-matter of enquiry has not been made intelligible to yourself. Yet you hold that it is pratyak. This is obviously not to do justice to Sūtra presenting the subject-matter.

In understanding these criticisms it may be noted that in all these considerations T.C., insists on the intelligibility of all ideas made use of in Sāstra. Whichever concept does not enjoy intelligibility becomes pūrvapakṣa and that which is

intelligible siddhānta.

So far the second alternative has been examined. T.C., now examines the third alternative, the non-duality of cit as such being the subject-matter of enquiry as:

ata eva ubhayānugata-cinmātre tattvam-pada-lakşye vipratipattih, jijīāsā-dharamitu bimbam brahma cinmātram eva iti pratyuktam. višesya-mātra-vipratipatyā višista-dharmika-vicārā-daršanāt. višistasya mumukşubhih avicāryatvācca. cinmātre dehatvādi-vipratipatteh abhāvācca. brahma-sabdāsvārasyācca.

(For similar reason the position that 'there is dispute with regard to pure cit which is common [to both "that" and "thou"] which is indicated by the words that and thou; and the subject-matter of enquiry is bimba, the source of reflection itself and this is Brahman being of the character of pure cit' becomes refuted. For there may be dispute only with regard to the substantive aspect i.e., pure cit, but it does not follow that there is enquiry into the qualified.

[Prakāśa adds:

nirvišesa-jñānārthatvena višista-vicārastu antarādhikaraņe nirašisyate iti bhāvaḥ.

(The idea is 'that the supposition [contained in the statement of T.C.] that in order to obtain the knowledge of the attributeless i.e., nirviseşa, the substantive, there is enquiry into the qualified visiṣṭa, will be refuted under Antarādhikaraṇa.) Antarādhikaraṇa is a section of the second quarter of the first chapter of the Brahma-Sūtras.]

Further that which is qualified does not deserve enquiry by those that are after mokṣa. Further with regard to pure cit there is no dispute in the manner whether it is the same as body and so on.

[Prakāša adds:

tadīya-bhāṣye tvam-padārtha-viśiṣte ahamarthe eva'dehamātram caitanya-viśiṣtam ātmeti prākṛtāḥ janāḥ ityādinā vipratipattyukteḥ, tat-padārthe ca viśiṣte eva 'asti tadvyatiriktaḥ īśvaraḥ. sarvajñaḥ sarva-śaktiriti kecit.' ityādinā vipratipattyukteḥ, cinmātre abhāvāt ityarthaḥ. etena cinmātrameva jijñāṣā-dharmi iti pakṣopi pratyukto dhyeyaḥ.

(By the opponent's Bhāsya referring only to the entity denoted by 'I' being the meaning of the word thou, it is stated that 'those people who are interested in the things secular hold that ātman is only the body including in itself consciousness' and from the ideas such as this it is concluded that there

is dispute [with regard to the nature of the entity denoted by thou.] With regard to the entity denoted by that also it is stated 'there is Isvara: He is different from "I": He is omniscient; He is omnipotent: This is the position of some others' and from the ideas such as these it is concluded that there is dispute [with regard to an entity qualified in character. [Both these disputes obviously refer to the qualified entities and there is stated no dispute with regard to pure cit and for this reason] there is no dispute with regard to the nature of pure cit. This is the idea signified by the passage of T.C. From this it follows that the position that pure cit is the subject-matter of jijāāsā is also refuted.)

Further the use of the word Brahman by the Sūtra has received no consideration.)

Prakāśa adds—cinmātrameva brahmetyamgīkāreņa bimbe višiste jijnāsā-dharmiņi brahma-sabdo na svarasah ityarthah.

(By the opponent it is supposed that pure cit itself is Brahman. But bimba, which is the source of reflection is qualified, visista and it is considered to be the subject-matter of enquiry. Therefore to apply the word brahman to it is irrelevant.) The idea is this. Even supposing that pure cit is Brahman, it is not the subject-matter of enquiry and the subject-matter is what is called bimba, an entity qualified by the state of its being the source of reflection and this is for this reason different from pure cit. So to apply the word brahman to it is unwarranted.)

V

With reference to this discussion the following points may be noted. T.C., insists that the subject-matter of dispute alone can be the subject-matter of enquiry. So under the purview of enquiry nothing that does not admit of dispute can be brought. Pure cit of the opponent is beyond all dispute, because it is pure. It does not admit of conception and it can never be made intelligible. It does not therefore form the subject-matter of Sāstra i.e., jijāāsā. To insist upon it as the subject-matter is to force an element on Sāstra which it never tolerates. If Sāstra is jijāāsā, then nothing imaginary, nothing unintelligible, nothing that does not admit of dispute can be its

subject-matter. To disregard this truth is to negate Sāstra. That which negates Sāstra becomes pūrvapakṣa. That which makes Sāstra a necessity becomes siddhānta. Further desire for mokṣa is in essence desire to transcend all that is empirical. For, that which is empirical is the mark of bondage i.e., nescience, ajāāna. Hence desire for mokṣa is not consistent with the supposition that something that makes Sāstra impossible is the subject-matter of jijāāsā. So to suppose that pure cit is the subject-matter of jijāāsā is to disregard desire for mokṣa. Further in interpreting Sāstra, sāstra-nyāya, the requisites of Sāstra must govern our thoughts but not imaginations of positions.

Further Sāstra is characterised by the refutation of pūrva-pakṣa. Refutation does not mean anything personal. It is not condemnation of any person, or any idea that is commended by others in the ordinary sense of the terms. It is purely intellectual in character, adhyātma, concerning the mental character of the self. It consists in seeing that what is refuted is not given room in the thinking process even unconsciously. Refutation does not mean the rejection in the usual sense. For rejection in this sense means the rejection of something of which the person in question has a definite conception. In this case the very fact that the conception is definite justifies its existence and therefore the rejection of it becomes meaningless. Hence rejection in this sense is only a word signifying nothing.

When a piece of a shell is seen as a shell, where is the possibility of rejecting it? If a shell is seen as silver and it is realised to be an illusion, then there is the possibility of rejecting the perception of silver only in a particular sense. This rejection does not consist in throwing the silver out, because this silver is not an entity. Nor does it consist in stating 'I have no faith or interest in the silver,' because the silver in question is not an entity. The only sense in which rejection or refutation is intelligible is to see that the perception of silver is only an illusion and it has no place in the process of mental history as a case of knowledge. So in refuting a position one who refutes only understands that the position in question has no place in the system of knowledge and there is nothing i.e., no pramāņa to support that position. So to

refute a position is equivalent to see that the so-called know-ledge in question has no pramāṇa i.e., has nothing to cause it. If the opponent asserts a position siddhāntin sees that there is no occasion for the knowledge in question. This is what is meant by the examination of pūrvapakṣa as well as by the establishment of siddhānta. All this will be amply illustrated in the course of the second chapter i.e., Avirodhādhyāya of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, so as to show that refutation of wrong knowledge in this sense is a necessary step towards obtaining correct knowledge. This is why in this work also wherever an exposition of siddhānta is needed for the sake of purity of thought the corresponding pūrvapakṣa is developed and examined and the way to right knowledge is made.

morl newy

T.C., considers further the possibility of maintaining the opponent's position in order to show that what he calls knowledge does not deserve to be called knowledge. *Prakāśa* makes this consideration clear as:

nanu 'asti tāvat brahma nitya-suddha-ityādi para-bhāṣye bhāmatyām āgamādāpātato brahmani sāmānya-prasiddhyukteh. asti tāvat...vyatirikta ityādi-bhāṣya-vyākhyāvasare ca tat-padārthe vipratipattimāha ityavatārikā. pūrvam jīvādibhinnatvena viprtipattyuktah. jijñāsā-dharmini brahmanyeva sāmānya-prasiddhiviseṣapratipattī staḥ iti na kopi doṣaḥ ityāsamkya nirāha—atha iti.

(Against the previous conclusions the following might be stated. The Bhāṣya of the opponent says 'Brahman which is enduring and pure is indeed existent' etc. Commenting on this Bhāmatī explains how Brahman is in an apparent sense made familiar to us by means of āgama, verbal testimony. Further in connection with commenting on the Bhāṣya, asti tāvat... vyatirikta (it is indeed existent...different) and so on, the author of the same work says, 'the author of Bhāṣya mentions the dispute with regard to the entity signified as 'that'. Prior to this point the dispute about the idea that Brahman is different from jīva etc., was stated. With regard to Brahman itself which is the subject-matter of jijñāṣā there is familiarity in a general manner as well as the dispute of its details. For this reason there is indeed no defect in the opponents' position.'

[The author of T.C.,] having thought of this point in favour of the opponent's position refutes it as atha—

atha jijūāsā-dharmiņi brahmaņyeva pratīconyanna vā iti vipratipatteh na vaiyadhikaraņyam, tarhi bhavadīya-bhāṣye iha sūtre pratīci dehatvādi-vipratipatyuktih uttara-sūtre jīva-bheda-kasya laksanasya uktiśca ayuktā.

(Further if you hold that with regard to Brahman itself which is the subject-matter of $jij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}s\tilde{a}$ there is dispute whether it is different or not from that which is pratyak, and therefore there is no difference between the subject-matter and the thing that is defined, then in your $Bh\tilde{a}sya$ under this very $S\tilde{u}tra$ the statement of the dispute that pratyak is the same as body and so on and under the next $S\tilde{u}tra$ the statement of the definition that distinguishes Brahman from $j\tilde{v}va$ would be irrelevant.)

In this passage T.C., shows self-contradiction in the position of the opponent. Self-contradiction in the position of the opponent signifies that the opponent cannot maintain any position consistently with his other positions. Prakāśa mentions further difficulties against the observation of T.C., and removes them in order to substantiate the position of T.C., as:

nanviha sūtre pratīci dehatvādi-vipratipattih nāyuktā. tasyāh jijñāsā-dharmi-brahmani vipratipatti-sūcane eva tātparyāt. uktam ca bhāmatyām "tvam padārtha-vipratipattidvārā tat-padārtha-vipratipattim sūcayitvā" iti. tathā ca na doşa iti cedayamāšayah.

jīva-bhedābheda-vipratipattau tvanmate brahma-vicāra-pare dvitīya-sūtre jīvābhedasyaiva vācyatvena bhedaka-lakṣaṇoktirayukteti tat-kathanam vyadhikaraṇam. ata eva uktam uttarasūtre ityādi.

kim ca brahmani sāmānya-prasiddih kim višiste? uta nirvi šese?

nādyaḥ. tasya pratyagabhedābhāvena uddešyatvābhāvāt taduddišya jīvābheda-vidhānāyogāt. mumukşubhiḥ ajijñāsyatvācca. bhāṣye nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvamityanaupādhike brahmaṇi prasiddhi-pradarśanāyukteśca.

na dvitīyah. tatra vipratipatyabhāvāt. tvayāpi višista eva tat-pradaršanācca. "sarvajñam sarva-šakti-samanvitam" iti

višiste prasidhyuktyayukteśca. tasyāvedyatvena śabdāt pratītyayogācca.

etena vedādeva āpātato brahma savišesam kvacinnirvišeṣam ca pratītam iti viruddha-vākyadvayāt vipratipattiḥ. ata eva bhūṣye dvividha-brahma-rūpa-pradaršanamiti nirastam, bhūṣye keciditi vādi-vipratipatyayogāditi.

etenae tadadhikaranāmtargatam "etena etadapi parāstam" ityādinā "naivam sūtrakāra āhetyalam" ityantam sāmānyaprasiddhyādi-pradarsaka-para-bhāsya-khandana-param sudhāvākam vivītam bhavati.

(The considerations against siddhānta are still possible. They are the following—'Under this Sūtra the dispute whether pratyak is the same as body and so on is not unjustifiable. This dispute aims at illustrating the dispute with regard to Brahman, the subject-matter of jūjāāsā. It is stated by Bhāmatī "Through the dispute with regard to the entity signified by thou there is indicated the dispute with regard to the entity signified by that. Having said this..." For this reason there is no defect in the position i.e., the objections raised by Siddhānta do not hold good.'—If this argument is put forward, then in answer the significance of Siddhānta is stated.

If there is the dispute whether Brahman is different from jīva or not, according to your position in the second Sūtra which is devoted to the enquiry into Brahman only the non-duality of jīva ought to be stated, but in its place the statement of the definition that proves distinction [between Jīva and Brahman] becomes unjustified. Therefore the defined is one thing and the subject-matter is another. For the same reason in order to signify this discrepancy T.C., states uttara sūtre etc. [This statement shows the discrepancy between Sūtra and Samkara's commentary on Sūtra.]

[Further it is stated that there is familiarity of Brahman in a general sense.] Does this familiarity of Brahman refer to the qualified or the unqualified?

It cannot be the former i.e., the qualified. For it is not the same as pratyak. Therefore it is not the subject-matter of discussion. So to state it and attribute to it non-duality of jīva has no place in the present consideration. Nor does it deserve consideration by those that are after mokṣa. [Further if the qualified were

the subject-matter of discussion] then your Bhāsya which shows familiarity, of Brahman which is unqualified as "the enduring, pure, of the nature of consciousness, of the nature of freedom," etc., becomes irrelevant.

The second alternative also does not hold good. For with regard to Brahman, the unqualified, there can be no dispute-By you also the dispute is illustrated only with regard to the qualified. Further with regard to Brahman the qualified in order to make it familiar there is the statement [in your Bhāṣya] "omniscient, having omnipotence." This statement becomes wrong [if the second alternative is accepted.] Further the unqualified is beyond conception and for this reason by means of sabda i.e., Veda it cannot be made intelligible.

In the light of these criticisms another supposition of the opponent "By Veda itself Brahman is presented in some passages as being qualified and in some other passages as Brahman the unqualified. As there are these two types of passages opposing each other the dispute arises. Only to meet this dispute, in [Samkara] Bhāsya two types of Brahman are illustrated" becomes refuted. If what the opponent supposes were true then in that Bhāsya there ought not to be the statement referring to the dispute started by others, [the followers of other Darśanas] as "kecit." [The idea is that the commentaries on Śamkara-Bhāṣya are inconsistent with it. For in that Bhāṣya dispute (vipratipatti) started by Darsanas is mentioned and in the commentaries the dispute arising from different Sruti texts is mentioned. This means that the commentaries have not faithfully presented the meaning of Bhāsva.

In the light of the same criticisms the statement of N.S., under the same adhikarana beginning with "By this the following also is refuted" and ending with "The author of Sūtra did not hold the position in this manner" which has in view the refutation of the opponent's Bhāsya, which intends to show that the subject-matter is familiar in a general manner

and so on becomes substantiated.)

Prakāśa in this connection implies that the reasons presented by T.C., in refutation of the opposition of Siddhanta are such that they can be applied to any position against Siddhanta actual or possible. This speaks for the universal character of the reasons characterising Sastra i.e., Siddhanta. This character makes these reasons indispensable if thinking is respected. To have disregarded these reasons is responsible for contradictions found in the position of the opponent. Further if selfcontradiction is noted with reference to the position of the opponent it is never meant that there is contradiction only from the point of view of Siddhanta. Rather what is meant is that even granting all that is held by the opponent and interpreting passages of Sruti in the manner he likes, contradiction cannot be removed. Contradiction implies that there is nothing proved by the opponent. Let us take for an example a statement from prakāśa with reference to the unqualified mumuksubhirajijñāsyatvācca (Further the unqualified does not deserve the consideration of those that are after moksa). The idea is that though the unqualified is accepted to be the subject-matter it serves no purpose because it is no object of meditation, upāsanā. But on the other hand if the qualified is accepted to be the subject-matter, then it also cannot be the object of meditation by one who is after moksa. For the qualified is unreal. Meditation on it only develops illusion. It cannot therefore lead to release from illusion, the characteristic of mokşa. Therefore the opponent is not in any way able to fix the subject-matter of jijnasa. It may be noted that the same difficulty besets every position that opposes Siddhanta, in any manner. They are as a rule marked by self-contradiction and meditation on them can never form the discipline leading to moksa. The observations of Siddhanta against oppositions is therefore universal in character.

The character of Siddhānta is therefore totally different from that of pūrva-pakṣa. That that which is absolutely free from contradiction in every sense, that which is consistent within itself and with the elements without, that which is the necessary outcome of the conditions recognised to be the prerequisites of the study of Sāstra, that which has the scope to develop infinitely, that which is thoroughly intelligible and conceivable, that which without jijñāsā gives room for dispute and with jijñāsā becomes determined, that which justifies all that is so far concluded by the present Sūtra, that which

makes the rest of the Sūtra-teaching possible and indispensable and that which gives no room for its opposite is the position of Siddhanta i.e., Sastra. It is therefore the meaning of Veda. This explains how in the works of Siddhanta there is absolute inner harmony. One who cannot find out this truth and interprets passages of Siddhanta as it appears to be convenient to one arrives at some conclusion that is totally foreign to Sastra. In appreciation of all this, prakāša refers to N.S., in this connection and determines the position in the light of the present discussion. This illustrates how Uttara-Prasthana is governed by Pūrva-Prasthāna. From this circumstance we have to understand that in this aspect of Sastra i.e., Pūrva-Prasthana when once a position is defined it is never modified and it finds its fuller expression in Uttara-Prasthana. The student is within the jurisdiction of Sastra only in so far as he fully appreciates all these points and adopts them in his studies. This circumstance warns the student against private instructions about the truth of Sastra. Nothing of private ideas is ever encouraged by Sāstra. Sāstra insists upon perfect intelligibility of every idea that forms its body. Its value is therefore through and through public.

T.C., applies the same criticisms to the position of some other Bhāsyas belonging to some other schools of thought as:

etena bhāskarīyam jagatkāraņe pradhānatvādi-vipratipattipradaršanam nirastam. ādya-sūtre kāraņa-padasya uttara-sūtre

tallaksaņasya ca vaktavyatva-prasamgāt.

(From this the position of Bhāskara showing dispute whether the cause of the world is pradhāna, the root-matter, and so on becomes refuted. If his position were true, then in the first Sūtra there ought to be the word kāraṇa, cause, and in the second Sūtra its definition ought to have been stated.)

Prakāša adds the idea—kāraņa-jijnāsetyeva syāt; dvitiya sūtrepi jijnāsyasya kāraņasyaiva lakṣaṇam syāt na tu brahmaṇah

ityarthah.

(The form of the first $S\bar{u}tra$ ought to be only $k\bar{a}rana-jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$, (enquiry into cause) and in the second $S\bar{u}tra$ there ought to be the statement of definition of cause and there ought to be no mention of Brahman. This is the meaning of the passage (stating the criticism against T.C.)

So far T.C., has stated that there can be no jijñāsā of pure. cit, because pure cit does not admit of dispute. T.C., further states that with reference to the unqualified there can be neither general nor specific conception as:

kim ca jñātam sāmānyato ajñātam viseseņa vicāryate. jñātājñāta-vibhāgastu nirvisese na yujyate. uktam ca anuvyākhyāne, "idamitthamiti jñānam jijñāsāyāḥ prayojanam".

(Further that which is known in a general manner and not known in a specific manner is the subject-matter of enquiry. With reference to the unqualified the distinction as 'this is known' and 'this is unknown' does not hold good. It is said in Anu-Vyākhyāna 'The purpose of jijnāsā consists in obtaining the knowledge in the form 'This is that' i.e., This is so and so.)

Prakāśa adds—idamiti sāmānya-jūānam ittham iti viśeṣajūānam iti vadatā jūātam sāmānyatah ityādi sūcitamiti bhāvah.

('This' is the expression of general knowledge. 'So and so' is the expression of specific knowledge. By the author of Anu-Vy., who states this is indicated the truth of T.C., jāātam sāmānyatah etc.). This is the idea contained in T.C. By means of this statement T.C., implies the completeness of the teaching of Bhāsyakāra.

The reference to Anu-Vy., as the source of T.C., explains how the works of Madhva are self-explanatory and complete as Jayatīrtha has already illustrated at the commencement of this work T.Pr., and how a student of Sāstra can never think of adding anything that is not already there in it. The justification for an explanation in Sāstra consists in showing what is already there in Sāstra.

Further Madhva in Anu-Vy., makes it definite that pure cit and jijñāsā are irrelevant to each other. As jijñāsā characterises Sāstra pure cit is totally foreign to Sāstra as in no way can the general or specific character of cit be conceived.

T.C., concludes the discussion by stating Siddhanta.

tasmāt vedāntādinā āpāta-pratīte brahmaņi saguņa-nirguņā-

lpagūņatvādinā vipratipatteh jijnāsyatvam iti.

(Therefore with regard to Brahman which is apparently made familiar to the student by means of *Vedānta* etc. [i.e. according to *prakāśa* the *Bhāṣyas* on the *Upaniṣads* and so on,] as there follows the dispute whether Brahman is saguna,

qualified, or nirguna, unqualified, or alpaguna, possessing attributes in a limited sense and so on, there is the state of being enquired; i.e., Brahman made apparently familiar by Vedānta etc., being disputed as saguna and so on, becomes the subjectmatter of jijnāsā.)

This passage presents how Brahman is made familiar to the student in a general manner. Commenting on apata-pratiti

prakāša says:

vicārāt prāgeva siddhānta-bodhaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣyādinā

pratīte ityarthah.

(Prior to vicāra by means of the Bhāsya on the Upanisads and so on, Brahman is made familiar. This is the meaning of T.C.)

VIII

The statement of *Prakaśa* is very significant. It shows the place of the study that may take place prior to the study of *Sāstra* in the process of the education of a student. However wide the study of a student in this subject be prior to the study of *Sāstra*, it only gives him *āpāta-pratīti*, some general conception of Brahman, vague in character. At times even the word *brāhman* may not be known: but it is still an idea of Reality.

So to study Madhva's own works and with them Upanisads, other Śruti texts, Smrtis and so on and with them the Bhāṣyas and other commentaries of other exponents, Śamkara, Rāmānuja and so on and the works in several languages dealing with God or the cause or the Creator of the World or the entity that is supposed to satisfy the desires of the devotees, gives only āpāta-pratīti of Brahman i.e., some general or indefinite concept of Brahman. However expert this study may appear to be it must never be mistaken for the knowledge of Brahman. In fact it is no knowledge. At best it is some indefinite idea just enough to cause vipratipatti, doubt or difficulty i.e., dispute with regard to the nature of Brahman. Vipratipatti leads the student to the study of Śāstra. Only with the study of Śāstra there is the knowledge of Brahman leading to mokṣa.

So according to the convenience, condition, sentiment, tradition, conviction, practice, religion or anything else of the same nature a person may study or learn anything about God. He may even entertain some opinions and beliefs as his own. He may feel that he has very strong conviction that can never

be shaken. On this account he may command respect in the world in which he lives. He may be considered to be very learned, pious, or saintly person, a divinely being, a man of intuition or insight; but the ideas he has are cases of no knowledge. In the language of Madhva they are simply cases of durāgraha or bhrāmti. They never end in themselves and they never lead to the study of Sāstra. If they stand as mere conviction or even tested conviction, tested in the sense that their truth-value is verified by teachers or gurus, the person who possesses them has not made any progress spiritually i.e., on the way of knowledge. Without them the person would have been free from illusions caused by himself and he would have been more unostentatious. The fact that they are illusions show that they do not enjoy any place positively in the system of knowledge of the person in question. They may cause activities of life of several aspects, but they do not lead to spiritual integrity.

In some cases they may not be entirely purposeless. If by possessing them the person comes to have vipratipatti, doubts or difficulties in holding them and if in his own mind he disputes his own convictions, then what all he has studied presents him the subject-matter of enquiry and with enquiry his ideas become purified. This circumstance gives a new colour to all his mental activities which he had prior to jijiāsā and organises them into his mental system. At this stage what is introduced as faith or opinion or instruction transcends itself and all that is there becomes intellectual in character. So, it lies in the capacity of an individual to make his own beliefs and convictions useful to him. At this stage there is more to understand, feel and meditate rather than to waste energy in

attempting to prove impossibilities.

If something is somehow imagined or taken to have been conceived and this act gives room for vipratipatti, dispute and as a result there is jijnāsā, then it must not be supposed that even after jijñāsā the same idea is retained. The stage prior to jijñāsā presents sāmānya-prasiddhi, indefinite idea of the thing taken to have been conceived. With jijñāsā there is višeṣa-pratipatti i.e., with jijñāsā the thing comes to be defined definitely. The significance of this may be positive or negative i.e., the thing thought of may be retained or refuted. In the former case it is made intelligible and now it enjoys a definite

place in the system of thought. For it is, in this circumstance, presented by pramāna. In the latter case, the idea that presented it is understood to be illusion, and in this circumstance what is taken to have been existent prior to jijnāsā finds no place in the system of thought characterising the mental history of the person and in this circumstance its opposite becomes more confirmed.

Further, with jijñāsā if the thing that is believed prior to iijnasa is retained, it does not mean that it is retained in the same form as it was conceived before jijnāsā. With jijnāsā it comes to be the object of visesa-pratipatti, a new characteristic and with this it becomes completely a novel entity. With novelty the entity becomes distinct and it can be distinguished even from the same entity that was taken to exist prior to jijnāsā. So it is a mistake to think that what is believed is substantiated by jijñāsā. At the stage of belief there may be some other kind of viśeșa-pratipatti along with the sāmānyaprasiddhi. With jijnāsā this pratipatti is rejected and in its place there is some other kind of visesa-pratipatti even though the sāmānyā aspect i.e., the general aspect that was familiar prior to jijnasa may seem to continue. We may take for example the following: Before jijnasa i.e., operation of pramana, namely perception, a man may be taken to be a stump of a tree. Under this condition the judgment in its general form is 'This is so and so', 'this' refers to the substantive aspect of man and 'so and so' refers to the attributive aspect. The 'this' aspect may be taken to be common to all attributes that can be predicated of the thing. But in fact it is different with the predication of different attributes. At each instance it is a different entity. In the present case, before the operation of a specific pramāna the state of being tall like a stump of a tree or of a man is attributed to 'this' aspect. With the operation of the specific pramāna this attribute is found to have no basis and the state of being a man is attributed to this aspect. With this attribute 'this' aspect of the thing gains something fresh. As qualified by this attribute 'this' is different from 'this' with the predication of a different attribute. So even supposing that the substantive aspect is retained the thing is not the same under two sets of predication. Against these considerations, to hold that that which is believed prior to jijāāsā is substantiated in the course of jijñāsā is impossible.

Further the substantive-attributive aspects of things cannot be abstracted from each other. For each is determined by the other. Their distinction is only relative to different viewpoints. This means that with the change of attributive aspect there is also the change of substantive aspect. If this point is appreciated one can see that with jijnasa it is entirely a novel entity that becomes understood. So Brahman understood by means of jijnasa has nothing common to the entity that is supposed to have been made familiar prior to jijnāsā. This is the inevitable implication of the position that Brahman, the subjectmatter of Sāstra is Sāstraika-samadhigamya. To appreciate this truth consists in seeing that pure cit i.e., the un-qualified can never be the subject-matter of Sāstra, because the state of being pure cit and the state of being the subject-matter of Sastra are contradiction in terms. So long as there persists the illusion that the unqualified can be the subject-matter the profundity

of Sāstra can never be appreciated.

Further it must be noted that the position of Siddhanta is as a rule arrived at after the legitimate dismissal of pūrvapakṣa in the sense already defined. Irrespective of denominations and characterisations, however great or noble or sacred they may appear to be, ideas of truth and reality, prior to jijnāsā, lead to pūrvapaksa; and the ideas however simple they may appear to be, if they are obtained as the result of jijnasa form the content of Siddhānta. To illustrate this point we may take for example the very idea 'Brahman is the subject-matter of jijnāsā.' A person may be familiar with this idea in some manner without jijñāsā. As this idea is not the result of jijñāsā, it may at best give rise to vipratipatti whether it is true or false. If there is no proper jijnasa i.e., if in the consideration that follows vipratipatti, empirical pramānas govern the thoughtprocess, then enquiry into Sruti-vākya in order to see that Brahman is the subject-matter of jijnāsā becomes impossible and the idea gives rise to pūrvapaksa that Brahman is no longer the subject-matter of jijnasa. As a result of pūrvapakṣa there appear all sorts of imaginations-faiths, intuitions, insights, realisations and so on. A person becomes free from these only with the prasada of Bhagavan. Everything he has in himself has led him to pūrvapakṣa and its consequences. There is nothing in his experience to guide him properly. It is at this stage prasāda of Bhagavān is needed. There is nothing to make prasāda come to him, because prasāda is nothing but independent will of Bhagavān. If it comes, it comes of its own accord and with it jijāāsā i.e., Śruti-vākyārtha-mīmāmsā appears. This in turn removes pūrvapakṣa with all its consequences and the truth that Brahman is the subject-matter of enquiry is established and it becomes Siddhānta. T.C., insists that with respect to every idea, secular or spiritual there must be the operation of Siddhānta and then only the knowledge of

Brahman becomes possible.

All this proves the absolute indispensability of Sāstra i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā. An appreciation of this idea gives a clue to the method of studying the works of Madhva and with them Sruti and Smrti. Whatever be the prevalent ideas connected with the circumstance in which Madhva composed his works one thing is certain that all his works are devoted to expound Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This is clear from his position that the Brahma-Sūtras are nirņāyaka, determining factor of all branches of learning that make use of sabda, sound. Therefore it is futile to study his other works independently of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In the course of his other works there may be under special circumstances the statements that those works contain the most important exposition of the truth of Brahman such as sarva śāstrārtha-nirnayah, esa śāstrasyā nirnayah and so on. But independently of Brahma-Mīmāmsā to study them, as prakāśa has explained, only presents some general idea of truth and at best gives room for vipratipatti, pūrvapakṣa and so on. So by a genuine student of Madhva, the other works of Madhva ought to be interpreted in terms of Brahma-Mīmāmsā and with this interpretation alone the real position of Madhva is appreciated and enjoyed. The same consideration holds good with reference to the possibility of taking Sruti or Smṛti as Sāstra independently of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This is the view-point of Madhva which has been expounded by Bhāṣya. The main purpose of T. pr., B. hd., T.C., and Prakāsa consists in bringing this view-point to light.

Having so far explained Madhva's position with regard to the meaning of jijāāsā T.C., shows that it is not some conclusion forced on the exposition of Madhva by his commentator, but it is the position upheld and maintained by Madhva himself as:

taduktan anuvyākhyāne "tasmāt sāstreņa jijñāsyam asmadīyam guņārņavam vāsudevākhyamadvamdvam param brahmākhilottamam" iti

(All these ideas are stated in Anu-Vyākhyāna under Īkṣatya-dhikaraṇa 1.1.5, as: Therefore the truth characterised as guṇārṇava, vāsudeva, advamdva, parabrahma and akhilottama, ought to be the subject-matter of jijnāsā by means of Śāstra. Then only it is acceptable to us [Madhva]).

N.S., brings out the idea contained in this passage as:

yato nirgune samanvayah nopapannah tasmāt asmadīyam saguņameva param brahma sāstreņa jijnāsyam amgīkaraņīyam.

(To consider nirguna, the unqualified to be the subjectmatter of Sāstra makes Sāstra unintelligible. Therefore it must be accepted that Parabrahman that is indeed saguna i.e., absolute and complete, as explained by us, is the subjectmatter of Sāstra i.e., only this truth is what is presented by Sāstra but not nirguna).

This passage is very significant. Madhva intends to say that it is not enough if he simply shows how Brahman as conceived by the opponents does not hold good. Sāstra's refutation of the opponent's position only makes room for the positive statement of the position of Siddhānta. But that which is Siddhānta is the result of vedavākyārtha-mīmāmsā i.e., śāstra-jijnāsā. But it is not intended to state that an opponents' position is twice refuted, outside Śāstra, and in what is called śāstra-jijñāsā. The passage quoted from N.S., illustrates the same point taking for example the position of Siddhanta. Siddhanta is that Brahman is saguna. This does not follow merely from the fact that nirguna cannot be the subject-matter of Sastra, i.e., with reference to nirguna the application (samanvaya) of Sruti cannot be had. But it follows from śāstra-jijñāsā i.e., the application of all Sruti texts to it showing at the same time that to nothing else there can be the application of Sruti. With this application the conception of saguna acquires the status of knowledge.

It must be noted that the term saguna in this context is not saguna-Brahma of Advaita. Saguna-Brahman according to samkara is contradiction in terms and it is therefore mithyā. Hence in the present discussion saguna is the negation of Nirguna and it is an expression of guna-pūrna.

Therefore the discussed is Brahman guna-pūrna in Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XXI

JÑĀNA IS DISCIPLINE IN BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

1

The foregoing ideas powerfully illustrate the absolute indispensability of Sāstra. We have seen how Sāstra is no other than the process of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. The same is the knowledge that Sruti, tamevam vidvān (He who knows him thus) has in view. This knowledge is the result of prasāda. It is therefore an indication of prasāda and prasāda leads to mokṣa. This is the whole position signified by Bhāṣya and T.Pr., under consideration.

The foregoing discussion of T.C., must not be taken to be a fresh contribution made by T.C., to Sāstra. T.C., has made it clear that it is only bringing out the necessary implication of T.Pr., sūtram ca śrutyanusāri (Sūtra is consistent with Śruti). This means that all that is meant or implied by Śruti is meant and implied by Sūtra. An appreciation of this point is necessary if we are to understand how Sūtra presents nyāya, the reason i.e., principle of thought underlying Śruti as such. This is the implication of the fact that Sūtra is viśvatomukha i.e., nirnāyaka of verbal expressions as such,

Bh.D., clarifies the position:-

tad-vijijnāsasveti śrutau vidhi-pratyaya-śravanena tadvyākhyāna-param sūtram kartavya-padānvitameva tadanusaratianyathā tadananugunameva syāditi bhāvaḥ.

(Sruti, tadvijijāsasva presents the word [vijijāsasva] signifying 'ought' [vidhi]. Sūtra is devoted to justify it. It can therefore be consistent with it [Sruti] only with the understanding of the word kartavyā, 'is indispensable.' Otherwise, i.e., without this word Sūtra ought to be inconsistent with it [Sruti]. This is the idea signified by T.Pr.)

Bh.D., cites an objection raised by some opponent as: yat kaścidāḥa. bhavat-pakṣepi śrutau anuktayoh adhikāri-phalayoh athātah-padābhyām ukteh śrutyananusāri sūtram iti-

([Against the position of T.Pr] some opponent says, 'In maintaining your position also because you present as the

meaning of the two words atha and atah respectively adhikara and phala, Sūtra is inconsistent with Sruti.')

By introducing this discussion Bh.D., aims at showing absolute consistency between Sūtra and Śruti. It illustrates the same idea by way of meeting the objection raised by the opponent as follows:

tanna. na hi tadvijijnāsasva tadbrahmetyādyekamevodāharaņam visvato-mukhatva-bhamgāpatteh sūtrānām. kim tu vicāra-

vidhāyaka-nānā-vākyānyapi-

(The objection does not hold good. To illustrate the meaning of Sūtra a simple passage, tadvijijnāsasva tadbrahma may not be enough. To disregard this fact is to deny viśvatomukhatva, the all-comprehensive character of Sūtra. So in this connection all passages that enjoin vicāra are also considered. [viśvatomukha means that which operates on all sides.])

Bh.D., cites certain passages to illustrate the position it

has expounded.

teşu ca kvacit śāmto dāmta ityādau adhikāri-vişaya-jijnāsānām yasya prasādāt paramārti-rūpāt asmāt-samsārāt mucyate nāpareņa, nārāyaņosau paramo vicimtyah mumuksubhih karmapāšāt amusmāt ityādau adhikāri-vişaya-phala-jijnāsānām catasmām api ukteh.

(Of those passages by some śāmto dāmta etc., adhikārī visaya and jijnāsā are stated. By the passages like "From His prasada a person becomes liberated from this bondage which is nothing but misery, and from nothing else," and "By those that desire to be liberated from the bondage of karma this Nārāyana which is the Highest ought to be enquired," are stated adhikārī,

viṣaya, phala and jijñāsā, all the four.)

The last passage of Śruti illustrates how karma is the essence of bondage. For bondage is characterised as karma-pāśa, the rope of karma. This indicates how karma is opposed to spiritual discipline. Jñāna which is the soul of spiritual discipline has nothing to do with karma. It neither presupposes karma nor does it encourage it. In fact it makes karma impossible as it absorbs the whole life. Hence it follows that the whole of Pūrva-Tamtra consisting of Dharma-Jijnasā is out of place in the scheme of spiritual descipline. Unless this point is well recognised justice to the passage of Śruti, tamevam vidvān is not done and under this condition to speak of knowledge is a mere word meaning nothing serious. Unless knowledge in its full sense is appreciated the facts that it is the expression of prasāda and that it is the same as śravana, manana and nididhyāsana cannot be understood.

II

The collocation of the four, adhikārī, viṣaya, phala and jijñāsā indicates the purity of knowledge. We have seen how adhikāra necessarily leads to knowledge in question. Viṣaya being nothing less and nothing more than Nārāyaṇa makes knowledge defined. Phala namely mokṣa i.e., brahma-prāpti which is of the character of knowledge indicates the purity of knowledge, jijñāsā presents the character of knowledge. Hence all the four items signified by the passage are the language of knowledge. They are intended to show that nothing other than knowledge has any place in the scheme of Sāstra.

Bh.D., illustrates further how an appreciation of this position enables one to see the same truth with reference to every passage of *Sruti* as:

'tadvijijnāsasva' 'sa vijijnāsitavyah' ityādāvapi vi-sabdena

adhikāri-phala-vaišistyasyāpi sūcanācca.

(In the passage tadvijijñāsasva there is the word vijijñāsasva. In the passage sa vijijñāsi'avyaḥ there is the word vijijñāsitavyaḥ. In the passages such as these the word jijñāsā is used with the prefix vi. By this prefix there is in fact the indication of jijñāsā as being accompanied by adhikārin and phala.)

Bh.D., shows that this is not something assumed to meet certain fresh demands; but it is actually the position developed

by Madhva himself as:

ata eva samkşepa-bhāşye kṛtsna-sūtrārthoktyartham śrutyavi-

samvādārtham ca visņureva vijijnāsyah ityuktam.

(Because the position of Śruti is this, it is said by Madhva in Samkṣepa-Bhāṣya i.e., Anu-Bhāṣya "viṣnureva vijijñāsyah," viṣnu alone is the subject-matter of vijijñāsā but not mere jijñāsā. The purpose of this statement is both to present the whole meaning of Sūtra and to present that meaning of Śruti which is not opposed by any other passage of the same.)

This passage clearly explains that what exactly is said by Sruti is just the position of Madhva and nothing short of it. So his whole system of thought is an attempt to find out what

exactly *Śruti* states. In him *Śruti*, *Śūtra* and *Bhāsya* are found to be the expressions of the same truth. The identity of purpose of these three is just what defines the truth of *Śāstra*. If it is modified in any manner, i.e., if *Śūtra* is separated from *Śruti* and *Bhāsya* from the other two, then *Śāstra* loses its truth-value.

Bh.D., shows further that all these ideas indicate how another supposition of the opponents is falsified.

ata eva ca pūrva-tamtre dvitīyasya ādya-pāde vidhi-mamtrayoraikārthyam eka-sabdāditi vidhi-mamtrādhikarane agnīn viharetyādau āmamtranādityukte vidhi-sakti-pratibamdhokteh iha ca tadvijijāasasveti bhrgorāmamtranāt. ātmāvāretyatra maitreyyāh, are iti āmamtranāt avidhitvamiti pratyuktam. bahu-srutyanu rodhena atrāpi vidherevānumānena āmamtranena tanmātram pratyuktau atātparyāditi.

(For the same reason the position of the opponent "In Pūrva-Tamtra in Vidhimamtrādhikaraṇa first quarter, second chapter under vidhimamtrayoraikārthyam ekasabdāt with reference to the passages like agnīn vihara because of their inclusion of āmamtraṇa (act of addressing) it is said that the strength of their being the cases of vidhi, injunction is obstructed. For this reason in the present case also as there is the act of addressing bhrgu as tadvijijāāsasva and as there is the act of addressing maitreyī as are in the passage, ātmāvāre it is not possible to hold that injunction is meant in these passages" becomes refuted. For consistently with many Śruti texts with reference to the passages under consideration also the fact that they are cases of vidhi, 'ought' is inferred. The fact of calling to, āmamtraṇa need not imply the negation of vidhi as such.)

As it was already shown, with reference to the present point also *Siddhānta* studies more the sense rather than some ruling imagined to govern thought by particular people with particular interest.

T.Pr., illustrates next the absolute character of knowledge by way of criticising some possible ideas against knowledge as:

astu mokşo bhagavat-prasāda-sādhyaḥ. tadartham na jñānam apekṣitam. 'tat-karma haritoṣam yat' 'ya imam paramam guhyam' ityādeḥ karmādināpi, bhagavat-prasādaḥ siddhaḥ. yadyapi mok-

şasya karmādi-sādhyatvam śrutyādi-siddham tathāpi 'tamevam vidvān,' 'yamevaişa vṛṇute' ityādau anya-niṣedhāt śamkābhāvah. atra punaḥ 'priyohi'iti vākye anya-niṣedhābhāvāt bhavedeva śamketyāśamkām pramānena pariharati—KARMAŅĀ. iti

(Let moksa be the result of the grace of Bhagavan. Yet no knowledge may be required to obtain it, grace. The same grace might be obtained also by karma etc. This is the teaching of the passages, 'That is karma which pleases Hari' and 'One who teaches this most secret doctrine' etc. [If this difficulty occurs the following may be the answer.] It is thus true that the fact that moksa results from karma and so on is stated by Sruti etc. [From this there occurs the doubt that karma etc. may lead to moksa.] Against this it may be noted that by the passages 'tamevam vidvān' (one who knows It in this manner) and 'yamevaişa vrņute' (whom alone It chooses) there is the denial of those things that are other than knowledge and for this reason there is however no room for doubting [that karma may be the means for the grace of Bhagavān.] But yet in the passage [from the Gitā] 'priyohi' (Dear indeed) there is no negation of other entities. For this reason room for doubt becomes unavoidable. Bhāṣyakāra removes this difficulty presenting at the same time pramāṇa, the proof for his thesis as KARMAŅĀ etc.)

Before studying Bhasya the intention of T.Pr., may be

noted.

Bh.D., brings out the intended idea of T.Pr., as:

anena ca jñānam vinetyādi svoktisamarthanārtham idam bhāṣyam iti darśitam.

(By this statement of T.Pr., it is shown that the purpose of Bhāṣya under consideration is the establishment of its position defined as 'na ca jñānam vinā atyartha prasādaḥ.' (Nor is there intensive grace without knowledge). Intensive grace is the grace that brings about mokṣa.

How this conclusion is arrived at is made clear by Bh.D., as: tat-karma haritoşam yat, sā vidyā tanmatiryayā ityadṛṣyatvanaya-bhāṣyokta-vacanāt, ya idam paramam guhyam madbhakte-svabhidhāsyati iti gītāyām abhidhā-padokta-pravacanasya, na ca tasmānmanuṣyeṣu kaścin me priyakṛttamah ityuttara-vākyastha-priyakṛttama-padena prasāda-hetutva-lābhāt iti bhāvah.

(Under Adrsyatvādhikaraņa Bhāsya says "That is karma from which there is the pleasure of *Hari*; and that is knowledge which apprehends It." For this reason [the reason is this— This passage defines karma and jñāna and thereby points out how they are profoundly different from what we ordinarily call karma and jñāna. By karma we commonly mean an act or the resultant disposition, punya or pāpa. By knowledge we ordinarily mean various forms of knowing as it has been already noted. But the real nature of karma and jñāna has nothing to do with these ideas. Karma in fact is that which brings about prasada i.e., haritoşa. We have already seen how that which brings about prasada is jñana. This is the position of Bhāṣya as stated na ca jñānam vinā atyartha-prasādah. So in the passage 'tat karma haritoşam' karma means study and teaching that cause knowledge. For the same reason in the contexts like the present one the word karma must not be mistaken to mean some distinguished karma which is other than (opposed to) jñāna and which is at the same time supposed to please Hari. Similarly vidyā i.e., knowledge is that which apprehends *Hari* as *Hari* i.e., as expounded by *Śruti*. So *karma* and *vidyā* are synonymous. Otherwise we have to hold that each leads to prasada and this becomes impossible as neither can finally be decided. This is the reason in question.] Gītā says 'The person who introduces this profound secret i.e., knowledge to those that are devoted to me.' In this passage by the word abhidhā teaching of Sāstra is stated. The next statement of Gītā is 'Apart from him among men there is no man that has done that which pleases me best....' In this statement the idea of prasada as well as the fact that pravacana is the only cause of prasada are presented. This is the idea of T.Pr.]

III

We may also concentrate on the word priyakrt. This means doing that which pleases me, Bhagavān. This in meaning is identical with 'tat karma haritoṣam yat.' This karma as the passage states is nothing but pravacana and pravacana is the expression of knowledge. So far the real sense in which karma and jñāna are used in Śāstra is indicated. Taking the ordinary sense of these two words into consideration Bhāṣyakāra points out the distinction of the knowledge recognised by Śāstra and shows how this knowledge alone is the discipline

leading to mokṣa and nothing else and how therefore it is the knowledge in the real sense of the term.

Bhāṣya:

KARMAŅĀTVADHAMAḤ PROKTAḤ PRASĀDAḤ ŚRAVAŅĀDIBHIḤ MADHYAMO JŅĀNA-SAMPATYĀ PRASĀDASTŪTTAMO MATAḤ ||
PRASĀDĀTVADHAMĀDVIṢŅOḤ SVARGA-LOKAḤ PRAKĪRTITAḤ

MADHYAMĀJJANA-LOKĀDIḤ UTTAMASTVEVA MUKTIDAḤ |

(It is said that prasāda resulting from karma is adhama, inferior; Prasāda resulting from śravaṇa and so on is madhyama, medium and prasāda resulting from the acquisition of knowledge is uttama, best. From the lowest prasāda of Viṣṇu the world called Svarga results. From the middle prasāda results the world called Jana. It is only that prasāda which is the best that gives mokṣa.) In this context by karma is meant the action which is conducive to knowledge. If it ends in itself then the result is adhama, if it results in śravaṇa etc., then the result is medium and if it results in knowledge in the full sense of the term, then the result is the best.

T.Pr., comments on Bhāṣya as:

satyam bhavedeva karmādinā bhagavat-prasādaļı. tathāpi tasya anuttamatvāt jūāna-sādhyasyaiva uttamatvāt. anuttamena svargādi-mātra-siddheļi. uttamenaiva mokṣa-siddheļi. tat-sādhanam jūānam apekṣitamiti bhāvah.

(The idea of Bhāṣya is this: Prasāda is Bhagavan's desire. Without it nothing takes place. Karma etc. have their effects because of prasāda. Hence, it is true that from karma etc., follows prasāda of Bhagavān in some sense. But it is not the best. [Śāstra has throughout in view the very best aspect of prasāda.] Only that which results from knowledge is the best in the sense that it is required i.e., that the aspirant in question is in need of. From that which is not the best there results only Svarga etc. Mokṣa results only from the best. Hence as the means for it, knowledge is needed. This is the idea signified by Bhāṣya.)

The whole idea is this. The subject-matter of discussion now is mokṣa and the means for it. So far there is no dispute with regard to the point that it is prasāda of Bhagavān that causes mokṣa. The cause of this aspect of prasāda is under consideration. On the basis of 'tamevam vidvān' etc., knowledge

is shown to be the means for this prasāda. By the opponent against this knowledge karma and knowledge in the ordinary sense are suggested as the means for mokṣa. Against this suggestion Bhāṣyakāra points out that karma etc., are no where given as the means for that prasāda which results in mokṣa. T.Pr., brings out the importance of this knowledge by holding that it is the only means for mokṣa because it alone is the presupposition of prasāda which leads to mokṣa.

 $T \cdot Pr$., having recognised that knowledge discussed in $S\bar{a}stra$ alone is knowledge in the real sense introduces $Bh\bar{a}sya$ which illustrates the absolute character of knowledge as:

nanu jñānam ca karmaṇā jñānamātanotītyādeḥ karmādināpi sambhavati iti na jijñāsayā kṛtyam. ātmeti vākye anya-niṣedhābhāvāt iti āśankām taccheṣeṇa pariharati—ŚRAVAṇAM iti.

(A difficulty arises:—knowledge may result from karma. This is the reason why it is said "one formulates jääna by means of karma." This implies that jijäāsā has no function. Further by the statement 'ātmāvāre' the things other than knowledge are not negated. [Therefore it is not opposed to the idea that karma is the cause of knowledge.] Having in mind this difficulty Bhāṣyakāra removes it by stating the following in continuation as:

BHĀṢYA:

ŚRAVANAM MANANAM CAIVA DHYĀNAM BHAKTIḤ TATHAIVA CA SĀDHANAM JÑĀNA-SAMPATTAU

(Understanding, reflection and also incessant reflection i.e., application as well as devotion [to the other three] form the discipline to the attainment of knowledge.)

The idea is that the acquisition of knowledge consists in sravana, manana, dhyāna as well as bhakti.

Dhyāna is what is called nididhyāsana. Bhakti is also the devotion to Viṣṇu in the form of śravana, manana and dhyāna and it is the same as viṣnu-bhakti leading to viṣnu-pādaika-

samsrayatva. It is therefore no other than devotion to sravana etc.

T.Pr., introduces the passage of Bhāṣya that follows the one that was just introduced as:

kā gatih tarhi etadvacanasya ityata āha.—PRADHĀNAM iti.

(What is then the propriety of this statement, karmanā jñānamātanoti? In answer to this Bhāsya says PRADHĀNAM etc.)

BHĀṣYA.—PRADHĀNAM NĀNYADIṣYATE (Nothing else can be the means in the primary sense.) *T.Pr.*, brings out the meaning of Bhāṣya as: apradhāna-sādhanam karmādīti bhāvah.

(The idea is that the things such as karma are the means in

a non-primary sense.)

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya that shows how the reverse position that karma is primary and $j\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ is non-primary is not possible.

viparītam kim na syāt ityatah āha.—NA CA iti.

(Why not the reverse be the position? In answer Bhāṣya says— Bhāṣya.—na caitāni vinā kaścit jñānamāpa kutaścana iti nāradīye.

(In Nāradīya it is stated that without these none has obtained knowledge by any means.)

T.Pr., brings out the idea contained in this Bhāṣya as:

etāni śravaṇādīni. kutaścana karmādeḥ. jñānasya śravaṇādyanvaya-vyatirekitvāttadeva pradhāna-sādhanam. karmādeḥ tadabhāvāt pāramparyeṇa sādhanam iti bhāvaḥ.

('Etāni' means śravaṇa etc. 'Kutaścana' means by means of karma etc. [This is the idea contained in this Bhāṣya.] If there are śravaṇa etc., then there is knowledge. If there are no śravaṇa etc., then there is no knowledge. Therefore śravaṇa etc., are the primary means for knowledge. Karma etc., are not so. Therefore they are the means only indirectly. This is the intended meaning of Bhāṣya). By karma in this connection is meant the action that is conducive to knowledge.

IV

With reference to this idea the meaning of the word pradhāna, (primary) must be fixed. It means śravaṇa etc., can cause knowledge irrespective of karma. But even supposing that karma etc., can cause knowledge without śravaṇa etc., it is not seen that they cause knowledge. Therefore śravaṇa etc., alone are the causes of knowledge but not karma etc. This is the meaning of the passage, ātmāvāre* and the knowledge signified by this passage is the same as that which is presented by tamevaṃ vidvān. It is obvious that other things as causing knowledge

[•] It is understood at this stage that the reader remembers that the passages ātmāvāre, tamevam vidvān, etc., are from Sruti.

are negated in this passage. Therefore the meaning of all other *Śruti*-texts ought to be the same thing. This is determined by the word *atah* of *Sūtra*. All this means that non-primary meaning has no place in *Śūstra*. Karma is shown to be non-primary. It follows that it is no means as bare karma and it is the means indirectly only insofar as it is conducive to knowledge.

Bh.D., concludes the discussion as: etena jääna-prasädädele taddhetutvädesca prämänikatvät, pramänaih srutyädibhih sarvasya buddhau sannidhäpitasya sütre ata iti moksa-hetu-prasädajanaka-jäänotpädakatvät iti parämarso yukta ityapi sücitam.

(From all this discussion results the following. The facts jñāna, prasāda etc., and the state of their being the means for release moksa, are presented by pramāna. Sruti and so on are Pramāna. All that is presented by them is apprehended by intellect. Only in this circumstance all this is reminded by the word atah of this Sūtra meaning 'because they (Sruti etc.,) generate knowledge that causes grace which in turn causes release.' It is also indicated that this act of reminding is relevant.)

From this it follows that karma etc., as the means of knowledge or of prasada are not pramanika i.e., they are not presented by Sruti etc. Though they seem to be presented apparently by certain passages, they are not in fact ever presented. As it has been already shown the passages that seem to present them condemn them in fact, as they are not the means of knowledge or of prasāda. Adhama, apradhāna and so on are the words of condemnation. These words must not be given commonsense meaning and on this basis it must not be held that karma etc., are the means at least as adhama i.e., in an inferior sense and so on. This is the demand made by Sūtra, by the word atah. The application of atah in the sense defined to the passages, the apparent meaning of which is opposed to Sāstra, yields that after all these passages powerfully substantiate Siddhanta i.e., Sastra at the outset indirectly and directly when Siddhanta has emerged.

Bhāsyakāra further studies the distinction between jijiāsā and Brahma-jijiāsā. This is the study of the distinction between philosophy in general and philosophy of Brahman in particular. There may be philosophies and philosophies. They may be

arranged in the order of hierarchy following some principle. Yet there may not be the philosophy of Brahman. It must be kept in mind that Brahman in the course of this discussion is Brahman as expounded by *Sruti*. So long as this Brahman is not considered however great a system of philosophy may appear it is in its essence empirical. Even to consider Brahman as expounded by *Sruti* from a point of view which is in any sense independent of *Sruti* is to reduce Brahman to the empirical level.

It is commonly supposed that to emphasise Sruti in philosophy is to negate philosophy and in place of philosophy to recognise something that is not philosophical. This supposition does not stand examination. To emphasise Brahman which is presented by Sruti (śrutyutkta) does not mean that empirical reason is negated on the basis of faith and concluded that it is of no value. It rather means that empirical reason is negated because it is empirical and it does not therefore transcend the limits of individuality. To see this defect in all that is empirical is in fact an indispensable aspect of the philosophy of Brahman. Only after one becomes familiar with the defect of empirical reason, however universal it may seem to be, one is able to catch the significance of that which is expounded by Sruti (śrutyukta). Without understanding the independent character of Sruti as the only source of correct knowledge, one is not in a position to appreciate the significance of śrutyukta. Hence to emphasise Sruti in philosophy is not to negate philosophy, but it is to present philosophy in all its fullness. All this indicates how the philosophy of Brahman is the very ideal of philosophy. An appreciation of this truth gives a standard from which the merit of a given philosophy may be measured. So the true test of philosophy is to evaluate a given philosophy in terms of the philosophy of Brahman. This consists in finding out how far a given philosophy makes the philosophy of Brahman possible.

This may be illustrated by taking for example the philosophy of Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant attempts to show that Ding an Sich, Thing-in-itself is beyond the reach of categories of understanding. His practical philosophy that belief in God is a practical necessity does not modify the negative conclusion of his Critique of Pure Reason. Whatever validity his philosophy may possess so far as the non-empirical

character of Reality is emphasised Kant's position comes nearer the Reality as śrutyukta. But from the point of view of Brahma-Mīmāmsā his philosophy is most incomplete.

Another example from Indian philosophy may be taken. Śankara's Advaita-Vedānta holds that the world of kartrtva, doership, and bhoktrtva, enjoyership is mithyā. Whatever validity the details of his philosophy may possess it prepares the ground to appreciate the position of Brahma-Mīmāmsā that nothing is real independently of Brahman. Similarly Sankara's analysis of the proximate causes of knowledge to show that they are devoid of truth and the insistence on the mahāvākyas of Śruti as the only case of truth (prāmānya) prepare the ground for the establishment of srutyukta character of Brahman. At this stage if Sankara's thought is not fully understood and its limits are not fixed, then the significance of these observations may not be fully appreciated. The main point to grasp is that two philosophical systems, when either of them is Brahma-Mīmāmsā, are not opposed to each other as 'yes' and 'no' are opposed to each other. With all the opposition there still persists an underlying element of truth and this element makes non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā a preparation to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It is a preparation to the latter in the sense that to bring the truth element in it to its perfection results in Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

For example to concentrate on the transcendent as the sole ground of the empirical gives rise to the recognition of Sruti and with it Brahman as śrutyukta. There is thus, speaking from the point of view of European philosophy, a clear passage from Kant to Brahma-Mīmāmsā, as it is already indicated. Similarly to concentrate on the mithyā character of the world and on Brahman as signified by the mahāvākyas of Śruti and as the ground of the superimposition of the world results in Brahma-Mīmāmsā with its philosophy of Svatantra, as the sole and complete explanation of all that is existent. This is the reason why Brahma-Mīmāmsā cannot be properly appreciated unless there is a thorough criticism and appreciation of all grades of philosophy that come under non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā. The truth of these observations becomes clear as we go on with our study of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Brahma-Mīmāmsā is not one among several philosophies. It is the philosophy of which philosophical thought of every level is only a stage in its growth. An application of this truth makes the horizon of vision of philosophers broadened. Consequently the person in question welcomes every opposition to the truth he understands in order to see that there is growth of knowledge so that there may

emerge a position that is absolutely true.

Opposition is not limited to mere theory. Though at the outset it is a theory, it soon develops into practical life. Hence welcoming opposition is to welcome the opposing aspects of life. This has in view to overcome the opposition by getting contribution even from it. All this forms an item of santi, peace as taught by Śruti, 'śāntodāntah' and so on which is already considered. The same circumstance gives us the reason why a philosophical system must not be made the basis of a religious practice. A philosophy reduced to religion is no longer there. All there is under this condition is only religion. In this circumstance reason becomes replaced by faith. While in the manner explained so far, there is no opposition between a philosophical system and Brahma-Mīmāmsā, there comes to be irremovable opposition between religions based on these philosophies and Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In other words so long as the study is philosophical pūrvapaksa and siddhānta do not become very much opposed to each other. If once these two are reduced to the level of religion there is only opposition and a serious study becomes impossible and even before any study the person has faith in the thing which he may fail to understand even after a very serious study. This tendency of the mind may be removed only by recognising the contribution that pūrvapakṣa offers to the growth of knowledge. The intimate relation of pūrvapakṣa to siddhanta leads to intellectual toleration. This in its turn develops into sānti, equilibrium of life characterising the very life of the person in question. With this equilibrium the person becomes wholly devoted to Vișnu. Mundaka characterises this man as santa.

V

With these ideas in order to make adhikārin familiar to the whole ground of philosophy consisting of two aspects non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā and Brahma-Mīmāmsā, pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta or avidyā and vidyā in the language of Iša-Upaniṣad Bhāṣyakāra attempts to bring out the significance of the word Brahman of Brahma-jijiāsā. T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣyakāra as

follows. The circumstance in which it introduces him may be noted.

In connection with expounding the meaning of atah Bhāṣyakāra states:

YATO NĀRĀYAŅA-PRASĀDAMŖTE NA MOKŞAḤ

consistently with Sūtra, athāto brahma-jijnāsā he ought to have stated yato brahma-prasādamrte na mokṣaḥ. But he does not do it-This circumstance creates a doubt in the mind of the student.— Bhāṣyakāra has so far studied that Brahman is samdigdha. Hence in his case Brahma-jijnasa has become indispensable. But he says now that moksa is caused by nārāyana-prasāda. The student infers from this that Bhāṣyakāra has in mind nārāyaṇa-jijñāsā as indispensable and from this he may conclude that brahma-jijñāsā is irrelevant to it. The student in this circumstance evidently distinguishes brahma-jijñāsā from nārāyaṇa-jijñāsā. He already knows that Brahman means guna-pūrna. He must therefore mean by Nārāyaṇa which he distinguishes from Brahman something that is not guṇa-pūrṇa. Bhāṣyakāra no doubt says at the very outset "nārāyaṇam guṇaih sarvaih udīrṇam" meaning that Nārāyaṇa is guṇa-pūrṇa. The student finds fault even with this expression. At the beginning of his study he is not fully equipped to do the same. But the discussion that has taken place so far gives him a definite background which enables him to feel the difficulty. Further he has now seen that jijnasa is not an end in itself in the present context. It is a means to an end. This end is called moksa. The subject of jijnāsā ought to be that which gives mokşa. If Nārāyana through prasāda gives moksa, then, the student naturally feels, that the subject-matter of jijnāsā ought to be only Nārāyaṇa. Further there is another aspect of difficulty. Bhāṣyakāra has no reason to change the subject-matter of jijnasa. He ought to have straightly stated yato brahma-prasadamrte etc.

Having all these ideas T.Pr., formulates the difficulty and

introduces the student to Bhāṣya as:

nanu nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte na mokṣaścet tarhi tadvijijñāsviva kartavyā na brahma-jijñāsā.

(A difficulty arises at this stage. If there is no moksa without the grace of Nārāyaṇa, then enquiry into It (Nārāyaṇa) alone ought to be indispensable but not enquiry into Brahman.)

One who feels this difficulty thinks that $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is incomplete (apurna) because It is not Brahman (pūrna). It is somehow assumed by him that apūrna is the cause of mokṣa and is therefore the subject-matter of jijnāsā. This conclusion is obviously the result of some faith but not of study and reason. It is non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Yet it is notentirely opposed to the latter. At least it insists that which gives mokṣa and that which forms the subject-matter of jijnāsā ought to be identical. This truth carried on to its completeness (pūrnatva) results in Brahma-Mīmāmsā. But if a religion is developed from this conclusion the person in question does not move a step further and his religion becomes deadly opposed to Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

The same passage may also be interpreted in a different manner. One may consider that Brahman is different from Nārāyaṇa. On this basis it is possible to think that Nārāyaṇa cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry and therefore it cannot be the giver of mokṣa. Hence one may conclude that Bhāṣya-kāra's statement yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte etc., is falsified by Brahma-Mīmāmsā. T.Pr., expresses both these difficulties in the same passage.

the same passage.

At this stage one may try to throw the whole responsibility on Sūtrakāra himself. Hence in order to clarify the point T.Pr., says.

"na ca vācyam nārāyaṇa eva brahma-padena vivakṣitaḥ sūtrakṛteti."

(It cannot be assumed that by the author of Sūtra Nārāyaṇa

alone is meant by the word brahma.)

The student who has this disposition of mind has the idea that Bhāṣyakāra is wrong in introducing Nārāyāna into Brahma-Mīmāmsā. He shows that the responsibility cannot be thrown on Sūtrakāra. His reason is stated by T.Pr., as:

brahma-śabdasya bahvarthatvena sūtrakāra-vivakṣā-viśeṣasya durjñeyatvāt.

(As the word 'brahma' has many meanings to fix the meaning of Sūtrakāra is not easy). The critic intends to show how Nārāyaṇa as the meaning of 'brahma' cannot be assumed and the responsibility cannot therefore be thrown on Sūtrakāra. His idea is that the whole responsibility lies on Bhāṣyakāra himself.

T.Pr., in order to remove this difficulty introduces the critic to Bhāṣya as—ityata āha Brahma iti.

(In order to remove this difficulty Bhāṣyakāra says BRAHMA and so on.)

Bhāṣya—BRAHMA-ŚABDAŚCA VIṢŅĀVEVA

(The word 'brahman' is used only in the sense of 'Vișnu'.)

T.Pr., adds vişnāveva mukhya iti śeşah.

(The sense of Bhāṣya must be made complete by complementing viṣṇāveva by mukhyaḥ.)

mukhyah means that the word has attained its primary meaning only when it is used in the sense of Viṣnu. This means that any other meaning of it is not primary. It is therefore of secondary importance. Primary meaning alone is the true meaning of the word.

T.Pr., presents the significance of the whole idea as: brahma sabdasya anekārthatvepi tasya visnāveva mukhyatvāt mukhyasyaiva grāhyatvāt sa eva sūtrakāra-vivakṣito jūāyata iti bhāvah.

(Though the word Brahman has many meanings it attains to its primary meaning only when it is used in the sense of Viṣṇu. Further only primary meaning deserves to be recognised. For these reasons it is understood that only Viṣṇu is meant by Sūtrakāra by the word brahman. This is the significance of the passage).

This passage has a reference to several ideas connected with words and their meaning. A word may be supposed to have many meanings i.e., people may use a word in many senses. According to the senses the meanings of the word differ. But as a rule a word has a single primary meaning. As other meanings are relative to the individual interests only the primary meaning must he recognised as the correct meaning of the word. With this understanding it is easy for one to see that the word brahman has one meaning that is primary. This meaning is Visnu as it will be explained shortly. No other meaning deserves recognition. For this reason only this meaning is acceptable to Sūtrakāra. This conclusion implies that Sūtrakāra as a rule uses words in their primary sense. A note on this implication gives discipline. In interpreting Sūtrakāra it must always be seen that only the primary meaning is attributed to the words used by Sūtrakāra. This means that the language of Sūtra does not tolerate any meaning governed by the interest of a commentator.

By the present passage Bhāṣyakāra intends to say that the Bhāsva based on the meanings other than Visnu do not do justice to Sūtrakāra. In illustrating this point one may at the outset answer a difficulty. What is the special reason for which one has to hold that the usage of Sūtrakāra is confined only to primary meaning? The answer is that it is because Sūtra is nirnāyaka of all expressions, verbal in character. If Sūtra itself is of doubtful meaning then how can it decide the meaning of the Vedic passages the meaning of which is doubtful? Of the primary and non-primary meanings that a word is supposed to have, primary meaning is one and the non-primary meanings are many, and therefore to fix the non-primary meaning can never be beyond doubt. But to arrive at the primary meaning is finally to fix the meaning of the word in question. A word that has a non-primary meaning can never decide anything. Nothing decided can be had from it because each meaning is governed by a subjective interest and interest varies with varying conditions. It never attains to definiteness.

But primary meaning is objective in its very disposition. At every stage it is definite. Hence interpretation of Sūtra consists in arriving at the primary meaning of the words of Sūtra. With the help of sūtra-nyāya to decide the meaning of Veda is to arrive at the primary meaning of the Vedic expressions. So with reference to a given meaning of Sūtra or Śruti one has to find out whether that meaning is primary or non-primary; objective or subjective: If it is the latter then the individual thinker has not attained to the true meaning of the passage in question. His meaning is beset with all difficulties which he can never transcend. To have separated the primary meaning from the word in question presupposes defective outlook and the recognition of a secondary meaning as the meaning of the word in question breeds wrong theories. Unless a person has a defective point of view he cannot ignore primary meaning. If his decisions are subjectively determined he cannot be free from wrong theories. Under these conditions even though he is engaged in interpreting Sūtra and Śruti he cannot have any good resulting from his study.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XXII

STUDY OF PREVIOUS SCHOOLS LEADS TO BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

1

We have so far understood the main position of Bhāṣyakāra (Madhva) with regard to the meaning of the word Brahman. As I have shown in my other works "The Dvaita Philosophy and its place in the Vedānta" (p. 219) and so on, Madhva's position is only that which has emerged from the previous thoughts of Vedānta of which Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are the representatives. The study of these works not only presents the distinguishing features of Madhva's thought but it also shows how the whole of Vedānta philosophy has reached its culmination in Madhva's thought. A clear understanding of this truth is indispensable for the present study.

The procedure of Sankara's Bhāṣya is this. In his Bhāṣya the meaning of atha is first expounded. This meaning has already been evaluated and Madhva's meaning against it is

expounded. Sankara interprets atah as follows:

ataśśabdo hetvarthah yasmādveda eva agnihotrādīnām śreyassādhanānām anitya-phalatām darśayati "tadyatheha karmacito lokah kṣīyate evamevāmutra punyacito-lokah kṣīyate." (Ch. Up. 8.1.6) ityādih. tathā brahma-vijñānādapi parama-puruṣārtham darśayati brahma-vidāpnoti param (Tai. Up. 2.1.) ityādih.

(The word atah means reason. For Veda itself shows that agnihotra, worship of fire etc., which are supposed (by Pūrvamīmāmsā) to be the means of good have only the result transient by nature. It is said "Just as the result of the doer of karma dies the result of the doer of merit also in the same manner dies" (Ch. Up. 8. 1.6) and so on. But Veda itself holds that from the knowledge of Brahman results the highest good. It says 'One who knows Brahman attains to the Highest' (Tai. Up. 2-1) and so on.

Sankara's idea according to this passage is that knowledge of Brahman gives the highest good. This idea after all gives

prominence to the Knowledge of Brahman, but not to Brahman. It is wrong to suppose that to give prominence to knowledge is to give prominence to Brahman, its subject-matter. This point may be illustrated by taking for example the knowledge of a thief. The knowledge of a thief may lead to good. But in this circumstance the thief is not important. The important thing is knowledge. For without thief even illusion of thief i.e., knowledge of thief even though he is not there may lead to good.

This defect is removed in Madhva's position. It is this. According to him atah means 'because Brahman is the giver of the highest good' as it is implied in his statement yato nārāyaņa-prasādamṛte na mokṣaḥ (Because there is no mokṣa without the grace of Nārāyaṇa). So he gives unmodified prominence to Brahman. Having kept this difference between the two positions in mind the studies of Sankara-Bhāsya may be continued.

Sankara concludes the meaning of atah and introduces the student to the word brahma-jijnāsā as:

tasmāt yathokta-sādhana-sampatyanantaram brahma-jijnāsā

(For this reason after the obtainment of sādhana-sampatti as it is expounded previously Brahma-jijnāsā becomes something that must be conducted).

At this stage Madhva feels that Sankara is not precise. Sankara said that knowledge gives moksa. Consistently with it he ought to have introduced the student to the enquiry intoknowledge, jñāna-jijñāsā but not to the enquiry into Brahman i.e., Brahma-jijñāsā. This is not an unfamiliar idea. In the Chāndogya Seventh Chapter Sanatkumāra asks his student Nārada to enquire into vijnāna because without vijnāna satya cannot be understood. Similarly Sankara ought to have advocated jñāna-jijñāsā. Śankara's commentator also is silent about this point. Bhāmatī for instance says 'ayamarthah-atah svargādīnām kṣayita-pratipādakāt brahma-jñānasya ca paramapuruşārthatā-pratipādakāt āgamāt, yathokta-sādhana-sampat, tataśca jijñaseti siddham.

(This is the meaning [of Bhāṣya of Śankara]. Ataḥ means because there is the verbal testimony which says that Svarga and so on come to an end as well as the verbal testimony that says that the knowledge of Brahman results in the highest good.' From this it is established that 'obtainment of sādhana as it is expounded comes first and next jijnāsā, enquiry follows.')

It is clear from these ideas that Madhva takes up that which Sankara has failed to expound. Consistently with the exact expression of Sūtra, Madhva holds as the meaning of atah that Brahman is the giver of mokṣa. In doing this he indicates that the commentator of Sūtra must not forget that he is interpreting Sūtra and he is not therefore required to give his own convictions. Why is Brahman alone the giver of mokṣa but not the knowledge of Brahman? Madhva answers that which is the giver of mokṣa must be determined by enquiry. The propriety of these considerations is indicated by T.Pr., as—nanu nārāyana-prasādamṛte na mokṣah tarhi tajjijāāsaiva kartavyā na brahma-jijāāsā (A difficulty is felt—Without the grace of Nārāyana if there is no mokṣa, then only enquiry into it Nārāyana ought to be indispensable but not enquiry into Brahman.)

11

To have a clear idea of the distinction between Madhva and Sankara the following points also may be noted. The doubt that if knowledge gives moksa then it may be of Brahman or of non-Brahman is not removed in Sankara's position. But with Madhva as it is indicated in interpreting the word atah the position is that Brahman is the whole cause of moksa without requiring any assistance. As it will be made clear later on, his concept of moksa is the whole circumstance consisting of what Sankara would bring under the concept of moksa as well as all the presuppositions, adhikāra, jijnāsā, aparokṣa and prasāda, of what he (Madhva) calls mokṣa. The only cause as well as the whole cause of the whole circumstance to which Madhva gives the name mokṣa is Nārāyaṇa i.e., Brahman. This is the indication by the word dvāra which Madhva uses in his Bhāsya. Following this T.Pr., says, 'nanu nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte na mokṣah tarhi tajjijñāsaiva kartavyā,' but not dvāra-jijñāsā. Tajjijñāsā in this passage means Nārāyaṇa-jijnāsā but not Nārayaṇa-prasādajijñāsā. This is clear from the following sentence of T.Pr.

na ca vācyam nārāyana eva brahma-padena vivakṣitah etc. If tajjijñāsā means Nārāyaṇa-prasāda-jijñāsā then consistently with it there ought to be the expression in the following sentence,

na ca vācyam nārāyana-prasāda eva etc. To understand the difference between the two view-points prepares a better ground to follow Sankara.

Having prepared the ground as he wants Sankara inter-

prets Brahma-jijnāsā as:

brahmano-jijñāsā brahma-jijñāsā. brahma ca vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇaṇi. 'janmādyasya yata iti' ata eva na brahma-sabdasya jātyādyarthāntarāṇi āśankitavyāni.

(Brahma-jijnāsā means enquiry into Brahman. Brahman is that which is defined in the following passage of $S\bar{u}tra$ as $jann\bar{u}dyasya$ yatal. For the same reason it ought not to be supposed that different entities, class $(j\bar{a}ti)$, etc., are the meaning of Brahman.)

In this passage Sankara indeed wants to know what Brahman is. The natural course of his thinking would be to consult Śruti itself. But he does not seem to make use of this method. Yet he has to understand what Brahman, the subjectmatter of jijnāsā is. Without this special circumstance the word may mean class etc. But it is evident how they cannot be the subject-matter of jijnāsā and how the knowledge of them does not give rise to any good. He feels that there is only one possibility left to him. He refers to Sūtra itself. The following Sūtra is jannādyasya yatah. (From which birth etc., of this world occur). He conveniently presents Brahman as being defined by this Sūtra.

Madhva thinks that this is a wrong procedure. In the first place to conceive Brahman of Brahma-jijñāsā as that which is defined by 'janmādyasya yatah' is to confuse the second Sūtra with the first one. It is therefore to make the second Sūtra contentless. For following this interpretation all that forms the subject-matter of the second Sūtra is in spirit presupposed by the first Sūtra. Hence second Sūtra does not emerge from the first Sūtra according to this interpretation. Rather first sūtra emerges in fact from the second Sūtra as without knowing the definition of Brahman the first Sūtra cannot be understood. Hence Sankara's Bhāṣya creates a

confusion in the Sūtra literature itself.

The procedure of interpretation according to Madhva is this. The first Sūtra, athāto brahma-jijāāsā must explain how that which is the subject-matter of enquiry is Brahman. Next

follows the question how this Brahman, the subject-matter of enquiry is to be made intelligible to the philosopher. In answer the second Sūtra, janmādyasya yatah appears. Thus first Sūtra leads on to the second one. It first presents the concept of Brahman. Next there is the question of intelligibility. In answer the second Sūtra appears. It is therefore wrong to hold that the second one is presupposed by the first one. The first

must be the first in the order of thought also.

Madhva rejects therefore Sankara's introduction to Brahman. He wants to know which Brahman Sūtrakāra is holding to be the subject-matter of enquiry and which Brahman he is further defining in the second Sūtra in order to make the fact that it is the subject-matter of enquiry more intelligible. It is in the first place, as Sankara himself recognises, Brahman with reference to which there is the statement of Sruti 'One who knows Brahman attains to the highest good', and in the second it is Brahman, as Sūtrakāra holds, considered by Sruti (Srutyukta). To think of Brahman as meaning birth in a caste etc., or to think of something empirical as standing for Brahman is irrelevant. For Brahman in these senses is evidently not and cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry and further the knowledge of such Brahman or Brahman in an indifferent sense does not cause moksa. Brahman as the subject-matter of enquiry transcends therefore all that is empirical. The source of its knowledge must therefore be something transcendent. This transcendent source is called Sruti. Hence Brahman under consideration is that which is expounded by Sruti (Srutyukta).

Consistently with these ideas Madhva studies this disposition of Sruti. He studies various conceptions which present the subject-matter of Śruti. He observes how the same subject-matter is presented by Sruti under the concepts, Brahman, Vișnu and Nārāyana and so on and how Sruti makes use of these terms as synonyms and how each concept is explained by the other concepts. He studies further the etymological significance of the word brahman as given by Sruti as 'brhantohyasmin gunāh.' He sees how the same is the meaning of Nārāyana and how in the concept of Visnu all the ideas presented by the word brahman and its synonyms are present. On the basis of these considerations and as Brahman cannot otherwise be conceived he identifies Brahman as Vișnu. By means of this identification he brings all passages of *Śruti* together and thus prepares his mind to appreciate Sūtrakāra's attempt at organising the whole *Śruti* text so as to present one single truth. Madhva's outlook is thus consistent with the scheme of Sūtrakāra. Without identifying Brahman as *Viṣṇu* he visualises that he cannot appreciate the scheme of Sūtrakāra consisting in showing that all texts of *Śruti* teach the same truth because without identity of Brahman and *Viṣṇu* the two truths become separated and in the presence of this separation *Śruti* itself becomes unintelligible. This means great preparation on the part of

Bhāsyakāra to interpret Sūtra.

But the same preparation is not found in Sankara. In fact in Sankara there seems to be an attempt to disregard Sruti. In illustrating this point Madhva further notes that the preparation he indicates is inevitable on the part of the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. For as he amply illustrates throughout the course of his work it is Brahman identified as Visnu that forms the subject-matter of enquiry. It is the subject-matter because it is ever the subject-matter of discussion, sandigdha. The more it is considered the more it becomes transcendent. and the more it requires enquiry. Not to identify Brahman in this manner is already to fix its nature. This is the mistake that Sankara commits. Even before knowing that Brahman is the subject-matter of enquiry he knows definitely that it is the cause of all. The fact that he is certain in this manner is responsible for his holding that Brahman under consideration is that which is defined in the second Sūtra 'janmādyasya yatah' as the cause of all. Because of this circumstance he is bound to mean by cause something empirical. This is evident by his position that Brahman under consideration is self-evident, svaprakāša or asandigdha. Thus Sankara knows already definitely what Sāstra ought to expound. Even with regard to the details he does not seem to have any doubt. He simply asserts ideas about Brahman following the apparent meaning of certain Sruti texts.

But Madhva at every stage attempts to arrive at the teaching of Śāstra. He understands the word Brahman as presenting the subject-matter of Śāstra. Brahman, the concept comes from Śruti. He studies Śruti. He identifies Brahman as Viṣnu. He realises that it is sandigdha. He feels jijūāsā is indispensable.

After this is finally established he feels the necessity for defining Brahman because otherwise jijñāsā does not take place. Thus by the first Sūtra he prepares himself to receive

the teaching of the second Sūtra.

Further without jijñāsā Brahman as the cause of all cannot be conceived. We are familiar with the produced and the unproduced things. A thing that is produced is seen to have many causes. But the cause of all, the only cause of all, or the whole cause of all is unintelligible. It is in accounting for this concept that many systems of thought have appeared. They have held either that the world of products is an illusion, bhranti (Sankara and Bauddha) that there is no cause of the world except nature, svabhāva (cārvāka) or that the cause of the world consists of several items independent of one another (Nyāya-Vaiśesika). The systems that followed these schools upheld one or the other view. The whole cause, the complete cause, the one cause of all which is truly transcendent is thus beyond the reach of non-Vedic philosophy. Rgveda observes ko addhā veda ka iha pravoca kuta āyātā kuta iyam srstih. (Who can know it well? who can teach that from which this comes, from which this has its existence?) This indicates that there is ordinarily none who knows all this. Smrtis appreciate this difficulty as: na me viduly suraganāh prabhavam na maharşayah (Bh. G. 8.10) (Neither the hosts of divinities nor the best of the sages can understand my

This is the disposition of the content of the second Sūtra janmādyasya yatah. The whole of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, as Madhva illustrates it at every stage of his thought, is directed towards understanding this greatness of the problem and the complexity involved in arriving at the solution. To understand the problem is to appreciate the truth of Brahman. According to Madhva 'the state of being the subject-matter of never-ceasing enquiry' i.e., jijīāsyatva is illustrated by the fact, that Brahman the subject-matter is only the whole and complete cause of all. According to him the position is this. Jijāsyatva, the state of being enquired into prepares the mind to appreciate kāranatva the state of being the cause in its complete sense and further an appreciation of the transcendent character of kāranatva, further confirms in its turn jijāāsyatva, the state of being the

subject-matter of never-ceasing enquiry.

Thus to apprehend the position of Brahma-Sūtra is very difficult. Without appreciating this difficulty Sankara assumes that Brahman is already known even before jijnasa. With reference to every detail Madhva makes good for what Sankara has to tackle, as is already shown in the course of previous discussions. Sankara considers whether Brahman is familiar or unfamiliar and arrives at the conclusion that it is the different positions of philosophers that create difficulties though Brahman is all along svaprakāśa, self-evident. Hence he says that jijnāsā is required. But Madhva notes that this position is psychologically false. If Brahman is self-evident, then thousand theories that hold that it is not so cannot render it doubtful. If they can, as the theories have no end, Brahman can never be understood as self-evident. Further with regard to a thing which is self-evident, to talk of degrees of knowledge is meaningless. Either it is given as a whole or not at all. Further to speak of bhranti, illusion with regard to it is irrelevant, because it is self-evident. If illusion is possible then its self-evident character is denied. Thus Sankara's position does not do justice to Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

dientes int

What applies to Sankara applies to Rāmānuja as well Rāmānuja says in his Bhāṣya of Jijnāsādhikaraņa—

tasmādanādi-karma-pravāha-rūpājīāna-mūlatvāt bandhasya tannibarhanam ukta-lakṣaṇa-jīānādeva. tadutpattisca aharaha-ranuṣṭhīyamāna-parama-puruṣārādhana-veṣātma-yāthātmya-bud-dhi-viseṣa-samskṛta-varṇāśramocita-karma-labhyā. tatra kevala-karmaṇām alpāsthira-phalatvam. anabhisamhita-phala-parama-puruṣārādhana-veṣāṇām karmaṇām upāsanātmaka-jñānotpatti-dvāreṇa brahma-yāthātmya-bhāva-rūpānanta-sthira-phalatvam ca karma-svarūpa-jñānādṛte na jñāyate. kevalākāra-parityāga-pūrvaka-yathokta-svarūpa-karmopādānam ca na sambhavatīti karma-vicārānantaram tata eva hetoh brahma-vicārah kartavyah ityathāta ityuktam.

(Therefore as bondage is caused by nescience which is no other than the flow of beginningless karma, its removal is only from the knowledge in the sense in which it is already defined. This [knowledge] is produced by karma defined by particular varna and āśrama as well as purified by the correct knowledge

which is no other than the worship of the Supreme Person [God] through every day practice. Of these concepts the karmas that are independent of knowledge yield negligible and transient result. But the karmas which are not done for the sake of results and which are done in the form of worshipping the Supreme Being give rise to knowledge which is the same as meditation; and through this there follows the correct realisation of Brahman and this result is infinite and enduring. This cannot be understood unless there is the knowledge of what exactly karma is; nor can there be for the same reason, the practice of karma as defined already having abandoned the so-called karma [that is independent of correct knowledge of Supreme Being]. For this reason after enquiry into karma, for the same reason enquiry into Brahman ought to be had. In order to present these ideas it is said athātaḥ.)

Śruta-Prakāšikā, a commentary on Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya by Vedānta Deśika brings the gist of the same passage in interpreting tasmāt, the first word of the passage of the Bhāṣya so far quoted as:

evam brahma-vyatirikta-kṛtsna-mithyātva-nirākaranena bandhasya satyatva-siddheḥ tannivṛttiḥ karma-sāpekṣopāsanātmakajñānādeveti karma-vicāra-pūrva-vṛttatvam yuktamityāha tasmāditi,

(Thus as the theory, 'All that is other than Brahman is mithyā' is refuted, and for this reason it is established that bondage is real and as for this reason the removal of bondage is effected only by the knowledge which is the same as meditation which presupposes karma, [Rāmānuja] says that it is reasonable to hold that enquiry into karma must be presupposed [by enquiry into Brahman] as: Therefore etc.).

With reference to these passages the following may be noted. After all in spirit Sankara's position is not transcended by Rāmānuja. Knowledge is supposed by Sankara also to give mokṣa and the importance of Brahman is not recognised. In fact Rāmānuja's position goes still more backward insofar as it makes knowledge dependent on karma and Brahma-jijjāāsā dependent on karma-jijāāsā. The place of adhikāra in the scheme of knowledge is thus entirely ignored in these philosophies.

Further even with regard to the word Brahma-jijiāsā Rāmānuja has not much to give us. To illustrate this point a

passage from Śruta-Prakāsikā in connection with this discussion may be cited. It runs as:

athātassabdārtham nigamayati (iti karma-vicārānantaramiti) brahma-vicārah kartavya ityanena brahma-jijnāsā-sabdārthah uktah, vicārasya kartavyatāyām nātīva vivādah, sabdah arthah ityetāvadeva hi vaisamyam, athātassabdārtha eva hyatīva vivādah, ato athātah ityetāvadapāttam, evam sūtrasya akṣarayojanā kṛtā.

([Rāmānuja] concludes the meaning of atha and atah as, by saying 'Thus after the enquiry into karma', enquiry into Brahman ought to be had the meaning of Brahma-jijāāsā has been stated. With regard to the necessity for enquiry there is not much dispute. There is the difference of opinion only with regard to the acceptability of either the meaning of the word or the sense given by the word. But there is much dispute with regard to the meaning of atha and atah. Therefore [in the Bhāṣya] only the words atha and atah are stated. Thus the arrangement of the letters of Sūtra is made).

It might be noted against this observation that there is in fact more room for dispute with regard to the meaning of the word Brahma-jijñāsā than there is room for dispute with regard to the expressions atha and atah. This is evident by the foregoing considerations. But Rāmānuja says that there is no dispute. The reason is that he does not somehow bestow much attention on the expression, Brahma-jijñāsā. He simply concludes his Bhāṣya on jijñāsā as:

atah kevalānām karmaņām alpāsthira-phalatvāt brahmajñānasya ananta-sthira-phalatvāt tannirnaya-phala-brahma-vicārārambhah yuktah iti sthitam.

(Therefore for the reason that the result of bare karmas is negligible and transient and the result of the knowledge of Brahman is unlimited and enduring, the commencement of enquiry into Brahman which results in deciding it [knowledge] is justified. This is the position established).

In following this *Bhāṣya* with a critical eye one fails to understand how Rāmānuja could have missed to study (i) the unmodified importance of Brahman against the knowledge of Brahman, (ii) the possibility of explaining knowledge without making it depend on *karma*, (iii) the difference between the

view that knowledge is the result of vicara and that knowledge is no other than vicāra and (iv) the fact of fixing the attention on the concept of Brahman as the real problem in Sastra. At least after studying Madhva one is bound to see that in the case of Rāmānuja it is the failure of recognising the indispensability of adhikāra, that is responsible for his assumptions as well as serious omissions. Adhikāra is the language of no prepossession. It is the expression of the preparedness of mind to receive the teaching of *Śruti* that results from the application of *sūtranyāya* to *Śruti*. With *vairāgya* mind is governed by no wrong theory and with visnu-bhakti mind with full freedom is directed towards apprehending the highest Truth i.e., Vișnu. These two are the contents of adhikāra. But sādhana-sampat i.e., nityānitya-vastu-viveka and so on upheld by Sankara and Rāmānuja is the language of predisposition of mind. As it is already shown, with this sādhana the person even before jijnāsā is supposed to have the ideas nitya, anitya, their distinction and so on. This predisposition governs the thought of individual thinker who upholds these ideas. With this predisposition justice to Brahma-Mīmāmsā can never be done.

IV

An examination of all the positions based on these ideas and the observation of their defects are not overlooked by T.Pr. T.Pr., clearly enunciates the principle 'That which gives mokṣa is the subject-matter of jijñāsā.' It is the principle given by Sūtrakāra by the word ataḥ and established by Bhāṣyakāra i.e., Madhva by his statement yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte na mokṣaḥ and so on.

Madhva's attempt to fix the concept of Brahman is justified by the disposition of Sūtra. Brahman mentioned by Sūtra is not an indefinite concept. It is in the first place defined as the subject-matter of jijiāsā. To amplify this truth it is defined further as śrutyukta. In Śruti wherever the idea of Brahman occurs it is defined by the ideas characterising Viṣnu, Nārāyana and such other concepts. To disregard this fact is not to do justice to Śruti. Nor is it to do justice to the concept of Brahman. Madhva brings this fact to the notice of the student in identifying Brahman as Viṣnu. T.Pr., understands how

substantial Madhva's position is by adding the word mukhyah to Madhva's statement viṣnāveva. It indicates by this that only the primary meaning is acceptable to Madhva but never a meaning secondary in any sense. This is the point of distinction of Madhva from his predecessors. The far-reaching effects of this point will be considered shortly. It may however be noted that this point of distinction governs Madhva's thought from the start to the finish. It is in fact the distinction of Sūtrakāra himself and Madhva's outlook is shaped by him.

T.Pr., says:

brahma-sabdasya anekārthatvepi tasya viṣṇāveva mukhyatvāt mukhyasyaiva grāhyatvāt sa eva sūtrakāra-vivakṣito jñāyata iti bhāvaḥ.

(Though the word *Brahman* has many meanings it has its primary meaning only when it is used in the sense of *Visnu*. [Of all the meanings] only the primary meaning is acceptable. Therefore only this meaning is understood to have been the meaning that Sūtrakāra intends to express. This is the idea signified by *Bhāṣya*.)

In this passage T.Pr., brings $S\bar{u}tra$ and $Bh\bar{a}sya$ to unity and with this observation it itself becomes one with these works. A ruling is given in this connection. It is that that in studying these three works the emphasis is only on the primary meaning. Anything less than the primary meaning misleads the student and the texts become unintelligible.

T.Pr., further shows that Sūtrakāra intends to express that the primary meaning of the word brahman is not only a matter of inference but it is determined by the very context in which he composes the first Sūtra as:

sa visnurāha hi tam brahmetyācakṣate iti nirantara-sūtra-dvaye brahmatvena nārāyaṇasyaiva prastutim sūcayati visnu-grahanena.

('It is Visnu that is so far expounded. Sruti says this indeed. Those that know Brahman hold that Visnu Itself is Brahman'. Thus in the successive two Sūtras reference is made only to Nārāyana in the sense of Brahman. [The author] indicates this by mentioning Visnu.)

The idea is this, 'sa viṣnurāha hi. tam brahmetyācakṣate' are the last two Sūtras of Deva-Mīmāmsā by the same Sūtrakāra, i.e.

Bādarāyana. Immediately after the close of this work he is said to have composed the Brahma-Sūtra of which athāto brahmaiiinasa is the first Sūtra. Thus the latter Sūtra succeeds the former immediately. In the former Visnu is presented as Brahman; and in the Sūtra on jijnāsā the word Brahman is mentioned. This means that this word must naturally mean Vișnu. Vedic Vișnu is the same as Vedic Nārāyaṇa. Hence Bhāṣyakāra by the expression of Viṣṇu as the meaning of brahman indicates that the same is the concept of Nārāyana. For this reason he holds that Brahma-jijnasa is the same as Nārāyaṇa-jijnāsā. With a view to finding out the truth of this idea he examines the whole of Sruti-texts. Supposing that he had not done this, passages that are apparently devoted to Brahman would be taken to be separate from the rest of Veda devoted to Visnu or Nārāyana and Brahman as being complete in attribute would not be conceived. This circumstance as it is already indicated would create the confusion that is responsible for conceiving Brahman according to the fancy of individual thinkers.

Madhva in his Anu-Vy., explains how Sūtrakāra is the author of the last Sūtras of Deva-Mīmāmsā as: svayam bhagavatā viṣnuh brahmetyetat puroditam saviṣnurāhahītyante: deva-sastrasya tena hi. (By the revered teacher, the Sūtrakāra himself it is already established that Viṣnu is Brahman as 'sa viṣnurāha hi'—It is Viṣnu. Sruti says this 'indeed' at the end of Deva-Sāstra i.e. Deva-Mīmāmsā).

Supposing that one does not know this circumstance T.Pr., explains, however, that it is not difficult to see that according to Sūtrakāra as it is already shown Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone is the meaning of the word brahman as Viṣṇu is the primary meaning of brahman. Sūtra being the deciding factor of all sabda (sound as such) cannot itself support secondary meanings. With secondary meaning nothing can be decided. Hence it follows that by the word brahman is meant Viṣṇu and Viṣnu Itself.

A study of the foregoing ideas has enabled us to see the relation of the meaning of the words of Sūtra atha and atah to Brahma-jijnāsā more closely so that we are truly in a position to understand the significance of Brahma-jijnāsā. In order to have this advantage T.C., explains the idea contained in the T.Pr., on the Bhāṣya, yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte etc.

T.C., feels a difficulty in understanding the passage, yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte etc., as the meaning of ataḥ. It says:

'yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte na mokṣaḥ' ityādi. nanu prakṛtasya hetutva-vācakena ataśśabdena kathamidam labhyam'? adhikāri-višeṣaṇatvena mokṣasya prakṛtatvepi tam prati nārāyaṇa-prasādasya sādhunatvāderaprakṛtatvena tasya ata ityatra prātipadikena paramarṣāsambhavena tasya vicāra-kartavyatāyām hetutvasya vibhaktyoktyayogāt.

(With regard to the passage 'yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte na moksah' etc., as stating the meaning of atah, a difficulty arises. The word under consideration is atah. It presents the idea of reason. How is this meaning [nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte etc.,] obtained by this word? [Prakāśa explains idam='this meaning' as mokṣasādhana-prasāda-sādhana-jñāna-hetutvam = The state of being the cause of the knowledge which is the cause of the prasada which leads to moksa.] As the object of the desire of adhikārin release may be under consideration. But with regard to it to consider prasada of Narayana as the means for it is not relevant. For this reason there is no reference to it by etat, the basic part of the word atah. Owing to this fact the addition of the sign of pancamī in order to indicate that that is the reason for holding the indispensability of enquiry becomes groundless.) [With regard to the formation of the word atah the following may be noted. etat is prāti-padika, the basic part of the word. In order to obtain the meaning of pancamī the suffix called tasil is added to it. In this connection according to the Pāṇini-Sūtra etados there is the addition of as to etat, the basic form. The result is the formation of the word atah].

Having formulated this difficulty T.C., meets it in seven ways.

1. T.C., says first-

maivam, yamevaisa vṛṇute ityādi-srutyā prayojanābhāvaprayuktānārambhaṇīyatva-sankā-nirāsa-hetoh anyasyābhāvāt yata ityādi bhāsyoktādhyāhārena sabdatah prakṛtatva-sambhavāt ata eva yatrānavasarah iti sloko yata ityādyadhyāhāra-samarthanaparatayāpi vyākhyeyaḥ'. 1. It is not so. For on the basis of *Sruti yamevaiṣa-vṛṇute* etc., the *Bhāṣya* beginning with *yataḥ* [stating reason] can be understood. For there is nothing else that indicates reason that removes the difficulty that as *Sāṣtra* is devoid of purpose it does not deserve commencement. That which is understood therefore becomes as good as being actually mentioned:

[Prakāša explains the idea contained in this passage as. yamātmā prasannassan vṛṇute tenaiva prāpyah, iti śrutyā 'na tā-dṛṣī-prīti' iti śrutyā 'draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ' iti śrutyā ca praṣādā-di-gata-mokṣādi-hetutvasya śabdatah prakṛtatva-sambhavāt itya-nvayah. buddhisthasya hi parāmaršah. buddhisthatvam ca śrutyu ktatvāt sambhavati iti bhāvah. . . . yamevaiṣa ityādi śrutyukta-śankā-nirāsa-hetoh anyasya abhāvāt mokṣa-hetu-praṣāda-janaka-jñāna-kāraṇatvasyaivokta-śankā-nirasana-samarthatayā sa eva bhāṣyoktādhyāhāvena pūryata ityarthaḥ. uktam ca sudhāyām "jijnāsottha-jñānajāt tatpraṣādādeva mucyate" ityatra 'yadyapi na sūtrākṣarebhyo bhagavatpraṣādo labhyate tathāpyanyathānu-papatyā angīkaraṇīya' iti.]

(By means of Sruti "Whom Atman, Svatantra being pleased chooses, by him It becomes obtained", by means of Sruti "Vișnu never shows that love to others which, It shows [to one who understands Its (Viṣṇu's) greatness]" and also by means of Sruti, "If Atman were to be realised then it ought to be understood" the state of being the cause of moksa etc., which is attributed, to Prasāda etc., becomes as good as being actually mentioned. This is the sense [in which the first sentence of T.C., ought to be taken.] A word refers to something if this something occurs indeed to mind when the word is apprehended: In the present case the state of its occurring to mind happens because it is stated by Sruti. [The following is thus the meaning of the passage in question.] As there is nothing else to remove the doubt that may beset Sruti, yamevaisa etc., and as only the state of being the cause of the knowledge which gives rise to prasāda that leads to mokṣa is capable of removing the difficulty, that want is made good only by the Bhasya understanding the passage [yato nārāyaṇa prasādamrte etc.] It is indeed said in the Sudhā i.e., Nyāya-sudhā in connection with interpreting [a passage from Anu. Bh., "one is liberated only by prasada caused by the knowledge which is caused by enquiry" that the idea of prasada of Bhagavān is not indeed given by the words of Sūtra, yet this supplement must be made because, otherwise Sūtra with reference to Śruti 'yamevaiṣa' cannot be explained.)]

For the same reason the verse 'yatra anavasarah' etc., ought also to be interpreted so as to justify the understanding of yatah etc., in order to fix the meaning of atah of Sūtra.)

[Prakāśa says: yasmādyata ityādi vākyādhyāhāram vinā vicāra-kartavyatva-rūpārthānupapatyā yata ityādyadhyāhārāh ata evetyarthah.]

('Because without understanding the sentence yatah etc., to conceive the indispensability of enquiry is not possible, yatah etc., there is the understanding of the same reason. This is the meaning of the passage in question.)

This work further says that according to the ruling given by this verse 'yatra anavasarah etc. not only kartavyā is understood but also the sentence yatah etc. Just as the use of padam in the verse is the reason for understanding kartavyā, the use of vākyam vā is the reason for understanding the sentence yatah etc. This observation illustrates how Madhva's Bhāṣya consists also in supplying the ellipsis in Sūtra. Ellipsis is inevitable in Sūtra because it is characterised by minimum expression.

T.C., presents another method of meeting the difficulty as:

2. yadvā janmādi-sūtre prāmāņikatvāt jagatah idam-šabdena parāmaršavat atrāpi prasādādeh mokṣa-hetutvādeh prāmāṇi-katvādetacchabdena parāmaršah, buddhi-sannidhānameva hi prakṛtatvam. ata eva 'tamevam vidvān' ityādinā tasya prāmāṇikatā daršītā bhāsye.

(The following emerges from the former position. In interpreting the Sūtra, 'janmādyasya yatah' by the word idam i.e., asya [of the Sūtra] the world is understood, because it is given by the reason [Śruti, the source of correct knowledge.] Similarly in the present connection also as prasāda etc., are on the basis of reason [Śruti, the source of correct knowledge] given as the cause of moksa etc., by etat [a part of the word ntah] of Sūtra that meaning is obtained.)

[Prakāša explains prāmāṇikatvāt as pramāṇena buddhau sannihitatvāt. Prāmāṇikatvāt means 'as it is in contact with intellect because of Pramāṇa, reason'. It explains idaṃ-śabdena as asyetyanena: Asyetyanena means 'by the word asya' of the second sūtra.] Having thus given the equivalent of certain expressions of T.C., Prakāša proceeds to meet a difficulty in connection with interpreting the word asya in the Sūtra, janmādyasya yataḥ. Though this consideration properly belongs to the exposition of the second Sūtra a note on it works as an analogy in the present connection of understanding 'yataḥ' etc., in interpreting the expression, brahma-jijāāsā. This, by the way, illustrates the general method of interpretation that governs Sūtra teaching. Further this discussion also prepares the mind to receive the teaching of the second Sūtra. So this work says—

nanu tatra asyetyetat prāmānikatvāt na jagat-parāmaršakam. kintu yatovā imāni bhūtānīti visaya-vākya-gatasya jagadvācinah imānītyasya vipariņāmena nirdešah. na ca tatra jīvantīti śravaṇāt bhūta-padasya cetana-mātra-paratvena kṛtsna-jagat tatra na-prāptamiti vācyam. bhūta-śabdasya sarva-cetana-paratve tadabhimanyamāna-mahadādi-jadasyāpi prāpteh. tena vinā teṣām janmā-yukteh. anyathā kṛtsna-hetutvasya śrutau aprāptau tad-vyākhyā-rūpa-sūtre asyetyanena kṛtsna-lābhāyogācceti cenna. imānītya-nenāpi prāmāṇikatvādeva jagat-parāmaršasya vācyatayā sūtrepi sa eva nyāyo anusartavya iti tātparyāt. ata eva sudhāyām 'asya pratyakṣādi-pramāṇa-siddhatayā prakṛtasya samasta-prapancasya ityuktam.

(There is a difficulty with regard to the meaning of asya-'The word asya does not mean the world because it is a word presented by [Sruti which is] pramāṇa. But it only restates with some change in the verbal expression—change from imāni to asya-the world presented by imāni, a word occurring in the statement of the subject-matter of discussion presented by Sruti, 'vato vā imāni bhūtāni [From which alone these beings.] In connection with interpreting this word bhūtāni it must not be supposed that the whole world is not meant because there is the use of the word jīvanti as [yena jātāni jīvanti] and for this reason it must be taken to mean only cetanas (spirits). For the word, bhūta gives the meaning of all cetanas [and they are the controlling agencies of material objects] and for this reason there is the idea of the material objects mahat etc., which exist because of the cetanas that control their existence. Independently of cetana the birth of these material objects is not justified. If this interpretation is not accepted then through Sruti the state of being the cause of all is not understood, and for this reason by means of Sūtra the function of which is only to decide the meaning of Sruti by means of the word asya, the idea of the cause of all cannot be obtained'—This is so far the difficulty—It does not hold good. By the word imāni itself there may as well be the idea of the world given by pramāṇas. With reference to Sūtra also for the same reason the same method of interpretation may be followed. It is for the same reason it is said in Sūdhā 'asya' means 'of the whole world' which is under consideration as it is presented by the pramāṇas, pratyaksa and so on.)

With reference to this passage the point to be noted is this—What is the meaning of the pronoun imāni as occurring in the passage of Śruti, yato vā imāni etc.? The word may be taken to mean only spirits on the basis of jīvanti occurring in the same passage. But this meaning does not explicitly bring out the prāmānikatva, the state of being given by correct knowledge of the world that is other than spirit. Therefore this meaning is abandoned and the word is taken to mean all that is spiritual as well as material that is given by correct knowledge, pratyakṣa and so on. This explains how Brahman is the sole source of all reality that is given differently from it.

The state of being under consideration is nothing but the presence of the idea in question in intellect. Whatever intellect is conscious of becomes the object of consideration. For the same reason it may be remembered that in the Bhāṣya by means of 'tamevam vidvān' etc., the meaning in question is shown to have been given by pramāṇa.

This consideration brings out the rational character of Sruti with reference to its every aspect.

3. T.C., presents another method of removing the difficulty. It says—

yadvā etat-sūtra-nirņetavyena "nārāyaņosau paramo vicintyo mumukşubhih karmapāšāt" ityādi vicāra-vidhi-vākyena upasthāpitatvāt vicārasya mokşa-prayojakatvam atassabdārthah. vyākhyeye prakṛtasya vyākhyāne ata iti parāmarsa-sambhavāt.

(The following emerges from the former two positions. The meaning of the word atah is that vicāra is the means

for mokṣa; because it has occurred to the mind by the agency of the statement which enjoins vicāra as "This Nārāyaṇa is the highest i.e., the only object of vicāra by those that want to be free from the bondage of karma." The exact significance of this statement is to be determined by the present Sūtra [Athāto Brahma-jijñāsā]. [The reason behind the whole consideration is this]. That which is indicated by the statement the meaning of which is to be determined (vyākhyeya) becomes the object of reference by the word atah of vyākhyāna, the determining agent i.e., Sūtra.)

It may be noted that this observation brings out the absolute consistency between *Sruti* and *Sūtra*. In the absence of this consistency *Sūtra* cannot be that which decides the meaning of *Sruti*.

4. T.C., presents another method of removing the difficulty as—

yadvā anuvyākhyānoktarītyā mīmāmsāngabhūta-brahmatarke prakrtatvāt siddhe vyutpatyādikamiva vicārasya mokṣa-hetutvam ataśśabdārthah.

(The following emerges from the former positions. According to the method adopted by Anu-Vyākhyāna that in the process of the reasoning that helps the knowledge of Brahman and that is a necessary element in enquiry into Brahman, the theory that a word means a thing that is already existent is indispensable. Similarly it is necessary to hold that vicāra, enquiry is the discipline leading to mokṣa, as the meaning of the word atah.)

It may also be noted that the same idea for the same reason is already mentioned in *Brahma-Tarka*, another work of Sūtrakāra. So according to *Anu-vyākhyāna* "siddhe vyutpattih" etc., comes to the mind as it is mentioned in *Brahma-Tarka* as the background of enquiry. Similarly the fact that vicāra leads to moksa through causing knowledge and prasāda is expounded in the same work, *Brahma-Tarka* by Sūtrakāra himself. For this reason it occurs to the mind as the meaning of atah.

It may be remembered in this connection that Madhva with reference to every idea he presents as the position of Sūtra never fails to add to his exposition that what is presented as

the idea of Sūtrakāra is expressed by Sūtrakāra himself in some one of his works. Of these works he repeatedly mentions Brahma-Tarka. Thus throughout his exposition, out of necessity he exhibits his vast learning. This also is a point that distinguishes him from his predecessors. A note on these points gives us an idea of the extent of research expected from those who are interested in these studies.

So far the meaning of atah is decided by taking the general background that is presupposed by Sūtra into consideration. This background is outside Sūtra. The author of T.C., considers the meaning of atah from a point of view internal (antaranga) to Sūtra.

5. T.C., presents another method of meeting the difficulty

yadvā janmādi-sūtre brahmaņo vicāra-sādhya-jūāna-janyaprasāda-dvārā mokṣadatvasya vakṣyamāṇatvāt bhagavataḥ ukta-dvāreṇa mokṣadatvasya ataśśabdārthatvopapattiḥ.

(The following emerges from the former positions. By [the second] Sūtra 'janmādyasya yataḥ' it is to be explained that Brahman through prasāda caused by knowledge produced by enquiry is the cause of mokṣa.)

[Prakāša says mocakatvena viṣṇuḥ jijñāsyašcet bandhakatvena ajijñāsyopi syāditi prāpte aprasannasya bandhakatvam prasādahetoḥ jijñāsāyāḥ kartavyatvānukūlameva natu pratikūlamiti varnakāntarasya mokṣadatvāt jijñāsyamityanuvyākhyāna-rītyā vakṣyamāṇatvāt ityarthaḥ.]

(If Vinu is the subject-matter of enquiry because It gives moksa, then it must follow from this that It cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry because it gives bondage. If this difficulty arises then the answer is this. It (Vinu) gives bondage if It is not pleased. But this is relevant to the fact of indispensability of enquiry which is the cause of prasāda; and it is never irrelevant. Therefore the position that Vinu is the subject-matter of enquiry because It gives moksa as expounded in Anu-Vyākhyāna has to be upheld. This is the meaning of vakṣyamānatvāt.)

With regard to the observations like these it must be noted that these authors are very careful that nothing of their own thought should become mixed with Sāstra. Hence one's knowledge of Sāstra strictly consists in recalling to mind what is already expounded by Sūtrakāra himself. Even the originality of Bhāṣyakāra consists only in this fact. This not only speaks for a powerful continuity of culture but also the complete and inexhaustible character of the original teaching i.e., the teaching of Sūtrakāra.)]

In the light of the present method the following may however be concluded—Bhagavān is the giver of mokṣa in the manner explained. Hence there is reason to hold that 'for the reason of Bhagavān' is the meaning of the word ataḥ. This explains the internal harmony in the ideas presented by Śūtra.

6. T.C., presents another method of meeting the difficulty as—

yadvā mumukṣā-rūpādhikārānantaram vicārah kartavya iti atha-brahma-jijñāṣā-padābhyām ukte vicāra-vidhyadhikāriviṣeṣanecchā-viṣayatvam labdham mokṣasya prayojanatvam ata iti hetūkriyate.

(The following emerges from the former position. After the desire for mokṣa which is the presupposition (adhikāra) enquiry becomes indispensable. This idea is given by the two words 'atha and brahma-jijūāsā of the Sūtra. This is the injunction of the commencement of enquiry. He with reference to whom it is made is one who is fitted, adhikārin. Desire for mokṣa is his attribute. Hence the object of this desire is mokṣa. Mokṣa is the purpose of enquiry. Hence it is made the reason for enquiry by means of the word atah. So atah means 'because mokṣa is the purpose for the realisation of which enquiry is ordained.' The whole idea is that mokṣa as the result is the reason for which enquiry ought to take place.)

[Prakāśa explains the idea that mokṣa is the cause of jijāāsā as—

evam ca icchā-viṣayatvena labdham mokṣa-phalatvam prātipadikena parāmṛṣya vibhaktyā hetutvoktau yamevaiṣa ityādi bkāṣyokta-ṣrutyādi-balāt jñāna-janya-prasād-advāraīva tat setsyati

(Thus having understood the idea that mokea is the result which is presented as the object of desire by the portion of the word atah without the case mark, by the suffix indicating

the case the reason for enquiry is given. This reason on the basis of *Sruti* cited by *Bhāṣya* yamevaiṣa etc., is intelligible only when it stands for the idea that mokṣa as the result becomes

caused through prasada caused by jñana.)]

With regard to mumukṣā the following may be noted. According to Śāstra it is the same as adhikāra, but it is not as it is already shown mere desire for mokṣa in the sense in which it is defined as an item of sādhana-sampat according to Śaṅkara. But in Sāstra this desire takes the positive aspect of vairāgya and viṣnubhakti i.e., adhikāra. T.C., in place of saying adhikārānantaram says also mumukṣārūpādhikārānantaram. From this it follows that it intends to illustrate how mokṣa is the result of enquiry. T.C., justifies its position further as—

na cātra dvitīya-pakṣe adhikāryāderapi ataśśabdenaiva parāmarša-sambhavāt atha-śabdādi-vaiyarthyam. śamāderadhikārivišeṣaṇasya siddhasya pravṛtyangatvam. prayojanādestu asiddhasyāpi buddhisthasya. tatrāpi viṣayasya nāsiddhatva-niyamaḥ, prayojanasya tu tanniyamaḥ ityādi višeṣa-jñāpanārtham pṛthak sūcanāt.

(With regard to this second position [based on the internal evidence of Sūtra] it cannot be supposed that the use of the word atha and such other words or ideas are devoid of purpose, because by means of the word atah itself the ideas such as adhikārin can be obtained. For, the use of these words or ideas is needed in order to indicate the following—śama etc., the attributes of adhikārin as being actually existent form the background of the will to enquiry: The result to be achieved and such other things though they may not be actual as mere ideas [lead to enquiry]: In this connection it may also be noted that it is not the rule that the subject-matter ought to be unfurnished; but it is a rule that the result ought to be unfurnished. This is the reason why mumukṣā is separately indicated.)

7. T.C., further indicates that all the items prasada and so on that form the background of enquiry are presented in a sense by the word atha as—

yadvā upanişad-bhāşyādi-rūpa-siddhārtha-kathanātmakopadesādhīna-grahanātmakasya sravaṇa-manana-rūpa-jijīāsādhikāriviseṣaṇatvāt sravaṇa-viṣayasya mokṣa-prasādādi-sādhya-sādhanabhāvasya atha-śabdopasthāpitatvāt hetutva-yogyatvācca ata iti parāmarśa iti.

(yadvā=The following emerges from the previous considerations. [Madhva's] Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads and so on expound the truths that are already furnished. To instruct them is to instruct this fact. To understand it is an attribute of the student who is fitted to have enquiry which is noother than understanding, śravaṇa and reflection, manana. The object of understanding is that release, mokṣa is the end and grace praṣāda etc., are the means. This fact is introduced to mind by the word atha. The same fact is capable of being the reason [for enquiry]. To present this idea there is the use of the word atale.)

It may be noted in this connection that T.C., understands by upadeśa teaching or the interpretation of the Bhāṣyas of the Upaniṣads and so on. It is implied that independently of them teaching these ideas does not help knowledge. The understanding in this connection cannot be called śravaṇa. Even the so called philosophical thinking not governed by the Upaniṣads and their Bhāṣyas has nothing to regulate it. It is freedom of thought carried to excess disregarding the indispensability of the sources of knowledge. Freedom carried to excess is no freedom. Madhva illustrates this truth in Sāstra-yonitvādhikaraṇa of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

Further in connection with the afore-said seven methods of meeting the difficulty that prasāda of Nārāyāṇa has no place in the scheme of the first Sūtra the following points may be noted. Of the seven methods the first four are external (bahiranga) in the sense that they are based on the works that are outside Brahma-Sūtra. They indicate the equipment on the part of the student expected by the study of Sāstra. With this equipment the student cannot think differently from the thought presented by Madhva. Having this background the student naturally appreciates the understanding (adhyāhāra) of yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamrte etc., in order to make the meaning of atah definite. So the formulation of pūrvapakṣa against Sāstra implies that the person who upholds it is devoid of this background or equipment needed by Sāstra.

The last three methods of meeting the difficulty offer internal (antaranga) evidences from the Sūtra in question. They show that to understand yato nārāyaṇa-prasādamṛte etc., is a logical necessity arising in connection with interpreting the words of Sūtra, atha and atah along with brahma-jijnāsā. Brahman being the subject-matter of jijnasa necessarily points to the facts that It is the giver of the result which is called moksa, that to hold that It is the giver of moksa is to hold that Its prasada is the cause of moksa, that this prasada is caused by knowledge and that this knowledge is caused by enquiry. If knowledge itself were to cause moksa, then enquiry into Brahman would be irrelevant. If it is said that this enquiry is ordained because Brahman is the subject-matter of knowledge, then it is to hold that Brahman of Sūtra does not mean Brahman proper, but it stands for the knowledge of Brahman. This would be accepting a secondary meaning of the word Brahman. Further if Brahman stands for the knowledge of Brahman, why should Brahman be mentioned in the Sūtra but not knowledge itself? Even though knowledge had been mentioned, still the idea of Brahman would be there, because it is the object of the knowledge in question. This makes enquiry into Brahman dispensable. Hence the position of Sankara and Rāmānuja that knowledge by itself gives moksa is totally inconsistent with the disposition of Sūtra and in fact it is irrelevant to it.

In expounding the position of Madhva also the statement that knowledge causes mokşa becomes at times a necessity in different contexts. But this circumstance is not identical with the position of his predecessors that knowledge is the cause of mokşa. They entertain this view in order to prove that Brahman is not the cause or the whole cause. Sankara's Brahman is no cause of anything because it is nirguna. Rāmānuja's Brahman is not the whole cause of mokşa, because cit is not Its creation as it subsists in every circumstance in its subtle form, sūkşma-rūpa, and this form is therefore as enduring as Brahman is and Mokşa therefore is as much due to this as it may be due to Brahman. But with Madhva the circumstance in which knowledge is spoken of as being the cause of mokṣa is entirely different. On every occasion it has in view the establishment of the fact that Brahman is the whole cause of mokṣa. Hence if others say that knowledge

causes mok ildes a it is a language of the denial of Brahman either partly or wholly. But if Madhva says that knowledge causes mok ildes a, then it is the language, for the reasons that are so far stated, of the truth that Brahman is the giver of mok ildes a. Brahman gives mok ildes a through enquiry, knowledge and grace and all that is implied in Madhva's expression that knowledge causes mok ildes a. So Madhva's position is the logical implication of the very disposition of the S ildes t trae in question.

V

After enunciating the foregoing position T.C., illustrates it further in the light of Anu.Vy. as—

anu-vyākhyānetu "ato yathārtha-bandhasya vinā viṣnuprasādataḥ | anivṛtteḥ tadartham hi jijñāsātra vidhīyate || pratyakṣavacca prāmāṇyam svata evāgamasya hi | vyutpattiḥ prathamā tasmāt vartamāne agate tataḥ ||

(In Anu.Vy., it is said "Therefore bondage which is real without Prasāda of Viṣṇu does not become removed. To obtain prasāda enquiry is indeed enjoined as being indispensable.)

[Though the literal translation of jijnasatra vidhīyate would, from the common linguistic point of view be 'jijnāsā in this connection is enjoined' yet the implication of this expression is that the person in question may or may not have it according to his will and this means independence of his action. Hence from the point of view of Sastra this translation is wrong. Therefore in Sastra injunction, vidhi means indispensability. The idea is that one cannot do without it. This implies spontaneous occurrence. As such it is *Prasāda* of *Bhagavān*. Another point may be noted. Prasāda is commonly taken to be a religious expression. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Madhva is spoken of as upholding religion even by modern writers who have more scope for comparative study. But Madhva's concept of prasāda is profoundly different. It signifies natural or spontaneous occurrence. A position which Cārvāka would call nature or svabhāva and thereby deny Iśvara, the creative principle, is shown to be the work of Visnu by Madhva. So with Madhva there is svabhāva, nature, no doubt.

But it is there because of Viṣṇu. Prasāda is the expression of the same truth.

Prasada in the religious sense is the language of the so called divine interference with the natural order of things. By prasada it is supposed that a natural event is arrested and in its place something else takes place. A poor man who is destined to continue to be poor according to natural order of things is supposed to become rich if only God wills it. Religion somehow attributes all that is good to God and all that is evil to nature. Good and evil are conceived according to individual whims and fancies. But what is good to one is necessarily evil to another. What is good in one circumstance is necessarily evil in another circumstance. Without seeing this contradiction a religious person attributes good to God and evil to nature. Mind, in this environment becomes so blind that with reference to several individuals of varied and mutually opposed interest the same God is emphasised. This contradiction is present in all religious groups. Religion does not stop at this alone. It believes in the efficacy of prayer. What cannot be attained to by merit is supposed to come from prayer. This is the underlying conviction of all prayers however sincere and harmless they may appear to be.

But the force of nature never yields to man's illusions. A circumstance which he attributes to divine interference, is in fact an event of the natural order of things. When natural course of things is hard to detect religion readily attributes the occurrence to the divine agency. But Madhva detects efficacy of nature even with reference to a case which is presented as the most divine.

He shows that prayer is a myth and to talk of its efficacy is illusion. According to him miracle-makers, the so called mahātmas, men of spiritual powers and so on are mere persons who are not properly understood and therefore profoundly misunderstood. One never knows the conscious and unconscious levels of human nature and how they act upon and react to the powers of nature to define which is equally difficult. the reaction of one upon the other is more complex. To abstract an event from this and idealise it as divine is due to the failure of observation and understanding. What applies to the so-called good things applies to the evil things.

So Madhva holds that every thing is nature and there is nothing divine in the world as it is commonly understood to be. To mix nature with the divine is dualism (dvaita). In this circumstance neither is justified. One becomes confused with the other. One who mixes them leads the life of confusion,

illusion and misery.

Carvāka's Svabhāva-Vāda has one merit. It has the merit of freeing man from evil caused by religion. But his position gives rise to a serious problem. Is svabhāva the real explanation of any thing? Is it svatantra? 'No' says Madhva. Because it is Nature, svabhāva it is blind and devoid of the qualities of cetana. It is therefore not the explanation of anything. Then what is the real explanation? It must be some cetana. It may be supposed that it is an individual cetana that explains all. Is it svatantra? Individual cetana is not svatantra, because it is limited by other cetanas. Hence the cetana that is the explanation of all must be cetana in the special sense. It must include all cetanas in the sense that It underlies all. must therefore be supreme cetana i.e., parama-cetana. As the explanation of all it is Iśvara, the divine. It is the doer of all. It is the maker of even illusion, dvaita. Hence every thing is the work of Iśvara. There is therefore no nature. Dvaita, dualism, or illusion is evil. Its removal is good. Both are the creations of Iśwara. Overcoming evil and maintaining good is also its creation. This distinction is characterised as prasada. Prasada is therefore complete negation of all that is religion, illusion or dvaita. To obtain prasāda no prayer is needed. But enquiry into Iśvara which is the same as Brahman in the capacity of its being guna-pūrna is the only means to obtain prasada, because enquiry itself is a case of grace. Enquiry is knowledge in the real sense. Knowledge is therefore the only good. It leads to Prasada and through it moksa, the highest good. Enquiry is the origin of the whole process. Knowledge etc., are its continuity. It is therefore the only good in life. Life without enquiry is bondage. Removal of bondage is effected by jijñāsā. Hence Madhva shows the indispensability of jijnāsā as jijnāsātra

It may be further noted that in the passage anivertient tadartham of Anu. Vy., tadartham from ordinary sanskrit point of view may be taken to mean 'in order to effect the removal

of bondage.' But this meaning is definitely wrong from the point of view of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Whatever be its justification from the point of view of common language or from that of some logic it attributes to jijāāsā something other than Viṣṇu. Removal of bondage mentioned separately in preference to Viṣṇu-prasāda i.e., Viṣṇu Itself necessarily implies that the removal is different from Viṣṇu. Consequently Viṣṇu-jijāāsā in this case becomes irrelevant to it. There ought to be in fact nivṛtti-jijāāsā, as opposed to Viṣṇu-jijāāsā. This is sublated by the word Brahma-jijāāsā of the Sūtra. Nivṛtti, the removal of bondage in Sāstra is therefore finally the language of Viṣṇu-prasāda and this is the language of Viṣṇu itself. So prahāsa says tadartham = Viṣṇu-prasādārtham = in order to obtain Viṣṇu-prasāda i.e., Viṣṇu itself.

Interpretation of words in Sastra is thus the result of a definite discipline. Every interpretation offered must therefore be tested from the stand-point of the discipline before it is accepted. The greatness of the author of Prakāśa is this discipline. With it alone, he has become a commentator. Similarly the author of T.C., and the author of T.Pr., are commentators because of their discipline. Discipline is no other than insight into the truth taught by Madhva. This explains how the study of Sastra moulds the life of the student. It gives the required discipline or insight. The student becomes qualified to expound Sastra insofar as he has imbibed this discipline or insight. The observation holds good with reference to Madhva himself. His outlook and his life are moulded by Brahma-Mīmāmsā. It is this but not mere scholarship that makes him Bhāṣyakāra. Discipline according to Madhva is genuine scholarship characterised by rju-bhāva, straightforwardness in thinking and doing. This is the outlook formulated by Brahma-Mīmāmsā as its presupposition. To have it is to be one in spirit with Sūtrakāra. This circumstance brings unity to the continuity of the exposition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā by means of successive commentaries. As the spirit, discipline and insight behind them are the same, the real author of the whole development is Sūtrakāra himself. Development in this connection is no other than the infinite extent of the richness of the thought of Sūtrakāra. Madhva repeatedly illustrates this point in his Anu. Vy., and makes use of this illustration in explaining the validity of *Bhāsya*. According to him the first and foremost evidence of validity is consistency with Sūtrakāra.]

As it is in the case of perception, truth in the case of agama,

verbal testimony, is indeed svatah, self-established.

[Prakāša means by svatah samšāya-viparyayājanakatve sati jñāna-janakatvādevetyarthah.

(The meaning is this—The truth of āgama is svatah, because it gives rise to knowledge without giving rise to doubt and wrong knowledge.)

The idea is that which gives rise to the knowledge which is free from doubt and wrongness is Agama. By Agama in this

connection is meant Brahma-Mīmāmsā.]

This explains how a word means at the first instance that which is present i.e., that which is existent, siddha or furnished and only next it means that which is to come, aiddha or to be furnished.

[Prakāša presents the gist of the latter idea as vyutpattirityanena siddhārthe prāmānyam na iti šankā-nirāsah.]

(By means of the statement commencing with the word vyutpatti [of Anu. Vy.,] the supposition that the validity of a verbal testimony does not take place if the testimony means

something present i.e., furnished becomes refuted.)

The Pūrva-Mīmāmsā philosophers hold that a statement (vākya) is pramāna only as meaning something to be furnished and therefore asiddha or kārya. They hold this view in order to explain how Veda does not become valid if it is supposed to expound Brahman, a furnished object. Madhva refutes this position by showing that even the supposition that a vākya is pramāna only when it means something asiddha presupposes that it has already meant something siddha. Even to hold that a meaning is asiddha, one ought to be familiar with that meaning. In this act the meaning in question becomes familiar and therefore furnished. Hence prakāsa says:

vartamānārtha-vyutpatteļi kāraṇatvāt anāgatādyarthavyutpatteļi kāryatvāt.

(The idea that a word is related to a furnished object, siddha is cause. The idea that a word is related to an unfurnished object, asiddha is effect.)

T.C., further explains why Anu. Vy., holds this position:-

ityādinā bandhasya mithyātvāt tannivṛtteḥ prasāda-nairapekṣyāt na bhagavat-prasādārthā jijñāsā mumukṣuṇā kāryā etyādi-śaṅkā-nirāsāya prayojana-sādhakaṁ jagat-satyatvādikaṁ ataśśabdenoktaṁ.

(By the word atah is also meant the reality of the world and the things consistent with it. This work has in view the establishment of the fact that enquiry has a definite purpose to serve. An exposition of this fact removes the following difficulty—"Bondage is mithyā. In order to remove it no prasāda is required. Therefore with a view to obtaining prasāda of Bhagavān by one who is after mokṣa no jijñāsā is to be had and so on.")

The idea is this. The purpose of maintaining the reality of the world is the justification of jijnāsā. By Sankara the world is held to be mithyā because he wants to show that jijnāsā is not needed. Hence Sūtrakāra shows by the word atah giving the justification of jijnāsā the reality of the world and the ideas connected with this reality.

VII

T.C., mentions further implications of the same word atah as:

vişaya-siddhi-hetu-yuktişvapi svaprakāśa-pratyagarthābhinnatvāt na vişayatvamiti prameye āropitākāra-śankā-nirāsakṛdyā brahma-pada-sūcitā yuktih, tadatirikta-śabdasya na prāmānyam, prāmānyepi siddhārthe na prāmānyam ityādikā pramānāropitākāra-śankā-nirāsa-kṛdyuktirapi ataśśabdenaiva sūcitā.

(With regard to the reasons which are required to prove the subject-matter [of Sāstra] the following may be noted. The reason which is indicated by the word Brahman refuting the difficulty that all that is objective is superimposed on the entity under consideration and this difficulty being the outcome of the fact that the entity under consideration cannot be regarded as object because it is the same as the self which is self-evident; and the reason that removes the difficulty that the source of correct knowledge is super-imposed [on the self], and this difficulty arising from the thought that verbal testimony is different from self and is therefore invalid and even if it is taken to be valid it cannot be valid with reference to a thing which is furnished and so on, are indeed indicated by the word atah itself.)

The idea is this. Against Śāstra there are two kinds of theories. 1. With regard to the subject-matter, prameya and 2. With regard to the source of knowledge, pramāṇa. These theories hold that these two ideas prameya and pramāṇa are only super-imposed and they are therefore not existent. Hence, it is concluded that no Śāstra is required to expound them. In this circumstance if Śāstra were to make a start, then it ought first to meet these two difficulties. Sūtrakāra meets the difficulty with reference to prameya by the use of the word brahman. It is already shown how this word means completion with regard to every attribute, (guṇapūrti) and how it is the subject-matter of Śāstra. The other difficulty with regard to pramāṇa is met by the use of the word atah by Sūtrakāra. These reasons employed by Sūtrakāra in meeting these two difficulties are indicated by the word atah of the first Sūtra.

In the light of Anu. Vy., in which Madhva explains Sūtra-

kāra's position T.C., continues as:

apekṣitārtha-hetu-sūcakatvāt ataśśabdasyetyuktvā "yato anubhavaṭaḥ sarvam siddhametadatopi ca." ityādinā buddhau vipari-vartamānam hi sākṣāt-prakṛtam granthoktaṭvam tu tallingam bandha-satyatvādikam ca anubhava-siddhatvāt prakṛtamiti matāntaramuktvā "ataḥ tadartham samkṣepādata ityabhyasūcayat" ityādinā mīmāmsāngabhūta-brahma-tarkākhyatarka-śāstre sūtra-kṛt-kṛte prakṛto jijnāsā-kartavyatvopayogī yukti-kalāpo ataśśabdārthaḥ.

(Having stated that 'the word atah means all that is required to justify jijnāsā' [This passage belongs to N.S. T.C., takes it to be one with Anu. Vy. The idea is that N.S. brings out the heart of Anu. Vy.] Anu. Vy. states "All this, [the reality of the world and so on] is given by immediate apprehension. For the reason such as this also". In this manner having stated the other positions as that which is prominently in the mind is animmediate concern, to state it in a work is its indication and the reality etc., of the bondage is the object of consideration because it is given by immediate apprehension, the work continues as ["Because the

same position is considered in *Brahma-Tarka*] all that is meant by that work is briefly indicated by the word *atah.*" and so on. From all this it is meant that *Brahma-Tarka* forms the background of *mīmāmsā*, enquiry: It is *Tarka-Sāstra*, Science of Reason. It is composed by Sūtrakāra. Of the things expounded here all reasons that amplify the indispensability of enquiry happen to be the meaning of *atah*)

[Prakāša says eka-kartṛkatvācca atra parāmaršo yukta iti bhāvenoktam sūtra-kṛtā iti.]

(Because of the identity of the author that which is said in that work, i.e., Brahma-Tarka, must be brought to this work, Brahma-Sūtra. To indicate this idea the word sūtrakṛt is used in this passage as sūtra-kṛtā.)

[The idea to note is this. Both Brahma-Tarka and Brahma-Sütra are the works of Sütrakāra i.e., Bādarāyaṇa. The subject matter of both is reason. Therefore the knowledge of Brahma-Tarka is indispensable in interpreting Brahma-Sütra.]

This implies that to judge the position of Sūtra by some science of logic, Nyāya-Vaiesika and so on is wrong. Sūtra-kāra is the author of Brahma-Tarka. He has in that work expounded his own system of logic. It is but natural that he has composed Brahma-Sūtra only in terms of his own logic. If a Bhāṣyakāra does not take note of this fact he is bound to go wrong. For this reason, Madhva in every context draws the attention of the student to see if the logical conditions demanded by Sūtra are satisfied. Brahma-Tarka is the tarka, reason relevant to Brahman. This implies that the other systems of tarka have only subjective value. Hence to depend on them does not help knowledge of Brahman.

VIII

T.C., proceeds to show that in Anu.Vy., another implication of the same position is given as—

tarka-śāstrasya mīmāmsāngatvam ca tannirnīta-svarūpasankhyā-balābalādibhih pramānaih iha prameya-śodhanāditi matāntaramuktam.

(The fact that the science of Reason, Tarka-Śāstra forms the background of mīmāmsā is established by the fact that there is

evaluation of the things discussed herein i.e., in mīmāmsā by means of the standards (pramāṇas), the nature, number, strength, weakness, etc., which are determined by Tarka-Śāstra. Thus another position is also given.)

The idea is that the conclusions in interpreting Sūtra must be tested by the standards with their implications given by Brahma-Tarka. One may see at this stage how the very approach of Madhva has its own distinction and how reliable the knowledge he gives is. It is devoid of all religion, faith or dogma. All that he says marks the very essence of enquiry. It is also worth noting how because of this element his commentators enjoy infinite richness of the implications of his teaching because his teaching stands every test.

Prakāsa introduces T.C., in its continuation of the same discussion as:

'tadevam ataśśabdārtham prasthāna-dvayoktam samarthya idānīm atha-brahma-śabdārtha-viviktatvena ataśśabdārtham niş karştum athāderapi artham vadan "bhaktimān parame viṣnau, karmanātvadhamah proktah", ityādi-bhāṣyasya utsūtratva-bhrama-nirāsāya athātaśśabdārūḍhatvam sphorayan upasamharati.'

(So far the meaning of atah as given in the two prasthānas [earlier and later, pūrva and uttara i.e., Brahma-Sūtra-bhāṣya and Anu-Vyākhyāna] is established. After this there arises the necessity for fixing the meaning of atah as being clearly distinguished from the meaning of the words atha and brahman. In order to do this, Bhāṣya states also the meaning of atha etc., as "bhaktimān parame viṣnau, karmaṇātvadhamah proktah" and so on. In this connection he, [the author of T.C.,] wants to remove the wrong idea that these passages of Bhāṣya are going beyond Sūtra i.e., they state thoughts that are outside the jurisdiction of Sūtra. To do this he shows that these passages are actually needed to expound the meaning of atha and atah [following the indication given by Tīkā i.e., T.Pr.]

[So the author of T.C.] concludes—

tadevam svargādi-sādhana-jyotistomādau yathā tatkāma-traivarnikodhikārī tathā vicārasya satyapi visaye phale ca mumuksuḥ traivarnikodhikārī na tu sāntyādikamapi tadvisesanamiti sankā rājasūyādau rājatvādiriva vacanāt sāntyādirapi tadvisesanamiti sūcayatā atha-sabdena parihrtā. visaya-prayojanayoḥ abhāvāt niradhikāritvamiti sankā tatsamarpakābhyām atassabda-brahmasabdābhyām nirākṛtā.

(With regard to the foregoing considerations the following is a difficulty. Just as in the case of the performance of the sacrifice, jyotiṣṭoma which is the means for obtaining Svarga, the adhikārin is a member of any of the threefold varna, [brahma, kṣatra and vaiṣya] who desires to have it (Svarga), in the case of vicāra though there is already the subject-matter [Brahman i.e., guṇa-pūrṇa as presented by the word, brahma] as well as the result [mokṣa as presented by the word ataḥ] a member of any of the threefold varna who is after mokṣa is adhikārin. Sānti etc., need not be his attribute. [Even though he is devoid of śānti etc., he can be adhikārin.] This is a difficulty. This difficulty is removed just as it is removed in the case of the attribute rājatva etc., in connection with the sacrifice rājasūya etc., on the basis of the expression [rājā etc.,]

[Prakāša explains the idea as:

yathā 'rājā rājasūyena yajeta' ityatra rājeti vacanāt rājatvam tatra adhikāri-višesaņam yathā vā 'brāhmaņo vājapeyena yajeta' ityatra brāhmaṇatvam tathā 'bhaktimān parame viṣṇau' ityādi vacanāt śāntyādirapi tadvišeṣaṇam iti bhāvaḥ.

(Just as it is the case with reference to the statement 'A king ought to conduct a sacrifice, by means of $r\bar{a}jas\bar{u}ya$ ' as there is the expression $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}$, (king) the state of being a king is an attribute of adhikārin: and further as it is the case with reference to the statement "A brāhmaṇa ought to conduct the sacrifice, by means of $v\bar{a}japeya$ " as there is the expression, brāhmaṇa, the state of being a brāhmaṇa is an attribute of adhikārin, as there is the statement 'One who has devotion to Viṣṇu etc.,' sānti etc., the state of being devoted to Viṣṇu etc., are the attributes of adhikārin. This is the intention of the passage.)]

by the word atha indicating the idea that śānti and so on also form the attributes of him, (adhikārin). There is further another difficulty and it is—'There is neither the subject-matter nor any purpose to serve; there is therefore no question of adhikārin.' This difficulty is removed by the word, atah and the word, Brahma, which present respectively the purpose to serve and the subject-matter.

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There is next the question—Granting that the word, atah, gives the idea of the purpose of jijāāsā, what justification is there to hold that the same word also means prasāda etc.,? [It may be noted that this question is in a sense already answered. But it is the answer given to particular difficulties. But the difficulties responsible for this question are different. They are given by prakāša as—

nisprayojanatva-śankā ca jñānādeḥ karma-janyatvādi-prayuktā ekā. ātma-jñāne satyapi tadanupalambha-kṛtā anyā. taddvayorapi kramānnivartanena dvayamapi prayojanārpakam ityetadvyanakti.

(Knowledge etc., may be supposed to have no purpose to serve. This difficulty occurs for two reasons. One is due to the supposition that jñāna and so on are caused by karma. The second is due to the supposition that though one obtains the knowledge of ātman, mokṣa is not obtained. These two cases of difficulties are met in order and it is shown that the removal of these difficulties helps the conception of purpose, [mokṣa] by T.C.)

T.C. in this connection concludes-

evam satyapi vişaye jijñāsā na sākṣāt mokṣa-hetuḥ, nāpi jñāna-dvārā. "karmaṇā jñānamātanoti" ityādi-śrutyā karmaṇāpi siddheḥ. kimca jñānamapi na sākṣānmokṣa-hetuḥ. nāpi bhagavat-prasāda-dvārā, tasya 'tatkarma haritoṣam yat' ityādinā karmaṇāpi siddheḥ. jñānena ajñāna-nivṛttau prasādasya anapekṣitatvāt ceti śaṅkā ataśśabdena prasādādeḥ mokṣādi-hetutvam sūcayatā pariḥṛtā.

(In the same manner the following difficulty also becomes removed. The difficulty is this. 'Even though the subject-matter is there, jijnāsā is not the immediate cause of mokṣa. Nor can it be the cause through causing knowledge. According to Sruti 'karmaṇā jiānamātanoti, (One obtains knowledge by means of karma), [knowledge] may be obtained also by karma. Further, even knowledge is not the immediate cause of mokṣa. Nor is it the cause through causing praṣāda. Mokṣa may be effected even by karma according to 'tat karma haritoṣam yat. (That is karma) from which there is the pleasure of Hari). Further, if non-knowledge were to be removed by means of knowledge, there is no need for praṣāda.'

This is the difficulty. It is removed by the word atah indicating that prasāda etc., from the cause of mokṣa.)

By way of explaining this difficulty, Prakāša says:

tamevamiti jūānasyaiva mokṣa-hetutva-śruteḥ jūāna-janana eva sāmarthyācceti bhāvaḥ, . . . yasya prasādāditi śrutyā prasāda-syaiva taddhetutva-darśanāt "na harim vinā jūāna-svabhāvatopi syāt muktiḥ kasyāpi hi kvacit" ityādyanuvyākhyānokta-diśā svato asāmarthyācceti bhāvaḥ. prasādam vinā jūānādeva mokṣa ityatra yuktimcāha. ajūāna-nivṛttereva mokṣatvāt na hi dīpasya andhakāra-nivṛttau anyāpekṣeti paraiḥ angīkārāditi bhāvaḥ.

([jijñāsā is not the immediate cause of moksa] because according to Sruti 'tamevam vidvān' (one who knows That) knowledge itself is the cause of moksa and jijnāsā has only that much of capacity which is required to generate knowledge. [This is the idea implied by the expression, na sākṣāt of T.C.] ... Further the idea is that knowledge by itself has no capacity to cause moksa because of the reasons given by Sruti 'yasya prasādāt', stating prasāda itself is understood to be the cause of moksa and Anuvyākhyāna stating 'Independently of Hari, by the mere strength of knowledge moksa does not occur to anyone in any circumstance.' In favour of [the opponent's position] that without prasada only by means of knowledge moksa occurs, a reason is given as follows-Moksa is the removal of ajñāna by means of knowledge. [In this act no assistance is required.] If a light is to remove darkness there is indeed no assistance of external entities needed. This is the position accepted by the other thinkers. To meet this pūrvapaksa the passage in Anu. Vy., occurs.)

Further, Prakāśa interprets prasādādeļi as prasāda-jñānayoļi moksa-prasāda-hetutvam ityarthaļi.

(The meaning of Prasādādeḥ mokṣādi-hetutvam is that prasāda and jñāna are respectively the causes of mokṣa and prasāda.)

From these ideas, this work concludes—

tathā "śravanam mananam caiva", "karmanā tvadhamaḥ proktaḥ" ityādi bhāṣyokta-diśā karmano antaḥkaraṇa-śuddḥi dvārā paramparayaiva jūāna-hetutvam karmādi-janya-prasādādeḥmokșetara-hetutvam ca sūcayatā ityapyarthah, tena karmanetyādikam bhāṣyam notsūtramiti dhyeyam.

(Further, according to Bhasya 'sravanam mananam caiva, karmanātvadhamah proktah' etc., the ideas that karma is indirectly the cause of jñāna as it causes purity of mind and thus prepares it to have knowledge and that prasada which is caused by karma etc., is the cause of something which is other than moksa-may also be taken as being indicated by the word, atah. This explains that the Bhasya 'karmana' etc., is not outside the jurisdiction of Sūtra.) Karma in this context must be taken in the sense of that karma which is indispensably presupposed by knowledge. That karma is called vidyākarma in Śāstra.

Consistently with these ideas by Karma in this passage must be understood that Karma which is relevant to the truth of the indispensability of enquiry under all circumstances. Similarly prasada of lower order which is said to give the result other than moksa must be such that it is consistent with prasāda which is the cause of moksa. Its cause, karma also must be such that is consistent with jijñāsā. All this indicates consistency in the history of development of adhikāra that leads to brahma-jijñāsā. By means of these expressions Bhāsyakāra intends to illustrate how brahma-jijnāsā is not an accidental occurrence but it is a stage of a definite growth in the history of spiritual growth.

T.C., removes the second difficulty as-

ahamiti brahmani jñāyamānepi mokṣānupalambhāt niṣprayojanatvamiti sankā tu vişaya-sūcakena brahma-padenaiva nirasteti drastavyam.

(There is a difficulty expressed as; "As 'I' though Brahman is known, there is no moksa. Hence knowledge etc., have no purpose to serve." It must be understood that this difficulty is removed by the word brahma itself which indicates the subject-matter of knowledge.)

T.C., further shows that the indication of the subjectmatter is a necessity as-

yadyapi vişayādikam samanvayādhyāyādau vaksyate, tathāpi sāstreņa viņayādikam niścitya śāstra-pravrttau anyonyāśrayāt ādau tat-sūcanīyam.

(It must however be noted that the subject-matter etc., are considered in the chapters samanvayādhyāya and so on; i.e., of the three things, viṣaya, adhikārin and phala, viṣaya is considered in the first two chapters, Samanvaya and Avirodha, and adhikārin and phala are considered in the last two chapters, Sādhana and Phala. [The idea is that to consider them in the first section which is only an introduction to Sāstra is irrelevant. This difficulty is removed as:] Yet, the position that one ought to understand viṣaya etc., by means of Sāstra and after this understanding one ought to study Sāstra is an argument based on mutual assumption. [Without study of Sāstra, viṣaya etc., are not understood and without understanding them, there can be no study of Sāstra. This is a case of mutual assumption.] For this reason, i.e., in order to remove this difficulty viṣaya etc., must be indicated before the commencement of Sāstra.)

Does this mean that there ought to be commencement of the

commencement? T.C., answers-

adhyayana-vidhi-vākyavat etat-sūtrasyāpi śāstrāntargatasya śāstrārambha-pratipādakenaiva ārambha-siddheḥ nānavasthā.

(Just as the statement which enjoins the study of the Veda namely, svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ, this Sūtra being a part of Śāstra marks the commencement of Śāstra itself. As this accounts for the commencement there is no room for the process of ad infinitum in thinking.)

Can we not have the knowledge of vişaya etc., from the Bhāṣyas of the Upaniṣads? T.C., answers—

yadyapi vişayādikam āgamādevāpātatah pratītam; tathāpi pūrva-pakṣokta-nyāyena tadabhāva-śankāyām nyāyena etatpratipādayitum sūtram.

(It is true that visaya etc., are in appearance made familiar by means of āgama itself i.e., Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas. But owing to the force of argument advanced by pūrva-pakṣa there is the idea of the absence of viṣaya etc. Hence in order to account for them by means of reason, this Sūtra is composed.)

This indicates that the knowledge produced by agama is no knowledge at all. For it is negated by pūrva-pakṣa. Supposing a person does not know pūrva-pakṣa, negation is waiting for him i.e., the so-called knowledge obtained by means of agama, though for the time being, it appears to be

knowledge, when the person becomes acquainted with the pūrva-pakṣa it becomes negated. Therefore knowledge of viṣaya etc., ought to come only from nyāya i.e., Sūtra.

T.C. further proceeds to justify the exposition of the meaning of atah.

evam ca atha-śabda-labdha-hetutvasyaiva ataśśabdenoktyā bhāskarasyeva nāsmākam paunaruktyam. adhikāri-viśeṣaṇasya śamādeḥ vicāra-kārakatvasya atha-śabdena lābhepi saprayojanatvādeḥ vicāra-kartavyatā-pramāṇasya ataśśabdenokteh.

(Thus the justification for Śāstra is obtained by the word atha, and the same is repeated by the word, atah. This is Bhāskara's position. This position involves the defect called repetition. But in our position i.e., the position of Śāstra, there is no repetition.)

[prakāśā says—evam hi tanmatam. atha-sabdastāvat ānantaryābhidhāna-mukhena hetutayaiva pūrva-vṛttamavagamayati.

ānantarya-mātrasya viphalatvāditi.]

(This is the position of Bhāskara. The word atha, in the present connection, by way of stating after-ness as the reason for the commencement of Sāstra, gives the idea of what has preceded in the capacity of reason. For, mere statement of after-ness is of no avail.)

Prakāśa observes the defect in this view.

tathā ca atha-sabdenaiva prakrtasya hetutva-siddheh atassabdasya punaruktatā ityarthah.

(So, by the word atha itself the reason for the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ is presented. Therefore the word atah is only a repetition. This is the idea [conveyed by T.C.])

Sama etc., the attributes of adhikārin which make vicāra possible are presented by the word atha. Further the facts that enquiry has a purpose to serve and so on which are the reasons for holding the indispensability of vicāra are presented by the word atah. [This is the reason why there is no repetition.])

Having expounded the meaning of atha and atah, T.C., points out the fallacies in the meaning given by the predecessors of Madhva.

bhāmatyāni tu brahma-sabdena pramānani vedah upasthāpitah ata iti parāmršyate. sa ca yogyatvāttadyathehetyādih. tathā ca

brahma-jñāna-karmaṇoh nityānitya-phalatva-pratipādakādāgamāt ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāgādi. tataśca brahma-jijñāsā, evam ca nātaśśabdena jijñāsām prati sādhana-kalāpasya hetutocyateena paunaruktyam. kim tu tat-svarūpālābha-parihārobhidhīyata ityuktam.

(In Bhāmatī it is said that by the word brahma, Veda, the source of the knowledge of Brahman is brought to mind. The word atah brings out the same idea. The passage of Veda referred to by the word brahma is from the point of view of relevancy 'tadyathā' and so on.

[Prakāśa explains the meaning of the passage from Bhāmatī as: "tadyatheha karma-cito lokah kṣīyate evamevāmutra puṇyacito lokah kṣīyate" ityādih karmaṇo anitya-phalatva-bodhakah "brahma vidāpnoti param" ityādih brahma-jūānasya nitya-phalatva-bodhakah.

(The passage "Therefore just as the result obtained by the doer of karma comes to an end, similarly the result, svarga obtained by the doer of merit comes indeed to an end and so on" illustrates that the result of karma is non-enduring. The passage 'One who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' and so on illustrates that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is enduring.)

So, on the basis of Veda i.e., Upanisad that tells us that the knowledge of Brahman and that of karma lead respectively to the enduring and the non-enduring results there appears detachment from enjoyment of the results belonging to this and the other world. From this, there occurs Brahma-jijñāsā. So, by the word, atah, the background of the aggregate of the circumstances that leads to jijñāsā is not stated. How then is there repetition? In fact by this word the remedy for the non-occurrence of detachment etc., is stated.

[Prakāśa adds:

jijnāsām prati vairāgyādi-rūpa-sādhana-kalāpālābha-parihāra ityarthah. anyathā anukūla-vedanīye laukike "yannaduhkhena sambhinnam" ityādeh duhkhāsambhinne āmuşmike ca sukhe na

¹ The former passage is from Chāndogya and the latter from Taittirīya-Upanişad.

virajyeta iti vairāgyādi-svarūpam durlabham syāt. akṣayya-vākyāt nityatva-jūānena vivekopi na syāditi bhāvaḥ.

(The expression, svarūpālābha-parihārah means the removal of the non-obtainment of the aggregate of the means such as vairāgya etc., that lead to jijāāsā. If the removal is not effected then with reference to the pleasures of this world which are taken to be convenient and with reference to the pleasure of svarga which is devoid of misery according to the āgama, 'that which is devoid of misery etc.,' one may not be detached. Owing to this difficulty, the very fact of detachment etc., ought to be an impossibility. Further from the statement that illustrates the indestructibility of mokṣa there may not follow the knowledge of the enduring character of mokṣa and from this there may not follow discrimination between the enduring and the non-enduring results. This is the idea intended.)]

X

T.C., Shows that the position expounded by Bhāmatī is fallacious.

tanna. hetoh vicāra-kartavyatvādi-rūpa-sādhyānvaya-tyāgena virāgādi-sādhanānvayāyogāt. atha-sabdānantaryopasarjanasya virāgasya atassabdokta-hetvanvayāyogyatvācca. atha-sabdopasthā pita-virāgenaiva sva-janakasya tadyathetyādeh vākyasya sākṣādevopasthāpana-sambhave brahma-sabdena paramparayopasthāpanoktyayukteśca. virāga-hetutvena tvadabhipreta-satyānrtaviveke nehanānetyādereva hetutayā vaktavyatvena tadyathetyādyuktyayukteśca.

(This position does not hold good. The reasons are the following:

1. The reason [stated by atah] cannot have relation to proving detachment and so on having abandoned its relation to the thing that is to be proved which is no other than the state of enquiry being conducted.)

[Prakāša mentions a point of consideration—

yadyapi tanmate yathā-śrute kartavya-padādhyāhārābhāvāt jijñāsā kartavyeti nārthaḥ; tathāpi jijñāsā jñānecchā bhavitum yukteti śrautārthe sati arthādvicārakartavyatvam prāptamityevamuktam. (There is a point to be considered. According to the position taken by Bhāmatī 'jijnāsā kartavyā' is not the position of Sūtra, because even as Sūtra apparently means there is no necessity for understanding the word kartavyā. Yet the meaning given by Sruti is that jijnāsā meaning desire for knowledge has reason to occur. In this meaning by implication that vicāra is something that ought to be conducted is obtained. For this reason T.C., said, 'having abandoned its relation to the thing that is to be proved which is no other than the state of enquiry being conducted'.)]

It is commonly said that Madhva and his followers are unable to understand Sankara and solely with the intention of refuting him, they attribute to him the position that he never meant. How baseless this charge is becomes clear by a reference to this passage in which a position of Sankara is studied and its implication defined and then evaluated.

2. 'Afterness' is the meaning of atha. Virāga, detachment is its object. It is therefore incapable of being related to the reason stated by atah.

[It may be supposed that if there is no occurrence of detachment there can be no discipline and for this reason there can be no jijnāsā and this may be said to be the justification for the position of Bhāmatī. To meet this difficulty, T.C., says the following.]

3. The idea of detachment is obtained by atha. This itself causes the idea of its cause, i.e., the passage of Sruti 'tadyathā' etc. If this is so, then to hold that there is the idea of this passage, indirectly, by the word brahma is not justified.

Paramparayā—indirectly. This means as Prakāśa says brahmopāsti-dvārā pramānasyopasthāpanāditi bhāvaḥ.

(The idea is that there is the idea of Pramāņa through the idea of Brahman.

[It is said that relevancy requires the selection of *Śruti*, 'tadyathā' etc. T.C., meets this supposition.]

4. The position you accept is that the discrimination between the real and the unreal is the cause of detachment. Hence with regard to this discrimination the Śruti 'neha nānā' (There is no duality in this Truth) ought to have been cited.

Therefore to justify the position by citing 'tadyathā' etc., is unwarranted.

[Prakāša makes the idea clear as:

nityānitya-vastu-viveka ityādi bhāṣya-vyākhyāyām nityaḥ pratyagātmetyādinā tathaiva tvayā uktatvāditi bhāvaḥ.

(This is the idea. In connection with interpreting Śańkara-Bhāṣya 'nityānitya-vastu-viveka' etc., you hold the same position beginning with the passage 'nitya' means pratyagātmā' (presented for itself) and so on. [The author of T.C., has criticised only this position.] This is the idea).

T.C., next examines the position of Vivarana as:

vivarane tu atha-śabda-gṛhītāyā-eva sādhana-kalāpasya brahma-vicāra-hetutāyāh 'akṣayyam ha vai cāturmāsya-yājinaḥ sukṛtam' ityādinā apavāda-śankāyām prāptāyām tannirākaraṇam punaratha-śabdokta-hetutvābhidhāyinā ataśśabdena kriyata ityuktam.

(Vivarana presents the following explanation. The aggregate of the ideas of discipline that leads to enquiry into Brahman is presented by atha. But owing to the statement of Sruti 'The merit of the one who has performed the sacrifice called Cāturmāsya is inexhaustible', there appears a difficulty, apavāda i.e., the idea that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is enduring has no absolute value as there is something that is equally enduring. The removal of this difficulty is effected by the word atah which once more states the reason presented by the word atha.)

T.C. observes that this explanation also is fallacious, as-

tadapi na, atha-śabdoktānadhikābhidhāyinā apavāda-śaṅkānirāse atha-śabdenaiva tannirāsa-prasangāt. hetutva-sādhakahetoḥ kathane eva apavāda-śaṅkā-nirāsah na tu uktasyaiva hetutvasya padāntareṇa kathane-iti dik.

(If it can be held that the difficulty is removed by a word which means nothing more than what is presented by the word atha, then it may as well be held that the difficulty is removed by the word atha itself. [What is to be understood in this connection is this.] The difficulty called apavāda in the present connection can be removed only by pointing out the

reason that explains how the given reason is a sound one but never by restating the same reason i.e., the given reason by another word. This is the way in which the position of *Vivarana* is shown to be fallacious.)

XII

There is a general criticism against Indian Philosophy that it is in the main theological. The criticism is mostly foreign in origin. It is due to confining philosophy to a narrow idea and without any attempt at overcoming this narrowness, judging Indian Philosophy from the point of view of the narrow definition. Some go even to the extent of saying that there is no philosophy in India. It is observed that 'the problems considered in Indian thought are never philosophical. They are the problems created in interpreting the Vedic authority. The so-called Indian thinkers do not care for the problems before them. They create difficulties where there are no problems. They are so religious-minded that they disregard all that is given, all that is pressing for explanation and all the problems connected with experience. They take the sayings of particular people as their guiding principle. They call these sayings Veda. Consistently with the same spirit they have composed several works. They mostly contain individual imaginations, at times most fantastic ones. They seriously attempt to interpret them. If needs be, they even take the help of experience and reason in so far as they seem to support their illusions. They try in this manner to define every-day-life of human beings.

They imagine the distinction between self and body. They hold that self actually exists independently of body. The relation of the two, they think, is similar to that between a man and his dress. They stress either the one or the other. Stressing the body as against the spirit they advocate most licentious life devoid of all considerations, sacred in character. In the name of Yoga they develop all sorts of imaginations relating to the bodily power. This has been the origin of their anatomy, medicine and so on. Stressing the spirit against the body they hold that spirit endures while body decays, even as a man is more enduring than his dress. This illusion has

given rise to the several imaginations about the existence of soul before birth and after death. It is also imagined that pleasure makes life worth living. Mostly for the sake of obtaining pleasure, fantastic religious ideas are developed and they are presented in pious language. Honest means for living and the life of discipline are laughed at. Gods, saints etc., are invoked because they are supposed to give wife, children, wealth, power, influence and so on even against nature. Merit and acquirement of the result of merit are considered to have nothing to do with each other. Dishonesty, immorality, life of ease are consciously allowed to have their full sway in the life of religion. An evil man whose evil ways are known is respected highly just because he is religious i.e., he has faith in a particular god or a saint and he does this or that thing. A really good man is disregarded because he is free from certain illusions. Education is considered to interfere with faith. It is therefore dismissed. Even gods and saints are made immoral. According to one's notion or conviction particular aspects of verbal testimony are emphasised. They are justified from considerations seemingly reasonable. The origin of this practice is found in Veda. The influence of Veda is amply felt even in the course of the so-called philosophical thought. This influence comes to its culmination in what is called Vedanta thought.'

These various observations are gathered both from books and from the life led by particular sects of people. Even Indian writers on Indian philosophy, consciously or unconsciously subscribe to these thoughts. They select particular ideas which, they suppose, may be appreciated by the foreign scholars because they are akin to their thought. Supposing that Indian thought is presented as it is handed down there is no wonder if some one says that it is not what the scholars appreciate. Thus genuine Indian thought finds no opportunity to express

itself.

All these ideas are foreign to what Sastra calls Veda. Sastra calls that aspect of verbal expression which is required to give knowledge independently of the operation of other sources of knowledge, Veda. Sūtrakāra himself takes up the discussion of this idea at a later stage. In the present context the philosophical background for taking things from Veda may briefly be noted. Taking for example the passage cited by Vivarana and considered

by Sāstrai.e., T.C., the following may be observed. The question now is whether it is correct to hold that the result of knowledge of Brahman is enduring. The concepts enduring result, knowledge of Brahman and Brahman are made use of in this consideration. In the sense in which they are used these words have no basis in empirical world. Which is their basis? It must be something non-empirical. Which is it? whichever it is, it must be called Veda because in all circumstance it is the only source of knowledge of the transcendent objects. Supposing that it is recognised as Veda it is necessary to make it internally consistent. For this reason, in connection with defining the meaning of a passage, to see that the whole Veda is consistent with it and contributes to it as well, becomes a necessity. Further, even without reference to Veda as Veda whenever a position is examined it becomes necessary to examine even a suggestion or possibility of opposition. In accounting for enduring nature of the result of knowledge of Brahman, even the mere supposition that the result of karma is as enduring creates a serious problem and a careful examination of the position becomes inevitable. With reference to this consideration, thought is more important than the imaginations about how thought originates. When the origin of thought becomes a problem, even then it is thought that is important.

There is a fundamental distinction between the disposition of Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. While Indian philosophy has to make room for a discussion either to reject or uphold Veda as independent source of knowledge, Western philosophy is quite free from this thought. This distinction is commonly explained by the presence or absence of a theological bent of mind. It is said that Indian thought is not free from theology while Western thought is free from it. Though apparently this seems to be correct, it results in missing Indian thought. In fact, this explanation does not apply to Indian

philosophy at all.

This point may be illustrated by a reference to how these two philosophies originate. Duessen says that the first philosophy of a country is its religion and the first religion is nature-worship i.e., the worship of natural elements. He observes this in connection with accounting for how Indian philosophy originated. Whether his observation holds good or not

particularly with reference to Indian philosophy it seems to be true of Western philosophy. A note on how philosophy began and how the conclusions of philosophy were named in the West throw a light upon this problem. Thales conceived something as ultimate. The question is how he arrived at that conclusion that something must be called ultimate. Empirical usages do not present this term signifying that it is the origin of all. We may be familiar with the concept of origin. But 'origin of all' we do not know. On the empirical basis which is through and through relative in character, to be conscious of the word ultimate itself is impossible. The seriousness of the problem is such that to recognise 'origin' even in the relative or secondary sense is a philosophical impossibility. Further this origin of all may be called God. What is the origin of the word, God? So far as the West is concerned, the only answer is that these words were used in some religion and they were borrowed by philosophers. Whether Duessen would mean all these things or not, his observation that religion is the origin of philosophy holds good with reference to Western philosophy. All that he meant was that religious ideas finally give rise to philosophical ones.

Can we apply the same thought to India? The answer is a definite 'no'. India is the land of Veda. Apart from its being impersonal, apauruseya it is universally recognised that it is the earliest record of human civilisation. There is a fundamental difference between the use of words in Veda and the use of the same words in the empirical world. In Veda every word has its complete and absolute meaning. Empirical life knows nothing about this meaning. So without any religion there is Veda in India which has all the expressions that a rich and sound philosophy is in need of. This circumstance is the origin of philosophy in India. In fact to arrive at the complete and absolute meaning of words is itself the subject-matter of philosophy. This is exactly what is called Brahma-Mīmānisā. Hence the origin of philosophy in India is Veda but not

religion.

Further, no religion can be the first beginning of anything. The ideas may be assumed to be its own. What about the language? It must borrow language. From where? The final answer must be from Veda i.e., the state in which words have complete and absolute meaning. So we are forced to conclude that the

so-called first religion of the West has at some stage and in some manner its origin in Veda.

A research in this direction is indispensable if we are to obtain correct knowledge of things and to understand correctly the significance of Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

H. H. Cox in his work 'The philosophy of language' a recent publication, has attempted to examine the ways in which the study of language throws light on most important problems of philosophy. Similar attempts in this direction may some day enable a student of modern thought to appreciate how the Vedic background brings philosophy to its perfection. It may however be noted that the foregoing ideas show that to disregard this aspect of Vedic interpretation in presenting Indian thought is not to do justice either to it or to the student himself.

XIII

T.C., mentions the position of Rāmānuja with regard to the question of the meaning of atah.

kecittu atha-śabdo jijñāsā-viśeṣaṇībhūta-kāla-parah. na hi brahma-vicārasya kartavyatā-mātram sādhyam. kim tu dharmajijñāsānantarya-viśiṣṭam. ataśśabdasya tu tasmin viśiṣṭe sādhye karmaṇām alpāsthira-phalatva-nirṇaya-sahito brahmajñānasya ananta-sthira-phalatāpāta-pratīti-rūpo viśiṣṭo heturarthah. tataśca sārthakam pada-dvayam ityāhuḥ.

(But some hold that the word atha presents the idea of time as an attribute of jijiāsā. It is surely not enough if only the idea that jijiāsā ought to be conducted is proved. But jijiāsā as following enquiry into dharma (dharma-jijiāsā) ought to be proved. The meaning of the word atah is in this circumstance the reason in the special sense of the apparently clear idea that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is infinite and enduring coupled with the idea that the result of actions is negligible and transient. Hence these two words have their individual justification.)

Prakāśa presents the gist of this position.
atha-śabdoktādadhikasyaiva ataśśabdenokteh iti bhāvah.

The idea is this. What is said by atah is more than what is said by atha. For this reason (both the words are justified.)

In support of T.C., Prakāśa mentions.

uktanı ca "adhīta-sānga-śiraska" iti bhāṣya-vyākhyānāvasare śruta-prakāśe "na kartavyatā-mātram sādhya-dharmah apitvānantarya-višiṣtatvamiti."

(It is said in *Sruta-Prakāśa* in connection with interpreting the *Bhāṣya* "adhāta-śānga-śiraska" etc., that the proved in this context is not the mere state of being something that ought to be done, but the state of being something that ought to be done coupled with the state of being after).

Further it says.

tathā "karma-vicārānantaram ca brahma-vicārasya kartavyatve karmaṇām alpāsthira-phalatva-nirṇaya-sahitānantasthira-phalatāpāta-pratītirityayam visisto hetuh" iti ca.

(Similarly after enquiry into action if enquiry into Brahman is to be had, then the reason is qualified in the sense that the apparently clear idea that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and enduring result together with the idea that actions have negligible and transient result.)

T.C., points out that this position also is fallacious.

tadapi na. atha-śabdasya ukta-pratītyānantaryārthatve akāraṇānantaryokteh vaiyarthyena atha-śabdenaiva tasyāḥ hetutva-lābhāt ataśśabda-vaiyarthyāt. atha-śabda sya ānantar-yārthatve tu nokta-pratīti-hetutva-vācakatvam, ataśśabdasya pra-kṛtasya hetutvārtho ataśśabda ityasya tvanmatasya bhamgāt. kim ca siddhe vyutpatyabhāvāt vicārākartavyatve tvadrītyā pūrva-pakṣite brahma-vicāra-kartavyatā-mātram siddhānta-yitavyam. natūktānantarya-viśiṣtam. na hi siddhe vyutpatyabhāve anyadā pi vicārasya kartavyatā sidhyati.

Even this position does not hold good. The reasons are the following.

[In understanding this consideration Prakāśa gives a leading. It presents the ideas that are not made clear by the opponent's position though they are implied in it as:

atra atassabdenokto yo visisto hetuh tadānantaryam athasabdenocyate, uta 'karma-vicārānantaram tata eva hetoh brahmavicārah kartavyah' iti bhāṣyānusārāt karma-vicārānantaryamiti vikalpau hrdi nidhāya ādye paunaruktyam tadavasthamevetyāha atha-sabdasyeti. (In this connection the question is this. Is afterness the reason defined as being the meaning of the word atah stated by atha or according to the $Bh\bar{a}sya$ 'after enquiry into action for the same reason enquiry into Brahman ought to be commenced' is it the state of being after the enquiry into action? Having kept these two alternatives in mind T.C., observes with reference to the first meaning that the fallacy of repetition remains the

same as-atha-sabdasya etc.,)].

In the manner defined if the word atha is taken to mean afterness, as the statement of afterness without reason serves no purpose, and as it may be held that the idea of this reason is obtained by the word atha itself, then the use of the word atah becomes unnecessary: [For this reason according to the first meaning, repetition is not removed. With regard to the second meaning also there is difficulty.] If the word atha is taken to mean 'after enquiry into action' then this word atah cannot be taken to give rise to the idea that the reason for the indispensability of enquiry is the idea that the result of action is negligible and transient. In this case you have refuted your own position that the word atal means reason for the indispensability of enquiry because its result is infinite and enduring together with the idea that the result of action is negligible and transient. [The word atah gives the reason for the idea in question i.e., the idea of afterness given by the word atha.]

[Prakāśa introduces the next statement of T.C.]

yadapi dharma-vicārānantarya-visiṣṭa-brahma-vicāra-kartavyatvam sādhyamiti tadapi netyāha.

[T.C., shows that the position that which is to be proved in this connection is the state of being commenced of the enquiry into Brahman as being qualified by the state of being fafter the enquiry into dharma (action) also does not hold good.

T.C., presents the reason.]

Further, the pūrva-pakṣa to Sāstra according to you is this-Enquiry cannot be had, because a word does not present the idea of a thing which is already furnished.' In answer to this [pūrva-pakṣa] only the position that enquiry into Brahman can be had ought to be established. There is no necessity for qualifying enquiry by afterness. [Prakāśa introduces the next statement.

nanu višistākartavyatvameva pūrva-pakṣyate ityataḥ āha na hīti.

(The following might be supposed. The position of $p\bar{u}rva-pak_{\bar{z}}a$ is that that enquiry in this qualified sense cannot be had. Against this T.C., says.)

If a word cannot give rise to the idea of a furnished thing, then by qualifying the enquiry the fact that enquiry can be had never follows.]

What we have to note in connection with this discussion is this. Sāstra is marked by absolute precision of thought. But in Rāmānuja's position, precision is absent. Hence his position does not help Sastra. This means that what he expounds is not Sāstra. It is only an expression of how he differs from particular thinkers. A thinker need not necessarily be a philosopher, though a philosopher is necessarily a thinker. Thinking may be prompted by some interest non-philosophical in character. But philosophy is marked by a definite outlook philosophical in character. The outlook that is behind Brahma-Mīmāmsā is something that is consistent with Brahman. Thinking in philosophy is purified by the philosophical outlook. Hence thinking with this outlook requires precision. Bare thinking is not justified because it develops interest, durāgraha, absence of peace, aśānti and so on. Thinking without precision gives prominence to emotion and leads to the loss of thought. So the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā must see that his thought is precise. He must further purify it by means of outlook, tatva-dṛṣṭi, purely philosophical in character. Next there must be the purifying process of the outlook so that the outlook becomes really consistent with Brahman. This is how Brahma-Mīmāmsā is obtained. It is from this point of view that T.C., is examining the positions that are somehow supposed to help Brahma-Mīmāmsā, but in fact do not.

Another point may be noted. Supposing a position given by a thinker is examined. What is it that is really being examined? It is neither the thinker nor is it the position that is his attribute. It is truly the examiner's consciousness that apprehends that position. It is thus self-criticism. This is how examination raised to the level of philosophy and finally to Brahma-Mīmārisā

is regarded as tapas, nididhyāsana and so on. No position is the property of any one. As the object of consciousness that may occur to all every position is virtually the common property of all thinking beings. This is the spirit in its purest sense that governs Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Hence with regard to every aspect of discussion nobody needs to claim any proprietorship. The word, in a sense or the Truth i.e., Brahman is the proprietor of all. Just as Brahman is thus the proprietor of a position supposed to be wrong, it is equally the proprietor of its examination and the process and establishment of the true position. It is for this reason that thought in every degree and form occurs to all. The same is everybody's property, because it is nobody's property. It is nobody's property because it is Brahman's property. So in reading a work of this kind if the thought that such and such a person is criticising my or our, or our guru's or his position were to occur, then immediately he must put a question to himself why on earth did I, did we or did our guru or he speak in a language that can be understood by others? Hence Brahma-Mīmāmsā so long as it is possible is interested in no person. It is nothing but the examination of possible positions with a definite view to arriving at a position, pūrņa, nirdoṣa, jñeya, gamya and guru. The names Sankara, Rāmānuja and Madhva only help easy identification of positions for the benefit of the student and the definition of particular thought-systems that oppose or lead to Brahma-Mīmānisā.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XXIII

REFLECTION ON THE WORD BRAHMA LEADS TO BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

Having thus purified the ground T.C., mentions the position of Madhva as-

tadevam atha-sabdena adhikāram ata ityamunā phalam brahma-śabdena vişayam sūcayāmāsa sūtrakṛt.

(Therefore Sūtrakāra indicated thus by the word atha fittedness, by the word atah, the word under discussion result and by the word brahma the subject-matter.)

Keśava another commentator on T.C., observes the following:-

ataśśabda-brahma-śabdayoḥ viśeṣataḥ phala-viṣaya-sūca-katvoktiḥ prādhānyābhiprāyeṇa. anyathā prāgataśśabdasya vişaya-siddhi-hetu-yukti-sücakatvena vişaya-sücakatvasya uktatvāt brahma-śabdasya-nisprayojanatva-śankā syāt.

(There is the statement that atah means phala and Brahma means visaya from the point of view of the main issue. If this is not the case then the statement goes against the previous idea that atah indicates the subject-matter because it indicates the reason for obtaining the idea of the subject-matter. From this there arises the difficulty that the use of the word brahma

serves no purpose.)

The idea is that though the subject-matter is indicated by atah it is not mentioned as being the main idea. This justifies the use of the word brahma separately. It may be noted that the discussions of this kind indicate the disposition of Sastra. There are expressions and expressions of all colours. In a given context an expression with a definite colour may be required. In a different context it may present the main idea. All these ideas must have a conscious recognition, evaluation and appreciation. Thus only they form the content of Sastra. T.C., in order to examine the supposition that the subject-matter and result are indicated by the word $jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ cites the position of $Bh\bar{a}mat\bar{\iota}$ as:

Bhāmatyām tu niścite jijñāsāyogāt sandigdhatvena brahmaiva vişayah. jñānameva icchā-vişayatvena prayojanamiti jijñāsā-padenaiva viṣaya-prayojane sūcite ityuktam.

(But in *Bhāmatī* the following is stated. There can be no *jijīāsā* with regard to an entity which is already known definitely. Brahman is doubted. It is therefore the subjectmatter. Knowledge is the subject-matter of desire. It is therefore the end. This explains how by the one word *jijīāsā* both the subject-matter viṣaya, and the end, prayojana are indicated.)

T.C., examines this position and concludes as-

tanna. na hi pūrva-pakṣinā brahma-jūāne icchāmangīkṛtya tadvicāra ākṣiptaḥ. kim tu viṣayādyabhāvena icchaiva nodetum yuktetyākṣiptam na ca tam prati icchāyā viṣayādi-sādhanam yuktam.

(This position does not hold good. The reason is the following. The upholder of pūrva-pakṣa has indeed not objected to enquiry after having accepted the fact of desire for the knowledge of Brahman.

[Prakāša explains the idea as-

na ca sarva-janīnānubhava-siddha ātmā sandigdho vā saprayojano vā. yena jijnāsyah san vicāram prayunjīta iti tvadīya pūrva-paksopasamhāre jijnāsākṣepa-pūrvam vicārasya ākṣiptatvāt iti bhāvah.

(Atman, common to all individuals is immediately apprehended as 'I'. It is neither doubted nor is there any purpose that it fulfils. How can it be the subject-matter of jijnasā and how can it prompt enquiry? Thus while you conclude pūrvapakṣa vicāra becomes objected to, because jijnāsā is objected to. This is the idea of T.C.)]

It is not relevant to prove the subject-matter etc., of desire against him, the upholder of this pūrva-pakṣa.

[Prakāśa clarifies the position.

jñānecchāyām siddhāyām vişaya-prayojana-siddhiḥ tat-siddhau ca tat-siddhiḥ ityanyonyāsrayāditi bhāvaḥ.

(The idea is that there is the fallacy of mutual dependence in the position of *Bhāmatī*. If the desire for knowledge is justified then the subject-matter and result become conceived; and if they are conceived then the desire for knowledge becomes justified.)]

T.C., examines the position of Vivarana.

vivarane tu atha-sabdena adhikārī jijñāsā-padena icchāvisayatvena brahma-jñānam prayojanam, arthādadhikāriviseşaṇam mokşo brahma-jñāna-phalam, viṣayasca sūcita ityuktam.

(But Vivarana holds a different position. By means of the word atha adhikārin, by the word jijnāsā the knowledge of Brahman as the object of desire and this knowledge being given as prayojana, by implication mokṣa, an attribute of adhikārin as the result of the knowledge of Brahman and the subject-matter as well are indicated.)

Prakāša explains the point of difference between Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa.

Prayojanamiti avāntaram prayojanam na tu bhāmatīva mukhyam ityarthaḥ.

(The meaning of prayojanam according to Vivarana, is that the knowledge of Brahman is the result, prayojana in the intermediate sense, but it is not final as it is accepted by Bhāmatī.)

So according to *Bhāmatī*, knowledge of Brahman is the result, *prayojana* in the final sense, and according to *Vivaraṇa* it is intermediate and the final result is *mokṣa*.

T.C., criticises the position of Vivarana also as:

tadapi na. tvanmate jijääsä-padasya vicära-lakşakatvena icchä-paratvasya abhävät. na hi viṣam bubhukṣate, kūlam pipatiṣati ityanena viṣa-bhakṣaṇādeh iṣṭatva-siddhiḥ. pratītasyāpi mukhyārthasya tyaktatvāt. pūrva-pakṣiṇā icchānangīkārāccatvanmate jñānecchā-asambhavasya uktatvācca. mumukṣāyā adhikāri-viṣeṣaṇatva-nirāsācca. viṣaya-sūcanam asamdigdhāt anya-sūcanam vinā na ṣʿakyam. anyathā sāstrārambha-sāmarthyādeva vā kartavyatokti-sāmarthyādeva vā tatprayojaka-viṣayādi-sūcana-sambhavāt jijñāsā-padādinā tat-sūcanoktyayuktiriti.

(This position also does not hold good. The following is the reason.1 According to you the word jijnasa finally means (by way of lakṣaṇā²) enquiry i.e., stands for enquiry and does not mean desire.

[For example the expression 'He wants to eat poison', (an observation made by a father with reference to the behaviour of his son who wants to eat the food given by an enemy) does not certainly mean that the person in question has the desire to eat poison; but it stands for the prohibition of taking food, for instance in the house of an enemy. Similarly the expression 'He wants to bring down the side wall of a well' does not certainly mean that he actually desires to do so, but it stands for the idea that the persons in question fear the fall of the side

wall. The same idea is presented by T.C., as:]
By the expressions 'He wants to eat poison' and 'He wants to bring down the side wall of a well', the desire for eating poison and so on do never become presented as the meaning. For in these expressions the primary meaning is rejected even though it becomes the object of consciousness. Further by the opponent desire is not accepted. Further, the idea that according to you the desire for knowledge is impossible is already illustrated [in connection with examining the meaning of atha]. [In connection with examining mumuksā, desire for moksa] it is shown that desire for moksa, mumuksā cannot be an attribute of adhikārin. [It is said that by jijñāsā the subject-matter is indicated.] But to indicate the subject-matter is impossible, unless what is indicated is something other than what is not doubted. If this conclusion is not accepted, then either by the strength of the mere commencement of Sastra or by the strength of the statement of the state of being something that ought to be done, there ought to be the indication of the subject, visaya etc., which make them (the commencement or the statement etc.,) possible; and for this reason it is wrong to hold that they [visaya etc.,] are indicated by the words jijñāsā etc.,]

¹ In stating the reason for a conclusion, the statement ending with a word in ablative case is made. In the translation this idea is brought out by saying 'the following is the reason' after mentioning the conclusion.

2 In Sanskrit there are two kinds of senses in which a word is

taken to present its meaning-mukhya and amukhya, primary and secondary.

Prakāśa introduces T.C., considering the word, brahma., evamomathātaśśabdān samyagvyākhyāya dvayorapavyākhyāma ca pratyākhyāya krama-prāptasya brahma-śabdasya paroktamartham nirasitum bhagavatpādoktam artham āha.

(Thus so far having considered the words aum, atha and atah and also having shown the fallacies in the wrong interpretations of the two words, atha and atah, with a view to pointing out fallacies¹ in the opponent's meaning of the word, brahma T.C., states the meaning given by Bhagavatpāda² as brahma-sabdasca and so on.)

T.C., considers the word, brahma.

brahma-śabdaśca "atha kasmāducyate brahmeti bṛhantohyasmin gunāh" ityādi śruti-balāt guṇa-pūrtyarthaḥ.

On the basis of *Sruti*, (the word *brahma* means *guṇa-pūrti*, completeness of *guṇa*. "After all why is Brahma so called? For the reason the attributes of It are huge, infinite, complete.")

In defining Brahman as complete T.pr., and following it T.C., have their basis in Ny.V., another $Bh\bar{a}sya$ of Madhva which is solely devoted to expound the principle of thought, $ny\bar{a}ya$, expressed by each $S\bar{u}tra$.

Prakāśa presents the significance of selecting only this particular meaning while there are other possibilities as—

yadyapi deśa-kālāparicchedopi brahma-padārthaḥ. tathāpi tatra avivādāt guna-pūrtyuktyaiva tasyāpi gunasya lābhādvā 'deśataḥ kālataścaiva' ityupasamhārāt upalakṣaṇatvādvā na doṣaḥ.

(It is possible to hold that the state of transcending space and time also is the meaning of the word brahma. Yet, for the reasons that (i) to hold this meaning does not provoke thought as it does not invite discussion, or (ii) by the definition the state of attribute, guna being complete this particular guna i.e.,

¹ The words pratyākhyāna, nirāsa and so on ordinarily mean refutation and so on. But as used in Śāstra they have a spiritual (adhyātma) significance. It signifies rooting out wrongness from mind and establishment of correct view.

² prakāśa indicates that the necessary condition of commanding respect is correctness.

transcendence also becomes covered, or (iii) as it is concluded in Ny.V., 'From the stand-point of space, time and so on' as this definition also can be formulated by means of upalakṣaṇa¹ there is nothing wrong in choosing this particular definition.)

With regard to this passage the following may be noted. The expression tatrāvivādāt (because there is nothing to dispute) is highly significant. Only those concepts which kindle enquiry find legitimate place in Sāstra. For these concepts give rise to dispute, doubt, formation of opposite position (pūrvapakṣa) examination, position (uttara-pakṣa) and result phala in order. This explains how mere repetition of a certain formula, japa is opposed to Sāstra. Japa negates enquiry. Sāstra is enquiry. If guna-pūrti is accepted, then there is at once the opposition from those quarters which will be mentioned immediately. Transcendence does not cause the opposition readily. But it does not mean that it is accepted without enquiry. If guna-pūrti is disputed, then transcendence also being a guna becomes disputed. If transcendence means all-comprehensiveness, even then the principle of its acceptance is its pūrti, completeness. Through this idea it becomes the meaning of the word brahma. Hence the concept of Sastra is that which is readily disputed and considered. This is the language of a great discipline.

T.C., mentions the position that is directly opposed and examines it as:

para-pakṣe akhandasya brahma-pada-lakṣyasyaiva jijñāsyatvāt śruti-sūtrastha-mukhyārtha-tyāgaḥ.

(By the position opposed to Sāstra akhanda, the partless that which is only pointed to by the word brahma is taken to be the subject-matter of jijāāsā. For this reason, there is the rejection of the primary meaning of the word brahma itself as expounded by Śruti and Sūtra.)

With regard to the expression, opponent's position (para-pakṣa) the following may be noted. It does not mean anything personal. It is irrelevant to Sāstra to bring in personal factors.

¹ Upalakṣaṇa is the method of meaning something which is not the literal meaning of a word by the same word on the basis of the common thought that underlies the literal meaning as well as the meaning that is not the literal one.

For Sastra is spiritual, adhyātma and it is marked by devotion to peace, santi in its ultimate sense. Hence opponent's position is one that is diametrically opposed to the position in question. If guṇa-pūrti is Brahman then the position opposed to it is that which holds that the attributeless, akhanda is Brahman. Akhanda is the language of the negation of attribute, guna. On the basis of common-sense ideas attributes are taken to form parts in a thing. The same sense of opposition is carried to the attributes of Brahman. The reason for this is the nonrecognition of the truth that attribute in its completeness is Brahman itself. Opposition as such to Brahman is the result of this non-recognition. Further all other ideas that are opposed to Sāstra in different degrees support directly or indirectly the concept of attributeless, akhanda. Hence attributeless, akhanda stands for all the ideas that oppose Sāstra. Hence it is called opponent's position, para-pakṣa. It is already explained how all ideas that oppose Sastra whether they are individual positions or systems of thought called Darsanas are finally reducible to māyā-vāda, the position that upholds the concept of attributeless, akhanda.

By the critics of Sāstra expressions like śruti-sūtrastha may be taken to uphold theology. But any such act is irrelevant to Sāstra. If an individual thinker is giving his own thought as it is the case with Western philosophy, then to bring in the idea presented by Śruti and Sūtra would be irrelevant. But if the position is the exposition of Śruti and Sūtra the first and foremost test of validity is to see whether the position given is consistent with them. Akhanda is not presented as the individual position. But it is presented as the meaning of Śruti and as the position expounded by Sūtra. Hence to find out that it is opposed to Śruti and Sūtra i.e., that it is not śrutyukta

becomes a necessity.

If akhanda were to be an individual position without any reference to Sruti and Sūtra, then the position becomes nāstika, opposed to Sruti i.e., śruti-bāhya and becomes empirical in character. But as being empirical it never stands. For that which is empirical and that which is attributeless, akhanda are contradiction in terms. If it is held that it is the meaning pointed to by Śruti, then there is the need to examine the whole field of Śruti to see whether there is any support from

Struti and therefore from Sūtra for it. T.C., conducts this examination with reference to the statement under consideration. Supposing any other criticism were given by the author, then the opponent would at once remark that that it is the very reason why it is the meaning of Sruti.

III

Prakāśa introduces the next passage of T.C., which evaluates the opponent's position as—

evam brahma-padāsvārasyamuktvā yadbrahma-padasya deśakāla-vastu-pariccheda-lakṣaṇa-trividha-paricchedābhāva-rūpamahatvam arthah ityuktam tadapi netyāha.

(Thus having so far illustrated the hollowness (asvārašya*) of the opponent's meaning of the word, brahma, T.C., shows that even the position that brahma means the speciality or greatness (mahatva) which is the same as the absence of the threefold limitation, namely, the limitations by space, time and thing is incorrect as:)

yacca paraih brahmaņo jīvādbhede tadrūpa-vikalatvena alpatvam syāditi nirankuśa-mahatvāsiddheḥ trividha-paricchedā-bhāva-rūpa-mahatvārthena brahma-padenaiva jīvābheda-siddhi-rityuktam.

(It is also said by the others [upholders of akhanda, attributeless] that—if Brahman is different from jīva, then it is to that extent modified and becomes alpa, small and in this case the absolute greatness of Brahman is not established. For this reason i.e., in order to avoid this difficulty in securing absolute greatness, non-difference from individual self is established by the use of the word, brahma, which means greatness or speciality (mahatva) which is the same as the absence of the threefold limitation.)

T.C., examines this position and concludes as-

tanna. tenaiva ghatādyabheda-prasangāt. jīva-svarūpasya tātvikatvāt ghatādeśca atathātvāt vaisamyamiti cenna. deśakālayoratātvikatvepi gaganādāviva ghatādau tātvikasya vā svatulya-sadrūpasya vā deśādyaparicchedasya abhāvena alpatvāt. abhedasya apariccheda-rūpatve vastuno ghatādeh atātvikatvepi

 Where the translation does not seem to be satisfactory its equivalent in Sanskrit is mentioned in brackets. brahmaņi tātvikasya svatulya-sadrūpasya vā vastvaparicchedasya abhāvena alpatva-prasangāt.

(This position does not hold good. If it is correct, then for the same reason there ought to be non-difference from a jar and so on. It cannot be supposed [against this difficulty] that the essence of individuality (jīva-svarūpa) is real and jar and so on are not so and this accounts for the distinction between the two. The reason is this. Space and time are not real. Yet as it [the absence of limitation] is in the case of space etc., in the case of a jar etc., there is the absence of the absence of the limitation from space etc., which is real in the sense in which it, a jar, is real. For this reason it, a jar has smallness. Similarly if non-difference is the same as absence of limitation, then though the things,* jar etc., are not real, there is the absence of non-limitation in Brahman from things which are real or as real as Itself, Brahman. For this reason It, Brahman, ought to have smallness.)

Prakāśa presents the gist of the position as-

yathā gaganādau atātvika-deša-kālābhyām aparicchedasya satvena mahatvam tathā ghaṭādau tadaparicchedasya abhāvena alpatvam dṛṣṭam, tadvat atātvikādapi ghaṭādeḥ abheda-rūpasya aparicchedasya brahmanyabhāve nirankuśa-mahatvāsiddhyā alpatvam syādityarthah.

(Just as there is in the case of space etc., greatness (mahatva) because there is the absence of the limitation from unreal space and unreal time, similarly in the case of jar etc., as there is the absence of the absence of limitation from the same, there is observed smallness. In the same manner, if there is in Brahman no non-limitation which is the same as the non-difference from jar etc., which are unreal, then as unmodified greatness is not estabilished there ought to be (in Brahman) smallness. This is the meaning of the passage.)

Prakāśa introduces the next statement of T.C., as-

nanu deśādeḥ ghaṭa-sama-sattākatvāt deśādyaparicchedābhāve tasya alpatvam yuktam na tu brahmani, tasya ghaṭādeśca

[•] In T.C., there is the word vastu singular in number. In the translation the word things plural in number is used. This is a case of peculiarity of language.

bhinna-sattākatvāt jīva-brahmaņośca sama-sattākatvena mahatvasiddhyai jīvāpariccheda eva vaktavyaḥ. na tu ghaṭādyaparicchedaḥ ityāśankyāha. na ca iti.

(A difficulty appears. Space etc., are real in the sense in which a jar is real. For this reason, if a jar has no non-limitation from space etc., then to hold that it is alpa, small is justified. The same observation does not hold good with reference to Brahman. For, Brahman and jar etc., are real in different senses. But jīva and Brahman are real in the same sense. Therefore to attain to the idea of greatness (mahatva) of Brahman only the fact that It (Brahman) is not limited by jīva ought to be shown but not the idea that it is not limited by jar etc.). To meet this difficulty T.pr., says "na ca".

T.C., meets this difficulty after mentioning it as-

na ca paricchedakasya deśādeḥ ghaṭa-tulya-sadrūpatvāt ghaṭādeḥ deśatālpatā. brahmaṇi tu paricchedakasya ghaṭādeḥ vastunaḥ svatulya-sadrūpatvābhāvāt tadabhedābhāvepi na vastutolpatā. jīvasya tu brahma-tulya sadrūpatvāt tadabhedābhāve vastuto alpatā syāditi vācyam.

(The following supposition is not correct.¹ 'As the limiting agencies space etc., are similar [in reality] to jar etc., jar etc., are small (alpa) [owing to the limitation by space etc.]. But with reference to Brahman the limiting agencies, jar etc., have not the same reality as Brahman. Therefore [Brahman] may not have non-difference from them. Yet it does not follow that there is limitation of Brahman from a thing (vastuto alpatā).² But jīva is in reality similar to Brahman. For this reason if there is no non-difference from it then limitation from a thing follows.')

The opponent's technicality behind this consideration is this. This consideration has in view three entities Brahman, jīva and jaḍa. By jīva is meant jīva-svarūpa, jīva in itself i.e., jīva in its distinction from jaḍa. Jaḍa is a material object. Of them, Brahman is real in the sense that it is never sublated. Jīva i.e., jīva-svarūpa is real in the same sense. Hence Brahman and jīva

¹ This is the translation of na ca vācyam.

² Alpatā, limitation and smallness are used in the same sense in translation.

are spoken of as sama-sattāka, having the same reality. Jada is sublated. It is not real. This is signified by the fact that it is limited, that it is alpa and so on. But the unsublated reality of Brahman is spoken of as apariccheda, mahatva and so on. This technicality is the underlying thought of Sankara and his followers.

T.C., meets this supposition as.—
tatvatalı sadrūpe brahmanı vyavahāratalı sadrūpa-deśādinā
paricchedepi mahatva-siddhi-prasangāt. svatulya-sadrūpaghatādyanātmakepi gaganādau alpatva-budhyabhāvācca.

(The following is the reason. Brahman is real from the standpoint of Truth (tatvatah). [This standpoint is called pāramārthika point of view. Pāramārthika may be translated as absolute.] Space etc., are real from the standpoint of practical life (vyavahāra). [Usage, practical life and empirical life are taken to be synonymous.] Hence in spite of the limitation from space etc., the idea of the greatness of Brahman ought to be attained. Further, there is another circumstance which strengthens this observation. [This is the significance of abhāvācca.] Idea of smallness is not attributed to space etc., even though they are not non-different from jar etc., the reality of which is the same [as that of space etc.])

T.C., illustrates the same observation further .-

anyathā kālāparicchinnepi paramānvādau deśa-paricchedena alpatva-buddhivat ubhayāparicchinnepi gaganādau bheda-mātreņa paricchinnatva-buddhiḥ syāt.

(If the truth of these observations are not recognised then there is the necessity for meeting the following difficulty. Just as there is the idea of smallness (alpatva) with reference to things like atoms just because they are limited by space even though they are not limited by time, with reference to space etc., in spite of their being unlimited by both [space and time] by the mere fact of their difference [from jar etc.,] there ought to be the idea of limitation.)

So far T.C., has examined the leading idea behind pūrvapakṣa i.e., para-pakṣa. This idea is—That which leads to the idea of alpatva, smallness is the fact that the limiting agency is in point of reality the same as the entity limited. In the following passage the idea that the fact that the reality of limitation is the same as that of the limited is the cause of the idea that the limited is *alpa*, small is examined.

T.C., observes.

nanu ghaṭādau svatulya-sadrūpa-dešādi-paricchedo alpatvam. brahmani ghaṭādi-pratiyogiko bheda-rūpo vastu-paricchedo na svatulya-sadrūpa iti nālpatvamiti cet maivam.

(A difficulty with regard to the previous conclusion may be stated as:* 'with reference to a jar etc., the state of being small (alpatva) means the limitation from space etc., which are real in the same sense in which Sva, jar etc., are real. But with reference to Brahman there is limitation. This limitation is the same as Its difference from jar etc. Yet (Brahman) is not alpa, small. This is because the limitation is not real in the sense in which Brahman (Sva) is real'. But this position is not consistent.

T.C., presents the reason why it is not consistent as:

tathātve ghaṭādivat jīvādapi svatulya-sadrūpa-bhedābhāva-

mātreņa mahatva-siddhyā jīvābhedāsiddheh.

(If what the opponent says is true then the following difficulty cannot be avoided. Just as it is in the case of jar etc., in the case of jīva also it is possible to hold that It has no difference from an entity which is real in the same sense as It (Brahman, Sva) is real. From this fact alone the idea of greatness becomes attained. But the result of this consideration is the non-attainment of the idea that It (Brahman) is non-different from jīva.)

T.C., further points out that the position of para-pakşa in

fact supports an opposite view as:

gaganādau svatulya-sadrūpo desādyaparicchedo mahatvam.
na ca brahmaņi ghaṭādi-pratiyogiko abheda-rūpo aparicchedaḥ
tatheti mahatva-hāni-prasangācca. kim ca svatulya-sadrūpasya
aparicchedasya abhāve tādṛśa-paricchedaḥ syādeva. tātvikasya atātvikādapi svatulya-sadrūpa-bhedasya nedam rūpyamiti darśanāt.

(With reference to space etc., the non-limitation from space etc., is as real as sva, space etc. This accounts for their greatness. But with reference to Brahman the non-limitation which is the same as non-difference from jar etc., is not similar i.e., this non-difference is not as real as sva, Brahman. For

^{*} Nanu cet stands for this idea.

this reason there ought to be the negation of greatness of Brahman. This is an additional difficulty.* [T.C., further illustrates this idea and shows that it is inevitable.] Further, if the non-limitation [from jar etc.,] which is as real as sva [Brahman in the present connection] is absent, then it necessarily follows that there is limitation. For the difference of a real thing from an unreal thing is observed to be as real as the thing to which it is attributed. For example, the experience 'This is not silver' may be taken. [Shell-silver illusion is sublated by the correct perception of the shell as 'This is not silver'. Shell is real. Silver is unreal. The difference of the shell from the unreal silver is as real as the shell.])

The idea is this. The difference between the real and the unreal is real. If the non-difference of Brahman from jar etc., is not as real as Brahman, then Its difference from them ought to be real. This means that Brahman is bound to be small.

T.C., concludes the discussion as-

tasmāt brahmano jagataļ vyāvyttim aparicchinnatām ca abhilasatā bhedasya paricchedataiva tyājyā. paricchinnādbhede aparicchedasyaiva siddheļi.

(Therefore it follows that in the case of one who wants to maintain the difference of Brahman from the world as well as Its greatness the idea that difference is limitation ought to be abandoned. For, from the difference from the limited follows the non-limited.)

Thus the position of Sankara which is presented as parapaksa is not based on sound reasoning; because it gives rise to all sorts of difficulties and confusions. If the implications of his reason are carried further they negate the very thing to prove which the reason was advanced. Greatness of Brahman is to be proved. This requires non-difference from self (jiva) and non-self (jada). But this is impossible. Jīva and jada are opposed to each other. That which is identical with self (jīva) is necessarily different from non-self jada. In spite of its difference from non-self jada, if It is great then the same conclusion may hold good even though it is considered to be different from self, jīva. This means that difference and gaeatness have nothing to do with each other.

^{*} Ca stands for an additional difficulty.

Having so far shown that difference does not interfere with mahatva, greatness, T.C., shows further that nondifference does not help greatness as—

kim ca nirankuśa-mahatvārtham brahmaṇaḥ sarvātmakatve alpa-deśādadhika-deśe alpa-guṇādadhika-guṇe ca mahatva-buddhivat ekātmakāt gaganādito anekātmaka-rāśyādau mahatva-buddhiḥ syāt. avayavānekatvepi pramāṇotkarṣādinaiva mahatvam. nibiḍānekāvayavāyaḥ-piṇḍādapi viralālpāvayave tūla-rāśyādau mahatva-buddheh.

(Further, in order to obtain the idea of absolute greatness, if it is held that Brahman is non-different from all, then it follows that, just as there is the idea of greatness with reference to a larger area from the standpoint of a smaller area and to a thing which has more properties than the thing which has less properties, there ought to be the idea of greatness with reference to a heap which consists of many individuals [and is therefore non-different from them] unlike a thing such as' space which is one in number and does not consist of many things. [But the fact is different.] A thing may consist of many parts. But the thing is considered to be larger* because of the largeness of its quantity. For example there is the idea of largeness with reference to the heaps such as the heap of cotton unlike a piece of iron, even though the latter consists of many parts thickly related and the former consists of a smaller number of parts loosely related.)

Having so far shown that difference and non-difference have nothing to do with the idea of mahatva, greatness, T.C., having granted for the sake of argument that like the non-limitation from space etc., the non-limitation from things also explains greatness, examines the position by putting the following questions.—Is this non-limitation different from Brahman or non-different? If it is different, then is it real or unreal?—as—

kim ca aparicchedasya brahmānanyatve brmhati-dhātvarthasya bhāvepi pratyayārthābhāvenāparicchinnatvāsiddhih. anyatvepi

[•] Largeness and greatness are spoken of as synonyms in this connection.

To make the idea contained in this passage clear the idea mentioned within flower brackets is understood.

tātvikatve sutarām tadrūpa-vikalatvāt. atātvikatve tatvatah paricchinnatvāpattih.

(Further, if non-limitation is the same as Brahman, then the meaning of the root, *brimhati* may be secured. But the meaning of the suffix is not obtained. For this reason non-limitation is not secured.

[Prakāśa explains the idea-

bṛhi vṛddhāvityasmāt "bṛmherannalopaśca" iti manin-pratyaye nalope amāgame yaṇi ca brahmeti vṛddhi-śabditāparicchedavaducyate. vṛddhi-śabditāpariccheda-rūpatvepi vṛddhimatva-rūpam aparicchinnatvam na syādityarthaḥ.

(The root brhi means vrddhi, growth. To this root, according to "brmherannalopasca" the suffix manin is added to the root; na is negated; am is introduced and yani also and as the result the word brahma meaning that which has greatness denoted by vrddhi is obtained.—The difficulty with regard to the position under consideration is this*—There is recognised non-limitation, the meaning of vrddhi. But 'the state of having greatness, the meaning of the state of being unlimited is not obtained. This is the meaning of the first sentence.)]

If it is held that non-limitation is different from Brahman, and if it is supposed to be real, then the idea of non-limitation is never (sutarām) obtained. For in this case Brahman has, not lost its own characteristic.

[Prakāša gives the meaning—

svatulya - sadrūpāparicchedākhya - vastvabheda-sūnyatvāt ityarthaḥ.

(For It (Brahman) becomes devoid of the non-difference which is the same as non-limitation which is as real as Itself, Brahman. This is the meaning of the statement.)]

Further, if it is unreal, then there appears the idea of limitation in a real sense.)

T.C., further shows how it is wrong to hold that the word Brahman means non-difference.

^{*} In the translation of T.C., introduction of other ideas is marked as [] and in Prakāša as—...—.

kim ca vastuto alpe satyeva tannirūpita-mahatvasya vāstavatvamiti brahma-sabdenaiva sadvitīyatvam. desādyaparicchedepi na desādeh vastuto abhāvo hetuh. ghaṭāderapi tatprasangāt. desādeh satvepi tatparicchedābhāva-mātreṇāpi tat-siddhesca. bauddhābhimata-kṣaṇika-vijñānāderapi vastutah kālādyabhāvena aparicchinnatva-prasangācca.

(Further, if that which is small (alpa) is actually real and from its point of view greatness is illustrated, then alone it can be actually real. This explains how the fact of something existing along with It (Brahman) is illustrated by the word brahma itself. Even with regard to holding non-limitation from the stand-point of space etc., the basis is not the real absence of space etc. The same conclusion might be drawn from the stand-point of jar etc., also.

[In explanation of this idea Prakāša says-

vastuto ghaṭādeḥ tvanmate abhāvena tadaparicchedo brahmaṇaḥ syādityarthaḥ.

(According to your position there is real absence of jar etc. From this point of view Brahman ought to have non-limitation from them.)]

Though space etc., are real, merely by the absence of their limitation the idea of non-limitation is obtained. [If it is insisted that space etc., ought to be unreal if the idea of non-limitation were to be obtained then] there ought to be non-limitation attributed to the momentary vijūāna held by Bauddha, for the reason that time etc., are for him really absent.)

With reference to this discussion the following may be noted. The examples shell-silver illusion etc., and technicalities from Grammar and so on are not supposed to bind $S\bar{a}stra$. They are not cited to give strength to the conclusions of $S\bar{a}stra$. The conclusions of $S\bar{a}stra$ are sound because they come from reason and they need no support. $S\bar{a}stra$ is ever independent of observations empirical in character. But the real significance of referring to these ideas is this.

In the first place the conclusion of Sastra must be intelligible. Intelligibility consists in being consistent with the method of thinking on the one hand and the method of expressing on the other. Hence these considerations are a necessity.

In the second place the exposition must safeguard the prestige of Sāstra. This prestige consists in the conscious recognition of the fact that Sastra is the origin of all branches of learning including the reasoning on the basis of experience and the method of expressing the ideas of the several branches of learning. Reasoning and expression may or may not be sound. If they are sound they presuppose a system behind them. Not to be a member of a system is a fallacy and is the origin of other fallacies. Even a system needs to be sound. A sound system presupposes a principle of thought that holds good universally. This principle of thought is called Brahma-Vidyā i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Brahma-Mīmāmsā literally means enquiry into the highest. That which falls short of the highest cannot be the So Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the subject of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. origin of systems of thinking and language. This means thinking and language in so far as they are sound grow from Brahma-, Mīmāmsā. They are only off-shoots of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. At times they may develop inconsistency with or opposition to Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In such circumstance Brahma-Mīmāmsā, the basis of all learning becomes considered to be one among many branches of learning. If in a given case of thinking this truth is understood, then there is naturally the tendency to refer an idea presented as an item of Brahma-Mīmāmsā to the disposition of the growth of thinking and language.

At this stage the operation of the relative merits on the one hand and the idea presented on the other in the system of thinking and language must be evaluated. This is the only method how the validity of a given idea is tested. The indispensability of this evaluation is the reason why Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the most difficult of all sciences. It does not ignore and does not readily endorse or subscribe to any item of experience of any individual being, human or below human. In the third place this observation introducing itself to the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā as a mere standard of test develops into an outlook that governs his life and finally becomes the life itself in all its aspects. Properly speaking this is the life of jijñāsā. It is called tapas, upāsanā, nididhyāsana and so on. This is what is meant by knowledge. One who has this is in the language of the Upanisads Śrotriya and Brahma-nistha. The expounder of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, the author of T.C., in the present connection being one of such persons, in seeing the propriety of an idea spontaneously considers all aspects of

thinking and expression.

Further with regard to the present discussion the following is the distinction between the outlook that characterises Sāstra and the outlook that governs para-paksa. A reference to parapakşa shows that it either assumes that Brahman is unlimited and is therefore non-different from all that exists or develops certain technicalities and in the light of them formulates its own conception of Brahman. Supposing that Brahman is non-different, that It is non-different from jar etc., cannot be justified because Brahman is opposed to matter. From this assumption therefore, the assumption that jar etc., are unreal follows and consistently with it other theories are developed. Or in certain cases on the assumption of these ideas or consistently with these assumptions Brahman is conceived. In either case the basis of para-paksa is assumption. This is the fallacy in the position of Sankara and his followers. This fallacy develops expertness in assumption and it does not help spirituality.

But Sāstra tolerates no assumption. In Sāstra as thinking develops it creates its own principles and expressions. No idea is the first origin of thinking and no expression is bound by a particular meaning. To find this out, to study it, to develop it and to carry it to its final issues forms the subject-matter of Jijīāsādhikaraņa of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This study becomes introduced as a case of learning. Gradually as the study becomes more and more intensive it develops into the principle that governs the whole life and finally becomes the very content of life characterised as jīvan-mukti and mukti in order. This is the only heritage of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This is what

Madhva has handed down to the world of eternity.

The following distinction between Sāstra and para-pakṣa may be illustrated. Sāstra speaks of degrees of reality (satyatva-tārataṃya). Para-pakṣa speaks of types of reality as prāti-bhāsika, vyāvahārika and pāramārthika. Prātibhāsika is that which is sublated by our knowledge. Vyāvahārika is that which is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. Pāramārthika is that which is never sublated. Para-pakṣa constructs the view of Brahman on the basis of these distinctions. But these distinctions themselves are questionable. Or it assumes a

particular view of Brahman and on its basis develops these distinctions. In either way it is not free from assumptions. On the other hand Sāstra without assuming anything and at the same time showing that no assumption is needed examines the field of knowledge with all its presuppositions and illustrating how thinking grows transcending itself from a lower stage and including the spirit of all that is already considered arrives at the highest truth which is the explanation of all. This truth is Brahman according to it. After this truth is established it looks back and defines things in terms of Brahman. According to relative merits of things it fixes the levels or degrees of realities. All these ideas form the subject-matter of an advanced study of Jijnāsādhikaraṇa of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. They are recorded here to show the scope of the study so that the student does not develop an illusion that his study of Adhikaraṇa has come to an end. Even to see the incompleteness of knowledge is a case of the growth of knowledge.

v

Having so far shown the fallacies in para-pakṣa, T.C., concludes the position of Śāstra.

tasmāt dešatah kālatašcaiva guņatašcāpi pūrņatā brahmatā.

natu bhedasya rāhityam brahmatesyate.

(Therefore [as all other positions are fallacious] the completeness from the standpoints of space, time and attributes is what constitutes Brahman-hood. It is never non-difference that constitutes Brahman-hood.)

Care must be taken to note that completeness from the standpoint of space or time does not mean existence in all space and in all time. Such a view would make Brahman dependent on space or time and Brahman cannot in this case be complete. So as it will be shown later on the expression means the state of being the very source of space and of time. Similarly, completeness in attributes means not merely having all attributes. For in this case the attributes mutually limit one another and therefore completeness in the complete sense is not conceived. Hence this expression also means that each attribute is complete and is therefore inclusive of other attributes.

¹ Madhva's Anu-Vyākhyāna, another commentary on the Brahmasūtras offers this study.

In justification of its conclusions T.C., quotes from Madhva in his Gītā-Tātparya as—

taduktam 'deśatah kālataścaiva guņataśca tridhā tatih' iti.

(The same is expounded as 'All-inclusiveness or comprehensiveness i.e., completeness is threefold—from the standpoint of space, from the standpoint of time and from the standpoint of attribute.')

T.C., shows the bearing of this passage on the present exposition.

tadetadabhipretyoktam bhāşye "brahma-śabdaśca viṣṇāveva" iti.

(For the same reason with the same idea it is expounded in Bhāsya that 'the word brahma is indeed used in the sense of Viṣṇu.')

T.C., illustrates the same idea.

trividha-pūrti-vācako hi visnu-sabdah.

(The word viṣnu indeed, as it is well-supported by pramānas, states the threefold completeness.)

Prakāśa explains the position.

vişlṛ=vyāptau ityasya knu-pratyaye rūpam viṣnuriti.

(The root vişlr means pervasion. To this root the suffix knu is added. Vişnu is the resultant form.)

The same work explains further the aspects of pervasion. vyāptišca tredhā bhavati dešata iti vacanāditi bhāvah.

(Pervasion occurs in three ways. This idea is based on the statement *desatah* and so on. This is the idea signified by the last statement of T.C.)

Prakāša further explains the advantages gained by Bhāṣya in defining Brahman as Viṣṇu.

yadyapyayan śivādi-vyāvṛtyarthatvena upāttah tadrūpavišesya-parah. tathaiva bhāṣye pratipādanāt. tathāpi višesyam vadan ukta-trividha-pūrtyabhidhāna-pūrvameva tadvadati. sarvaśabdānām yogapūrvameva bhagavati vṛtterityevamuktam. etena avaśyavaktavyam jīva-bhedakam viṣaya-siddhyangam gunapūrnatvam brahma-padārthatvena anuktvā viṣnvarthatvam anupayuktam ucyate iti bhāṣye anaucitya-codyam nirastam. viṣnvarthakatvena tallābhāt, nyāya-vivarane brahma-śabdena guņa-purņatvokteruktatvācca. viṣṇvarthakatvam tu siṣya-hitāya vā guṇa-pūrti yogyatvāya vā iti nānupayuktam.

(There is a point to note with regard to the use of the word This word is mentioned with a view to avoiding the possibility of taking the words siva etc., as synonyms of brahma. So this word applies to the substantive aspect of that which is not different from Siva etc. This is just the sense in which it is used in the Bhāṣya. Yet this word in the capacity of stating the substantive aspect actually states it as having threefold completeness. It is established in Bhasya that every word is applied to Bhagavān only after seeing that the etymological sense i.e., the sense that the attributes signified by the root, suffix or affix of the word are actually found in the entity to which it is applied. For the following reason the possibility of finding fault of irrelevancy with Bhāṣya because it states something that is not relevant, namely, stating that brahman means Visnu in place of stating completeness of attributes in the capacity of its being the meaning of the word brahman as it alone leads to the establishment of the subject-matter as being distinguished from jīva which is for this reason necessary to state becomes removed. For this idea is obtained as the meaning of the word visnu. In fact to make the same point clear it is said in Nyāya-Vivaraņa that the completeness of guņa is stated by the word brahma. Hence the statement that the word brahma means Visnu is needed to make the completeness of attribute, guṇa-pūrṇatva intelligible to the student and further to justify that the word brahma is capable of giving rise to the idea of completeness of attribute, guna-pūrti. For this reason the statement is not out of place.)

V

With regard to the passage under consideration the following may be noted. It is likely that a superficial reader takes this passage to be highly religious as it seems to have in view the religious quarrel whether Viṣṇu or Siva is great. But the student of Sāstra should not forget that he is expounding the concept of Brahman as being complete by attribute (guna-pūrṇa). The view that Brahman is aparicchinna, unlimited is already examined and limitation by space, time

and thing (vastu) is evaluated. Further the difficulty with regard to the idea that Brahman is free from the limitation from things is felt as to suppose that there is a thing different from Brahman is to hold that Brahman is limited by that thing. In meeting this difficulty there appeared two possibilities—1. To hold that Brahman and a thing are non-different and 2. To hold that there is nothing apart from Brahman. The former upholding nondifference makes Brahman a material object and in that case to hold that it is spiritual becomes impossible. Unless It is spiritual, It cannot be svaprakāśa, self-evident. Unless It is self-evident there is nothing to present It. To come to this conclusion is to lose Brahman and with it all higher values of life. Hence Brahman cannot be identified with matter. But to hold that there is matter is to limit Brahman. Therefore it becomes necessary to hold the second alternative i.e., that matter is unreal. Space and time are material. Therefore they are unreal. Hence to hold that Brahman is unlimited actually results that anything other than Brahman is unreal. But the difficulty does not end here. If matter is unreal, then the absence of limitation from it becomes unreal. This ends in holding that presence of limitation is real. This is in other words to recognise the reality of matter. Hence the supposition that Brahman is aparicchinna, unlimited and therefore non-different ends in hopeless contradictions. This circumstance gives rise to the alternative that non-difference and non-limitation are not the implications of each other. Brahman may be unlimited but it may not be non-different. In spite of its being different from particular entities It may still be aparicchinna, unlimited. This is how the concepts of non-difference and difference, abheda and bheda entered into the discussions connected with Brahman. This circumstance gives rise to particular doctrines about these concepts. Whatever the views be, non-limitation of Brahman is not questioned. But only a particular interpretation of nonlimitation is questioned and there is an attempt at a correct solution. T.C., shows that the correct solution is obtained only with the recognition of difference in proper sense.

But aparicchinnatva taken with bheda i.e., non-limitation taken with difference necessarily results in guna-pūrnatva. If it is not recognised, then neither aparicchinnatva nor bheda

becomes justified. Aparicchinna taken by itself ends, as has been seen already, in contradiction and confusion and bheda in exclusiveness of things. The former presents an artificial monism and the latter develops dualism and pluralism. In either way knowledge is not obtained, Sruti is not understood and Brahman is lost. If Brahman were to be understood as expounded by Śruti, 'brhanto-hyasmin-guṇāḥ' pluralism and dualism must be removed and monism must be made genuine. It is genuine where it is logical. It is logical if it is selfconsistent and therefore free from contradiction and confusion. To attain to this it must be seen to have aparicchinnatva and bheda each justifying the other. In this case bheda is governed by aparicchinnatva and therefore it does not lead to dualism and pluralism; and aparicchinnatva is justified by bheda and therefore it does not give room for contradiction and confusion. In this circumstance aparicchinna as being free from deśa-pariccheda etc., limitation from deśa, kāla and vastu in the sense that these three are unreal really gives room for aparicchinna as being free from pariccheda in the sense that these three entities desa, kāla, and vastu are real. As Sankara thinks that these three, because they are jada, must be different from Brahman and with this difference Brahman cannot be aparicchinna, he holds that these entities are unreal. So his position amounts to say that these entities are not unreal on their own merit but they are unreal because as real entities they do not suit his theory. His theory is founded on an assumption that aparicchinna means only the idea he has in his mind and bheda means the negation of aparicchinna. So Sankara's mind is not prepared to expound Sruti pertaining to Brahma-jijñāsā.

Madhva observes the failure of Sankara. He sees that the logic behind the conception of aparicchinna requires the recognition of difference, bheda of Brahman from deśa, kāla and vastu. Hence it is not opposed to the reality of these entities. Without the recognition of these ideas it becomes wrong to hold that Brahman is all-exclusive. Without being all-inclusive It cannot be aparicchinna. All-inclusiveness is pūrnatva. Hence aparicchinna means the state of being pūrna from the standpoint of deśa, kāla and vastu. What is vastu? It is an expression of attributes, guņas. Deśa, kāla also are expressions

of gunas, extension, duration and so on. Hence the conception

of aparicchinnatva has resulted in guna-pūrņatva.

Madhva is defining the Vedic truth of guna-pūrnatva. In the light of Veda he sees that this idea is connoted by the word brahman itself. But that this word means guna-pūrnatva is disputed. To meet this difficulty so far the reason that there is no basis for dispute is shown. But that that is the Vedic meaning is yet to be illustrated. Hence some other concept which shows how gunapūrnatva of Brahman is the truth taught by Veda is to be found out. Supposing that it is not found out, then there is still room for the doubt that after all gunapūrņatva may not be the meaning of the word brahman occurring in Veda. Hence on the basis of reasoning which is indicated so far it is necessary to find out the justification for pūrņatva in the Veda itself. He finds out that this necessity is satisfied by the concept of Visnu as presented by Veda. He expounds this idea as brahmaśabdaśca visnāveva (the word brahman is synonymous with vișnu alone.) In this expression the word eva (alone) is rich in significance. It has in view all the discussions that are required to justify this conclusion.

Both by the root-meaning and by the Vedic circumstance, it is shown how this word means pūnatva. Those words which present the same idea, even according to the linguistic developments on the basis of Veda are considered to be synonymous. They are the words like nārāyana. But there are still other words śiva and so on and why they are not taken to define

Brahman is the question that appears at this stage.

Prakāśa attempts to answer this question having in view the position of Bhāṣya on the Sūtra 'patyurasāmanjasyāt' (2.2 11.37) Hence this discussion has no reference to Pati i.e., Śiva, a concept of religion. It concludes that the word brahma does not mean Śiva because this concept in Veda is found to be incomplete and defective. It is incomplete because it is not Viṣṇu i.e., its etymological meaning is not completeness. It is defective because it is relative. If it is Viṣṇu, then there is no point in upholding it against Viṣṇu. If it is not relative, then it is the same as Viṣṇu. But it is relative. This is the gist of the position implied by Bhāṣya.

The position of Bhāsyakāra that Viṣnu is the primary meaning of the word brahma, is highly significant. Has he any

other meaning in mind which he may call non-primary, amukhya? The possible answers may be evaluated. Supposing that there is some meaning, is it not after all the meaning or one of the meanings of the word? In this case, is his calling it non-primary justified? Supposing he is justified, is he not actually giving to the reader two kinds of meanings of the word? In this case, is he justified in selecting the one against the other? Supposing that he has in his mind no other meaning what is the meaning of specifying the meaning as primary?

In answer to these questions the following may be noted. One word has one and only one meaning. This is the force of eva in 'brahma-śabdaśca viṣṇāveva'. Bhāṣyakāra thinks of no other meaning of the word. But to his position there is opposition. This is opposition in mind, but not opposition in an external sense. The former is the presupposition of the latter. So to remove the latter is not required. But to remove the former is necessary. Without this removal, there may be a thought. But it is only an idea. It is not certain. It is not conviction, drdha. The process of making what is presented as an idea a case of conviction marks the very disposition of mind.

This is an aspect of the process of jijñāsā.

The removal of opposition in mind is the removal of opposition outside. The idea is this. Opposition in the outside world is either genuine or artificial. The artificial is that which is caused by emotions such as interests, attachment and hatred. In the presence of them the man is really not opposed. But he appears to be opposed. His appearance is governed by interests. Hence so long as interests persist willingly he is not prepared to get rid of opposition. Hence this opposition has nothing to do with intellect. But a genuine case of opposition is intellectual in character. It is the effect of seeing that the other position is devoid of reason. A man who has this naturally desires to evaluate his position. Unless he is convinced of the untruth of the other position he does not become convinced of the truth of his own position. This disposition is philosophic in character. At no stage does it give room for interests. For interest presupposes interest, not philosophy. Philosophy develops philosophy, not interest. Interest in philosophy is philosophy itself. It is not the meeting place of interest and philosophy. Hence to say that opposition is intellectual is to say that it is philosophical. A man who has this opposition develops jijnāsā. As it is already indicated, to remove opposition he goes to a guru who is śrotriya and brahma-nistha.

All this explains how propaganda with regard to truth is not needed. If one understands one's self it is enough. To have opposition is to have doubt or difficulty. Jijnāsā is the remedy for it. Even though one knows that a position is true, unless there is an examination and through it the falsification of the opposition there is no appreciation of truth which is fully conscious of itself. This is the reason why there is an examination of relative merits of the primary and the non-

primary meaning of the same word.

What are the sources of these ideas of meaning? The source of the idea that brahman means Vișnu is Śāstra. If it were anything different, then there would be no room for dispute. Of these two sources Sāstra is unknown. The other source being empirical or secular is known. Even supposing that it is not known to any man, there is every possibility of its being known in some circumstance or other just as all other languages are known. But to know the meaning from Sāstra is different. For it then becomes the subject-matter of jijnāsā. This means that just as Sāstra is unfamiliar before jijnāsā every item connected with it is unfamiliar before jijnāsā.

Then how can the position that upholds opposition be conscious of the meaning given by Sāstra? If it appears to be conscious it means simply that it has not understood or appreciated the position of Sāstra. If Sāstra is really understood there is a real appreciation and there is no room for opposition. So the correct idea of something presupposes a conscious rejection of opposition. This is the idea signified by the expression viṣṇāveva of Bhāṣya. In this passage the primary meaning is emphasised against secondary meaning. The latter meaning is presented by opposition. The former

comes from Sāstra.

VII

Madhva shows that the primary meaning is valid and the secondary invalid.

T.Pr., summarises the position as-

brahma-śabdasya anekārthatvepi tasya viṣṇāveva mukhyatvāt.

(Even though it is supposed that the word brahma has many meanings, the primary meaning is Visnu* and nothing else.)

Further the distinction between these two meanings has in view which of the two meanings in a given context is to be accepted.

Following Bhāṣya T.Pr., gives a ruling as—mukhyasyaiva grāhyatvāt.

(Only the primary meaning is acceptable.)

This passage presenting the idea that only the primary meaning is acceptable gives a definite disposition to Sāstra to maintain which itself becomes a huge discipline. In the light of this discipline it may however be seen that on no occasion the acceptance of secondary meaning is encouraged in Sāstra. To accept it is not only to go against this ruling but to negate Sāstra itself.

T.Pr., further strengthens the position of Bhāṣyakāra by showing that Sūtrakāra himself intends to state only the primary meaning. This means that nothing else can be the meaning of $S\bar{u}tra$.

Which is the source of the idea of the primary meaning of the word brahma? T.Pr., says next that it is the context of the two Sūtras concluding Deva-Mīmāmisā. Which is the source of the knowledge of this context? In answer T.Pr., introduces the following passage of Bhāṣya as—

brahma-sabdasya anyatrāpi rūdhatvāt rudhereva mukhyatvāt

kuto visnāvevāsau mukhyah ityatah āha YAM iti.

(There is the usual use of the word brahma in the sense of things other than Viṣṇu and primary meaning is nothing but the meaning in the sense of which a word is usually used. How is then the position that the primary meaning is Viṣnu justified? To answer this Bhāṣyakāra says "YAM etc.")

Bhāṣya: yamantassamudre kavayo vayanti yadakṣare parame prajāḥ yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī toyena jīvān vyasasarja bhūmyāṁ ityādyuktvā "tadeva rtaṁ tadu satyamāhuḥ tadeva brahma paramaṁ kavīṇāṁ" iti hi śrutiḥ

• This word Vișnu is in italics, because in the present context it is purely a philosophical concept. Vișnu in Roman indicates a deity which has its origin in faith.

("That which the seers [of Veda] know as being the indwelling principle of the sea (the innermost essence of a self), that which is the most indestructible in which [for this reason] creatures have their abode, that from which that which gives rise to the world has its production, created individual souls, jīvas by means of water on the earth." Having stated this Śruti continues [indeed as the seers of Veda say] 'Only that is straight, Rta, only that is Real, Satya, only that is the highest Brahman for the wise'.)

T.pr., in the present context becomes more intelligible by the following note. Outside Brahma-Mīmāmsā the method of explaining the relation between a word and its meaning is this. There are two cases of relation-primary and secondary. There are two cases of primary relation-rūdhi and yoga. Rūdhi is usage in general. Usage by scholars in language has its own speciality. Usages by Kālidāsa, Pāṇini and so on may be taken for example. Yoga is the literal meaning of the word in question. A word consists of root with affix or suffix. Each of these is defined to have a particular meaning on the basis of its disposition. Between these two rūdhi is particularly emphasised in popular languages. The secondary relation is of varied character and it may be considered in a proper context. The person who upholds pūrva-pakṣa has his mental background influenced by this analysis. He carries this analysis even to Veda quite forgetting or not knowing that it is of a transcendent character and what applies to empirical language does not apply to it. Hence he feels difficulty in following that Brahman means Vișnu.

T.Pr., points out that the difficulty is illegitimate as:

yadyapi anyatra-rūdho brahma-sabdah tathāpi viṣṇāveva mukhyah. anyatra ajña-rūdhitvāt. bhagavati ca vidvad-rūdhyā brahma-sabda iti.

(It is true that the word brahma is used in the sense of things other than Vișnu. Yet even against this usage its primary meaning is Vișnu and Vișnu only. The reason is this. With reference to the meanings other than Vișnu the usage is the result of ignorance. [It is the usage of ignorant people i.e., people who are ignorant of Vișnu, the Vedic meaning.] Brahman in the present context is used in the sense of Bhagavān,

complete i.e., Viṣṇu still by usage. But this usage is called vidvadrūḍhi, the usage of the wise i.e., of those that know the Vedic Truth Viṣṇu. For this reason to express Viṣṇu the word brahma is formed.)

The expression Bhagavati ca vidvad-rūdhyā brahma-śabdah may be taken to mean 'the word brahma means Bhagavān by vidvad-rūdhi, the usage of the wise'. By 'the wise' is meant the Vedic seers.

In the light of the whole meaning vidvad-rūḍhyā may be added to Bhāṣya, brahma-śabdaśca Viṣṇāveva, so that the whole passage becomes 'brahma-śabdaśca vidvad-rūḍhyā viṣṇāveva'. This reading is supported by Anu-Vyā.—Prayoga-mātra-bāhulyam rūḍhirityabhidhīyate. (The more commonness of usage [than the commonness of the literal meaning, yoga] is called rūdhi).

It may be noted further that the idea signified by Bhāṣya and explained by T.Pr., is very important. Without noting it it is impossible to appreciate the conclusions of $Brahma-M\bar{\imath}m\bar{\alpha}m\bar{s}\bar{a}$. Finally the position of $S\bar{a}stra$ in the light of this discussion is this. All usages outside $S\bar{a}stra$ are the result of ignorance. They may be the usages of $P\bar{a}nini$, $K\bar{a}lid\bar{a}sa$ or other men of exceptional eminence from the standpoint of wordly affairs. They are still the result of ignorance. What they consider to be usage is no usage at all with reference to $S\bar{a}stra$. Therefore to follow them in interpreting a Vidic position is irrelevant. This explains how wide the gulf between classical Sanskrit and the Sanskrit of $S\bar{a}stra$ is.

VIII

T.Pr., draws certain conclusions indicated by Bhāṣya—
kavīnām tadeva paramam brahmeti śrutyuktatvāt
vidvadavidvadrūḍhyoḥ vidvad-rūḍhereva mukhyatvāt.

(As it is expounded by *Śruti*—that 'only that is for the wise the Highest Brahman', of the two *rūdhis*, the usage of the wise and the usage of the ignorant, the usage of the wise is primary.)

This means that in interpreting a Vedic passage the principles of interpretation that are relevant to classical Sanskrit are irrelevant. What is primary in the former case is secondary in the latter. In the light of the ruling given by T.Pr., the

primary must be accepted and therefore the non-primary must be rejected. So the meaning given to a Vedic passage from the standpoint of ajña-rūḍhi i.e., non-vidvad-rūḍhi is to be rejected in Śāstra. To follow non-vidvad-rūḍhi does not help the knowledge that Śāstra aims at. The implication of this conclusion is very great. If a question is put how many of the expositions of Vedic ideas follow this rule, in answer, one may say 'practically none'. The same observation applies equally well to the systems of thought other than Vedānta as well as the Vedānta systems that preceded Madhva's exposition. Whatever the circumstance of other systems be, Madhva from the start to the finish of his system of thought follows this method of interpretation without exception.

This explains why it is difficult to interpret Madhva, and why he is thoroughly misunderstood even by the writers who are not religiously predisposed. The difficulty is connected with reference to the very language apart from the rigour of logic.

Bh.D., means by 'akṣare . . . prajāḥ' akṣare avināśini, in the Indestructible, prajāh adhīnāh, creatures are dependent. According to Madhva 'abode' meant by locative case, saptamī means dependence. 'Dependent' is a technical word meaning that there is nothing in the thing characterised as dependent that subsists or endures by itself, that has no origin in aksara and that is with reference to any aspect or sense independent of akṣara. If this meaning is not kept in view, then even to hold that creatures have their abode in aksara does not explain the equalless indestructibility of aksara. For that which requires an abode may still be indestructible. For example jīva according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is indestructible, but yet during life it requires the abode of body. So following this idea along with akṣara there may be posited an entity which is equally indestructible. In this case the absolute or equalless indestructible entity is not conceived. Hence in order to avoid this difficulty it becomes necessary to define the creatures, prajah as adhīna, dependent. Dependent indestructibility is no indestructibility. Bhāṣyakāra himself explains these ideas in Janmādhikaraņa and so on.*

Madhva evidently means Visnu by the word tat in tadevartam. He quotes this passage to illustrate how the word

^{* &#}x27;So on' etc., are used in place of Sanskrit ādi as ityādi.

brahma means Vișņu. Hence this passage must have Vișņu in view.

T.Pr., confirms this idea by raising a difficulty and answering it as—

tacchabdena viṣṇuriti kuta-iti cet yamantassamudre sthitam jñānino jānantīti viṣṇu-lingādeveti bhāvaḥ.

(How is it correct to hold that *Visnu* is meant by the word tat? If this difficulty occurs, the intended answer is this. It is only because of the sign of *Visnu* signified by the expression, 'the wise know that which indwells the sea'.)

Sruti holds that samudrāntasthitatvam, the state of indwelling the sea is the sign or the distinguishing feature of Viṣṇu. Rgveda explains how the discussion that centres round the concept 'indwelling the Sea' has Viṣṇu as its subject-matter, as is clear in Mahā-Nārāyaṇīya.

T.pr., introduces Bhāṣya which justifies that 'indwelling the Sea' is the distinguishing feature of Viṣṇu only as—

samudrasthatva-lingasya anyatra kathamcit sambhavāt tacchabdena kuto viṣṇutva-niścayah ityato niravakāśa-śruterevetyāha Tanna iti.

(The attribute 'indwelling the Sea' may in some sense or other be had by something else. How is then to decide that it is *Visnu* on the basis of the word *tat* correct? The answer is this, 'That is only because it is the position of *Sruti* which cannot be interpreted in a different manner'. Madhva says the same as Tanna.)

BHĀṣYA:

tanno vişnuh* iti vacanāt viṣnureva hi tatrocyate

(Because there is a statement 'May therefore Viṣṇu [direct] us' by the previous passage it is Viṣṇu that is indeed expounded.)

'Tanno viṣnuḥ' indicates the full passage as nārāyaṇāya vidmahe vāsudevāya dhīmahi tanno viṣnuḥ pracodayāt.

(May we understand Nārāyaṇa. May we recognise It as Vāsudeva, complete. Therefore, may Viṣṇu direct us towards good.)

• Mahā-nārāyaṇiya Upanişad.

T.pr., presents the gist of the meaning of this passage as—yatalı tam vidmahe dhīmahi ca tasmāt asmān śubham prati viṣṇuh codayatu ityarthaḥ.

(We know It [that Nārāyaṇa is Vāsudeva] and also understand It, for the same reason. May Viṣṇu direct us to realise the highest good. This is the meaning of the passage of Śruti.)

This passage means that $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ recognised as $V\bar{a}sudeva$, the complete is what is called Vişnu. $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is the Self in the sense that it is the principle from which an individual self comes. Being recognised as guna- $p\bar{u}rna$, $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is $V\bar{a}sudeva$. This is Vişnu. Vişnu is the Self characterised as guna- $p\bar{u}rna$. Madhva expounds these ideas in a later Adhikarana i.e., in the Adhikarana devoted to $up\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ -traividhya, the three fold-discipline. $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ and $V\bar{a}sudeva$ are therefore synonyms of Vişnu.

The idea signified by this discussion is this. It is not in this context required to interpret the word brahman in any manner the interpreter may like. For this word is taken from Sruti. Sūtra is required to decide the meaning of Sruti. The question is not what the word brahman means. But it is what the word brahman as used in Sruti means. This circumstance creates all the difference between Bhāṣyakāra and Bhāṣyakāra. To do justice to the meaning, what brahma means in the context of Sruti in which it is used must be taken into consideration. This can be done only by identifying the ideas that define Brahman. In this connection on the basis of this similarity one must try to find out the words that may happen to be synonyms of the word brahman only. To find them out helps the exposition of the concept of Brahman. Irrespective of this any other consideration is illegitimate.

At this stage the difference between Sankara and Madhva may be studied. Sankara indeed knows that the word brahma mentioned by Sūtrakāra is a word of Sruti. But he does not give proper weight to this observation as is evident by how he interprets the word. Just like a bare linguist he identifies the root of the word, notes its meaning, somehow feels that the word must mean aparicchinna, unlimited and assumes that this is the meaning that Sūtrakāra has in his mind when he selected the word brahma to express the subject-matter of jijnāsā. He

applies his meaning to the whole of Vedic thought under the name ātmaikatva-vidyā. But Madhva's approach is totally different. He recognises that the word is from Sūtra that decides the meaning of Sruti. He therefore searches for the meaning of Sūtra. In this connection he studies similar concepts in Sruti itself to define the concept of brahma used in the Sūtra. Even in doing this he takes the lead from Sūtrakāra himself who defines brahma as Vișņu in Deva-Mīmāmsā.

Having so far illustrated how brahma according to Veda means Visnu, Madhva shows that other concepts even though they may be taken from Veda do not present the meaning of brahma.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāsya as:

yadi visnu-sabdāt sa eva atroktam brahma tarhi 'tanno rudrah*' ityādītara-vācaka-sabda-sadbhāvāt tesāmapi mukhyabrahmatvam prāptamityatah āha NA CA iti.

(If it is held that only Visnu is expounded as brahma in this passage, because there is the use of the word Vișnu, then because there is the statement of others as 'Therefore may Rudra [direct] us . . . etc.', they also can be taken to be the primary meaning of the word brahma. If this difficulty arises then Madhva says NA CA.)

Вназуа-

NA CA ITARA-ŚABDĀTTATPRĀPTIĻ

(But it does not follow that others are meant because there is the mention of the words that denote them.)

Madhva himself explains this idea. T.Pr., introduces

kuto netareṣām mukhya-brahmatva-prāptih iti cet tat-prāpakaśabdanam visnaveva mukhyatvat iti abhiprayena tatra śrutimaha NĀMĀNI iti.

(Why do not the others be the primary meaning of brahma? i.e., why do not the others have the state of being Brahman in

• 'Tatpuruṣāya vidmahe mahā-devāya dhīmahi tanno rudraḥ pracodayāt' is the complete passage of Sruti.

the primary sense? If this question occurs having the answer—
It is because the words that appear to introduce them primarily
mean Vinu itself.—in mind, Madhva quotes Śruti as
NĀMĀNI etc.)

Вназуа-

NĀMĀNI VIŚVĀBHI NA SANTI LOKE YADĀVIRĀSĪT ANŖTASYA SARVAM NĀMĀNI SARVĀŅI YAMĀVIŚANTI TAM VAI VIŞŅUM PARAMAM UDĀHARANTI ITI BHĀLLAVEYA-ŚRUTIḤ

(For the reason that the world, anrta, other than Viṣṇu has all that makes it have name is produced by or given by Viṣṇu. Name without exception cannot be applied to the things of the world in the primary sense.

They, the wise, illustrate that It is Visnu, the Highest to which all names without exception apply spontaneously in the primary sense.

This is how Bhāllaveya-Śruti expounds Viṣṇu.)

T.pr., presents the gist of the meaning.

sarvāni nāmāni rudrādi-jagati mukhyato na santi. yato visņvitarasya jagatah sarvam nāma-pravṛtti-nimittam utpattimat tarhi kasmimstāni mukhyatah? sarvāņi nāmāni yam mukhyatah vācakatvena visanti tam aparicchinna-pravṛtti-nimittam viṣṇum vadanti vidvāmsah ityarthah.

(All names without exception do not apply to the world of Rudra and so on.

[The word rudra has two senses 1, deity and 2, Vișņu Itself in Śāstra. Rudra as a deity is a part of the world and it is devoid of name.]

The reason is this. In the world other than Vișnu all that

makes it have name is produced.

[This means that nothing in the world deserves name by its own merit. In fact to speak of its own merit is itself contradiction in terms. For it is nothing but naming the thing. To hold that nothing deserves name because that which forms the origin of name is itself produced means that there is nothing unproduced in the world, and there is therefore nothing beginningless and nothing enduring. If anything is beginningless, enduring or unproduced, then it ought to have a name.

But this supposition is sublated by Sruti that attributes all

names i.e., every name to Vișnu and Vișnu only.

At this stage the significance of sublation may be made clear. To say that a position is sublated by Sruti must not be taken to imply that Sruti is taken in the sense of authority against reason giving reason the name supposition. This kind of consideration is common among students of modern philosophy. The point at present is this. We are not reasoning out things according to our taste in the present context. We are attempting to find out the meaning of Veda. Veda has found out guna-pūrna, the highest truth in the concept of Visnu. The word brahma as it presents the idea of pūrņa is defined in terms of Visnu. Consistently with this idea Visnu is considered to be the only primary meaning of all names i.e., words. Against this a different supposition has no justification, because it is irrelevant to the very context of the discussion. This context is governed by Śruti, nāmāni etc. Hence the supposition becomes sublated by Sruti. So the supposition does not represent reason. It is a case of irrationality. Sruti on the other hand is an expression of reason. For it is through reason we have arrived at Sruti. Having arrived at Sruti, it is through reason we are upholding Sruti.

Having confirmed the view that nothing of the world deserves name, T.Pr., proceeds to show how Viṣnu is the

meaning of all words.]

If so what is their primary meaning? The answer is this. The wise say that It is *Viṣṇu* which has all that which forms the origin of naming in the complete sense. It is therefore that to which all names spontaneously apply in the primary

sense. This is the meaning of the passage.)

The discussion illustrates how a thing is not named at our will. It is not convention that is responsible for naming. Though when Sāstra is not studied convention seems to be the origin of naming, in fact name has its primary meaning in the sense of Viṣṇu i.e., when it means Viṣṇu. For Viṣṇu is complete. It has in It every attribute. Every attribute is complete in It. The completeness invites the name that signifies that attribute. Hence, It has all names, because It has all attributes each being complete. But the same does not hold good with reference to other things that form the world. They have no attributes.

What attributes they seem to possess are produced in them. Even what is signified by them is an attribute. It is therefore produced. Hence no name can be applied to them. Then how are they named for practical purposes? Madhva explains his position in a later adhikarana on the principle of thought called samākarşa-nyāya in 1.4.5.16. This principle of thought consists chiefly in showing that the name of an attribute of Viṣṇu with that particular attribute. For instance the word jīva means life. Life in complete sense is Viṣṇu. Hence Viṣṇu is the primary meaning of the word jīva. Yet the name jīva is given to individual self to show that it is produced by Viṣṇu. Madhva illustrates that to understand every thing in terms of this truth is to see the whole life in terms of Viṣṇu. Madhva shows that to see life in this manner is the only case of spirituality that is ever known to the world of spiritual beings.

It is not a newtion that is responsible for neming. Though when his not a newtion that is responsible for neming. Though when his, is not at effect convenient seems to be the origin of name has its prince meaning in the sense of Views is, when it means Views Ter From is complete. It has in the every with home I were surface is complete in E. The completeness maintes the menter than say med that attribute.

HARIH AUM

CHAPTER XXIV

ENQUIRY INTO WHOLE VEDA SHAPES BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

I

Madhva, having shown that no entity other than Visnu has name makes his position completely objective and thereby removes the possibility of his being partial to Visnu, a deity.

T.Pr., introduces this Bhāṣya as-

yathā sarva-nāmavatvena viṣṇurevātroktam brahma tathā rudrādīnāmapi viṣṇvādi-śabda-vācyatvena te eva atroktam brahma kim na syuh ityata āha YA iti.

(Just as it is held that only Vișnu is Brahman as It has all names, as Rudra etc., have the names vișnu etc., why are they themselves not considered to be Brahman, the subject-matter of the present discussion? In answer to this, Madhva says YA etc.)

Bhāṣya— yo devānām nāmadhā eka eva tam sampraśnam bhuvanāyantyanyā [r.sam 10-82-3]

ITYEVA-ŚABDĀT NĀNYEṢĀM SARVA-NĀMATĀ

(It alone being absolutely independent, (ekah) has the names of all divinities Brahmā and so on. [None of the others has therefore names.] The other worlds enter into that which governs all (Praśna means prastāram, governing principle.) [when destruction or mokṣa occurs to them.] Thus from the use of the word alone, eva, it follows that others Rudra etc., have no names.)

T.Pr., gives the meaning of nāmadhā as nāmadhā nāmadhārakaḥ

(Nāmadhā means that which bears name.)

This presents two ideas. 1. Of the several things that are spoken of in Veda it is only Visnu that bears name. The

others including the different deities have no name. From this it follows that 2. the names that are supposed to be of other entities are really the names of Vinu. The reason for this is given by the word sampraśnam. This word means the governing principle, because it is the subject-matter of consideration i.e., the question is put with reference to it.

Bh. D., says

sampraśnam praśna-vişayam.

(Sampraśnam means the subject-matter of enquiry.)

The whole idea is that Visnu is the governing principle of all other entities and therefore the names that are supposed to be theirs are really Its names. Evidently this governing activity is different from the governing activity in the empirical sense. In the empirical sense it does not touch the name of the body governed. In fact, it confirms its name. For, empirical reason is this. There is the name of the governed. Hence the governed is an entity. Without it there is no government and therefore no governing principle. So empirically name explains and confirms the reality of the governed. But with all the conclusion it contradicts itself. For according to it the process of reasoning is that there is governing principle because there is the governed. In this reason from the reality of the governed the reality of the principle is inferred. In the act of inference itself the principle is subordinated to the governed. For without the governed the principle cannot be conceived. This is the mistake that particular Darśanas, Nyāya and so on commit. They infer the maker, Kartr, from the made. Empirically this inference may hold good. But it does not apply to the maker of all. Owing to this inherent difficulty they never attain to the concept of the doer of all. For before attaining to this concept they have to provide for the reality of the made. How do they identify the made? They do it by means of names. This is impossible unless they hold with or without discussion that things bear names as a matter of right. Taking Nyāya for example this is the conscious or unconscious significance of its identification of the two concepts prameya and abhidheya. Prameya is that which happens to be the object of correct knowledge. Correct knowledge is pramā. It is that which presents its object as it is given i.e., as it appears. In this very concept the defect of this system is evident. If Śāstra questions the reality of appearance, Nyāya makes the reality of appearance its starting point. Having assumed prameya, it is busy with defining it as abhidheya. Abhidheya is that which has name. If this is the leading idea of the system, how can it conceive even the possibility of the doer of all, sarva-kartr? At best it can conceive a doer which has nothing to do with the reality of other things. Even though Nyāya calls this doer Iśvara it is not praśna, i.e., praśna-viṣaya, subject-matter of enquiry.

This subject-matter is the source of reality of all. The things that constitute all are those that are presented by name. Name therefore constitutes their reality. Supposing they have no name there is nothing that helps the conception of their reality. With the removal of the name all is taken away from them. To introduce name to them is to give them all. This is the importance of name. Name is therefore more fundamental than reality. Nameless reality is evidently no reality.

It has nothing to justify it.

But there are thinkers who separate reality from name. Buddhism holds that name is vikalpa, imagined by mind without any basis. But the mistake it commits is that it conceives reality as vikalpaless and in this act it names it vikalpaless i.e., devoid of vikalpa. Similarly Sankara holds that Brahman is beyond speech i.e., name. But 'beyond speech' is itself a name of Brahman. This simply means that these thinkers have not

bestowed their serious attention to this problem.

The question before us is therefore which is the principle of all? Which is therefore that bears all names so that other entities have no names? This principle is sampraina, the subject-matter of enquiry. In understanding this point, one in the light of the foregoing discussion feels a difficulty in conceiving a thing from which all names are taken away. Similar to the previous considerations, the state of being nameless itself may serve as a name. How is then the nameless thing conceived? The answer is implied in the concept of Sampraina itself. The implication of this concept is that the present enquiry is the very attempt at finding out the truth which has every name leaving nothing to that which it is not. The same cannot be said with regard to the truth that

is beyond speech. For, that which bears all names falsifies The truth that bears all names cannot be transcended. Unless it is transcended the truth that lies beyond speech cannot be justified. Hence the former has priority to the latter. Even the upholder of the latter cannot disregard the former. To disregard it is to have his position sublated by it. But the same cannot be said with reference to the truth beyond speech. It cannot be prior to the other truth. To conceive it is to contradict one's self. Hence of the two truths, the truth that bears all names is independent of the other truth. For without considering the other truth this truth can be considered. But to consider that which transcends all speech presupposes the consideration of that which bears all names. Hence it is dependent on the latter. Further, when once the truth that bears all names becomes conceived there is no going back. Hence it is the true subject-matter of enquiry. It is samprasna whereas the truth that lies beyond speech is never samprasna because it is contradiction in terms.

Sruti further explains how as the bearer of all names It is the source of all reality and is therefore the subject-matter of enquiry as bhuvanāyantyanyā. (All other worlds i.e., the created as such go to it.) This means that It is their goal. From the final point of view they have two aims-pralaya, dissolution and mukti, attaining to immortality. One is destruction and the other is endurance. The source of both is nāmadhā, the bearer of all names. Hence It is the source of all in all states. If there is anything that is beyond speech It is the source of even that entity together with the theory about This is because It is nāmadhā, bearer of all names

including 'that which is beyond speech'.

Madhva shows further that nāmadhā, the bearer of all names is necessarily Vișnu.

T.Pr., introduces this Bhāṣya as-

yacchabdena vișnuriti kutah asya sūktasya anya-paratvāt ityatah āha AJASYA iti.

(By the word 'that which', (yah) how is Visnu meant? [In fact it is not meant,] because the hymn in which this passage occurs is devoted to something else. [This something is Viśvakarmā.] If this difficulty occurs Madhva says AJASYA.)

Вназуа-

AJASYA NĀBHĀVADHYEKAMARPITAM YASMIN VIŚVĀNI BHUVANĀNI TASTHUḤ

R. sam 10-82-6

ITI VIŞNORLINGAM

(For the reason that in this passage of *Sruti* the sign of *Visnu* is stated as—"In the naval of this entity which is never subject to production there is the production of something in which all the worlds, [fourteen in number] have their abode i.e., They depend upon that something." [It follows from this that that which is referred to by 'that which' (yaḥ) is Viṣṇu.])

T.Pr., makes the idea clear—
padma-nābhatva-lingāt ayam viṣṇureva.

(The sign is padma-nābhatva, the state of having lotus produced from the naval. Owing to this sign it is decided that the entity [to which yah refers] is no other than Viṣnu.)

The idea is this. In the passages of *Sruti* that are explicitly devoted to *Viṣṇu* 'the state of having lotus produced from the naval' is presented as the sign of *Viṣṇu*. This means that the passage in which *Viṣṇu* is not stated as the subject-matter of the passage, if referring to the subject-matter this sign i.e., 'having lotus' is stated, then it follows that the subject-matter of the passage is *Viṣṇu*. Applying the same test to the present passage, Madhva decides that the subject-matter of the passage is *Viṣṇu*. On this basis, he means *Viṣṇu* by the word *yaḥ*.

T.Pr., removes apparent difficulties by way of understanding the implication of Bhāṣya.

utsargato lingāt śruteḥ prābalyepi niravakāśa-lingena sāvakāśa-viśvakarma-śruteḥ bādha-sambhavāt iti bhāvaḥ.

(Generally *Sruti* is more decisive than sign, *linga*. [yet, *linga* the meaning of which is decided sublates *Sruti*, the meaning of which is not decided.] For this reason *linga* with its meaning decided sublates *Sruti* which seems to be devoted to Viśvakarmā. This is the implication of *Bhāṣya*.)

The idea is this. 'Lotus-naval' is decided to be the sign of Viṣṇu. Viśva-karmā only seems to be other than Viṣṇu. But it is not decided to be different. In the normal case Śruti

is more decisive. Yet in the present case linga is more definite. Hence Sruti becomes interpreted consistently with linga. So the whole passage of Viśva-karmā Hymn becomes devoted to Viṣṇu i.e., Viṣṇu becomes the subject-matter of the passage. For this reason Viśvakarmā becomes only a name of Viṣṇu Viśva-karma-Sūkta has thus become Viṣṇu-Sūkta. Linga makes this conclusion inevitable.

Madhva removes the difficulties with regard to this decision.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

nābhyarpitam padmādanyat kim na syāt ityatah āha

(Why is it not possible to hold that which is produced from naval is something different from lotus? [Nābhyarpita is the word given by Śruti. It only means 'that which is recognised as being produced in naval'. It does not say what is produced is lotus. Hence nothing binds us in holding that that which is produced from naval is something different from lotus. In this case there is in the passage no sign of Viṣṇu. This means that Viśvakarmā is different from Viṣṇu.] Against this difficulty Madhva says NA CA etc.)

BHĀSYA —

NA CA PRASIDDHĀRTHAM VINĀ ANYORTHO YUJYATE.

(It is indeed not reasonable to hold [that the word nābhy-arpitam means] something other than that which is already made use of [by Śruti.])

T. Pr., explains the idea.-

nābhyarpito viśvādhārah padārthah prasiddha-padmākhyārtham vinā anya na yujyate prasiddhi-bādhādityarthah.

(The meaning of the word nābhyarpita under consideration is that which is the basis i.e., the root-matter of the whole world. It does not hold good that this basis is different from what is given by *Sruti* as lotus. [By *Sruti* lotus is known to be the basis i.e., root-matter of the whole world]. To hold that it is something other is sublated by this fact which is made known by *Sruti*.)

The idea signified by sublation is this. In the case of a person that does not know the circumstance of *Sruti* but is introduced to *Sruti*, probably at the commencement of his studies or in

the case of a person who has made up his mind owing to some prepossession or other to oppose Visnu and therefore does not care to study the details connected with the subject-matter of the present discussion, it may appear to be convincing if it is said that the word nābhyarpita may mean something other than lotus and Viśvakarmā is therefore different from Vișņu. But in the case of one who has made a detailed study of the subject, who has understood that nābhyarpita does not mean anything other than lotus, because Sruti has already made the point clear that lotus is viśvādhāra, the basis i.e., the root-matter of the whole world and who has understood that to decide the meaning of viśvakarmā mere name is not enough to say that it is different from Visnu but the meaning must be decided in the light of the whole Vedic teaching making use at the same time of the concepts that the Vedic thinking makes use of, it is psychologically impossible even to think of the possibility that nābhyarpita means something else and Viśvakarmā is different from Visnu. A note on this point removes another difficulty viz., the possibility of one's jumping to the conclusion that all that is discussed is mere theology and a student of philosophy takes no interest in it. It is not correct to think in this manner. It is irrelevant to the context. The context is to find out the meaning of a certain Vedic expression and on that basis to arrive at important conclusions as important as philosophy itself. Hence to achieve this end to take the council of Veda becomes inevitable. This can be done only by referring to the particular circumstances in which direction the Vedic thought is developing.

T. Pr., shows that the same Bhāṣya removes a further difficulty as —

visva-karma-srutivat padmanābhatva-lingam ca anyasyāpi kim na syāt ityato vā āha NA CA iti.

(Just as Viśvakarma-Śruti, why is not the sign of having 'lotus-naval' also attributed to some other entity? [The question is why 'Lotus-naval' is the sign of Viṣnu alone.] In answer Madhva says NA CA etc.)

T. Pr., explains the answer.

padma-nābhatvena prasiddha-padārtham bhagavantam vinā anyah padma-nābho na yujyate. prasiddhi-bādhāt ityarthah.

Bhagavān i.e., guṇa-pūrṇa is already introduced to the student as padma-nābha, having lotus-naval. Therefore that padma-nābha is some other entity does not hold good. To hold some other entity as padma-nābha is sublated by the fact that is already expounded i.e., the fact that padma-nābha is Bhagavān i.e., Viṣṇu. This is the meaning of Bhāṣya.)

The following may be noted in this connection. If Viṣṇu i.e., guṇa-pūrṇa is not padma-nābha then a non-guṇa-pūrṇa ought to be padma-nābha. This is contradiction. What is padma? It is the basis or the root-matter of the whole world. How can then a non-guṇa-pūrṇa have lotus-naval? non-guṇa-pūrṇa is itself incomplete. It is therefore in need of explanation. It presupposes guṇa-pūrṇa as its author. It is for this reason devoid of padma, lotus. So one who knows this truth can never conceive that anything other than Viṣṇu can be padma-nābha.

Further in support of his thesis, Madhva refers to Vedic tradition. T. Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as—

na kevalametat śrutyuktam padmam; padma-nābhaśca hariḥ prasiddhaiva. kim tu tadvācitvena smṛti-gṛhītatvācca ityāha AJASYA iti.

(The position is not merely that what is stated by this Sruti is padma, lotus and padma-nābha is Hari, but the same idea that the word [padma-nābha] denotes It [Hari] is developed by Smrti. Madhva expounds this idea as AJASYA etc.)

BHĀSYA:

AJASYA NÄBHÄVITI YASYA NÄBHERABHÜT ŚRUTEḤ PUŞKARAM LOKASĀRAM TASMAI NAMO VYASTA-SAMASTA-VIŚVA-VIBHÜTAYE VIṢŅAVE LOKA-KARTRE. ITI CA SKÄNDE

(It is also said in the Skānda that according to Śruti, ajasya-nābhau etc., lotus, the basis of the world originates from Its (Viṣṇu's) naval. Namaḥ, obeisance to that Viṣṇu who is the author of the world being the source of all that is the world both in detail and in brief.)

As it will be made clear in Janmādhikarana all that occur to the world as such are eight in number—birth, existence, death, function, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and release. These states occur to jīva, a conscious being in various details in all their richness. They occur to jada, inert matter in a very general form. They may occur to the world in whatever manner and in whatever degree the author is in all cases Visnu.

T. Pr., explains the idea expounded by Bhasya.

ajasya nābhāviti śruteḥ ityanvayaḥ. kvacidvyastāḥ kvacitsamastāḥ viśva-vibhūtayo yenāsau tathoktāḥ. pūrvārdhe-viṣṇuvācaka-padābhāvāt uttarārdhodāharaṇam.

(In interpreting this Bhāṣya the passage ajasya nābhāviti must be taken along with Śruti. Viśva-vibhūtayaḥ, means the states that occur to the world which are in some cases rich in details and in some other cases brief and general. The entity by which all these states occur is called vyasta-samasta-viśva-vibhūtiḥ. In the former half there is no word that presents the idea of Viṣṇu. Therefore the latter half is quoted. [For in it Viṣṇu is explicitly stated.])

Further Madhva shows that it is not merely the definiteness of the sign of *Visnu* that leads to the present conclusion but this sign is backed up by circumstances similarly definite in character.

T. Pr., introduces Bhāṣya.

yadā niravakāšatvena lingamātram šruti-bādhakam tadá kim vācyam samākhyā-yuktam taditi bhāvena āha PARA iti.

(It is seen that the mark, linga the meaning of which is decided by itself sublates Sruti [the meaning of which is not decided.] If so it need not be mentioned that [it sublates Sruti more definitely] when it is coupled with samākhyā, the presence of similiar statement supporting the same idea, namely, the state of being padmā-nābha, being the sign of Viṣnu. With this idea Madhva says PARA etc.)

Bhāşya—

PARO DIVĀ PARA ENĀ PŖTHIVYĀĻ
ITI SAMĀKHYĀ-ŚRUTAU *Ŗ. sam.* 10-82-5.

yam kāmaye tam tamugram kṛṇomi tam brahmāṇam tamṛṣim tam sumedhām R. sam. 10-125-5.

ITYUKTVĀ MAMA YONIRAPSVANTASSAMUDRE ITYĀHA. R. sam. 10-125-7.

('It is superior, para to the shining heavens i.e., Lakṣmī the presiding deity. It is superior to this earth'. Samākhyā-Śruti says thus. 'Whom I want to make Rudra I make him Rudra. I make him Brahmā whom I want to make Brahmā. I make him a sage whom I want to make a sage. I make him wise whom I want to make wise.' Having stated this, the author of this statement says 'that which gives me birth dwells in the water within the sea.')

With regard to this passage the following may be noted. The passage from Visvakarma-Sūkta is this—Paro divā para enā pṛthivyā paro devebhirasuraih yadasti (It is higher than the shining heavens with the presiding deity: It is higher than this earth. It is higher than divinities, demons asuras and that which ever exists.) But in this passage the idea of Viṣṇu is not given. Who this para, the higher entity is, is to be found out. The process is this. In the Ambhraṇī-Sūkta there is a similar statement "paro divā para enā pṛthivyai tāvatī mahinā sambabhūva." That which gives rise to me is higher than the shining heavens: It is higher than this earth: But I am confined to what I am i.e., I am as limited as I was and I will continue to be the same.)

This is the statement of Lakṣmī. Having stated that it (Lakṣmī) is the origin of Brahmā etc., it mentions that its origin dwells in the sea. It further defines the origin of all as the highest presenting at the same time itself as being limited as ever it was. It is known that Lakṣmī's origin is Viṣnu. Hence the entity characterised as 'higher than dyaus etc.,' in Viśvakarma-Sūkta must be Viṣnu. From this it follows that Viṣvakarmā is Viṣnu.

T.Pr., concludes the position of Bhāṣya.

paro divā para enā pṛthivyā paro devebhirasuraiḥ yadasti. ityanena viśva-karma-sūktoktena sūktāntare paro divā para enā pṛthivyai tāvatī mahinā sambabhūveti samākhyānācca viṣṇureva viśvakarma-sūktoktaḥ.

('It is higher than dyaus [Lakşmī], higher than this earth, higher than gods, higher than demons asuras, and in fact higher than everything that exists.' Similar to this statement of Viśvakarma-Sūkta there is another Sūkta i.e., Ambhranī-Sūkta in which there is a statement 'It is higher than Lakşmī,

higher than this earth; but my greatness is measured. I am the same as I was.' For this reason it follows that the subjectmatter of Viśvakarma-Sūkta is Viṣṇu Itself.)

T. Pr., clarifies the position further—

na ca tatrāpi viṣṇuḥ kutaḥ iti śankyam yataḥ samākhyāśrutau dyāvā-pṛthivī-param mama yoniḥ apsu antaḥ samudre iti lakṣmī svakāraṇatvena samudra-sthitatvena ca āha.

(A question may occur. How is it correct to hold that Visinu is the subject-matter of Ambhrani-Sūkta itself? It is because in the Sruti quoted to show similarity of statements Laksini mentions [Visinu] as being her cause and as dwelling inside the sea by means of the expressions 'It is higher than dyaus and earth: It is my cause: It dwells inside the waters of the sea.')

T. Pr., shows that the cause of Laksmī is Viṣṇu-

na ca astu lakşmī-kāraṇam brahmādyanyatamam iti vācyamyam kāmaye iti lakṣmyāḥ brahmādīnām svādhīnatvokterityarthaḥ.

(It is wrong to suppose that the cause of Lakṣmī is some one of Brahmā etc. For in the light of the statement 'whomsoever I want to make Brahmā . . .' Brahmā etc., are dependent on Lakṣmī. This is the meaning of the passage.)

T. Pr., gives the meaning of the text.

divetyādi tṛtīyā pamcamyarthe. sa viṣṇuḥ dyāvā-pṛthivī paraḥ aham tu mahimnā etāvatī parimitā babhūvetyarthaḥ. yamugram brahmāṇam ṛṣim sumedhasam vā kartum kāmaye tam tam ugram, brahmāṇam, ṛṣim, sumedhasam vā karomītyarthaḥ.

(The instrumental case, tṛtīyā with reference to the words divā etc., must be taken to mean the ablative case, pancamī. Viṣṇu that is referred to is higher than dyaus and pṛthivī. But, I myself in point of greatness or comprehensiveness have become limited. This is the meaning. Whomsoever I want to make ugra, brahmā, ṛṣi (sage), or sumedhā (wise), I make him ugra, brahmā, ṛṣi or Sumedhā. This is the meaning.)

The idea is this. Nothing other than Vișnu becomes the cause of Vișnu. Vișnu is self-caused. All that is different from Vișnu is also caused by Vișnu Itself through Laksmī. Laksmī, ugra, brahmā etc., are other than Vișnu. If the cause of Laksmī is different from Vișnu then it must be one of Ugra

etc. But Ugra etc., are the creations of Laksmī as Laksmī itself admits. It follows therefore that the cause of Laksmī is Visnu. Laksmī presents this cause as being higher than dyaus etc. This means that Vișnu is higher than dyaus etc. From this it follows that that which is presented as higher than dyaus etc., making use of the same expression, must be Visnu. For that which is higher than dyaus etc., must be one, not many, because it is the cause of Laksmi, the representative of the world other than Visnu. To hold that it is many does not solve the problem of finding out the one principle of all. Laksmī which as the cause of Brahmā etc., is the principle of all. It therefore represents all. So if in Ambhranī-Sūkta that which is higher than dyaus etc., is Visnu, then it follows that wherever in Veda if the higher principle than dyaus etc., is mentioned the meaning is Vișnu. The same idea applies to Viśvakarma-Sūkta. It follows from this that the subject-matter of this Sūkta is Viṣṇu and Viśvakarmā of this Sūkta is therefore Viṣṇu.

The content of these Sūktas is thus one and the same and it is Viṣṇu. This is the way to find out the subject-matter of the whole Veda. Because there are different expressions in different sections of Veda it does not mean that the subject-matter is different. The expressions under each section must be studied. Their implications must be noted. In all this the leading idea must be taken from Veda itself in the light of the principle of thought (nyāya) presented by Brahma-Sūtra but never from other sources, however high or commanding they may appear to be. Unless a meaning of a passage is in the light of the Brahma-Sūtra found out to be thoroughly consistent and complementary to the meaning of all the other sections of Veda it must not be accepted as the meaning of the section. This is the method that Madhva brings to light in interpreting Veda.

II

Madhva examines the position that indwelling the sea is a sign of Visnu.

T. Pr. introduces Bhāṣya—

nanvatra samudrastho rudrah kim na syāt. tapya-mānāya salile iti bhāratokteh. na ca ramādhīnatvokti-virodhah. ugra-sabdena kasyacit krūrasyaiva grahana-sambhavāt ityatah āha ugra iti.

(A question occurs. Why cannot Rudra be considered to be the entity that indwells the sea? It is said in Bhārata 'To him who meditates in water' with reference to Rudra. This conclusion is not opposed to the statement that [Rudra] is dependent on Ramā i.e., Laksmī. With reference to that statement, by the word rudra some cruel entity may be understood. In answer to this difficulty Madhva says ugra etc.)

Bhāṣya—ugro rudrah samudre antah nārāyaṇah PRASIDDHATVÄT SÜCITATVĀCCA ASYA ARTHASYA

(Ugra means Rudra. That which dwells inside the Sea is $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. For they are made familiar in this manner. The same meaning is also indicated by the words themselves rudra and nārāyaṇa.)

With reference to this passage the following may be noted. This difficulty mentioned by T. Pr., does not occur to one whose outlook is out and out Vedic. It occurs to that mind which gives equal importance to the literature different from Veda even though some aspect of it may be taken to follow Veda. For example, Bhārata is generally taken to follow Veda. Grammar, Amarakośa and so on may or may not be consistent with Veda. Yet these works because of their first introduction to mind in the scheme of education and the works like Bhārata which are supposed to follow Veda but which form altogether a different literature in the case of one who understands them not in terms of Veda but in terms of Grammar, Dictionary and so on, influence the mind of the student in various directions. Under this condition the mind is unable to distinguish between Veda and non-Veda. However learned it may appear to be, it is in a state of utter confusion. It is thus unable to see that even Veda becomes non-Veda if the meaning of a passage that is consistent with the rest of Veda is not understood following the principles of regular study.

Having observed an uneducated mind behind the feeling of the difficulty, Madhva gives a relevant answer and thereby confirms the conclusion that is already stated.

T.Pr., makes this idea clear with reference to Rudra.

atra ugra iti rudra eva bhavet. ugrah kapardī srīkantha iti tasyaiva ugratvena prasiddhatvāt. ugra-šabdena rudra-šabdārthasya sūcitatvācca. ugro rudro raudrah ityekārthatvāt. (Ugra in this passage, i.e., Ambhranī-Sūkta ought to be only Rudra and nobody else. For, Amarakośa says that ugra, kapardī, srīkanṭha are synonymous with rudra. Hence Rudra is made familiar as ugra to the mind of one who feels the difficulty. Further by the word ugra the meaning of rudra is indicated. [Ugra means krūra, one who is cruel. The meaning

of rudra is the same.])

What is signified by T.Pr., is this. No doubt, having received education in various parts of literature the mind of the student feels the difficulty. But in doing it, is it consistent within itself? is the question. The answer is 'no'. For it is equally educated in Amarakośa and in Grammar and so on. It ought to have seen that after all, ugra and rudra mean the same thing and they are in fact recognised to be the same. Hence the difficulty is imaginary and it does not affect the Vedic conclusion. The reason is that these two circumstances have nothing to do with each other. They are entirely different developments. We are now trying to understand Veda but not non-Veda, for its own sake. So the difficulty felt on the basis of non-Veda in whatever degree, does not disturb

the process of Vedic thought.

At this stage the following questions may appear. If Veda is entirely different from the rest of the literature with which we are familiar then why consider this aspect i.e., non-Veda? Why not Veda alone be considered? The answer is this. To consider Veda as Veda is to fix Veda in its distinction from non-Veda. To consider non-Veda in this connection is finally to consider Veda itself. Another question may appear. Why should we think of these considerations in terms of Veda? Why should we not manage the whole affair in the light of the existing literature? It does not matter if we include Veda also in this literature. The following is the answer. Veda is the earliest record of human civilization as such. The concepts that are used in Veda are taken up by the later literature. When the question with regard to the genuineness of concepts occurs, study of Veda becomes inevitable. So far as this study is concerned Veda must be given an exclusive importance. To consider Veda to be one among many aspects of study does not help the knowledge that is required to be produced only by Veda. Supposing a question is put disregarding all these ideas, then it must be answered in the same manner. It must be relevant even from the standpoint of the person who puts the question. If it is not relevant, then the question becomes illegitimate. With this idea the author of Bhāṣya explains how to hold that Rudra is Samudrastha, dwelling inside the sea is inconsistent with the ideas that are already known.

TTT

The author of Bhāṣya further shows in the same passage ideas that have already become familiar even prior to the study of $S\bar{a}stra$ —

T.Pr., brings out this idea as-

tathā samudrastho nārāyaṇa eva bhavet. samudra-sayanatvena tasyaiva 'mahodadhi-sayontakah' ityādau prasiddhatvāt. tathā samudrāntasthatva-kathanena nārāyaṇa-sabdārthasya sūcitatvācca. 'āpo nārāh' iti smṛterityarthaḥ.

(Similarly that which dwells in the sea, Samudra can be only Nārāyaṇa. For in the passages such as 'mahodadhi-śayontakaḥ' [Viṣṇu-Sahasra-Nāma] Nārāyaṇa is made familiar as dwelling in the sea. [Mahodadhisaya means that which dwells in the great ocean. Antaka is another name of Nārāyaṇa. It means that which puts an end to all.] Further by stating the state of dwelling in the ocean the meaning of the word nārāyaṇa is indicated. This is according to Śruti, 'āpo nārāḥ' [nārāḥ means waters.] [The idea is this. The word nārāyaṇa consists of nārāḥ and ayana. Nārāḥ means waters. ayana means abode. The whole word nārāyaṇa means that which dwells in waters. So in particular passages where Nārāyaṇa is to be mentioned in its place samudra-śayana is mentioned.]

This means that it is going against these ideas to suppose that somebody else can be samudrastha, that which dwells in sea. The implication of this observation is that the person who supposes a contrary idea must first attempt at falsifying all these ideas. Without doing it, to suggest an opposition becomes groundless. Further Bhāṣyakāra in mentioning these ideas also intends to strengthen his position by pointing out how the meaning he gives to the Vedic passages is in keeping with the origin of the tradition handed down as genuinely Vedic in character. He thereby implies that if the opponent's view were

correct, then it ought to be consistent with tradition. Tradition in its real sense is *Smrti* composed by Sūtrakāra himself. If a supposition with regard to a Vedic meaning is contradicted by *Smrti*, then it naturally follows that it is not correct.

In view of all these ideas Bhāsyakāra holds that the cause of Laksmī is Viṣṇu i.e., Nārāyaṇa. This is because of samudrasthatva, 'dwelling in the sea' the sign of Nārāyana. Viṣṇu is shown to be the highest in the passage attributed to Laksmī. A similar passage occurs in Viśvakarma-Sūkta. In this connection there is already the mention of padma-nābhatva, 'the state of having a lotus-naval' the sign of Viṣṇu. These circumstances prove that Viśvakarmā to which the Sūkta is devoted is nothing but Viṣṇu. The same Sūkta gives the truth that its subject-matter is nāmadhā, the bearer of all names. The subject-matter is Vișnu. Vișnu is therefore the bearer of all names. The things other than Visnu are nameless. For they have, including themselves, nothing as their own. Everything connected with them is given by Vișnu i.e., it is produced and maintained by Vișnu. Therefore in Vișnu the other things disappear and in Visnu they find their peace. When they disappear in Vișnu there remains no trace of them. Hence their destruction in this sense must not be compared to the destruction that is commonly spoken of. In the case of a destruction commonly spoken of there is no complete disappearance of the thing destroyed. There still remains something to whatever extent the destruction is carried on. But when a thing meets destruction in Visnu there remains nothing. It is a wholesale destruction. There remains only Vișnu. This is how things disappear in Visnu. This is called pralaya. Similarly if certain things find their peace in Visnu, there is nothing that can modify them. They depend on nothing other than Vișnu. They have therefore transcended their destruction. They have attained immortality. It is immortality in the sense of attaining to peace unconditioned in Visnu. This state is called moksa. These ideas explain how Visnu is the unconditioned origin and goal of all that exists. This shows how these things are for the same reason nameless and Vișnu is the bearer of all names. Being the bearer of all names Visnu is guna-pūrna and all other entities are apūrņa as is acknowledged by Lakśmī as tāvatī mahinā sambabhūva (I am ever limited.)

Madhva strengthens the position further.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

nanvatra prasidhyādi sadbhāvepi tatparityāgena anya-svīkāre kim bādhakam ityataḥ āha NA CA iti.

(There may be a supposition. With regard to the point of discussion granting that there are tradition etc., and having disregarded them, if some other meaning is recognised, where is the difficulty? In answer Madhva says NA CA etc.)

Вназуа-

NA CA AVIRODHE PRASIDDHAH PARITYAJYATE

(If there is no contradiction that which is already known cannot be disregarded.)

T.Pr., brings out the idea.

prasiddhārthasya virodhaikāpodyatvāt tadabhāve tatparityāgo na yuktah prasiddhi-bādhādityarthah.

(That which is already known is disregarded only when there is contradiction. In the absence of contradiction to disregard what is already known does never occur to mind. The supposition of disregarding it becomes sublated by *prasiddhi*, the fact that it is already known.)

With reference to this passage the following may be noted. The person who raises the present objection that some object may be meant according to our interest disregarding all that is already known is ignoring that mind acts independently of will. He thinks that if one has an interest his apprehension or capacity to apprehend things becomes entirely subservient to it. But this is not the nature of mind. It works independently of man's will. The author of Bhāṣya draws the attention of the opponent to this fact. The opponent may no doubt want to have his own meaning of the expression in question. He may even say or swear that he wants to have only that meaning or that he has that meaning in his mind. But has he actually that meaning in his mind? Mind is not bound by saying or swearing or desiring. He may desire one thing but apprehend quite another thing. Bhāṣyakāra points out with regard to the present

point of discussion, that in the existing circumstance it is impossible to have any other meaning. One cannot be independent of the mental background. Whatever one's desire or interest may be, mind is mind. It works according to its laws. Unless the law of contradiction operates what is already known can never cease to operate. The idea of one who disregards this truth itself becomes sublated by the fact which is known already and which is not contradicted. So even the opponent with all his will cannot do away with the thought that Ugra is Rudra and Samudrastha is Nārāyaṇa if only he is familiar with the Vedic tradition. If anybody really thinks otherwise it simply means that he is ignorant of the things he ought to know before taking up this discussion.

Madhva examines his conclusion further by siding the

opponent's view for the sake of argument.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

atra ugra-padena rudra-grahaņe višvādhiko rudrah ityādi śruti-virodhāt tatparityāgah ityatah āha UKTA iti.

(In the present connection if Rudra is meant by the word Ugra, then there appears opposition from Sruti, 'Rudra is higher than the world.' If this is not respected then the position of Sruti becomes ignored. To avoid this difficulty Madhva says UKTA.)

BHĀŞYA:

UKTA-NYĀYENA CA ŚRUTAYAH ETAMEVA VADANTI

(From the reasons already expounded, the passages of *Srutis* ['Rudra is higher than the world' etc.,] expound only *Visnu* and none else.)

T.Pr., presents the substance of this passage as—
nāmāni viśvetyādyukta-nyāyena vakşyamāna-nyāyaiśca viśvādhikādi-śrutīnām viṣṇu-paratayā na bādhakatvam iti bhāvaḥ.

On the basis of the reason that is expounded in such passages as nāmāni viśvā and the reasons that will be stated hereafter, the Śrutis 'viśvādhiko' etc., have in view Viṣṇu and therefore these passages do not sublate the position in question. This is the idea intended by Bhāṣya.) [According to 'yo devānām nāmadhā' Rudra is the name of Viṣṇu.]

The passage of T.Pr., points out the comprehensiveness of Madhva's statement. Though he appears to refer to a particular item of his exposition, he has actually in view the whole position of Sāstra including what is already expounded and what will be expounded. So, to appreciate him a similar view is necessary.

v

Madhva next takes up the question that *Śrutis* as such have only *Visnu* in view.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

śrutīnām viṣṇu-vācakatve smṛtim cāha VEDE iti.

(In support of the view that Śrutis expound only Viṣṇu Madhva quotes Smṛti also as VEDE.)

Giving this support signifies that the actual Vedic tradition testifies the view. This view is already justified by the Vedic statements.

BHĀṢYA:

VEDE RĀMĀYAŅE CAIVA PURĀŅE BHĀRATE TATHĀ ĀDĀVANTE CA MADHYE CA VIŞŅUSSARVATRA GĪYATE ITI HARIVAMŚEŞU.

('Throughout Veda, Rāmāyaṇa also, Purāṇa, likewise Bhārata, in the beginning and in the end and in all places Viṣṇu is expounded.' This is illustrated in the Harivamsas.)

The word harivanisas is in plural. It stands for Khila, Akhila, and Pārijāta, and all the three parts of the work. The spirit of the whole expression is that all these works in every part, chapter, section, theme, para, by every sentence, clause, phrase, word, part of a word, letter and sound expound Visnu. One who understands Visnu in this manner understands these works. But one who has separate themes in his mind while interpreting them becomes indeed misled by them in the very act of studying them. To understand Visnu by them is an art by itself. This art is Sāstra. The study of Sāstra prepares the mind of the student so that no other meaning occurs to it. If any other meaning appears to occur then mind readily sees its illegitimacy and gets rid of it. By this expression what the author of Bhāṣya shows is this. If the only meaning of Veda

point of discussion, that in the existing circumstance it is impossible to have any other meaning. One cannot be independent of the mental background. Whatever one's desire or interest may be, mind is mind. It works according to its laws. Unless the law of contradiction operates what is already known can never cease to operate. The idea of one who disregards this truth itself becomes sublated by the fact which is known already and which is not contradicted. So even the opponent with all his will cannot do away with the thought that Ugra is Rudra and Samudrastha is Nārāyaṇa if only he is familiar with the Vedic tradition. If anybody really thinks otherwise it simply means that he is ignorant of the things he ought to know before taking up this discussion.

Madhva examines his conclusion further by siding the

opponent's view for the sake of argument.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

atra ugra-padena rudra-grahaņe višvādhiko rudrah ityādi śruti-virodhāt tatparityāgah ityatah āha UKTA iti.

(In the present connection if Rudra is meant by the word Ugra, then there appears opposition from Sruti, 'Rudra is higher than the world.' If this is not respected then the position of Sruti becomes ignored. To avoid this difficulty Madhya says UKTA.)

BHĀŞYA:

UKTA-NYĀYENA CA ŚRUTAYAḤ ETAMEVA VADANTI

(From the reasons already expounded, the passages of *Śrutis* ['Rudra is higher than the world' etc.,] expound only *Viṣṇu* and none else.)

T.Pr., presents the substance of this passage as—
nāmāni viśvetyādyukta-nyāyena vakşyamāna-nyāyaiśca viśvādhikādi-śrutīnām viṣṇu-paratayā na bādhakatvam iti bhāvaḥ.

On the basis of the reason that is expounded in such passages as nāmāni viśvā and the reasons that will be stated hereafter, the Śrutis 'viśvādhiko' etc., have in view Viṣnu and therefore these passages do not sublate the position in question. This is the idea intended by Bhāṣya.) [According to 'yo devānām nāmadhā' Rudra is the name of Viṣnu.]

The passage of T.Pr., points out the comprehensiveness of Madhva's statement. Though he appears to refer to a particular item of his exposition, he has actually in view the whole position of Sāstra including what is already expounded and what will be expounded. So, to appreciate him a similar view is necessary.

v

Madhva next takes up the question that Śrutis as such have only Viṣṇu in view.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

śrutīnām viṣṇu-vācakatve smṛtim cāha VEDE iti.

(In support of the view that Srutis expound only Visnu

Madhva quotes Smṛti also as VEDE.)

Giving this support signifies that the actual Vedic tradition testifies the view. This view is already justified by the Vedic statements.

BHĀṢYA:

VEDE RĀMĀYAŅE CAIVA PURĀŅE BHĀRATE TATHĀ ĀDĀVANTE CA MADHYE CA VIŞŅUSSARVATRA GĪYATE ITI HARIVAMSEŞU.

('Throughout Veda, Rāmāyaṇa also, Purāṇa, likewise Bhārata, in the beginning and in the end and in all places Viṣṇu is expounded.' This is illustrated in the Harivaṃsas.)

The word harivanisas is in plural. It stands for Khila, Akhila, and Pārijāta, and all the three parts of the work. The spirit of the whole expression is that all these works in every part, chapter, section, theme, para, by every sentence, clause, phrase, word, part of a word, letter and sound expound Visnu. One who understands Visnu in this manner understands these works. But one who has separate themes in his mind while interpreting them becomes indeed misled by them in the very act of studying them. To understand Visnu by them is an art by itself. This art is Sāstra. The study of Sāstra prepares the mind of the student so that no other meaning occurs to it. If any other meaning appears to occur then mind readily sees its illegitimacy and gets rid of it. By this expression what the author of Bhāṣya shows is this. If the only meaning of Veda

is not Viṣṇu, then how can there be this definite statement in the different parts of Harivamia-Smṛti, which has appeared to expound the Vedic tradition? This definite statement does not appear once. It appears repeatedly in every part of this work.

This is the observation made and confirmed by T.Pr., as:

etadvacanasya harivamsa-traya-gatatva-sūcanāya bahu-vacanam.

(There is the use of plural [as Harivamiseşu] in order to indicate that the same statement is found in all the three parts of Harivamisa-[Khila, Akhila and Pārijāta])

The repetition of the same idea in all the parts of the same work naturally indicates how wholesale the devotion of these works is to Viṣṇu. To understand this position it is not enough if a person practices to say that every word means Viṣṇu, this word means Viṣṇu, that word, another word and so on. All this is wrong practice. For even when he is making use of this expression for having an advantage, he has still in his mind in so far as he knows language the non-Sāstraic meaning of words.

Supposing he comes across a word, say a jar, ghaṭa, in mind he has the idea of a vessel. It is spontaneous. But owing to force of habit or some circumstance, he says that the word means Viṣṇu. He believes also that he is honest. He thus deludes himself and deludes others. Others may think that he is a great devotee of Viṣṇu. He may even have all the advantages of a devotee. But a student of Sāstra must realise that the whole circumstance is a serious error. Very often a circumstance like this is the birth-place of religion. This circumstance encourages faith against intellect. Thus the man is divided into two parts, diametrically opposed to each other.

Faith never becomes intellect. Intellect is reason. It never degenerates into faith. But faith easily becomes popular. On its basis emotion dominates in the man. Emotion breeds emotion. It kindles emotion in others. Weeping kindles weeping in others. Laughing kindles laughing in others. Thus people who do not think are easily attracted towards faith. People in general have a dislike to thinking. If a man who upholds faith by practising it, is cunning enough to take

advantage of the weakness of people, then he succeeds soon in building up a religion.

First he starts with the division of the inner self. As faith develops, intellect suffers. Finally this leads to the wholesale destruction of intellect. But the self is distinguished by intellect. For this reason it is called *cetana*. The destruction of intellect is therefore destruction of self, *cetana*. Iśa-Up. works out this fact and calls those that cause their own destruction ātma-hana.

The whole difficulty is avoided only by a study of serious nature. The student must at all cost understand how the Vedic tradition becomes lost and how it becomes regained. It is lost as the inner division in the self develops. It is regained as reason develops and dominates the inner self. As inner division develops, man sees one thing and believes another. As reason develops, man becomes devoted to what he actually sees. Division is the language of inconsistency and contradiction. Reason is the lauguage of their absence. Vedic tradition is marked by the absolute consistency and non-contradiction. That which is opposed to it is therefore not genuinely Vedic.

Madhva illustrates these points.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as:

tathāpyasti pāšupatādi-šāstra-virodhah. tatra rudrādīnām sarvottamatvādyukterityatah āha NA CA iti.

([So far it is indicated that the works mentioned in the previous passage carry on Vedic tradition in an unmodified manner.] Yet there is the opposition of the sāstras, Pāsupata and so on. This is because that in those sāstras the entities Rudra etc., are expounded as the highest and such other matters. To meet this difficulty [Madhva] says NA CA etc.)

BHĀṣYA

NA CA ITARA-GRANTHA-VIRODHAH

(Further there is not the opposition of other works [which uphold those that are other than Visnu.])

Bhāṣya does not mention views, but mentions works. The reason is this. In the first place, Madhva is considering the nature of Vedic tradition in the light of the existing works. So

far, he has evaluated the works that expound this tradition. But there are certain other works, $P\bar{o}supata$ and so on. They oppose Vedic tradition. Visnu is the subject-matter of the Vedic tradition. They oppose Visnu. Hence they oppose the Vedic tradition. To make use of Vedic expressions or statements for their (opposers') own purpose is not to continue Vedic tradition. It is to discontinue it by replacing it by some other

thing.

Further this discussion throws a very great light on the disposition of our educational activities. We may take for example a learned person expounding a theme of his own. No doubt he may be highly original. His theme may look to be promising. Given an opportunity he naturally proves its soundness by the reasons he has in his mind. Next he tries to make it appear the most prominent. He quotes from the established texts to illustrate how the most distinguished thinkers on the same line hold a similar thought. Thus he strengthens his ground. Next he proceeds to show that his theme contains something more than what is found in others' views expounded in the works he considers. To say that he is expounding the same view as is already given in some work does not pay him. He has to show his originality. He attempts to show the incompleteness of the works so far composed and the completeness of his work. All that he wants to say is that the first preference must be given to his work. This is how generally every attempt to write works based on Sruti is an attempt in the long run to dispense with Sruti.

Is dispensing with *Sruti* correct? If we understand by *Sruti* some work similar to other works, then it is correct. But if we understand by *Sruti* that which expounds *guṇa-pūrṇa* as *Viṣṇu* bearing all names, then it is incorrect to dispense with it. If it is indispensable, then it naturally follows that we can only study it but not supplement it. The process of this study for the sake of study, because the study is indispensable, and it is the end in itself, is *Brahma-Mīmāmsā*. This explains how *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* is the only case of education. All other educational activities are justified only in so far as they make

Brahmah-Mīmāmsā possible and actual.

What Madhva intends to say in the present passage is that Pāsupata and so on are opposed to Brahma-Mīmānisā. Even

Veda, Brahma-Sūtra and so on may be used by them. But they negate them and are bound to negate them finally. reason is that they start with the conviction i.e., faith that these works have nothing to do with Visnu. Thus they negate Vișnu and in Its place instal Pasupati and so on. They may even make use of the name Vișnu. But it is not Vișnu, Vedic in character. It is simply a non-Visnu named Visnu for some convenience or advantage. Vedic Vișnu is guṇa-pūrṇa. It is the only theme of Veda and Vedic tradition. This shows how the responsibility of the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is really very great. He must not be attracted by mere names. In a given context he must carefully see whether what is considered is Vișnu in the Vedic sense i.e., Vișnu as guna-pūrna and as such the only theme of Veda and Vedic tradition. Veda and Vedic tradition are not two things. The latter is the explanation and amplification in the sense that it brings out the Vedic spirit as expounded by Veda. Hence these two are the expressions of one and the same idea. Even this must be appreciated in the light of study. This is the implication of T.pr.

"śrutīnām visnu-vācakatve smṛtim-cāha".

([Madhva] quotes Smṛti also as the proof for the fact that Srutis denote Viṣṇu.)

T.pr., implies another important point in this connection. According to it the word virodha, opposition is a mental occurrence. The problem it considers is this. No doubt the study of Veda with its tradition is intended to give rise to the idea that Vișnu is the only theme of Veda. But whether this idea is obtained is the consideration. 'No.' is the answer. The existence of Pāsupata and so on is the reason. The student being acquainted with Veda, Rāmāyaṇa and so on becomes helplessly acquainted with Pāśupata and so on. Against Pāśupata, what he learns from Sāstra becomes a mere assumption, a mere word. Unless the opposition is removed, he is not in a position to appreciate Sāstra. At this stage, T.pr., helps the student. It asks the student to follow the reasoning expounded by Bhasya. To follow it is to get rid of the non-Vedic ideas. Getting rid of the non-Vedic ideas is imperative in the case of the student of Sastra. To be ignorant of this position is no excuse. It does not mean that the student is free from opposition. It simply means that being opposed he does not know that he is opposed. To be non-opposed is therefore to be conscious of the opposition with its shortcomings. Bhāṣya helps this process. *T.pr.*, brings

out the significance of this help.

Further, a superficial study of the subject at this stage drives the student to the conclusion that Madhva is developing the cult of Vișnu against that of Pasupati. The danger of this supposition is not to Madhva as it is to the student himself. Whether his position is defective or otherwise, Madhva has nothing to lose or gain. But if the student defines Madhva uncritically, then there is every chance of his losing not merely Madhva but Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the thought, universal in character. It is indispensable and irreplaceable. It is unopposed, unmodified and unsupplimented. It acquires its character as Brahma-Mīmāmsā when it is realised in this capacity. If what is given as Brahma-Mīmāmsā falls short of these tests, then it ceases to be Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Hence to realise it as Brahma-Mīmāmsā is to see that it is the property of every thinker, every adhikarin. Man, in the very capacity of being a man, has to study it. So Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the legitimate property of man as man. It is the

wealth of mankind. It is the only wealth.

In the light of Bhāṣya "Manuṣya-Pitra-Pakṣiṣu" which is already explained, Brahma-Mīmāmsā is also the wealth of even animal kingdom. It is the only wealth that can be spoken of and thought of. Other wealths are there in its absence. With it, man, an ordinary man or man considered to be the lowest has justified his existence. Without it, the highest man, a sage, an emperor, a divine being, a god or the highest god has committed a sin against existence, against his own self, against his own intellect and against the very purpose of his life. Brahma-Mīmāmsā knows no religion, no sect, no cult, no narrowness in outlook, nothing petty, small and base in life. Whether a man knows it or not, it is already there as

his legitimate, the only legitimate inheritance.

Against it, to speak of a religion, a cult, a sect, or a civilization is refusing to see what is actually given and take support of what is already there to help life. Looked at from this point of view Madhva's expressions, Visnu and Pasupati

have only a technical importance. They stand respectively for Brahma-Mīmāmsā and non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā. All this is the indication of T.Pr., "tathāpyasti pāsupatādi-virodhah. (Yet there is the opposition of the sāstras Pāsupata and so on.) This indication is an attempt to remove that which stands in the way of knowledge. The following note may make the point clear.

Which is the raw-material out of which the student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā comes? Obviously the raw-material is generally not something already in possession of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Hence it is something of non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā. This is Pāsupata and so on. So, a follower of Pāsupata does not necessarily continue to be in the same state of mind, even though he may confess firm faith in it. Pasupati is not Visnu i.e., pūrņa. If the follower becomes conscious of it, then he has already rejected Pasupati in the sense that it is the bearer of all names and therefore the origin and abode of all that exists. In the first place it cannot bear the name purna and it is therefore in itself in need of an abode. If once the follower comes to know this state of Pasupati, there are two courses open to him-either calling it pūrņa purely mechanically or to understand what pūrņa is. If pūrņa thus understood can be identified with Pasupati then mechanical denomination may please other devotees, but it fails to have the approval of the person who invents it. The God a person invents may be all-right to others. But the person does never depend on it when he is in difficulty. This is the contradiction from which every man of religion suffers. He preaches that God is the best remedy for all ailments. But if the suffering comes to him he is not poor in inventing excuses, to run to a doctor forgetting all about his God and preaching. So mechanical denomination does not make an incomplete God complete. Supposing he understands what pūrņa is he has understood what Visnu is. In this very act he has transcended Pasupati, incomplete God. Identification of the two is impossible because one is incomplete and the other complete. Granting that there is correct identification Pasupati ceases to be Pasupati because it has become Visnu.

This is how the believer in incomplete ideas is the rawmaterial out of which the student of *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* comes. So in introducing the student into this aspect of discussion, Madhva is far from encouraging religious quarrels. The supposition that he is doing it is thoroughly inconsistent with the search for Brahman as Vinnu. Nor does the student derive any benefit from the study if such supposition pleases him. In carrying this discussion to its culmination, Madhva is doing a great service to mankind. He is removing all that is religious from mind in the act of pointing out how the follower of Paśupati, in the sense of an incomplete God today is with adhikāra a student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā tomorrow. Judged from this point of view what he teaches has everything in it to bring mankind together and to effect unity which can never be broken under any circumstance. This is how Madhva has in the course of Brahma-Mīmāmsā arrived at social reconstruction and social solidarity.

Madhva further notes why Pāšupata and so on do not oppose Viṣnu, the subject-matter of the whole Veda.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya as-

kuto na virodha iti cet teṣām mohārtham kṛtatvāt iti bhāvena āha EṣA iti.

(Why is there no opposition? In answer to this question with the intention that it is because they [Pāśupata] and so on are composed with a view to causing delusion [Madhva] says "EṣA".)

BHĀŞYA

EŞA MOHAM SRJĀMYĀŚU YO JANĀN MOHAYIŞYATI TVAM CA RUDRA MAHĀ-BĀHO MOHA-ŚĀSTRĀNĪ KĀRAYA ATATHYĀNI VITATHYĀNI DARŚAYASVA MAHĀ-BHUJA PRAKĀŚAM KURU CĀTMĀNAM APRAKĀŚAM CA MĀM KURU ITI VĀRĀHA-VACANĀT

([Viņu states this to Rudra] "That is moha which deludes people. I instantaneously create moha, the deluding principle. O, Rudra! the strongest! Create delusion, make others expound systems of thought which delude people. Expound the ideas that have no basis and that are wrong. You obscure me. You appear to be all in all." This is the statement found in the Vārāha.)

T.Pr., interprets certain words.

muhyate anena jana iti moho naṭanam vancanam vā tvam ca sṛja. dadhīcyādibhih kāraya ca. avidyamānam atathyam. vyadhikaraṇatvena vidyamānam vitathyam. ātmānam mām ca prati. prakāśam prasiddhim.

(Moha is that by which a person is deluded. It consists in naṭana and vancana. [Naṭana is to obscure that which is and to show that which is not. Vancana is to state that which is not]. You yourself create and make Dadhīci and so on create. Atathya is that which is not. Vitathya is to mistake one for the other. i.e., to attribute the property of something to something else. Both yourself and myself—Rudra and Viṣṇu are the objects of your operation. Prakāśa means the act of bringing to light.)

In this passage various stages of moha are depicted with a view to making knowledge possible by removing them. Supposing they are not created, then there is no occasion for knowledge. The process of overcoming them is the process of the growth of knowledge. This is the process of pūrva-pakṣa and uttara-pakṣa in their relation. The process of transcending pūrva-pakṣa and finally arriving at uttara-pakṣa is jijñāsā.

Having shown that there is no opposition of Pāsupata and so on Madhva distinguishes between two types of literary developments in order to illustrate how Veda and Vedic tradition are marked by thorough consistency and how the exposition of the same cannot be expected from the works other than Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya in this direction as-

skāndādi-purāṇānām śivādi-viṣayatvāt tadvirodhaḥ syāt ityataḥ āha śAIVE CA iti.

(Because, Siva etc., are the subject-matter of the purānas, skānda etc., there appears the opposition [to the conclusion in favour of Viṣnu]. If this difficulty arises [Madhva] says SAIVE. etc.)

ВНАЗУА-

ŚAFVE CA SKĀNDE—

ŚVAPACĀDAPI KAŞŢATVAM BRAHMEŚĀNĀDAYAḤ SURĀḤ
TADAIVĀCYUTA YĀNTYEVA YADAIVA TVAM PARĀNMUKHAḤ
ITI. BRĀHME CA BRAHMA-VAIVARTE.
NĀHAM NA CA ŚIVONYE CA TACCHAKTYEKĀMŚA-BHĀGINAḤ
BĀLAḤ KRĪDANAKAIḤ YADVAT KRĪDATESMĀBHIRACYUTA ITI.

(It is said in *Skānda* which is devoted to Śiva—"The divinities-Brahmā, Išāna etc., become more miserable than one who lives on [i.e., who cooks] dog's flesh, [to eat,] exactly then, O, Acyuta! when you turn away from them." This is what is stated. Further in the *Brahma-Vaivarta* which is devoted to Brahmā it is said [by Brahmā] "Neither I, nor Śiva, nor other gods have even a speck of His (Acyuta's) power. Acyuta plays with us even as a child plays with toys." This is what is stated.)

T. Pr., presents the meaning of certain expressions—

brāhme brahma-vişaye. krīdanakaih krīdā-sādhanaih asmābhih karanaih, teṣām śaivāditvepi na virodhitvam tatrāpi viṣnūttamatvādereva uktatayā svavirodhena tatra aprāmāṇyāt, na ca viparītam kim na syāditi vācyam, śivādyutkarṣādeḥ śaivādipurāneṣu asādhāraṇyena prāptatvāditi bhāvaḥ.

(Brāhme means that which has Brahmā as its subject-matter. Krīḍanakaih means toys which are no other than ourselves i.e., Brahmā etc. Though they are attributed to Siva and so on., they do not form the opposition [to the works in which Viṣṇu is upheld,] because even in them the supremacy of Viṣṇu is expounded. This contradicts their subject-matter. Hence they are unable to give rise to correct knowledge. It may be asked why the reverse does not follow. But it does not hold good. For, in those Purāṇas which are devoted to Siva and so on, the supremacy of Siva etc., ought to be expounded in a special manner. This is what Bhāṣya intends to show.)

All these ideas illustrate that works on non-Brahma-Mīmāmsā are self-contradictory and they do not oppose Sāstra.

Madhva shows further that the same contradiction is not found in the works devoted to Visnu.

T. Pr., introduces Bhāṣya-

tathāpi viṣṇūttamatva-rudrādhamatvayoḥ vaiṣṇava-grantha-virodho astītyataḥ āha NA CA iti. (Yet it may be supposed that there is opposition from the works devoted to *Vişnu* to the conclusions that *Vişnu* is the highest and Rudra is lower. To meet this difficulty [Madhva] says NA CA etc.)

Вназуа-

NA CA VAIȘNAVEȘU TATHĀ.

(Further, the same opposition i.e., contradiction is not found in the works devoted to Vișnu.)

T.Pr., interprets the word tathā.

tathā sarvottamatvādi-virodhah.

(Tathā means the state of opposing the state of being the highest and so on.)

With reference to this supposition Madhva raises a difficulty and removes it.

T.Pr., introduces Bhāṣya-

nanu tatrāpi viṣṇunā rudra-stutyādi kathamucyate ityataļ. āha TACCA iti.

(It may be asked why the idealisation of or prayer to Rudra by Vişnu is stated in them. To answer this question [Madhva] says TACCA etc.)

Вназуа-

TACCA ESA MOHAM ITYUKTAM.

(In answer to this supposition it is already stated as ESA MOHAM etc.)

T.Pr., presents the meaning of Bhasya-

yaducyate taccaişa-mohamiti vacanāt mohārthatvena pratyuktam ityarthaḥ.

(Whichever is said against [the position of Śāstra] is refuted by the statement "ЕŞА МОНАЙ." This is the meaning of Вhāṣya.

The establishment of the greatness of knowledge presupposes the removal of non-knowledge in all its details. The purpose of Vyāsa i.e., Brahman in composing the Brahma-Sūtras is the establishment of knowledge against non-knowledge.

Even as he posits unadulterated form of knowledge he posits several forms of non-knowledge the removal of which accounts for absolute purity of knowledge. To achieve this end there is insistence on fittedness in Sāstra. To see that non-knowledge grows freely is in a sense an item of the insistence on fittedness. To see how non-knowledge leads to destruction is in a sense to see that knowledge leads to good.

T.Pr., concludes-

tasmāt rudrādīnām adhamatve bādhakābhāvāt yam kāmaye ityādau tadvacanāt. lakṣmī-kāraṇatvena mama yonirityukto viṣṇureva. tataśca tat-samākhyānāt viśvakarma-sūkta-vācyopi sa eva. tathā ca tasyaiva yo devānāmiti sarva-nāmatvokteḥ na anyeṣām sarva-nāmatā. atah teṣām tanno viṣṇurityādau aprāpteḥ viṣṇureva param-brahma. tato viṣṇāveva brahma-śabdasya mukhyatvena sa eva sūtrakṛtā jijūāsyatayā vivakṣita iti.

(Therefore there is no difficulty in holding that Rudra etc., are lower. This is approved in the Sruti, yam kāmaye. Therefore the entity defined as the cause of Lakṣmī in the Śruti 'mama yoniḥ' is no other than Viṣṇu. Further on the basis of the similarity of expression, Viṣṇu Itself is that which is expounded in Viṣvakarma-Sūkta. So with reference to Itself, the bearing of all names is attributed according to Śruti 'yo devānām'.' Therefore bearing all names does not belong to others. Therefore there is no reference to them in the Śruti 'tanno viṣnuḥ etc.' For this reason Viṣṇu and none else is the highest Brahman. So, the word brahma has primary meaning only in the sense of Viṣṇu. Therefore it is no other than Viṣṇu that is intended by the author of Sūtra as the subject-matter of jijñāsā, philosophy.)

T.Pr., concludes finally-

tadevam jijnäsye tadbrahmeti brahma-pada-śravanāt tena ca tasya pūrna-gunatvokteh nānubhava-siddhālpa-guna-jīvābhedah tasyeti sandigdhatvena viṣayatva-siddheh prayojanādi-sadbhāvācca brahma-jijnāsā kartavyaiva. atah śāstramārambhanīyameveti siddham.

(Therefore in the manner stated above with regard to the subject-matter of jijnāsā according to Sruti 'tad brahma' the word brahma is given. By this word, the state of being pūrņaguņā is attributed to the subject-matter of jijnāsā. For this

reason it has no identity (non-duality) with jīva which is given in experience as being incomplete. It is therefore doubted, sandigdha. This explains how it is the subject-matter. There are also the result etc., to justify enquiry. Therefore, brahma-jijñāsā, enquiry into Brahman is indeed indispensable. In order to have it Sāstra deserves to be commenced.

In conclusion it may be remembered that Advaita objected to the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ (philosophy) because it (philosophy) has no subject-matter as jiva which is the highest reality i.e., Brahman Itself is self-evident as 'I'. Reflecting on this objection Madhva has thus arrived at the Truth that Brahman as complete ($p\bar{u}rna$) is the Highest Reality. It is therefore distinct from $j\bar{v}va$ which is ever incomplete. The only possible way of understanding Brahman is philosophy ($S\bar{a}stra$). Philosophy has therefore its own subject-matter and therefore the commencement of $S\bar{a}stra$ is indispensable. This is the Truth taught by $Jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}dhikarana$.

Thus ends Brahma-Sūtra, Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya and Tattva-Prakāśikā on Jijñāsādhikaraṇa. ever at the control of the control o A SHARP, OF BIOM OTH TALLOUS

CONCLUSION

MADHVA'S FURTHER WORKS ON BRAHMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

Under this head by way of concluding the present volume Madhva's further works on *Brahma-Mīmāmsā* on *Jijñāsādhi-karaṇa* may briefly be studied so as to see the endless character of philosophical enquiry. It is this enquiry which gives man all that can be called good as it gives only right things in life putting an end to all that is wrong.

Madhva has written four commentaries (Bhāṣyas) on the Brahma-Sūtras. Of them Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya is the first. So far the Bhāṣya on the first Adhikaraṇa which is the very first Sūtra of the first Chapter of the Brahma-Sūtras is with its commentaries translated and the thought contained therein is

expounded and evaluated to an extent.

Madhva's another Bhāṣya on the Sūtras is called Anu-Vyākhyāna. It also goes by the name Anu-Bhāṣya. Having these two names in view, it is clear that he means vyākhyāna by the word bhāṣya. As he explains it elsewhere he means by vyākhyāna not only giving the meaning of the words of the Sūtra in question, but to establish the position in question against all oppositions actual and possible.

The prefix anu in anu-vyākhyāna means that it is after. It is after Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. The following is the relation between these two works. The former i.e., Br.Sū.Bh., more apparently presents Madhva's position i.e., the position of Brahma-Sūtras as Madhva defines it. The latter Anu-Vyā, more apparently strengthens and establishes the position of the Brahma-Sūtras against all oppositions that can be imagined under any condition of life and in any circumstance.

With reference to his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, Madhva notes—

 (Bhāṣya is imbedded with very profound meaning. Only those that are fully educated can follow it.... Only the persons of divine element have the fittedness (adhikāra) to study it.)

An earnest and fitted student of Madhva well realises the truth of these statements in the course of his studies. This circumstance is one of the reasons why Madhva makes more room for concentration on the positive side of his thinking in his Br.Sū.Bh.

Madhva's works present the last phase of Indian philosophical thinking and they are for this reason essentially a critique of not only the whole of Indian philosophy but all possibilities of thought against his position from the point of view of all branches of learning. From this it follows that unless one is an expert in all departments of learning, one is not in a position fully to appreciate what Madhva teaches.

From the point of view of philosophy as it is now studied, it goes without saying that a person who has not made a serious study of the whole of the growth of Indian thought is not in a position to understand the real significance of Madhva's position. For, in so far as the exposition of his position is concerned, Madhva speaks in terms of Vedic language and so far as the evaluation of other thoughts is concerned, he speaks in pure Darsana style. Further in all his works Madhva has in view the whole of spiritual history both in individual sense and in collective sense. Even though he points out the fallacy in a given position he recognises the sound element in the same which is necessary to help the growth of knowledge. After Isa Upanisad—

"vidyām ca avidyām ca yastadveda ubhayam saha. . . ."

(One who studies both position and opposition with reference to each other . . .)

Madhva insists on a serious study of both the position $(vidy\bar{a})$ to point out which is his aim and the opposition $(avidy\bar{a})$ together, with a view to seeing the elements of truth that characterises the position, discarding at the same time the elements of untruth that characterises the opposition. To facilitate this study for the first time in Darsana thinking he adopts a dual method. To establish his position he insists

on an undisturbed continuation of the principle of thought presented by the Brahma-Sūtras. Thus he makes his position thoroughly consistent within itself from the start to the finish. He shows that this is not the case with the other Vedānta philosophies. Generally the others criticise opposition to them from their own point of view. This method makes them blind to the merits that may be possibly involved in the opposition. This circumstance makes their study one-sided.

To avoid this defect and to falsify the opposition to his position Madhva adopts the mode of thinking favoured by the respective opponent. He points out that this mode breaks down at some stage or other in the opponent's thought. He therefore points out why there is self-contradiction in any

school of thought opposed to his thought.

Madhva therefore expects great discrimination from the student who wants to follow his thought. Unless the student is able to distinguish what exactly the disposition of Madhva's discussion is, whether the discussion is led by Madhva's own principle of thought or by the principle of thought favoured by the opponent and adopted by Madhva for the sake of right kind of discussion in relation to the opponent in question, the student is not in a position to see what exactly Madhva's position is. To define the principle of his own thinking which is consistent with the thinking underlying the Brahma-Sūtras he follows Brahma-Tarka, a work on Theory of knowledge by Bādarāyaṇa himself. Consistently with this work he defines correct knowledge and its proximate causes together with the fallacies in the causes of wrong knowledge both in Anu-Vyā, and in separate works like Pramāņa-lakṣaṇa, Kathālakṣaṇa, Tattvodyota and Viṣṇu-Tattva-Vinirnaya. He shows with illustration how a position that is better than that which is expounded by Brahma-Tarka can never be conceived. He holds that to understand the position of Br.Sū.Bh. in the light of the principles of understanding presented by him in different connections in the light of Brahma-Tarka makes the student finally realise the grace of Brahman and endure in Brahman in the enjoyment of untainted Bliss, spiritual in character.

To help the studies in achieving this end Madhva composed Anu-Vyākhyāna also called Anu-Bhāsya. This is a big work. It follows Sūtra in style. It is in every aspect highly technical.

Each expression, each sentence in it is rich in meaning. It is therefore in need of commentation for the use of ordinary students. The discussion in this work takes the position maintained by the Br.Sū.Bh., to a far advanced state. Therefore this work is distinguished as representing the position of the Brahma-Sūtra in a more advanced manner. For this reason it is called Uttara-Prasthāna; while Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāsya is called Pūrva-Prasthāna.

To bring the thought contained in Anu-Vyākhyāna within the reach of ordinary students, Jayatīrtha composed Nyāya-Sudhā, a commentary in each expression in Anu-Vyākhyāna. This work also corresponding to Anu-Vyākhyāna is very big in size and very high in technicality. The style of this work is considered to be the very best in the whole of Darsana literature in Sanskrit.

Rāghavendraswāmin observes that every word and every sentence of Nyāya-Sudhā is full of meaning that is many-sided. He says "prati-vākyam prati-padam anekākūti-garbhitā prati-bhāti Sudhā." To do justice to this fact, to an extent at least, he has written a commentary called 'Parimala' on Nyāya-Sudhā. In addition there are eight other commentaries that attempt to bring to light the richness of the teaching of Nyāya-Sudhā.

In a few pages that follow some passages from Nyāya-Sudhā are selected and translated with a view to illustrating the line of thinking adopted by Anu-Vyākhyāna and practised by Nyāya-Sudhā.

Part I

Anu-Vyākhyāna with Nyāya-Sudhā.

Selections from the earlier portions of Nyāya-Sudhā on Jijāāsādhikaraṇa.

The extent of Nyāya-Sudhā on Jijñāsādhikaraṇa is about 200 pages (Royal) in Sānskrit. To translate it with the necessary explanation requires volumes. In this work devoted to Jijñāsādhikaraṇa of Madhva's Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya under the present head 'Conclusion' the bare outline of earlier portions of this work, Nyāya-Sudhā with Anu-Vyākhyāna is given in the language of these texts with the present writer's translation

in English with a view to indicating how endlessly rich the thought contained in the Brahma-Sūtra, "aum athāto brahma-jijñāsā aum" is and how a genuine student of Brahma-Mīmāmsā has nothing to make him come back from his studies.

After the mention of preliminary ideas connected with the unusual greatness of Anu-Vyākhyāna the text of Nyāya-Sudhā starts as:

"bhagavatā bādarāyaṇena prāṇinām"nissreyasāya praṇītamapi brahma-mīmāmsā-sāstram asādhu-nibandhāndha-tamasā ava-kunṭhitatvena apraṇītamiva manyamāno bhagavān ānanda-tīrtha-muniḥ yathācāryābhiprāyam asya bhāṣyam vidhāya anu-bhāṣya-mapi kariṣyan vilīna-prakṛtitayā svayam antarāya-vidhuropi anavaratam īśvara-pravaṇa-kāya-karma-vṛttirapi nārāyaṇa-praṇāmādikam prāripsitasya anantarāya-parisamāpteḥ pracayasya ca hetutayā avigīta-siṣṭācāra-paramparādinā avagatam avasya-karaṇīyam siṣyān grāhayitum granthādau nibadhnāti Nārāyaṇah ii"

(By Bādarāyaṇa, the complete, with a view to realising the good of all creatures the Science called Brahma-Mīmāmsā is expounded. Yet it is made impotent by means of the darkness i.e., non-knowledge caused by erroneous exposition. For this reason the most revered sage, Anandatīrtha Muni i.e., Madhva saw this Science as good as being not composed. [To remove this evil] he composed Bhāsya quite consistently with what the author of the Brahma-Sūtras intended to say. He also wanted to compose Anu-Bhāsya i.e., Anu-Vyākhyāna. He is one in whom all that is material is transcended. He has therefore nothing that stands in his way [of completing the work]. Further in addition, the states of his body and his organs are absolutely and ceaselessly devoted to the Lord. [What this Lord is and why the states of body and organs must be devoted to It will be explained immediately. Yet as the cause of the completion of the work on hand without obstruction and the increase of the exposition and its effect he mentions his obeisance etc., to Nārāyaņa at the outset of the work in order to direct his pupils—those obeisance etc., that are known as being handed down by the agencies like the tradition of the practice of those that never fall short of the right path and that know Sastra and that are the items that ought to be observed without fail as: "NĀRĀYAŅAM".)

The main points to be noted with reference to this passage are the following—

Madhva for the first time in Darsana thinking points out that Bādarāyaṇa is a form of Nārāyaṇa. The purpose of this form is to present Veda and Smrti to the world and expound Brahma-Mīmāmsā to decide the meaning of these works. The idea behind this fact is that the principle that is responsible for creation is also responsible for the knowledge of the Truth underlying the creation. All this is indicated by qualifying

Bādarāyana as 'the Complete.'

Brahma-Mīmāmsā is the only means for the good of all. Great care must be taken in expounding it. To mix it with subjective ideas is to miss it. In expounding this Science what is important is whether the exposition is consistent with what the author of the Brahma-Sūtras intends to say. The intention of the author is determined by the fact of consistency of Śruti, Smrti and Sūtra and the Science of Logic expounded by Bādarāyaṇa in Brahma-Tarka. A legitimate study of the Sūtras in the light of consistency results in a study of the same in a higher degree. With this study one becomes able to see which practice of our learned forefathers is correct and therefore has an enduring value. Whatever is practised by the teacher must be such that is backed up by sound tradition and that deserves to be adopted by the pupils.

The same passage of N.S., defining this Science as Brahma-Mīmāmsā justifies the title of the present publication. To call Madhva's thought Dvaita is to give a wrong start to it. As an exposition of Brahma-Mīmāmsā it is essentially Brahma-

Mīmāmsā, the Science of Brahman.

The word bhagavān qualifying Ānanda Tīrtha Muni indicates that Madhva who is presented as Ānanda Tīrtha has all the qualifications that makes him the expounder of Brahma-Mīmamsā.

Madhva says that the test of the fact that one has understood him correctly is the experience of ānanda, spiritual bliss as the outcome of the study. To expound the Śāstra of this character Madhva's expression ought to be the outcome of bliss. This bliss is different from the pleasure one derives from poetry, music etc., though this pleasure is idealised as brahmānanda.

The following is the first verse of Anu-Vyā.

NĀRĀYAŅAM NIKHILA-PŪRŅA-GUŅAIKA-DEHAM

NIRDOŅAM ĀPYATAMAMAPYAKHILAIḤ SUVĀKYAIḤ

ASYODBHAYĀDIJĀŅĀ ĀŚSĀ-VIĢSĀTOPI

ASYODBHAVĀDIDAM AŚĘSA-VIŚĘSATOPI VANDYAM SADĀ PRIYATAMAM MAMA SANNAMĀMI

From N.S., only the following passages are selected.

athavā śrotṛ-buddhyanukūlanāya sakala-śāstrārtham sankṣepato anenācaṣṭe. vidita-sankṣepā hi prapancam jijñāsavo bhavanti. tatra sadā vandyam iti prathama-sūtrārthoktiḥ. mano-vṛtteḥ tatpravaṇatā hi vandanam. jijñāsāpi tadviśeṣa eva.

(For the reasons so far explained (athavā) by this passage the meaning of the whole Śāstra is stated in brief with a view to putting the mind of students in a position favourable [to understand Śāstra]. It is well-known that those by whom something is known in brief make enquiries with regard to that aspect of the world. In the present passage there is the expression 'sadā vandyam.' This is the statement of the meaning of the first Śūtra. Vandana [showing respect] consists indeed in the state of mind being absorbed in the thought of the subject-matter of Śāstra. Enquiry is nothing but this state of mind).

With regard to the passage from N.S., the following may be noted. Generally people are satisfied if they only know the jist of what Sāstra teaches. But N.S., shows that the knowledge of the jist is justified if it gives rise to enquiry and thereby knowledge in the proper sense. Especially with reference to Madhva's philosophy it is generally thought by some of the followers that it is enough if the jist in the name of prameya is somehow known. N.S., makes it clear that the practice of this kind left to itself leads nowhere. The knowledge of the jist is legitimate if it leads to enquiry and the study of Sāstra.

Further in the present environment one is familiar with the term vandanam only in the case of worship of a deity in which one believes. By this word one means some act which is called namas-kāra, consisting in folding hands and so on. But N.S., shows that it is of no avail. It shows that in the first place vandana is the state of mind being absorbed in the thought of the subject-matter of Sāstra; and in the second the highest aspect of this

absorption is enquiry into Brahman. It may seem to be possible to take enquiry only as an aspect of absorption. But absorption without enquiry is a myth. Further to speak of absorption without enquiry is not correct in the present context. The first Sūtra ordains enquiry into Brahman, because there can be no other discipline worth having. Therefore it follows that enquiry is the highest aspect of absorption because it is the very essence of absorption. N.S., mentions absorption as the meaning of vandana because it is in essence enquiry itself. The culminating point of absorption is enquiry into Brahman in the sense which is already explained.

N.S., says further-

tasya jīvādi-vyāvṛttaye yadbrahmetyuktam tasya arthaḥ NIKHILA iti.

(The subject-matter of enquiry is defined as Brahma. The meaning of this word is given as NIKHILA-PŪRŅA-GUŅAIKA-DEHAM (as having the body which is no other than attributes as such which are complete.)

This passage implies that Brahman has no body in any sense material. But it cannot be said to be formless. Its form i.e., body is attributes as such which are individually complete.

In these days generally Madhva's thought is studied as a school of thought which may be characterised as theistic. Theism is belief in a God as a person. This does not apply to Madhva's thought. Brahman for Madhva is purely a philosophical concept at which one arrives purely through philosophical enquiry. Belief and Brahman are therefore totally irrelevant to each other. Further Brahman is not a person. It is nothing but attributes. It is said to have the form of attributes strictly in the sense that the attributes can be defined and conceived unlike nirguna, the propertyless of Sankarācārya.

N.S., proceeds-

tadupapādanāya dvitīya-sūtre laksaņamabhihitam ASYOD-BHAVĀDIDAM iti.

(In order to explain the completeness of attributes, in the second Sūtra [AUM JANMĀDYASYA YATAH AUM] the differentia of Brahman is stated as: That which gives birth etc., to this [the world which is known through the different sources of knowledge]).

The idea is this. Brahman is the whole cause of the whole world. The world stands for birth, existence, death, control, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and release. Brahman is the cause of all. The world that has birth etc., is nothing but attributes. Each attribute has its rise in the corresponding attribute which is complete. That which is complete is Brahman Itself. Brahman being the origin of all attributes that constitute the world is all attributes which are individually complete (nikhila-pūrna-guṇa). So the second Sūtra offers the definition of Brahman, the subject-matter of the first Sūtra.

N.S., proceeds-

tṛtīya-sūtreṇa tatra śāstra-pramāṇam abhidhāya tasya adhyāyaśeṣeṇa tadviṣayatā upapāditā. tatkathanam ĀPYATAMAM iti.

(By means of the third Sūtra [AUM ŚĀSTRA-YONITVĀT AUM] having stated that the proximate cause of the knowledge of the ideas contained in the previous Sūtras is Śāstra, by means of the rest of the [first] chapter it is explained how Brahman is the subject-matter of Śāstra. The same is the meaning of ĀРУАТАМАЙ, 'That which is understood as being the sole object of all considerations').

N.S., proceeds-

prathamādhyāyārthe śankita-doṣa-nirāso dvitīye abhihitaḥ. tam āha NIRDOṣAM iti.

(The refutation of the fallacies supposed to vitiate the position expounded in the first chapter is stated in the second chapter. This fact is presented as "NIRDOŞAM," Faultless).

The lesson from this passage is this. It is not enough if something is understood even for good reasons. Unless the reasons in question are further tested and justified, understanding cannot become stable and confirmed. The process of testing consists in somehow from different points of view finding fault with the reasons and by means of a closer examination, seeing where exactly the fallacy lies in the opposition. This is exactly the function of the second chapter of Brahma-Mīmānisā. After establishing the position in the first chapter against it

from various points of view—religion, realisation, extraordinary greatness, supernatural powers, common sense, worldly usages, Darsanas, the possibility of interpreting Veda in an adverse direction and the possibility of confirming by means of reason the adverse suggestion given by Veda, the position of the first chapter is supposed to have been falsified. Next the validity of these points of view is tested. Further even supposing that the standpoints are valid that which is stated against Sastra is shown to be contradiction in terms. Finally against the opposition which is nothing but imaginary the position of Sastra is shown to shine all in all absolutely without any opposition.

N.S., proceeds-

evam brahma-svarūpe siddhe adhikāriņah tatprasāda-sādhanopāya-bhūta-tat-sākṣātkāra-jananāya vairāgya-bhaktibhyām akhilavedārtha-śravaṇādi tṛtīye abhihitam. tasya ayam sangraho AŚESA-VIŚESATOPI PRIYATAMAM ĀPYATAMAM iti.

(Thus [by means of the exposition of the first two chapters of Brahma-Mīmāmsā] the concept of Brahman becomes defined. In this circumstance Its (Brahman's) grace needs to be achieved. The means for this achievement is the immediate apprehension of It (Brahman). In order to have this apprehension produced, in the third chapter the understanding etc., of the meaning of the whole of Veda are stated. The same idea is said in brief as—That (Brahman) which is the dearest to me ought to be understood having disregarded all other objects).

It may be noted that the expression apyatamam of Anu-Vyā. is taken to help thought on two occasions by N.S.

Enquiry into the meaning of the whole of Veda, immediate apprehension of Brahman and attaining to the grace of Brahman are in order the processes of spiritual discipline. Among these three stages the lower one explains the higher with the equipment of detachment and devotion in an ever-increasing degree.

N.S., interprets this passage of Anu-Vyā, AśeṣA-VIŚeṣATOPI as: aśesān viṣaya-viśeṣān vihāya jñātavyam iti.

(Having disregarded all other objects of knowledge [Brahman] ought to be understood).

N.S., explains how Brahman is the dearest to the author of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$., as:

iyadamananadityartha-sucanam MAMA iti.

(The expression 'to me' has the purpose of indicating the position expounded by the Sūtra, iyadāmananāt [3.3.21.35.] and the connected ideas).

In this $S\bar{u}tra$ Brahman is shown to be the dearest to $V\bar{a}yu$ i.e., Mukhya-Prāṇa, the Vital principle of all. $Balitth\bar{a}$ - $S\bar{u}kta$, a portion of Veda says $tr\bar{t}iyo$ madhvalt . . . (Madhva is the third form of $V\bar{a}yu$).

In this passage of N.S., detachment and devotion are stated to be the presupposition of understanding the meaning of the whole of Veda. Detachment in this context means not only the abandonment of interest in enjoying the worldly pleasures but also the abandonment of wrong ideas which are the root-cause of all interests worldly in character. Further devotion (bhakti) in this context means unalloyed fixedness of mind on the subject-matter of Sāstra disregarding at the same time all other objects for their own sake. This fixedness is also called attachment (sneha) to the subject-matter of Sastra. The idea in insisting on devotion is that without it mind is distracted and it is not able to produce the knowledge in its fullness. N.S., in bringing devotion as the presupposition of the understanding of the meaning of the whole of Veda has a definite purpose in view. This purpose consists in insisting that devotion must not in any sense mean modification of knowledge. Ordinarily it is thought that after knowledge sneha or love comes and it is bhakti and it takes one to immediate apprehension. But N.S., puts sneha or bhakti or love as the presupposition of knowledge. What it means by this is already explained. By this it also means that knowledge in all cases must be the result of love. But it is never meant that blind love ought to be encouraged. In the process in which love is the presupposition of knowledge ultimately love and knowledge become synonyms. When once unity is attained to Madhva uses these words indistinctly according to the disposition of the context. He insists thereby that knowledge that does not give rise to love is not genuine. To give rise to love is to promise its endless growth.

The fact that love, sneha follows knowledge, according to N.S., simply means that it is the indication of knowledge becoming richer and fuller provided study follows devotion (sneha). But in a particular case, if the study in a more intensive manner does not take place then it follows that devotion is not genuine and owing to some defect degeneration has set in in the mind of the student. If sufficient care is not taken then this is an indication of the gradual extinction of the little knowledge that the individual may possess. If the truth of these observations is recognised, then all the passages of Sruti and Smrti that appear to emphasise devotion (sneha or bhakti) as an alternative to knowledge must be taken to mean consistently with the spirit of enquiry the unretarded dynamic character of knowledge giving no room for any other idea, so as to see the unrivalled prominence of knowledge caused by the study of Sastra as leading to the immediate apprehension of Brahman the grace of which is required to attain to It. If sneha or bhakti in any sense were opposed to knowledge, then insistence on enquiry in the first Sūtra would be meaningless. If this discipline of enquiry applies only to a few, then to call the exposition of enquiry Sastra becomes wrong. Sastra ought to have an unfailing sway on all minds. If particular minds fail to react to it, then it is a spoiled mind with no hope of regaining the strength of a proper mind. To introduce faith or love in the name of bhakti to such minds is to weaken it further. Faith or love in this case is sheer blindness. One may suppose that love is not blind. But without knowing the thing which is to be loved there cannot be love. Thus faith or love presupposes knowledge. In the absence of knowledge to talk of it is a psychological impossibility. For faith or love, some indifferent knowledge is not enough. The object of such knowledge may not be real. In that case faith or love becomes misplaced. A misplaced faith betrays itself soon. If knowledge is really accepted as the presupposition of faith, then knowledge makes faith an impossibility and it creates an environment to grow. From these considerations it follows that Indian philosophy in its proper form i.e. Brahma-Mīmāmsā gives no room for religion in the usual sense viz., the sense in which philosophy is made dispensable. Religion is arrest of philosophy. By religion practical aspect of philosophy may be meant. In that case it helps philosophy and deserves

to be encouraged in a healthy sense. But it is no religion in the usual sense.

Sankarācārya upholds dual standpoint as pāramārthika and vyāvahārika. Pāramārthika is the point of view of a person who has realised that he is Brahman Itself, by means of meditation on the truth of non-duality. Vyāvahārika is the point of view of other persons of common sense. Corresponding to these two viewpoints Sankarācārya prescribes laws of life. Similarly the upholders of religion say that while philosophy is only for a few, religion is for all. Making use of the term bhakti and jñāna they say that jñāna is for a few people and bhakti is open to all. All these ideas are similar to the saying that Science is for a few people and negation of Science is for all. Merely because one cannot understand Science one is not safe in following non-Science. Similarly if one cannot adopt pāramārthika point of view one is not safe in adopting vyāvahārika point of view. Likewise if one cannot follow philosophy one is not safe if one follows religion. Similarly if one cannot have knowledge one is not safe in adopting faith. If one cannot have the knowledge that one is rich, one is in danger in believing that one is rich. So just as one who does not know Science is safe if one respects science and does not adopt non-science, one who cannot follow philosophy is safe if one respects philosophy and does not adopt non-philosophy.

Even with reference to Sankarācārya's thought to hold that there are two points of view is not correct. To have pāramārthika point of view may require effort on the part of an individual. But there is vyāvahārika point of view in the case of others helplessly. Similarly to have philosophy presupposes great effort. But there is religion in the absence of philosophy. One must be taught to check it and make room for philosophy. To encourage religion giving it sacred names is not without danger. This is so far as the degenerated meaning of bhakti is concerned. But bhakti in Sāstra means interest in or devotion to enquiry (jijāāsā) in the sense in which the first Sūtra defines it. It is obviously the presupposition of enquiry. If enquiry gives rise to it then it is the sign of the rich increase of enquiry. Madhva concludes in a later passage of Anu-Vyā., the discussion on this topic as—

JIJÑĀSOTTHA-JÑĀNAJĀT TATPRASĀDĀDEVA MUCYATE. (1.1.1)

(One becomes liberated only by means of Its (Brahman's) grace produced by the immediate apprehension of the same generated only by enquiry, jijnāsā). The use of the word eva (only) indicates the absolute indispensability of enquiry in every case.

N.S., proceeds-

prasannam ca tat yādṛśam pumartham prayacchati tat-svarūpanirūpanam caturthe abhihitam. tadabhidhānam ĀPYATAMAM iti. āpti-mātrasya nitya-siddhatvāt tamapā tām viśinaṣṭi iti.

(In the fourth chapter the explanation of that Good which It (Brahman) being graceful gives is stated. This fact is stated as that which is the subject of special attainment. As mere attainment it is always there. [For all beings are in Nārāyaṇa the principle of all. But they do not know this truth.] Therefore the attainment is qualified as special by means of the suffix tamap.)

The final goal of a person who has the descipline of enquiry is the state of attaining to Brahman in a special sense. This attainment presupposes detachment, devotion leading to enquiry into Brahman and immediate apprehension of Brahman and the grace of Brahman in order.

The term nārāyaṇa stands for all these ideas and it is therefore mentioned to define Brahman at the very outset as: NĀRĀYAŅAM. From this point of view the subject-matter of Brahma-Mīmāmsā is Nārāyaṇa.

N.S., introduces the next passage of Anu-Vyā.

nārāyaṇa-praṇāmasyeva guru-praṇāmasyāpi abhimata-siddhyangatayā kāryārambhe avasyam anuṣṭheyatvāt tadācaraṇa-purassaram brahma-mīmāmsā-sāstra-vyākhyānam samarthayamānaḥ pratijānīte TAMEVA iti.

(Just as the respect given to Nārāyaṇa, the respect given to the teacher also helps the realisation of the intended result. Therefore at the commencement of the work, it must necessarily be recorded. Hence the author (Madhva) mentions that he is expounding the establishment of the meaning of Brahma-Mīmānsā-Sāstra along with recording the same i.e., the respect to the teacher as 'It alone'.)

Anu-Vyā.

 TAMEVA ŚĀSTRA-PRABHAVAM PRAŊAMYA JAGADGURŪŊĀM GURUMANJASAIVA VIŚEŞATO ME PARAMĀKHYA-VIDYĀ-VYĀKHYĀM KAROMYANVAPI CĀHAMEVA.

Just as it is in the previous case in connection with the previous passage $n\bar{a}r\bar{a}yanam$ etc., a merely verbal translation of the present passage is of no effect. N.S., on this passage is quoted and translated.

N.S., in interpreting this passage says:

tam pūrva-praņatam nārāyaṇam eva anvapi punarapi. praņamya bhaktyādyupetatā-lakṣaṇena prakarṣeṇa natvā aham paramākhya-vidyāyāḥ brahma-mīmāmsā-śāstra-rūpāyāḥ vyākhyām karomi iti sambandhah.

(The syntax of the passage with meaning is the following—Once more having shown respect in the best possible manner consisting in being the outcome of devotion etc., to the same Nārāyaṇa to which respect is already shown in the Previous passage, I expound the highest Science which is no other than the Science called Brahma-Mīmāmsā.)

In the previous passage $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is respected as the Lord (Deva) and in the present passage It is respected as Teacher (Guru).

Anu-Vyā., explains how Nārāyaṇa is the Teacher as—śāstra-prabhavam

(That which gives rise to Śāstra.)

N.S., explains the idea contained in the passage from $Anu-Vy\bar{a}.$, as:

śāstra-śabdena prakrtatvāt brahma-mīmāmsā-śāstram vedādikam ca ucyate. prabhavati utpadyate prathamam upalabhyate vā yasmāt sa prabhavah. yathā sambhavam śāstrasya prabhavah śāstra-prabhavah. tam. yo hi yacchāstre pravartate tasya tat-prabhavah gururiti prasiddhameva.

(By the word Śāstra in the present context both Brahma-Mīmārisā-Ṣāstra and Veda etc., are stated. The word prabhava means that by which something is produced or is seen [for the

first time in the cycle of creation]. One which is thus the origin of $S\bar{a}stra$ in the sense appropriate to that thing in question is one which is called $S\bar{a}stra-Prabhava$. This word must be taken in objective case. [It is the object of the verb indicated by the word pranamya.] It is wellknown that to one who commences the study of a Science, the expounder of that

Science is the teacher.)

In this connection by the word $S\bar{a}stra$ two things are meant—(i) $Brahma-M\bar{i}m\bar{a}ms\bar{a}-S\bar{a}stra$ and (ii) Veda etc. Of these two, the former originates from $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. The same cannot be said with reference to Veda. Veda is impersonal (apauruseya). It has no first beginning. In every cycle of creation (kalpa) it emanates from $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ quite in the same form as it was emanated from $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ in the previous cycle. It is in this special sense that $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is its origin. The same idea is given as that which is seen (upalabdha). In the case of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ being is seeing i.e., to see is to give being. During dissolution when there is nothing Veda resides in the mind of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$. It is therefore the mind of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ Itself. At the time of creation, $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ gives it an individuality.

N.S., says that Nārāyaṇa is teacher in another sense also

prakṛta-śāstra-sampradāya-pravartakatvācca nārāyaṇasya gurutvam ityāha—

JAGADGURŪŅĀM GURUM ANJASAIVA

iti. jagatah etacchāstra-pravaktrūnām brahmādīnām anjasā mukhyatayā na tu vayodhikatvādi-mātreņa gurum asya sāstrasya pravaktāram iti yāvat.

(It is the teacher in the primary sense but not in the sense such as being elder in age to Brahmā etc., who are the teachers of this Science to the world. The net idea is that it is the teacher of this Science.)

Nārāyaṇa after giving rise to Sāstra teaches it to Brahmā etc., who in turn teach this Science to the world.

N.S., explains that Nārāyaṇa is teacher in a special sense as:

prakārāntareņa gurutvam nārāyaņasya samarthayate.

višesato me iti.

gurum iti vartate. višesata iti sāksādupadestrtvena na tu jagata iva paramparayā.

(The author of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$, establishes in another way the teachership of $N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ as "to me in a special sense". This passage must be read with the expression, 'He is the teacher'. By the expression, 'in the special sense', is meant that $[N\bar{a}r\bar{a}yana$ is teacher] as teaching me directly but not indirectly as teaching the world.

Nārāyaṇa is both the Lord and Teacher. For these two

reasons respect to It is shown separately.

N.S., presents the significance of certain expressions-

višistākhyā vyākhyā. anena parakṛtānām apa-vyākhyānatām abhipraiti. tathā ca tatra tatra pradaršayiṣyati . . . prayojana-sadbhāve bhāṣya-dišā siṣyā eva anu-vyākariṣyanti ityato ahameve-tyabhihitam. eva-šabdena anyeṣām asāmarthyam sūcayati.

(Interpretation in a special sense is Vyākhyā. By using this word the author intends to say that the interpretation given by others [to the Brahma-Sūtras] is irrelevant. He illustrates in proper contexts how it is irrelevant. Against his work it may be said that if it is necessary the pupils themselves manage to have interpretation in the special sense in the light of Bhāṣya [and therefore this interpretation is not needed]. In answer it is said "I alone". By the word alone the inability of others is indicated).

This passage contains the reason why Madhva, the Vedāntaphilosopher appeared. The popular beliefs that he appeared because of his hatred to certain previous thinkers or to uphold Vaiṣṇava religion or Purāṇas are baseless and they must not be made the starting point of the study of Madhva.

N.S., shows further that what is expounded by Anu-Vyā., is the highest of the Sciences as—

3. Prādurbhūto harirvyāsah virinca-bhava-pūrvakaih arthitah para-vidyākhyam cakre śāstramanuttamam

N.S., presents the meaning of this passage as-

atra kṛtakṛtyopi hariḥ ātma-kṛpāspadaiḥ virinca-bhavapūrvakaiḥ amaraiḥ arthito vyāsaḥ prādurbhūtaḥ na tu jātaḥ. granthamimam cakre ityanena nārāyaṇasya śāstra-prabhavatve anupapattih parihrtā. drśyante hi kevala-krpā-pāravaśyena paropakārāya pravartamānāh sutarām taih arthitaḥ. ata eva para-prayojanamapi ātmagāmīva manyamānasya bhagavataḥ śāstra-praṇayanamiti jñāpayitum ātmanepada-prayogaḥ. atra ca nārāyaṇādvinispannam ityādyāgamaḥ pramāṇam. para-vidyā-khyayā asya sarvottama-prāmāṇya-siddhim vyutpādayitum para-vidyākhyam ityanūdya anuttamam śāstram iti vyākhyānam nāstyuttamam śāstram asmāditi anuttamam. śiṣyate yathā-sthitam pratipādyate tatvam anena iti śāstram.

(In this connection the following must be noted. Hari [i.e., Nārāyaṇa] is in need of nothing. Yet It is requested by the deities Virinca, Bhava and so on who are the subjects of Its compassion. For this reason It appeared as Vyāsa but not born as Vyāsa. [Hari being complete is not subject to birth.] It composed Sastra. This account removes the difficulty in holding that Nārāyaṇa composed Sāstra. It is seen in the world also that those who are compassionate do things only for the good of others. If they are requested they are much more so. For the same reason the composition of Sastra is of that which is Complete which takes the Good of others as if it is Its own. To indicate this the verb cakre which is ātmane-pada is used in Anu-Vyā. [Atmane-pada signifies that the result of the action signified by the verb applies to the subject itself.] The proximate cause of the knowledge of this fact is the verbal testimonies "It came from Nārāyaṇa" and so on. [It is said in Skānda that knowledge came from Nārāyana (Br.Sū.Bh.)] In order to show that this (Sastra) has the highest validity because it is the highest science [Anu-Vyā.] first states paravidyākhyam and defines it as anuttamam sāstram. Sāstra is qualified as anuttamam because there is nothing higher than itself. Sāstra is that by which the Reality or the Truth is defined as it is.)

N.S., presents the net result of the whole discussion as-

idam uktam bhavati. dve vidye veditavye parācaivāparā ceti vidyā-dvayamuddišya tatra aparetyādinā sāngān vedān aparavidyātvenoktvā atha parā yayā tadakṣaramadhigamyate iti paravidyā pradarsitā. sā tāvat vedādi-sāstra-prakaranāt paramākṣarādhigati-karanatva-lingācca sāstrameva bhavitum arhati. anyathā sakṛdukta-vidyā-sabdasya anekārthatva-kalpanā-prasaṅgācca. sāstraṁ ca apramāṇaṁ ceti vipratiṣiddhaṁ. tasya ca paratvaṁ nāma anyannasaṅbhavatīti anuttamatvameva. tadapi sannidhānāt pramāṇatvenaiva.

(This is the meaning intended. [In the Mundaka Upanisad] it is said "Two Sciences are to be understood-the superior and the inferior". Having thus mentioned two Sciences by the expression "between the two the inferior is" and so on, having marked the Vedas with the works that are generally accepted to be necessary to understand them as inferior, by means of the expression "Next the superior is that by which the Imperishable is understood" the Superior Science is exhibited. This Superior Science can be only Sastra because this is the context of the Sciences, Veda etc., and also because this Sāstra produces the knowledge of the Imperishable in the highest sense. If this conclusion is not accepted, then by means of the word vidyā which is mentioned only once there will be the room for assuming many things. [The same is also the reason why Superior Science means only Sastra]. Further it is contradiction in terms to hold that something is Sāstra and it is not valid. To hold that Sastra is superior does not mean any thing other than 'that there is nothing higher than it'. This [excellence] also is only from the point of view of validity because [the present discussion] takes place in the context of validity.)

N.S., proceeds-

tacca anuttamam šāstram idameva vivaksītam. nirnetavyārthānām rgādi-padopa-laksītānām ašesa-šāstrānām aparavidyātvenoktatvāt...sambhavati tu asya paratvam anugrāhakatvāt. etena upanisadah paravidyeti vyākhyānamapi parāstam, rgādi-grahaņena tesām api grhītatvāt...tajjanyam jñānam para-vidyetyapi na yuktam. adhigati-karaṇatvānupapatteh. anekārtha-kalpanāpatteśca. ato anayā para-vidyākhyayā asya šāstrasya sarvottamaprāmānya-sādhanam upapannam iti.

(This (Brahma-Mīmāmsā-Sāstra) is itself that which is defined as the highest Science. For all Sāstras which are indicated by the word rgādi are those that have the meaning that is to be decided. For this reason all of them

are classified as inferior sciences.... Superiority applies only to this $S\bar{a}stra$, because it governs all. For the following reason the interpretation that the *Upaniṣads* are the Superior Science also becomes fallacious. For, by the word rk etc., they are also meant.... To hold that the knowledge produced by them (the *Upaniṣads*) is superior Science also does not hold good, because in that case they cannot be the proximate cause of knowledge. Further to hold this idea necessitates the assumption of several meanings [to the word $S\bar{a}stra$, as the proximate cause of knowledge and knowledge itself.] Therefore by means of the definition of $S\bar{a}stra$ as the highest or Superior Science the establishment of the highest validity of this $S\bar{a}stra$ is justified.)

N.S., proceeds-

rgādyā aparā vidyā yadā viṣṇorna vācakāḥ. tā eva paramā vidyā yadā viṣṇostu vācakā iti bhagavatpādīyam vyākhyānamapi etamevārtham sūcayati.

("Rk etc., are inferior sciences if they do not expound Vişnu. The same are the highest Science if they expound Vişnu." This is the Omniscient teacher's (Madhva's) interpretation of the Upanişadic passage. This also indicates the same view as explained above.)

So Veda etc., are the Science of Brahman, Brahma-Vidyā only in the capacity of expounding Viṣṇu. Otherwise they are not the Science of Brahman. Merely because something is said to interpret Veda etc., it does not follow that it is valid. The interpretation is, for the reasons stated already, valid only in the capacity of expounding Viṣṇu. Without Śāstra this capacity cannot be recognised.

N.S., says-

brahma-mīmāmsā-šāstra-vyutpādita-nyāyānupakṛtā hi vedādayo viṣṇoravācakāḥ. tadupakṛtāśca tasya vācakā bhavantīti.

(If Veda etc., are not really favoured by the principles of thought defined by the *Brahma-Mīmāmāsā-Śāstra*, then they do not expound *Viṣṇu*. If on the other hand they are favoured by them, then alone they expound *Viṣṇu*.)

In this connection being favoured means being governed i.e., yielding that meaning which is directed by the principles

of thought expounded by Brahma-Mīmāmsā-Sāstra. N.S., shows that only under this condition, Viṣnu becomes understood as the meaning of Veda etc.

This is the secret of the exclusive greatness of Madhva's thought. But this secret can be understood only by the initiated few. This must be well-borne in mind in considering any position that Madhva entertains. This rule applies even to Madhva's own works. To disregard this discipline in studying Madhva is to lose the very thought and have in its place ideas suffering from self-contradiction. As to have this discipline is very hard even on the part of a good student, there is no wonder that Madhva is totally misunderstood even by those who seem to adore Madhva.

N.S., proceeds-

tathāpi kevalasya na para-vidyātvam labhyate iti cet mā lābhi. vedādīti-kartavyatā-rūpasya asya pṛthak-pṛāmāṇyāna-bhyupagamāt.

(It may be said against the previous ideas that the state of being the highest science does not occur to the bare $S\bar{a}stra$. The answer is 'Let it not occur'. For it ($S\bar{a}stra$) is nothing but the directive principle of Veda etc., and therefore it is not accepted that it has validity as a separate entity i.e., as being alienated from Veda etc.)

N.S., intends to say that at this stage the student must see the absolute oneness of Sāstra and Veda etc. Each must not be abstracted from the other, because in that case each suffers in validity. They are valid as being quite inseparable i.e., as forming a harmonious unity. This means that the principle of thought distinguished by Sāstra is innate in Veda etc., as Veda etc., are steadily in view of Sāstra as the only subject-matter of consideration.

III

N.S., introduces the next passage of Anu-Vyā., as-

evam tāvadāgamena sāstrasya anuttamam prāmānyam prasādhya adhunā anumānatopi tat sisādhayişuh ādau tāvat prāmānyamātre anumānam vaktum āha. (Thus so far having established the highest validity of Sāstra by means of verbal testimony, next desiring to establish it by means of reason also, to start with in order to state reason with reference to validity as such [the author of Anu-Vyā., says—]

Anu-Vyā.-

 GURURGURÜŅĀM PRAVARAĻ ŚĀSTRĀŅĀM BĀDARĀYAŅAĻ YATAĻ TADUDITAM MĀNAM AŢĀDIBHYAĻ TADARTHATAĻ

N.S., gives the meaning of this passage-

yato yatkāraṇam bādarāyaṇo gurūṇām jagatah tatvopadeśakānām brahmādīnām guruh upadeṣṭā, yataśca śāstrāṇām vedānām bhāratādīnām ca yathā-sambhavam prabhavah, gurūṇām aśeṣārthapratipādakānām savistarāṇām vedādi-śāstrāṇām guruh mukhyaprabhavah na tu sampradāya-mātra-pravartaka iti vā. tataśca ajādibhyah śrotrbhyah teṣām arthah mokṣah tadarthah tasmai tadarthatah, taduditam tena bādarāyaṇena upadiṣṭam idam śāstram ato mānam bhavitum arhati.

(yatah = for the reason. Bādarāyaṇa is the subject. gurūṇām = brahmādīnām, of Caturmukha and so on who are the teachers of the world. guruh = teacher. yataśca = also for the reason. śāstrāṇām = of Vedas and of Bhārata etc. prabhavah = the origin in the sense that is relevant to each. [Another meaning of gurūṇām guruh is given.] gurūṇām = of the Śāstras, Veda and so on with their details which explain all that exist in the world. guruh = the origin in the primary sense but not in the sense of being [the aged] that transmits the tradition.

Tatasca = also for the reason. ajādibhyah = for the sake of brahmā and so on who are the taught. tadarthah = teṣam arthah = their Good (mokṣa) tadarthah tasmai = tadarthatah = in order to obtain their Good. taduditam = tena = bādarāyaṇena = by Bādarāyaṇa. uditam = upadiṣṭam = taught. [The idea is that Sāstra is taught by Bādarāyaṇa for the sake of Brahmā etc., in order to get their Good.] Therefore Śāstra is capable of being valid.)

The whole idea is that Bādarāyaṇa is the teacher of the teachers of the world. He is the origin of Sāstra which is in

the form of Veda and Bhārata etc. Further he taught Śāstra (Brahma-Mīmāmsā) to Brahmā etc., in order to get them their Good. For these reasons it follows that Śāstra is valid.

In this connection the proved is validity of $S\bar{a}stra$. The proofs are that $B\bar{a}dar\bar{a}yana$ is the teacher of teachers and so on.

N.S., brings out the meaning intended by Madhva as-

atra gururgurünām ityādi hetūnām vaktṛ-śrotṛ-prasaṅgānām ānukūlyānyeva sākṣāt-sādhyam; mānamiti tu parama-sādhyanirdeśa iti jūātavyam.

(In this connection it ought to be understood that with reference to the proofs, 'the teacher of the teachers and so on' the proved that is immediate is only the harmony of the teacher, the taught and the circumstance, and the mention of the word māna (valid) is the statement of the proved in the final sense.)

N.S., explains the same idea as:

tathā hi. vivakṣitārtha-tattva-jñānam karaṇa-pāṭavam vivakṣā ceti trayam vaktuh ānukūlyam nāma. tattva-jñāna-yogyatā vaktṛ-prīti-viṣayatā ceti dvayam śrotuḥ. śrotṛ-prayojanoddeśaḥ prasaṅgasya.

(The following is indeed the explanation. The correct knowledge of that which is to be taught, healthy condition of the sense organs and the desire for teaching—these three are what is called the favourable disposition on the side of the teacher. Fittedness to obtain correct knowledge and being the object of the affection of the teacher—these two are of the taught. The favourableness of the circumstance is the teacher's intention to bring about the Good of the taught.)

N.S., applies these ideas to the present environment. First it explains how Bādarāyaṇa is omnicient (sarvajña) as:

tatra gurūṇām gururiti vaktuh bādarāyāṇasya vivakṣitārthatattva-jñāne hetuḥ. yo hi yasya tattvopadeṣṭā sa tato adhikatattva-jñānavān upalabdhaḥ. ayam ca sarvajña-kalpānām brahmādīnām tattvopadeṣṭā brahma-rudrādi-deveṣu ityādyāgamādavagataḥ. ataḥ sarvajño bhavitum arhatīti.

(In this context the statement 'the teacher of the teachers' is the proof for the fact of correct knowledge of that which is

to be taught, of the teacher, Bādarāyaṇa. It is indeed seen in the world that he who is the teacher of a person has more knowledge of the subject than the person [who is taught] has. The present one [i.e., Bādarāyaṇa] is the teacher of Brahmā and so on who are practically omniscient. This is proved by the verbal testimony, '[Having established knowledge] in the divinities—Brahmā, Rudra and so on.' [This passage is explained in Br.Sū.Bh.] Therefore he deserves to be omniscient.)

N.S., proves the healthy condition of the sense organs of Bādarāyaṇa as:

gurūṇām śāstrāṇām guruḥ prabhavaḥ ityanenāpi tattvajñānam karaṇa-pāṭavam ca sādhyate.

(Further by the same fact that He is the guru, in the sense of being the origin of $gur\bar{u}n\bar{a}m$ in the sense of the $S\bar{a}stras$, Veda etc., correct knowledge and the healthy conditions of the sense organs are proved.)

N.S., proves the omniscience of Bādarāyaṇa in another manner as:

yo hi yavadartha-pratipadakasya agamasya prabhavah sa tavantam artham tattvato janan avagatah, ayam ca asesarthapratipadakasya agamasya prabhavah "anuktam pancabhih vedaih" "utsannan bhagavan vedan" ityadi-vacanadavagatah, tato bhavitavyam anena sarvajnena.

(He who is the origin of the verbal testimony which studies things to an extent, to that extent is known to have correctly understood things. But this [teacher] is the origin of the verbal testimony which studies all things [of the world] without exception. This is understood by the verbal testimonies.—"[There is nothing in any sense] that is not studied by the five Vedas" and "[Hari] the Complete [Itself brought to light] the five Vedas which were lost." Therefore [Bādarāyaṇa who is no other than Hari] ought to be omniscient.)

The complete form of the two verbal testimonies referred to in this passage are 1. anuktam pancabhih vedaih na vastvasti kathamcana and 2. utsannān bhagavān vedān ujjahāra harih svayam. The former explains that the Vedas study the whole of the world in all details and the latter Bādarāyaṇa is the birth-place of all Vedas. The Mahā-Bhārata is called the fifth Veda.

because of its unusual extent and profundity. Hence there is the expression, five Vedas.

 $\it N.S.$, presents another reason for the soundness of Bādarāyaṇa's sense organs as:

yaśca bahorāgamasya prabhavaḥ so asati nimittāntare paṭukarano dṛṣṭaḥ- ayamca apārasya vedādeḥ prabhavaḥ katham apaṭukarano bhavediti.

(He who is the birth-place of many verbal testimonies is seen to possess sound sense organs if there is nothing to deny it. This one [Bādarāyaṇa] is the author of Veda etc., which are limitless. How can this one be of unsound sense organs?)

N.S., explains how there is the desire for teaching on the part of the teacher as:

taduditam iti vacanena kāryeņa vaktuh vivakṣā kāraņabhūtā upapāditā.

(By the statement that it is taught [by Bādarāyaṇa] 'by mentioning the effect the desire of the teacher which is the cause of teaching is explained.)

N.S., mentions the qualification of the taught as:

gurūnām iti śrotrūnām tattva-jñāna-yogyatopapādane hetuḥ. na hi svayam tattva-jñānāyogyaḥ pareṣām tattvopadeṣṭā dṛṣṭaḥ. ajādibhya iti vakṭṛ-premāṣpadatvopapādanam. brahmādayo hi parameśvara-prema-viṣayāḥ su-prasiddhāḥ.

(The mention of those that are the teachers of the world is the proof for the explanation of the fittedness for correct knowledge of things on the part of the taught. It is never seen that one teaches others something the correct knowledge of which one is not fitted to have. Further the mention of 'for Aja, Brahmā etc.,' is the explanation of the fact that they are the subject of the affection of the teacher. It is well known that Brahmā etc., are the subject of the affection of the highest Lord.)

N.S., mentions the favourableness of the circumstance as: tadarthata iti prasangānukūlyopapādanam.

(The statement "in order to get them their Good" is the explanation of the favourableness of the circumstance.)

N.S., reiterates the soundness of the above considerations as:

atra sarvatra akāraņa-kāryotpatyādi-prasango vipakṣe bā-dhaka-tarkah unneyah.

(With regard to all the above considerations if what is inferred is denied, then against it the reason that sublates the denial must be put forward. [This reason is] the absurdity that there ought to be effect without cause.)

If the soundness of the above considerations is questioned then Bādarāyaṇa ought to be the teacher without knowing the subject-matter he teaches; he ought to be the author of Veda etc., without knowing what they are; he ought to be the author of Veda etc., without having healthy conditions of sense organs; Brahmā etc., ought to be the teachers of the world without their being capable of understanding what they are taught and so on. It is obvious how all these ideas are absurd. If these absurdities are removed then all that is stated above naturally follows.

It must also be noted that these authors are not satisfied if it is told them that Nārāyaṇa, the Lord of all, teaches things. They want to understand how It is the Lord, how It was able to teach things, to whom did It teach, were the taught capable of understanding what It taught, and the problems connected with all these ideas. Further they wanted to see that there is nothing mythological or theological in the matter taught. They insisted that everything in every detail must be human in outlook and however extraordinary the taught is it must be humanly intelligible. If some aspect of Sastra cannot be understood then why it cannot be understood must also be known. If something is not understood at a given level then it must simply mean that the capacity to understand is in need of improvement. There should be nothing beyond human in Sāstra. Even though certain students of Sāstra are distinguished as divinities, in so far as thought-process is concerned every thing must necessarily be human. The term human in this context applies to the divinities also because divinity is humanity also. This is the teaching of the passage "manusyādhikāritvāt" of a later Adhikarana (1.3.7.25.) of Brahma-Mīmāmsā. In all cases the level of understanding depends on the capacity to grasp.

The capacity depends on the educational achievement at the previous stage. Further the whole process is the result of the grace of Nārāyaṇa as taught by the word ataḥ of Sūtra.

IV

N.S., introduces Anu-Vyā., which explains in what sense the validity of Sāstra is established by the previous passage as:

na hi vayam vaktrādyānukūlyena śāstra-prāmānyam sāksāt sādhayitum udyatāh. . . . api tarhi anukūla-vaktrādimatvasya āpta-vākyatayā vyāptatvāt tena tām prasādhya tayā prāmānyam śāstrasya sādhyate ityāśayavān āha—

5. VAKTŖ-ŚROTŖ-PRASAKTĪNĀM iti

(We are not indeed prepared to prove the validity of $S\bar{a}stra$ immediately from the harmony of the teacher etc.... But in the present circumstance the favourableness of the teacher etc., is invariably related to the state of being the statement of a reliable person. Having proved it, by means of it the validity of $S\bar{a}stra$ is proved. With this idea [the author of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$,] says "The harmony of the teacher, the taught and the circumstance.")

Anu-Vyā.

5. VAKTŖ-ŚROTŖ-PRASAKTĪNĀM YADĀPTIRANUKŪLATĀ

N.S., presents the meaning of Anu-Vyā., as:

yat yatra vākye vaktṛ-śrotṛ-prasaktīnām anukūlatā tatra āptih yadvaktrādyānukūlyopetam tadāpta-vākyamiti yāvat.

(Yat=In which statement, there is the harmony of the teacher, the taught and the circumstance, there is reliability. The idea is that which is the statement of the harmony of the teacher etc., is the statement of a reliable person.)

N.S., defines reliability (āptiḥ) as:

vivakşitārtha-tattva-jñānam avipralipsā vivakṣā karaṇapāṭavam ca iti iyam āptiḥ. tadvān āpta ityangīkārāt.

(Reliability consists in the correct knowledge of that which is to be taught, the absence of the intention to mislead, desire

to teach and the soundness of the sense organs. One who has all these virtues is reliable.)

N.S., illustrates the idea contained in proving the validity of Sāstra as:

yadapi prāmāņyam svata eveti bādarāyaņīyam matam. yadvakṣyati 'na vilakṣaṇatvāt' iti . . . tathāpi aprāmāṇya-śaṅkānirāsārtho ayam prayatna ityavirodhah.

(It is indeed the position of Bādarāyaṇa that validity is self-established, as he says 'No, because it is distinct'. [Brahma-Sūtra 2. 1.2.4.]

[Self-established validity of knowledge is established in this Sūtra in connection with showing how Veda is self-valid, Svataḥ-pramāṇa.]

Yet the present effort aims at removing the thought of the possibility of invalidity. For this reason there is no contradiction.)

With this idea Anu-Vyā., says

ĀPTA-VĀKYATAYĀ

From the fact that it is the statement of a reliable person [it follows that it is valid].)

The idea is that the state of being the statement of a reliable person does not positively prove the validity of $S\bar{a}stra$. It only proves that there is no invalidity. The absence of invalidity is followed by the presence of validity.

N.S., presents direct proofs as:

evam vijātīya-samvādena asya śāstrasya prāmānyam upapādya tadanuttamatā-siddhaye sajātīya-dvaya-samvādam āha ŚRUTI iti.

(Thus having proved the validity of this Śāstra through an indirect proof, with a view to establishing its validity of the highest character the author of Anu-Vyā., gives two direct proofs as: ŚRUTI.)

6. ŚRUTI-MŪLATAYĀ TATHĀ YUKTI-MŪLATAYĀ CA

N.S., presents the meaning of this passage as:

yadyapi śruti-yukti-mūla-śabdau śruti-yuktibhyām arthamupalabhya racitasya vācakau tathāpyatra samānārthatā-sāmānyena gaunyā vṛtyā śruti-yukti-samvāditārthau vyākhyeyau. bhagavato bādarāyanasya svatah sarvajñatvena mukhyārthāsambhavāt.

(It may however be noted that the word, *śruti-yukti-mūla* [having the origin in *Śruti* and *Yukti*, reasoning] denotes that which is composed after knowing the subject-matter by means of *śruti* and *yukti*. But in the present context, owing to the similarity of the same meaning [whether it is primary or secondary] by means of the secondary relation between word and its meaning [*śruti-yukti-mūla*] must be taken in the sense of having *śruti* and *yukti* as meaning the same thing. Bādarāyaṇa is Complete and He is omniscient without any condition. Therefore the primary meaning [of the expression *śruti-yukti-mūla*] cannot be entertained.)

N.S., justifies the position as:

evam tu prayoge angāngibhāvopi adhiko vijnāyate. sa ca pakṣa-dharmatopapādako bhavati.

(By selecting this kind of the use of the words the relation of means and end [as: Sāstra as the means and Sruti i.e. the meaning of Sruti as the end] becomes understood in addition. This relation becomes the explanation of the fact that the proof is present in the subject to which the proved is attributed.)

N.S., indicates the net result as:

tataśca ayamarthah. yat śruti-samvādi tat pramāṇam. yathā manvādi-vākyam. śruti-samvādi cedam śāstram. tadartha-vicāra-paratvāt, visamvāde tadanupapatteh. tacca punah tasyārtha-vittaye ityādyāgama-siddham. yacca yukti-samvādi tat pramāṇam. yathā dhūmavantam parvatam uddiśya parvatoyam agnimān ityuktam vākyam. yukti-samvādi cedam. mīmāmsā-rūpatvāt. mīmāmsāyāśca yuktyanusandhānātmakatvāt. tasmāt pramāṇam. anyathā śruteh yukteśca aprāmāṇya-prasangah. ardha-vaiśasāsambhavāt.

(Therefore the following is the meaning. That is valid which has that meaning which Sruti has. For example, the statement of Manu etc. This $S\bar{a}stra$ has that meaning which Sruti has. For, it is devoted to enquire into the meaning [of Sruti]. If there is difference between the two meanings, then $S\bar{a}stra$ cannot be that which enquires into the meaning of Veda.

This [that Sastra enquires into the meaning of Veda] is understood by the verbal testimony.—"Further, to help the knowledge of the meaning of Sruti [Bādarāyaṇa composed the Brahma-Sūtras]." Further that which has that meaning that yukti has is valid. For example—the statement that the mountain is on fire which is made with reference to that mountain which is with smoke. This [Sastra] has that meaning which yukti has. For, it is the body of enquiry and enquiry is nothing but the application of yukti. Therefore [Sastra] is valid. Otherwise Sruti and yukti ought to be invalid. [But in this connection] injury [consisting in separating the limb from the whole, i.e, the means from the end] cannot be had.)

"PUNAḤ TASYĀRTHA-VITTAYE CAKĀRA BRAHMA-SŪTRĀŅI"

is the full statement from $Br.S\bar{u}.Bh$. Quoting this only means the origin of the first knowledge of the fact that $S\bar{a}stra$ is the limb and Sruti and yukti are those that have the limb. To bring in this idea signifies that this thought which is arrived at independently is quite in keeping with $B\bar{a}dar\bar{a}yana$'s statement of the relation between $S\bar{a}stra$ on the one hand and Sruti and yukti on the other.

This is how on the basis of the statements of $Br.S\bar{u}.Bh.$, ideas in their more advanced form are developed by $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$. Thus the relation of the two works is one of regular growth from the earlier to the later stages.

N.S., introduces $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$., that states the result of these considerations as:

kimato yadyevam ityatah āha.

EVA PRĀMĀŅYAM iti.

(If all this is how it is so far stated, then what is the result? In answer Anu-Vyā., says 'EVA PRĀMĀŅYAM.')

Anu-Vyā.-

PRĀMĀŅYAM TRIYIDHAM MAHAT DŖŚYATE BRAMHA-SŪTRĀNĀM EKADHĀNYATRA SARVAŚAḤ

(Only the *Brahma-Sūtras* have validity in three ways. Therefore they have the highest validity. In all other valid literature there is validity in a single way [or in two ways.])

N.S., presents the meaning of Anu-Vyā. as:

eva-sabdo brahma-sūtrāṇām ityanena sambadhyate. trividhamiti kriyā-višeṣaṇam.

(The word eva relates to the word brahma-sūtrāṇām. The word trividha is the predicate.)

N.S., gives the meaning of the term Brahma-Sūtra according to Anu-Vyā. as:

brahma vedah tadarthah para-brahma vā. tasya sūtrāṇi brahma-sūtrāṇi. sakala-vedārtha-bhūtasya para-brahmano viṣṇoh svarūpa-nirṇayārthāni sūtrāṇi iti yāvat.

(The word brahma means Veda and Para-brahma, [the highest Brahman, higher than the highest, that is ever so far conceived in Vedānta philosophies.] the meaning of the same Veda [The idea is that both the meanings are in spirit the same. To understand Veda is to understand the highest Brahman. To state them separately signifies the inalienable relation of the two. Without Veda Brahman is inconceivable and without Brahman, the highest Veda is not conceived. To define Brahman as the highest signifies that nothing short of unconditioned completeness is the meaning of the word brahman. For instance nirguna and completeness are contradiction in terms. Therefore nirguna cannot be the meaning of the word brahma of Veda. Though people may present it as Brahman, Veda does not regard it as Brahman].

The Sūtras of Brahman [as the subject-matter] are Brahma-Sūtras. The whole meaning is that the Sūtras have the purpose of deciding the exact concept of Viṣnu which is the highest Brahman which is the meaning of all Vedas.)

N.S., explains the significance of this meaning as:

etena etat-śāstra-vācinah śārīraka-śabdasya śarīrameva śārīrakam; tatra bhavah śārīrako jīvah; tam adhikrtya kṛto ayam granthah śārīraka iti vyākhyānam nirastam bhavati. brahma-sūtra-śabdena viruddhatvāt. tvam-padābhidheyasya tat-padābhidheya-brahma-rūpatā-mīmāmseti vyākhyānāt avirodhah iti cenna, asambhavāt. na hi janmādi-sūtrāni abheda-parāni. pratyuta tannirāsa-parānīti vakṣyate. atah śārīrakah paramātmaiva. yathoktam śārīrau tāvubhau jñeyau jīvascesvara-saminītah iti.

tasya sakala-guṇa-pūrṇatvādi-mīmānsaiva śārīraka-mīmānsā. tathā coktam purāņe "sarva-dosa-vihīnatvan" ityādi.

(For the following reason the interpretation, given to the word śārīraka which is taken to denote this Sāstra, that this work is sārīraka because it expounds the individual self which is śārīraka because it is in śarīra, body, becomes refuted. For, it is sublated by the word, brahma-sūtra. It may be said against this observation that the position in question is taken to mean the enquiry into the fact that what is presented by the word tvam, (thou) has the non-duality of Brahman the meaning of tat, (that). [These words tvam and tat are from 'tat tvam asi' of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.] But this meaning does not hold good. For, [the non-duality of the individual self with Brahman] is impossible. The Sūtras 'janmādi' etc., are never in favour of non-duality. In fact, it will be shown that their purpose is to refute it [non-duality]. Therefore sarīraka is the highest Self i.e., Visnu and nothing else. It is said "Those two things ought to be understood as sarīra and they are the individual self and that which is defined as the Lord, the immanent principle of all." The enquiry into the completeness of all Its attributes and so on alone is Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā. For this reason it is said in Purāṇa "The state of being devoid of all defects" and so on.)

N.S., states the result of the discussion as:

yata evam brahma-sütränäm prämänyam trividham dršayate. äpta-väkyatvädi-pramäna-trayena dršyate iti yävat. atah tat mahat anuttamam mantavyam.

(For the reason that the validity of the *Brahma-Sūtras* is determined in three ways i.e., that it is seen from three view points, the state of being the statement of a reliable person etc., it is to be understood to be the greatest i.e., the highest.)

N.S., introduces $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$, that explains the significance of this discussion:

nanu pramāṇaikatvānekatvayoḥ prameya-tādavasthyāt kathametat? ittham. na hi pramāṇa-mātram nissanka-pravṛttau upayujyate. kim nāma? pramāṇatayā pramitameva. tacca yāvadyāvadadhikam pramīyate tattadanusāriṇīm avisankām pravṛttim prasūte ityanubhava-siddham. tataḥ prāmāṇyameva

svakāryātišaya-vašena atišayavaducyate. evam vişya-prayojanātišaya-vašenāpi atišayo drastavyah.

(The following may be said against the previous considerations. In spite of oneness or manyness of the proximate cause the object is the same. How is therefore all this consideration justified? The answer is this. The mere fact of something valid is not indeed the cause of having unretarded will to do.' But what is it that causes that will? It is that which is recognised as being valid. If the recognition is seen to be more, to that extent it generates immediate will without any retardation. This is proved by experience. [The cause of the will to do is the understanding that the thing in question is valid.] Therefore validity itself owing to the richness of its effect is known to have richness. In the like manner for the reason of the greatness [of Sāstra] must be understood.

N.S., introduces Anu-Vyā., that states the conclusion as:

tadevam śrutyanumānābhyām idameva śāstram pramāņatamam na anyat etādṛśam asti iti upasamharti ATA iti.

(Anu-Vyā., concludes that therefore in the manner that is so far explained, it follows on the basis of both Sruti and reasoning that only this $S\bar{a}stra$ is valid in the highest sense and nothing else as: "Therefore".) In the previous passages N.S., has shown that no other work however great it may appear to be is as valid as $S\bar{a}stra$.

Anu-Vyā.

7. ATO NAITĀDRŚAM KIMCIT PRAMĀŅATAMAMIŞYATE

N.S., presents the meaning and the consequence of this passage as:

işyate prāmānikaih iti seşah. tathā ca anya-parihārena asyaiva vyākhyānam yuktam iti hṛdayam.

(The word isyate must be read along with prāmāṇikaiḥ. [Thus the meaning of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$., is—'For the reasons stated so far by those that follow the path of validity no other work is taken to be valid in the highest sense as this $S\bar{a}stra$ is taken'.] For this reason having rejected other works, to expound this thought alone is justified. This is the heart of the author of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$.)

It is shown that the recognition of something as valid is the sole cause of the unretarded 'will to do' with reference to that thing. Brahma-Mīmāmisa is proved to be valid in the highest sense. This means that spontaneously the 'will to do' without any condition is in favour of expounding the thought of it [Sāstra]. The idea is that after appreciating the highest validity of Sāstra Madhva could not have any work other than expounding the thought of Sāstra. The same observation holds good with every student of Sāstra if only he appreciates the highest

validity of Sāstra.

Supposing all people study Sāstra, what about social life? The answer that Sāstra gives is that the supposition is illfounded. For it is the very disposition of society in the period of time called Krta to study Sāstra with wholesale devotion. The difference between Krta and non-Krta is this. In the former every one is after the study of Sastra with vairagya and Visnubhakti. It is the society of philosophers. At this time everyone is good to every one. There is therefore no need for control of people. As every one consciously lives in Visnu, the all-doer, every one is fully dutiful and happy in one's own station of life. As Madhva defines this life, even the whole environment of life, earth, sky and so on i.e., the presiding deities over these elements function in such a manner as to make life increasingly happier. By the study of Sastra is meant that the teacher must teach and the pupils must hear. This takes care of the other aspects of life. For, the study of Sāstra is the work of the grace of Viṣṇu, the maker of all. When the study is there the whole life in all its aspects becomes the work of the grace of Viṣṇu. So one who is devoted to Viṣṇu in the form of the study of Śāstra is asked by Śāstra to fear nothing. Without study to be devoted to Visnu is contradiction in terms as in this case what Visnu is can never be understood. In interpreting Isavasya Upanisad in the light of the Brahma-Sūtras Madhva points out that the absence of fear follows the study of Sastra for the reason that one who is devoted to this study is devoid of illusion and misery.

In the absence of study, vairāgya and viṣnu-bhakti are contentless and therefore they are only illusions. Study has no stop. If it is there then it means that the person in question has vairāgya and viṣnu-bhakti as the necessary

presupposition of the study. The absence of study therefore means fear, illusion and misery. These are the indications of the non-Krta period of time. With these evils, all other evils become produced and they bind man in all directions. Hence life in Krta is comparatively the life of freedom and the

life in non-Krta is the life of bondage.

Kṛta and non-Kṛta may be taken in the individual sense also. Whatever the condition of the world around one be, if one is sincerely after the study of Śāstra to the degree of one's study one enjoys the bliss resulting from the grace of Viṣṇu. Study depends on the will of the person who studies. The will to study nullifies an adverse environment. For will is the product of Viṣṇu's grace. This is the reason why an individual is indeed greater than the whole society put together. Will is the power of Viṣṇu. When it works nothing stands in its way. In understanding this truth the fact that always the leader of a society however huge it may be, is only an individual, must not be forgotten.

The recognition of the highest validity of Sāstra generates will to study it, abandoning at the same time all other works. To do other works is prompted by interest. But to study Sāstra is spontaneous. If it is prompted by any interest, then it is illegitimate. A legitimate study is the worship of Vișnu. It is the highest point of spirituality. It is the one thing that does good not only to the individual in question but to the whole world. For it is nothing but correct knowledge. The world i.e., society stands on correct knowledge. It is only study of Sāstra that gives correct knowledge. The study of other sciences gives only partial knowledge. Partial knowledge is partially wrong. Wrong knowledge does not save man. Hence the study of Sāstra is indispensable. If there is the real beginning of the study of Sastra in an individual it is the mark of the grace of Vișnu. Vișnu's grace is never defied. Just as it creates study of Sastra in the individual it creates the favourable environment also in the external world. Thus even one man's study of Sastra means the good of the whole world. If more than one or all study Sāstra, then there is gradually created Krta as then vairāgya and viṣṇu-bhakti, the springs of all other virtues dominate life.

Nothing else can save the mankind from evil. Other studies are the studies in the wrong directions. Take the study of

literature for its own sake. It breeds imagination. Imagination is illusion. Hence the result of this study is delusion without any hope of understanding real things. The study of Science for its own sake is another example. This study is also seen to end in destructive ideas and false assumption that one can do anything that one pleases. As the result of all this one is never in the position of understanding that man is no-doer and Visnu is all-doer. The sense of doership on the part of man is the spring of all evils. It is opposed to the fact that man is dependent. Thus the study of things independently of Sastra never ends in good. Oftentimes for the blunder committed by one man the whole lot of people will have to suffer even as one man's study of Sastra saves the whole of mankind from evil. The lesson that man is not a doer is taught only by Sastra. Sastra teaches that Vișnu is the doer of all. To realise this truth in the whole of experience is the positive lesson learnt only by Sāstra. This realisation is not passive. It is fully dynamic. It makes man fully active making use of all resources in the right manner without minding the immediate result and without being defied by the adverse circumstances that may follow a particular event of action. In the presence of this attitude resulting from a ceaseless study of Sastra man is not defied by the adverse circumstances of the world. Rather he defies them. To adopt this attitude by mere instruction without study of Sastra is nothing but adding another case of doership, because in this case this attitude is forced on the mind which is already deluded. The study of Sastra alone is the only remedy for the delusion that man is the doer.

So, in upholding the highest validity of Sāstra Madhva's message to mankind is that the study of Sāstra must never be given up whatever the circumstance of other things be.

Madhva says in Dvādasa-Stotra: "tadalam bahuloka-vicintanayā pravaņam kuru mānasamīsa-pade (Put an end to the thoughts of the world. Within your mind entertain enquiry into the concept of the Lord.)" It must not be forgotten that enquiry in this context means enquiry into Veda and Parabrahman its meaning and the word īśa (Lord) means the highest Brahman i.e., Viṣṇu. This is the way in which the words of Śruti and Smṛti ought to be interpreted as Anu-Vyā., shows and as N.S., practises.

N.S., introduces $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$., that answers the question why in addition to $Bh\bar{a}sya$ this work is composed as:

nedam vyākhyātavyam; vyākhyātatvāt ityatra yat prayojanāntaram astīti sūcitam tadvivaraņārtham āha SVAYAM iti.

(This $(S\bar{a}stra)$ must not be expounded. For, it is already expounded [in Bhāṣya]. To meet this objection, the special purpose is already indicated. The author of $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$., in order to explain the same says "I myself".

Anu-Vyā.

SVAYAM KRTĀPI TADVYĀKHYĀ KRIYATE SPAȘTATĀRTHATAŅ.

N.S., presents the meaning of this passage as:

yadyapi teşām brahma-sūtrāņām vyākhyā svayam mayaiva bhāşye kṛtā. tathāpi punaratra spaṣṭataiva arthaḥ prayojanam tasmai spaṣṭatārthataḥ. bhāṣye aspaṣṭīkṛtam artham spaṣṭīkartum kriyate.

(It may however be noted that an exposition of the Brahma-Sūtras was composed by myself in Bhāṣya. But further in this work clearness alone is artha, the purpose. Spaṣṭatārthataḥ means for the sake of the purpose of clearness. This work is composed in order to make clear the idea that is not clear in Bhāṣya.)

N.S., presents the ideas presented by clearness as:

spastīkaraņam ca aneka-vidham. kvacit anuktāmšasya uktih; kvāpi ati-samksiptasya vivaraņam; kvacit ati-vistrtatayā budhyanā-rūdhasya samksepah; kvāpi viksiptasya ekī-karaņam; kutrāpyu-ktasya upapādanam; kvacit apavyākhyāna-nirāsena dṛḍhīkaraṇam; ityādi tatra tatra drastavyam.

(Getting clear is of many kinds-In some places the statement of that which is not stated; in some places the explanation of that which is very briefly stated; in some places brief statement of that which is elaborately stated and therefore is beyond easy comprehension; in some places the putting together of those things that are said in different places; in some places the explanation of that which is stated some where else and in some places establishment of that which is stated, by pointing out the defects of wrong interpretation and

so on. These improvements must be identified in places relevant to them.)

Obviously the study of Bhāṣya and $Anu-Vy\bar{a}$, in terms of these ideas is a huge task. N.S., asks if this circumstance could have been avoided by writing one single work as:

nanu ekatraiva sarvam vaktavyam vaktavyam. kim prasthānabhedena? maivam. yatah sankṣepa-vistarābhyām uktam srotrūnām sugraham saprayojanam ca bhavati. yathoktam; "sankṣepa-vistarābhyām tu kathayanti manīṣiṇah bahuvāra-smṛteh tasya phalabāhulya-kāraṇāt" iti.

(A question may be put. What is to be said ought to be said in the same work. Where is the necessity for having two stages [of thought]? It is not so. It is for the reason that which is said in brief and subsequently said in elaboration results in easy apprehension and realisation of the purpose in a better manner. So it is said "The wise teach both in brief and in elaboration as it is the cause of repeated remembrance and the richness of the result." [Thus what is done is the best.])

So far Anu-Vyā., with Nyāya-Sudhā has established the highest validity of Sāstra and the special purpose to be realised by Anu-Vyā. Though the discussions connected with these ideas are elaborate and complex and highly technical, only the passages that indicate the flow of thought are selected and translated so as to illustrate the complete harmony of Madhva's outlook in his different works. It is also indicated how Bhāṣya in its every detail needs endless development according to the capacity of the student. With the study of these works one realises one's essence as a conscious being. It is not intended at present to translate Anu-Vyā., with Nyāya-Sudhā at the end of the exposition of Bhāṣya, the subject-matter of the present volume. With this brief note on the kind of the teaching that Anu-Vyā with N.S., offers the reader is assured that his study has endless scope. With this indication the text of Anu-Vyā., is translated keeping in view the exposition of thought in N.S. The study of Anu-Vyākhyāna with Nyāya-Sudhā in the present part is terminated with a brief mention of certain important problems which it raises and solves in the course of the rest of the text on Jijnasadhikarana. Next follows a general translation of Anu-Vyākhyāna under part II.

In closing the part I the following may be noted: It gives a discipline which helps the study of the rest of Anu-Vyākhyāna. Anu-Vyākhyāna proceeds further to show that the teaching of Bhāṣya and that of Anu-Vyā., is absolutely the same though the details in the process of thinking differ in each. It shows further that pranava i.e., Aum consists of three parts A, u and m. A means Brahman, u means the highest and m means omniscience. The whole meaning of Aum is therefore Visnu as defined in Sastra of the 564 Sutras, of which each is individually and separately an explanation of Aum. Thus Aum states the subject-matter and Sastra offers explanation. Further after explanation Aum is the conclusion. Thus Aum comes as parts of the text, in thought, of each Sūtra both at the beginning and at the end. Further to the student of Sāstra Aum is the letter of which Vyāhṛti, Gāyatrī, Puruṣa-Sūkta, the whole Veda, all Smrtis and the whole of the linguistic development in various details are the explanation. Every Sūtra as studying Aum has in view language as such in different forms. For this reason, every Sūtra must be commenced with Aum and ended with Aum. Every Sutra is thus a separate Science of Brahman (Brahma-Vidyā). Further every Sūtra, because it is in itself the Science of Brahman, contains the meaning of the rest of the Sūtras. Thus the teaching of Sūtra is infinite requiring infinite study.

All these ideas make philosophy i.e., enquiry into Brahman the very essence of life. But the previous philosophies have somehow entirely ignored this fact. Sankara for example holds that the highest reality is the self, the self-evident (svaprakāśa) and to realise this truth there is absolutely no need for philosophy and the so called philosophy has only a negative function in so far as it removes that thought which stands in the way of realising the self-evident character of self. Against the ideas like these the previous considerations show how without philosophy there can be no thought of Brahman as complete. Further the very idea that self is self-evident implies that there is already the realisation of the self. Against this fact to speak of obstruction is contradiction in terms. Hence philosophy of Brahman is totally different from the position of Sankara's non-duality.

In connection with establishing the soundness of Madhva's interpretation N.S., says:

māyā-vādinā hi kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-doṣa-samsarga-kriyākāraka-phala-lakṣaṇasya bandhasya ātmanyāropitatvena mithyātvam svabhāsvādau varnitam, tadanupapannam, bandha-mithyātvasya asūtritatvāt.

(By the upholder of the doctrine of māyā [in interpreting the first Sūtra] it is said in his Bhāsya that bondage which consists in doership, enjoyership, the state of being tainted by defects, action, causes of action and the result is superimposed on self, atman and therefore it is not real. But it is irrelevant. The state of being unreal of bondage is not taught by Sūtra.)

Next Anu-Vyā., successfully refutes the doctrine of Māyā and establishes the reality of what is called bondage. This must not be taken that something that is not Brahman is juxtaposed along with Brahman and therefore some form of dualism is accepted by Madhva. The reason is the following. Before Madhva, Sankara and so on have offered their definition of reality as "the state of being not sublated (abādhitatva) and so on. For example, with reference to shell-silver illusion silver is sublated by the knowledge of the shell. Therefore silver is considered to be unreal. Similarly it is argued by Sankara that the world is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman as propertyless. But Madhva shows that the idea of 'propertyless' is contradiction in terms, because it attributes propertylessness to the propertyless. Further he points out that the word brahman as used in Sruti and Sūtra means the Complete. If so the knowledge of Brahman as Complete does not sublate the world and in fact it justifies the reality of the world as the negation of the world stands in the way of understanding the Complete. Hence Madhva concludes that even from the standpoint of Sankara's definition of reality the world is real as it is never sublated. But in the same context he explains in what exact sense the world is real in the scheme of Brahma-Mīmāmsā, his own philosophy.

In understanding this stage of his thought it must be noted that some of his immediate followers seem to have misunderstood his thought. This is clear from N.S., in

connection with this discussion.

N.S., presents their idea and corrects it.

tatva-vido vadanti. sarvopi hi bandho buddhīndriya-śarīravişaya-taddharma-lakṣano asmābhirapi ātmanyāropita evetyangīkriyate. yathoktam bhāṣyakṛtā "PRAMĀDĀTMAKATVĀT BHANDASYA" iti. atah kim nibandhano bandha-mithyātva-nirāse nirbandhaḥ?

(Tattva-vettrs say "Bondage in every sense consisting in intellect, sense organs, body, objects and their properties is accepted to have been superimposed on self (ātman)." The same is said by Bhāṣyakāra "Bondage is nothing but superimposition." Therefore where is the necessity to make it a rule to refute the unreality of bondage?)

These thinkers i.e., tattva-vettṛs seem to jump to conclusions disregarding all technique of Madhva's thought. In the garb of interpreting Madhva, in spirit, they deny Madhva and uphold Māyā-Vāda.

N.S., brings out this fact while explaining the actual position expounded by Madhva as:

satyam, tathāpyasti atra darsana-bhedah, evam khalu adhyātma-vidām darsanam. kriyā-jñane prati kārakāntarāprayojyatvādi-lakşaņam kartrtvam bhoktrtvam ca parameśvarāyattam ātmani svato vidyata eva. kriyāvešādi-rūpāyāh vikriyāyāh vināšādyahetutvasya vaksyamāņatvāt. tasya aparāyattatvāvabhāsaḥ avidyā-nimittako bhramaḥ avidyādikam ca svarūpeņa ātma-sambandhitvena ca sadeva. evam buddhīndriya-sarīravisayāh svarūpa santa eva īśvara-vaśā api avidyādi-vaśāt ātmīyatayā adhyasyante. parāyattātmīyatāpyastyeva. tāmisca ātmano viviktānapi vispastatayā anupalabhamānah taddharmān duhkhādīn satyānyeva ātmīyatvena pasyan tatkrte nīcoccatvalakşane vikrtī satye eva pratipadyate. tato rāga-dveṣābhyām prayuktah tadvinivrttaye yatkaroti tadapi etadrgeva tanoti ityaneka-yonişu bambhramīti. na kvāpi ātyantikam tadupasamam labhate vinā parama-puruṣārādhanāt iti. māyāvādinastu duḥkhādikam svarūpenāpi mithyeti manyante.

(It is true [that the author of Bhāṣya makes that statement]. Yet there is difference between the philosophy of the doctrine of Māyā and that of Madhva. The following is indeed the position of those that know the truth of Brahman (Adhyātma-vettṛs¹), Madhva and with him his followers. As the source of action

and knowledge, doership2 and enjoyership [enjoyership consisting in being elevated or dejected], without being caused by any other entity and such other ideas, are there without having conditioned reality [as it is the case with Māyā-Vāda] in the self as being dependent on Brahman, the highest Lord of all. It will be shown [later in the Adhikarana on Syādvāda (2.2.10.33)] that the change which is no other than having action is not the cause of destruction. But the idea that [doership and enjoyership] are not dependent on anything else is the illusion caused by avidyā,3 nescience. Avidyā etc., are indeed real4 in themselves and as being in relation to self. Thus intellect, sense organs, body and objects are real in themselves. But they are under the control of the Lord, the source of the reality of all. Owing to avidyā etc., they are mistaken to be the Self's own. It is indeed real that they are self's own in the sense that the ownership is dependent on the highest Lord. But they are separate from the self. But [the self] does not see them to be separate and it mistakes their properties, miseries etc., which are real to be its own and consequently owns the sense of the changes, elevation and dejection which are indeed real. For this reason it is prompted to do things by the force of attachment and hatred. In order to get rid of them [misery etc.,] what it does is of the same kind. Owing to this circumstance it is again and again born in several wombs. It never gets lasting relief unless it is wholly engaged in enquiring into the Highest self.

But those that uphold $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ think that misery etc., are in themselves unreal.)

Against the numbers marking certain passages in the translation the following may be noted.

1. Of the two doctrines, Tattva-Vettr-Vāda ends in the denial of Brahman, the Complete. Adhyātma-Vettr-Vāda is wholly devoted to Brahman. It does not make much difference between Tattva-Vettr-Vāda and Māyā-Vāda. So the difference between Adhyātma-Vettr-Vāda and Māyā-Vāda is this. The former holds that misery etc., are real in themselves being dependent on Brahman, but the self as being dependent on Brahman falsely identifies itself with them. The latter holds that they are in themselves unreal.

2. Parimaļa says svatantraķ karteti pāņinyukta-svātantryameva vivrnvan āha kārakāntarāprayojyatvādīti (Pāṇini says that which is independent is doer. N.S., explaining the idea of independence says "without being the effect of other causes and so on".

Parimaļa further says: svataļ iti. na paramata iva upādhisambandhamapekṣya ityarthaļi. kartā śāstrārthavatvāt ityatra tathaiva sūtra-kṛtā nirṇītatvāt iti bhāvaļi.

(The word svatah of N.S., means that doership is not there as being the effect of upādhi i.e., māyā as is held by the opponent's position. For it is defined by the author of Sūtra himself, as N.S., shows, in a later Adhikarana "kartā śāstrārthavatvāt" (2.3.17.33.). This is the intention of the word in question.) So Madhva's position is that self as doer and enjoyer is real, being dependent on Brahman. But the doership and enjoyership is not conditioned by $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$. This is the meaning of the expression that $j\bar{v}a$ is $kart\bar{a}$, doer. In the sense that the doership is not conditioned Panini defines the doer i.e., jiva as svantantra. Madhva endorses this view. But he points out that which is taken to be svatantra in this sense is paratantra in the philosophical sense. That which gives reality to paratantra is Svatantra. Svatantra is Brahman i.e., Vișnu-Hence jīva as doer is the work of Viṣṇu. As such it has no self-established reality and therefore it has no self-established doership. Hence jīva is not a doer. This is the significance of the Sūtra: kartā śāstrārthavatvāt.

- 3. Avidyā is for Madhva the will of Brahman to bind a self. Prasāda is the will to release. So the cause of everything is the highest Lord i.e., Brahman.
- 4. It is so far shown in N.S., that the doctrine of the unreality of the world is not only contradiction in terms, but itself a clear proof for the reality of the world. Without the reality of the world in some sense there can be no thought of the unreality of the world. Further the upholder of unreality must at least grant the reality of unreality before putting forward his thought. This obviously denies non-duality i.e., Brahman. The result of it is nothing but duality. So Advaita at the final stage ends in dualism. So also Visistādvaita in positing Brahman as necessarily being

accompanied by the world of spirit and matter in the subtle form cannot do away with dualism. Therefore though these systems of thought appeared to expound the Upanisadic Brahman as Secondless, advitiya they actually ended in upholding that Brahman is with the second, in one case with māvā and in the other case with the world of spirit and matter in a subtle form. If the former appears to end in dualism, the latter ends in pluralism also. To hold that māyā is unreal or that the world is only a body of Brahman does not remove dualism. For they are only names. These names do not end in themselves. They create fresh problems of explaining why the world is only māyā or body. Any attempt at explaining them creates fresh difficulties which defy solution. Hence both these schools failed to make room for concentrating exclusively on Brahman as defined by the Upanisad "tadvījijnāsasva; tadbrahma" (Enquire into It; That is Brahman).

Full justice is done to the Upaniṣadic thoughts by Sūtrakāra in his Brahma-Sūtras. N.S., notes that by subjective interpretations by others the Sūtras are made effectless. To re-establish the thought expounded by the Sūtras Madhva appeared. In the light of the Sūtras he did full justice to the Upaniṣadic position that Brahman is Secondless in his philosophy of Brahman as it is held by Veda as Svatantra in the sense that being self-established It gives the reality to the world of spirits and material objects which is for this reason considered to be asvatantra. These very expressions clearly show how according to this thought room is made to enquire into Brahman as Brahman is a Sacatantra.

into Brahman as Brahman i.e., as Svatantra.

So, the fact that N.S., holds that the world is real must be understood consistently with the concept of Brahman as Svatantra. The reality of the world is given by Brahman and therefore it (the reality) cannot be denied and it cannot be made conditioned. But this reality must not be confused to be the same with the reality of Brahman. The reality of Brahman is Svatantra and the reality of the world is asvatantra (dependent). Of these two the reality of Brahman as Svatantra is unknown to the world of philosophy that is prior to Madhva and the reality of the world is just the same as non-Madhva philosophy attributes to Brahman on the basis of some definition that applies to the world of objects, such as non-sublatedness. Hence the highest

Reality according to non-Madhva philosophies have made themselves incapable of apprehending Brahman as Svatantra. From this point of view the highest Reality according to them comes to the level of the world and finally becomes an item of the world which Madhva defines as asvatantra. In accounting for the world in all its aspects Madhva has to account for the appearance of several theories also.

So after Veda Madhva for the first time introduced to the world of thinkers the philosophy of *Svatantra* so that all educational activities in the world may be defined in terms of the truth of *Svatantra* and the whole life be made spiritual as a consequence of which man enjoys Good both here and hereafter.

Madhva means by being dependent actually deriving reality. In explaining his position in a different context N.S., makes statements like na rājādivat niyāmakatva-mātram antaryāmitvam api tarhi sattādipradatvam ityuktam bhavati.

(The state of controlling from within does not mean mere governing activity like that of a king and so on, but it means the act of actually giving reality etc.)

The reality of the world according to Madhva is such that owing to its dependent character it is even said to be unreal by Madhva himself as:—

"pāramārthyena nāstyeva tadanyat tadvašam yataļi" (Bh.T.).

(That which is other than That (Brahman) is dependent on That. Therefore it is indeed not there from the standpoint of the Real i.e., Independent Reality.)

Having all these considerations in view in interpreting Bhāṣyakāra's passage "PRAMĀDĀTMAKATVĀT BANDHASYA" in the light of N.S., Rāghavendra Tīrtha in Parimaļa says:

yadyapi pramādātmakatvāt ityasya asvābhāvikatvāt ityevārtho na mithyātvāt iti. tathāpi jīva-svātantrya-vivakṣāyām mithyātvam api tadarthaḥ iti atra etadudāharaṇam iti jñātavyam.

(It may however be noted that pramādātmaka means asvābhāvika i.e., conditioned; but it does not mean unreal. But if [by the expression of the conditioned nature of bondage] the independent reality of self is meant, then the meaning of

the term [pramādātmaka] is unreal. To indicate this fact there is reference to this passage in N.S.)

The idea is this. The world of self and non-self is real in the sense that it is not superimposed i.e., not conditioned by māyā. It is svābhāvika but not aupādhika. So self, intellect, body etc., are real. But the fact that self misappropriates the properties of intellect etc., is caused by avidyā, non-knowledge etc. Hence the bondage caused by misappropriation is pramādātmaka in the sense that it is not svābhāvika. Further the whole circumstance is the work of Brahman, Svatantra. Therefore to take that avidyā etc., cause misappropriation and the self is the agent of this misappropriation is to recognise the self to be independent. But as independent it is unreal (mithyā). In this sense also it is pramādātmaka. Thus the word pramādātmaka is applied to bondage in two senses (i) asvābhāvika=caused without being conditioned by māyā of Sankara: and (ii) mithya in the sense of asat unreal. The net idea is that the world is real as paratantra, but unreal as svatantra and it is in every aspect the work of Svatantra i.e., Brahman.

It may be noted that māyā of Śankara is superimposed on Brahman, the propertyless and avidyā of Madhva is the power of Brahman the complete. Further svābhāvika, that which is natural for Madhva is that which is made by Brahman.

So, the world according to Madhva is such that though it is real from the standpoint of the usages of the other philosophies, from the standpoint of Madhva's philosophy that Brahman is Svatantra, it is unreal in the capacity of its being the same as Brahman. This explains how wholesale the room made for concentrating on Brahman, Svatantra is. This is the real position signified by the Upanişadic position that Brahman is Secondless. This position is far from being pluralism or dualism. It is the highest form of Monism which holds that the reality of the whole world is traced to a single Principle i.e., Brahman as Svatantra. Indian thought has found its culmination in this philosophy. If this philosophy is not properly understood then the very spirit of Indian thought becomes missed for ever. The Darsana thinking came into existence in India in the attempt at finding out the one principle of the whole of existence without giving room for dualism in

any sense. Madhva brought this attempt to success in his Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Hence to ignore Madhva is to miss Indian thought as such. Further by emphasising subjective interests such as meditation and faith the other philosophies developed sectarianism, as one man's meditation cannot be had by another man or one man's faith cannot be the same as another man's faith. Madhva expounding breakless enquiry makes man purely himself in his genuine relation to other men without the barricade of difference in faith and difference in practice. Enquiry is common to every being with intellect and it creates no gulf between man and man. By simply harping that every man is essentially one with others oneness is not obtained. In fact it is made impossible because at the time of hearing that all are one the man who hears helplessly concentrates on how genuinely he is different from other men. But while enquiring into Truth man irrespective of his differences realises the sameness of his self with the other who sincerely takes part in enquiry. This is often the case between the teacher and the taught when both are sincere thinkers. Madhva speaks of the possibility of the whole world being related as teacher and taught and participating in enquiry and living the life dictated by enquiry which is the birth-place of all Good.

At this stage one may judge how much evil one causes by presenting Madhva's thought as dualism or pluralism. If he cannot convince others he has at least denied to himself the privilege of studying the highest thought of the world. At the same time it must be noted that this is by no means an attempt to stop study at the stage of Madhva. Madhva himself insists on an endless study consisting in a constructive criticism of the thought he himself gives. For him life is philosophy and philosophy is life. For him Viṣnu Itself is the symbol of perfect enquiry. The act of Nārāyana realising Itself as Vāsudeva is defined as Brahma-Mīnāmsā and it is therefore the expression of the Ānanda-Maya (Blissful) character of Brahman which is the same as Nārāyana, Vāsudeva or Viṣnu. So Madhva shows that in this study one actually lives in Viṣnu.

N.S., further discusses all problems connected with the ideas so far mentioned. For the sake of brevity, a detailed study of this teaching is for the present postponed.

Part II

Anu-Vyākhyāna

So far seven verses from Anu-vyākhyāna are translated with a view to illustrating the trend of the development of thought in this work. In this connection to make the ideas contained in Anu-vyā., clear, particular passages from N.S., are selected and translated.

In order to present the main position expounded in $Anu-vy\bar{a}$, the rest of the text on $Jij\bar{n}\bar{a}s\bar{a}dhikarana$ is translated in the light of the teaching of N.S. N.S., takes the expressions of $Anu-vy\bar{a}$, in several senses and in different logical relations. But in the present context there is an attempt to present only the main trend of thought without doing injustice to N.S.

- (1) Śāstra has adhikārin (one who is in need of study) and Viṣaya (subject-matter)
- 8. There is the person who is fitted to study Śāstra as well as the subject-matter of Śāstra.—

TATRA TÄRÄTHA-MÜLATVAM SARVA-ŚÄSTRASYA CEŞYATE SARVATRĀNUGATATVENA PRTHAGONKRIYATE AKHILAIḤ

([In stating one who is fitted and the subject-matter by the author of $S\bar{u}tra$], the state of commencing every $S\bar{u}tra$ ($S\bar{u}stra$) with $T\bar{a}ra$ i.e. $Au\dot{m}$ [$Au\dot{m}$ is $T\bar{a}ra$, because the host of evil is transcended by it] and atha is desired. By all the authors of $S\bar{u}tras$ with reference to every $S\bar{u}tra$, $au\dot{m}$ is stated separately with the idea that it is common to all $S\bar{u}tras$.)

To establish this idea, Sūtra appears in the following form

AUM ATHĀTO BRAHMA-JIJÑĀSĀ AUM

The words aum and brahma state viṣaya i.e., Iśvara, the Lord of all which is different from jīva. Atha implies adhikārin.

- (2) Brahman is only that which is enquired into
- 9. otatva-väci hyonkärah vaktyasau tadgunotatäm sa eva bramha-śabdärthah näräyana-padoditah

(The word aum presents the state of pervasion or entering into. Therefore it denotes the pervasion of the subject-matter of enquiry by means of infinite and auspicious attributes, [bliss and so on. Auspiciousness consists in completeness.]

For this reason, the same i.e., the subject-matter thus qualified is the meaning of the word, brahman. The same is that which is stated by the word, nārāyaṇa.)

10. SA EVA BHARGA-ŚABDĀRTHO VYĀHŖTĪNĀM CA BHŪMATAĻ BHĀVANĀCCAIVA SUTVĀCCA SOYAM PURUSA ITYAPI

11. SA EVA SARVA-VEDĀRTHAĻ

(The same i.e., Nārāyana is the meaning of the word bharga, [because It is the protector and all-pervading.] The same is the meaning of vyāhrti i.e., bhūh, bhuvah and svah. [It is bhūh] because It is complete. [It is bhuvah,] because It gives rise to the world. [It is svah,] because It is bliss itself. [For the same reason] the same is Puruṣa of Puruṣa-Sūkta. The same is the meaning of the whole of Veda, [because the whole of Veda is an expansion of Puruṣa-Sūkta].)

JIJÑĀSYOYAM VIDHĪYATE

([For the reason that this Brahman i.e., Nārāyaṇa is given by Veda as being clearly distinct from the whole world consisting of spirit (jīva) and matter (jaḍa)] It is determined to be the subject-matter of enquiry.)

(3) Knowledge is that which is produced by enquiry

The word atah of Sūtra presents the idea that enquiry into Brahman has its result which cannot be had otherwise.

JÑĀNĪ PRIYATAMOTO ME VIDVĀNEVACĀMŖTAĻ

12. vrnute yam tena labhyah ityādyukti-balena hi jijñāsottha-jñānajāt tatprasādādeva mucyate

(Indeed by the strength of the passages "The wise is the dearest to me", "tamevam vidvān amṛta iha bhavati nānyah panthāh ayanāya vidyate—Among these people who are after liberation only he who understands Puruṣa i.e., Nārāyaṇa in this manner i.e., as defined by Puruṣa-Sūkta and through it the whole of Veda becomes liberated. There is no other way to attain to liberation."

"... yamevaisa vrnute tena labhyah. It is attained to by him whom It chooses as being Its own," and "ātmā vā are draṣṭa-vyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah.—The self ought to be realised. In order to do it, It ought to be understood to be the only subject of Śruti, be enquired into, and be the subject-matter of ceaseless enquiry." one who has knowledge is liberated only by means of grace arising from the immediate knowledge [characterised by devotion (sneha)] coming out of enquiry.)

(4) The will of Brahman i.e., Brahman is the cause of all 13-16. Liberation is not obtained by the disposition of knowledge but by Grace.

DRAVYAM KARMA CA KĀLAŚCA SVABHĀVO JĪVA EVA CA
YADANUGRAHATAḤ SANTI NA SANTI YADUPEKṢAYĀ
NA RTE TVAT KRĪYATE KINCIDITYĀDEḤ NA HARIM VINĀ
JÑĀNA-SVABHĀVATOPI SYĀT MUKTIḤ KASYĀPI HI KVACIT
AJÑĀNĀM JÑĀNADO VĪṢŅUḤ JÑĀNINĀM MOKṢADAŚCA SAḤ
ĀNANDADAŚCA MUKTĀNĀM SA EVAIKO JANĀRDANAḤ
ITYUKTEḤ

[For the reason of the following statements grace (anu-graha) i.e., the desire of Nārāyaṇa alone is the cause of all and therefore It alone is the cause of liberation.]

The statements are-

"Dravya = the categories of reality, root-matter and the root-spirit (prakrti) etc.,

karma = dharma and adharma—merit and demerit:

kāla = time as a whole and in part

svabhāva = the evolution etc., of root-matter etc.

jīva = abhimānī, that which accounts for the existence etc., of the thing over which it presides.

These are there only by the grace, anugraha of It i.e., Itself (Nārāyaṇa). They are not there if It is indifferent to them."
"Nothing is done without you."

On the strength of these statements of *Sruti* to none liberation occurs by the natural efficacy of knowledge, but it

occurs only by grace of Vișnu.

"Vișnu is the giver of knowledge to those that are devoid of knowledge. It is the giver of liberation to those that are given knowledge. It is the giver of bliss to those that are liberated.

For, It alone is eka, independent doer and the maker of others do without any intervention. It is the controller of all fivas.")

- 16. So far the position of $S\bar{a}stra$ is stated. To show that it is defectless it is explained how there are fallacies in the interpretations of $S\bar{u}tra$ given by others.
 - (5) The theories that oppose Brahman as the cause of all are fallacious

BANDHA-MITHYĀTVAM NAIVAMUKTIRAPEKŞATE

[N.S., takes this passage to present two ideas]

([i. By $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}-V\bar{a}da$ in order to oppose Brahman as cause bondage i.e., doership and enjoyership is taken to have been superimposed on self and therefore it is held to be unreal (mithy \bar{a}). This view is not correct.] For, it has no place in the statement of $S\bar{u}tra$.

and ii. Nor does liberation presuppose the unreality of bondage.)

Another fallacy is stated.

MITHYĀTVAMAPI BANDHASYA NA PRATYAKŞA-VIRODHATAḤ

(The state of being unreal cannot be attributed to bondage, because to attribute it to bondage is sublated by perception.) Perception presents bondage as being existent as 'I am doer, enjoyer' and so on.

17. Another fallacy is stated:

MITHYĀTVAM YADI DUŅKHĀDEŅ TADVĀKYASYA AGRATO BHAVET

(If it is the position of *Sruti* that misery etc., which are different from self are unreal, then that statement of *Sruti* ought to be unreal to start with.) If the statement is unreal, then it cannot prove the unreality of misery etc., even as the son of a barren woman does not do anything.

A proof cannot be unreal.

MITHYĀYĀḤ SĀDHAKATVAM CA NA SIDDHAM PRATIVĀDINAḤ

([In the case of one who believes in unreality no instruction is necessary, because on the same ground one has a chance of believing in the absence of unreality. But the one who wants

to know how there is unreality is opponent *prativādīn*, in the present context.] To this one, the proof which is non-existent can never be the proof for proving anything. Hence the non-existent proof cannot be accepted as proof.)

18. The idea is made clear.

TACCA MITHYĀ-PRAMĀŅENA SATĀ VĀ SĀDHYATE TVAYĀ

([If you say that Sruti, "neha nānāsti kincana (There is indeed no duality existent)" and on its strength reason yukti, such as 'The absence of the state of being seen by eye' being the proof for 'not proving the state of being transient of sound' prove the unreality of misery etc., then] you are asked to answer the question whether the proof you advance in order to prove that the non-existent proof proves the unreality of misery etc., unreal or real?)

The alternative that it is real is shown to be fallacious.

SATĀ CET DVAITA-SIDDHIḤ SYĀT

([If it is real, then is it real as self or real in a different sense? In the former case the fallacy will be pointed out.] In the latter case there follows only duality [because self and proof are different from each other and non-duality is not established]).

The alternative that it is not real is shown to be fallacious.

NA SIDDHAM CA ANYA-SĀDHANAM

(It is never seen that the proof being other than the real being the proof.) [The passage of *Sruti* "neha nānā" in fact denies different entities as constituting Brahman. Hence the Advaita interpretation of nānā as meaning difference in the abstract sense is not correct. Nānā is substantive].

19. You have accepted that the proof which is existent proves something.

SĀDHAKATVAM SATAŠTENA SĀKŞIŅĀ SIDDHIMICCHATĀ SVĪKRTAM

(By you, Māyā-vādin in connection with desiring to prove [nescience of positive character by means of perception i.e., immediate apprehension 'I am ignorant: I neither know myself nor other things'] sākṣī is accepted to be the witnessing

principle. Sākṣī is real. This means that it is accepted by you that a proof which is real proves something.)

Even this position of yours involves contradiction-

AVIŚESASYA SĀDHYĀSĀDHAKATĀ PUNAŅ

20. TACCA AVIŚESA-MĀNENA SĀDHYAM ITYANAVASTHITIḤ

(But $s\bar{a}ks\bar{a}$ is attributeless. It does not prove anything. That that it proves something must itself be proved. That must be proved only by a $pram\bar{a}na$ which also is attributeless. This is arguing in circle.)

Those that do not recognise the reality of the world have

no place in philosophical discussion.-

ANANGĪKURVATĀM VIŚVA-SATYATĀM TANNA VĀDITĀ

- (i. Thus the statements 'neha nānā' etc., cannot be taken to be proof, because they state that all that is other than self is unreal and ii. Those that do not recognise the reality of the world cannot take part in discussion.) [These are Cārvāka, Bauddha and Māyāvādin.]
 - 21. The result of this observation is stated:-

TASMĀT VYAVAHŖTIḤ SARVĀ SATYETYEVA VYAVASTHITĀ

(Therefore it follows that *pramāṇa* etc., [used in discussing strength or weakness of thesis and anti-thesis in *Bhāṣya* and so on of the opponent] are established to be real.)

The result of this consideration is stated—

VYÄVAHÄRIKAMETASMÄT SATYAMITYEVA CÄGATAM

(Therefore [as pramāṇa etc., are real] misery etc., which are discussed ought to be taken to be real in the primary sense.)

22. Even that which is taken to be real only from the standpoint of usage cannot be a proof.

VYAVAHĀRA-SATAŚCĀPI SĀDHAKATVAM TU PŪRVAVAT

(The idea that a thing which is real only from the standpoint of usage can be a proof is similar to the previous idea [that an unreal thing can be a proof.]) The idea is that both are incapable of proving anything. This observation is made on the basis of Advaita position that Brahman alone is real (paramārtha-sat) and under asat (unreal) there are two varietiesvyāvahārika and prātibhāsika. Paramārtha-sat is that which is never sublated. It is real in the primary (mukhya) sense. Vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika are real in a non-primary (amukhya) sense. The non-primary is of two varieties—i. That which is conditioned by māyā, an aspect of nescience and ii. That which is conditioned by avidyā the other aspect of nescience. Space etc., belong to the former class. They are not sublated till there is the knowledge of Brahman and they cause the usages relevant to them. The other things of the world which have public value are also vyāvahārika, though they refer to particular knowers at particular times. That which is conditioned by avidyā is prātibhāsika in the sense that it exists only at the time of knowledge. For example the silver superimposed on a shell. It does not cause any usage. It has only a private value i.e., it is existent only for that individual who has illusion.

The point of view that there are three varieties of sat (real) pāramārthika, vyāvahārika, and prātibhāsika does not hold good.

SATTRAIVIDHYAM CA MĀNENA SIDHYET KENETI PRCCHYATE

(By what pramāṇa this three-fold real (sat) becomes established? Is that pramāṇa paramārtha-sat, vyāvahārika sat or prātibhāsika sat? Thus you are asked.)

23. In reply one sees that it is never established.

TASYĀPI UKTA-PRAKĀREŅA NAIVA SIDDHIḤ KATHANCANA

(As it is already explained this also can never be established.)

It is not established by a pramāna which is paramārtha-sat because the position results in dualism.

The self (ātman) cannot be taken to establish it, because the self is property-less and the state of establishing anything cannot be attributed to it. To say that it is established by vyāvahārika sat or pāramārthika sat is begging the question.

It may be said that by non-primary sat is meant 'sada-sadvailaksanya' the state of being different from sat and asat. But it is not correct.

VAILAKṢAŅYAM SADASATOḤ API ETENA NIṢIDHYATE

(By the same method of criticism sadasadvailakṣanya also is refuted.)

24. The expression sadasadvailakṣanya consists of two ideas sadvailakṣanya and asadvailakṣanya. Of the two each is harmless, i.e., each is not opposed to the reality of the world.

VAILAKŞANYAM SATAŚCĀPI SVAYAM SADBHEDA-VĀDINAḤ ASATAŚCĀPI VIŚVASYA TENĀNĪŞŢAM KATHAM BHAVET

(To one that accepts the difference between two real things the state of being different from a real thing is quite welcome. Likewise the state of being different from the unreal can be attributed to the world. [For the world is real.] How is there any harm by the expression sadasadvailaksanya?)

25. YADYUCYATEPI SARVASMĀDITI SADBHEDA-SAMSTHITIĻ

(If it is said that the state of being different is from all those things that are real, then the difference between real things remains the same.)

If the real (sat) from which the thing in question is said

to be different is accepted to be unqualified then-

SANMĀTRATVAM BRAHMAŅOPI TASMĀT TADAPI NO BHAVET

(The state of being real which is unqualified can indeed be attributed to Brahman. For this reason the difference from Brahman ought to be acceptable to us.)

26. The proof for sadasadvailakṣanya is refuted—

JÑĀNA-BĀDHYATVAMAPI TU NA SIDDHAM PRATIVĀDINAŅ

([Jāāna-bādhyatva means the state of being sublated by knowledge. Sublation in this expression can be taken in two senses—i. The sense in which Māyā-vādin takes it and ii. The sense in which the upholder of Śāstra takes it. The sense accepted by Māyā-vādin is this—Sublation is the removal of nescience with its product present or past by means of knowledge. In this sense] jāāna-bādhyatva is not accepted by the prativādin—the upholder of Śāstra.)

The sense accepted by the upholder of Sastra is the

following.

(6) The theory of Illusion

VIJNĀTASYA ANYATHĀ SAMYAK VIJNĀNAM HYEVA TANMATAM

(The correct position is only that sublation is the correct knowledge of the thing which is wrongly apprehended.)

This definition of sublation is relevant to a real entity also such as self. The self may be wrongly apprehended and it may be apprehended correctly at a subsequent time. So wrong knowledge is illusion. The state of the wrong form of a thing being removed by correct knowledge is sublation.

27. The position of Māyā-Vāda that which is unreal cannot be known and therefore the world which is known is different from the unreal is not correct.

ASADVILAKŞAŅA-JÑAPTYAI JÑĀTAVYAM ASADEVA HI

(In order to know that something is different from the unreal that which is unreal must indeed be known.)

The silver superimposed on a shell is not sadasad-vilakṣaṇa, that which is different from sat and asat. It is asat.

ANYATHĀTVAMASATTASMĀT BHRĀNTĀVEVA PRATĪYATE

(The state of being mis-apprehended is unreal (asat). Therefore it is apprehended only in illusion.)

28. Asat is known.

SATVASYA ASATA EVAM HI SVĪKĀRYAIVA PRATĪTATĀ

(It ought indeed to be recognised that asat has the state of being asat, unreal and this state is sat, real). To hold that it is sadasadvilakṣaṇa does not solve the problem.

TASYA ANIRVACANĪYATVE SYĀDEVA HI ANAVASTHITIḤ

(If it is taken to have the state of being anirvacaniya i.e., sadasadvilakṣaṇa, then the thought indeed involves the process of ad infinitum.)

Thus the theory of *mithyātva* is irrelevant to enquiry into Brahman and it is irrational.

(7) The fallacy in Māyā-Vāda

The Theory of Nescience (ajñāna) is baseless.
 NIRVIŚEŞE SVAYAM BHĀTE KIM AJÑĀNĀVŖTAM BHAVET

(If the attributeless i.e., Brahman is self-evident, then which is it that is obscured by nescience?)

The theory that to the attributeless Brahman the properties that are $mithy\bar{a}$ can be attributed does not hold good.

MITHYĀ-VIŚEŞOPI AJNĀNA-SIDDHIMEVA HI APEKŞATE

(To attribute properties that are *mithyā* [to Brahman] presupposes the establishment of nescience.)

When nescience itself is under consideration this theory has no occasion to rise.

30. Even the idea that the inert (jaḍa) is obscured by nescience does not hold good.

NA CA ĀVARAŅAM AJÑĀNAM ASATYE TENA CEŞYATE

(By him, Māyā-vādin, it is indeed not accepted that the non-real i.e., the inert matter is obscured by nescience.) The inert being, itself being non-real, presupposes nescience. Hence it cannot be taken to be obscured i.e., it is not there in order to be obscured.

APRAKĀŚA-SVARŪPATVĀT JADE AJÑĀNAM NA MANYATE

(The inert is of the character of non-illumination. [Therefore it is incapable of apprehending both itself and that which is different from it.] Therefore he, Māyā-vādin does not hold that the inert is obscured by nescience.)

- (8) Māyā-Vāda makes Sāstra impossible
- 31. The result of these considerations is stated:-

ajñānābhāvataļ śāstram sarvam vyarthībhavişyati

(As nescience is impossible [because there is no location for it and it has nothing to obscure, there is nothing to explain bondage] the whole of Sāstra i.e., consisting of Veda and enquiry into the meaning of Veda will become purposeless.)

Is the superimposition of nescience unconditioned or conditioned? If it is unconditioned, then it ought to be ever there and there ought to be no release from bondage. If it is conditioned, then—

ajñānasya ca mithyātvam ajñānāditi kalpane 32. anavasthitih tathā ca syāt anyonyāśrayatā tathā (If it is assumed that the state of being mithyā, non-real is due to nescience, then the argument involves either the fallacy of the process of ad infinitum (anavasthā) or for the same reason [if only two cases of nescience are assumed—i. the nescience explained and ii. nescience that explains] the fallacy of having two ideas mutually dependent (anyonyāśraya) [or the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya) if the same case of nescience is taken to be the explained and to explain.]

(9) Brahma-Mīmāmsā is defectless. It favours Svabhāvājñāna-Vāda

Does not the same fallacy vitiate your position? If this question is put by Māyā-Vādin, then Madhva says:

SVABHĀVĀJÑĀNA-VĀDASYA NIRDOŞATVĀT NA TADBHAVET

(The doctrine, Svabhāvājñāna-Vāda is defectless. Therefore it is free from fallacies ad infinitum etc.)

Svabhāva-ājñāna-vāda means according to N.S.,—i. svayam-eva bhavati asti iti svabhāvaḥ. nājñāna-kalpita iti yāvat.

(It is by itself. The idea is that it is not the product of superimposition.) Svabhāva in this sense is Brahman according to Sāstra. The question of substratum etc., are irrelevant to Brahman. Therefore Sāstra having Brahman as the subjectmatter of ajñāna is not purposeless. The position of Māyā-Vāda against it is Jada-brahmājñāna-Vāda, the doctrine holding that nescience obscures the inert and Brahman. This doctrine is obviously vitiated by the want of substratum etc.

ii. svah svatantro bhāvah paramātmā svasya bhāvo dharmah. pāratantryādirvā svabhāvah tadvisayam ajñānam jīvasyeti vādah.

(Svah means Independent Existence. It is the highest Self. The abstract of sva is [Independence.] Or Svabhāva may mean the dependence etc., [of the world.] The doctrine that the non-knowledge of this fact has occurred to jīva is [Svabhāvājñāna-Vāda].) This ajñāna can be had by jīva.

iii. svabhāvena svatantreņa paramešvareņa ajñānam jīvasya iti vādasya. . . .

(Svabhāva means Independent. That is the highest Self. Because of Its power there is non-knowledge to jīva. Of this doctrine...)

- (10) Māyā-Vāda implies the negation of Brahman
- 33. If nescience is said to be indefinable, then Madhva says:
 AVIDYĀ-DURGHAŢATVAM CET SYĀDĀTMĀPI HI TĀDŖŚAḤ

(If nescience is held to be of the nature of being indefinable, then for the same reason the self ought to be the same i.e., non-real). Self $(\bar{a}tman)$ is said to be indefinable. In the present context nescience $(avidy\bar{a})$ also is taken to be indefinable. Nescience is for this reason said to be non-real $(mithy\bar{a})$. If so, on similar considerations self also ought to be non-real. The result of these considerations is the theory that there is nothing real $(S\bar{u}nya-V\bar{a}da)$. In this discussion the term $avidy\bar{a}$ stands for the whole of nescience.

The result of the whole discussion-

ATO ADHIKĀRI-VIŞAYA-PHALA-YOGĀDI-VARJITAM

34. ananta-doṣa-duṣtam ca heyam māyā-matam śubhaih

(Therefore the doctrine of $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ is devoid of one who is fitted to have knowledge, the subject-matter, the result, the relation [between the subject-matter and result and $S\bar{a}stra$] and so on. [The expression 'and so on' stands for the defects such as 'The absence of the proof that establishes the position of $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}-V\bar{a}da$ ']. This position i.e., $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}-V\bar{a}da$ is vitiated by innumerable defects—[both those that are already stated and those that will be stated later on.] Therefore it ought to be abandoned by those that are after correct knowledge.)

According to Madhva correct knowledge is the only good (subha) and incorrect knowledge is the only evil. The former is the birth-place of all virtues and the latter breeds all evils. Māyā-Vāda is shown to be incorrect. Therefore it is abandoned. Brahma-Mīmāmsā is nothing but correct knowledge.

Therefore it is adopted.

(11) Veda holds that Brahman is different from jīva

The idea of non-duality of jīva and Brahman does not come from Veda—

SATYATVĀT TENA DUŅKHĀDEŅ PRATYAKŞEŅA VIRODHATAŅ

35. NA BRAHMATĀM VADEDVEDO JĪVASYA HI KATHANCANA

(Veda, ['That thou art' (tattvamasi) etc.,] does not indeed state the non-duality of jīva, [the meaning of 'thou'] and

Brahman [the meaning of 'That' in both the ways: i. in the primary sense of the terms 'That and Thou' and ii. in the secondary sense of 'That and Thou'. The secondary sense is obtained by leaving out the attributive aspects of the things meant by these two words and retaining the substantive aspects. The attributive aspect of jīva, the meaning of 'thou' is limited knowledge and such other properties and the substantive aspect is consciousness in itself. This consciousness is called caitanya. The attributive aspect of Brahman, the meaning of 'That' is omniscience and such other properties. The substantive aspect is caitanya. To mean by the word jīva the entity that is presented as 'consciousness in the form of limited knowledge etc.,' and by the word Brahman the entity that is presented as 'consciousness in the form of omniscience etc., is primary. To leave out limited knowledge etc., in the case of jīva and omniscience etc., in the case of Brahman and to retain consciousness in itself in both the cases, jīva and Brahman is secondary. This particular case of secondary sense is called Jahadajahallakṣaṇā in Advaita.]

For, this position is sublated by the immediate apprehension of a jīva [that it is limited in every way. For the same reason the idea of leaving out the attributive aspect i.e., the state of being limited is psychologically impossible and the talk of retaining pure consciousness is only an expression meaning nothing.] Therefore the world characterised as misery etc., is real.)

The idea is this. If Veda were to teach non-duality of jīva and Brahman then the world ought to have been consistent with it. If there is no consistency, then Veda cannot be a pramāna. The world is indeed not consistent with Veda in the sense that it implies the unreality of the world. For, immediate apprehension presents and supports the difference between jīva and Brahman. Hence Veda as pramāṇa ought to oppose non-duality. Therefore it follows that immediate apprehension proves the reality of misery etc., i.e., the world.

In stating the conclusion of *Śruti* one ought to see that one's idea is not sublated by the *pramāṇa* which presents the thing under consideration—

yajamāna-prastaratvam yathā nārthaḥ śruteḥ bhavet 36. brahmatvamapi jīvasya pratyakṣasyāviśeṣataḥ (Just as the meaning of Śruti ['yajamānah prastarah' (The conductor of sacrifice is a handful of grass)] is not the state of being a handful of grass of the conductor of the sacrifice [because the idea that the conductor is grass is sublated by the immediate apprehension that the conductor is not grass,] the meaning of Śruti ['tattvamasi' (That thou art)] is not the nonduality of jīva and Brahman.)

The meaning of *Śruti 'yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*' is that a handful of grass stands for the conductor of sacrifice. Similarly the meaning of *Śruti 'tattvamasi'* is that Brahman is also that which is presented by the word 'thou' (tvam).

Just as the idea that $j\bar{i}va$ is Brahman does not hold good, the idea that Brahman is $j\bar{i}va$ does not hold good.

sārvajñādi-guṇam jīvāt bhinnam jñāpayati śrutih. 37. Iśam tām upajīvyaiva vartatehyaikya-vādinī

(Sruti teaches the Reality [the Lord] that is the source of all in the capacity of its being defined by omniscience etc., and therefore as being different from jīva. For this reason the Sruti which is mistaken for teaching non-duality has its rise being dependent on the Sruti that presents the Reality i.e., Brahman that is the source of all.)

The idea is that Sruti never teaches non-duality.

UPAJĪVYA-VIRODHENA NĀSYĀḤ TANMĀNATĀ BHAVEŢ.

(As there is the opposition of the basic *Śruti* that presents the Reality which is the source of all, this *Śruti* [tat tvam asi] does not enjoy the state of being pramāṇa [as meaning non-duality]).

Between the *Sruti* that presents that the Reality which is the source of all is different from *jīva* and the *Sruti* that presents the idea of non-duality, the former is stronger.

(12) The non-duality taught by Sruti may stand for several ideas

SVĀTANTRYE CA VIŚIŞŢATVE STHĀNA-MATYAIKYAYORAPI
38. SĀDRŚYE CAIKYA-VĀK SAMYAK SĀVAKĀŚĀ YATHEŞŢATAḤ

(The expression of identity or non-duality is applicable as the case may be also to independence, the exclusive greatness, the identity from the standpoint of location, the identity from the standpoint of intellect and similarity.)

It is evident that between the expression that does not apply to anything other than what it means and the expression that can be applied to something which is other than what it is taken to mean, the former is stronger. Difference does not mean identity in any sense but identity or non-duality may mean difference as is implied by independence and so on which may be taken also as the meaning of identity or non-duality. Therefore difference is stronger.

(13) The teaching of duality is primary:

39. AVAKĀŚOJJHITĀ BHEDA-ŚRUTIRNĀTIBALĀ KATHAM

(How can the *Sruti* that teaches difference without giving room for any other meaning be without being very strong?) The idea is that in understanding *Sruti* there is absolutely no occasion for the idea of identity or non-duality to occur to mind.) [Therefore by the upholders of non-duality this idea that is foreign to *Sruti* is superimposed on *Sruti*.]

AJNĀNĀSAMBHAVĀDEVA MITHYĀ-BHEDO NIRĀKŖTAĻ

(As nescience is impossible, the idea that difference is non-real (mithyā) becomes refuted.) The supposition that Sruti mentions difference with a view to discarding it, is unfounded. Of the two, difference and identity, identity is not given by any pramāṇa.

(14) The indispensability of Enquiry:

The position emerging from the foregoing considerations is stated:

 ATO YATHĀRTHA-BANDHASYA VINĀ VIŞŅU-PRASĀDATAH ANIVRTTEH TADARTHAM HI JIJÑĀSĀTRA VIDHĪYATE.

(Therefore bondage is real and it does not disappear unless there is the grace of Viṣṇu i.e., Brahman. For the sake of attaining to it (grace) enquiry into It is herein enjoined.)

The refutation of the opponent's position is the indispensable presupposition of the rise of the correct knowledge of the position to be established. Therefore refutation is a part of

the teaching of Sūtra. Opposition, refutation and the establishment of position illustrate the truth of the passage "ajūānām jūānado viṣnuh" (Viṣṇu is that which gives knowledge to those that are devoid of knowledge.)

(15) Reality or unreality is irrelevant to Removal:

Even though bondage is real it is removed by the grace of Visnu:

41. yathā drṣṭyā prasannaḥ san rājā bandhāpanodakṛt evam drṣṭaḥ sa bhagavān kuryāt bandha-vibhedanam

(Even as a king being pleased with being seen [with the feelings of reverence] puts an end to bondage, [imprisonment and so on] Visnu, the omnipotent removes bondage when It is pleased with being seen with exclusive devotion i.e., enquiry into It.)

Though bondage is beginningless, the power of Vișuu is such that it puts an entire end to it. This points to the character of Viṣnu's power as incomprehensible (acintya) and wonderful (adbhuta). This power (aiśvarya) makes what is impossible possible (aghatita-ghataka). It is infinite (ananta).

(16) The refutation of Kāryatā-Vāda:

The word atah of Sūtra is so far shown as establishing the result of enquiry in two ways. It is now shown that it establishes the subject of enquiry. The state of being something that ought to be done is said to be the meaning of Veda as it is that which makes a sentence effect an activity. This idea is in the name Kāryatā-Vāda entertained by Pūrva-Mīmāmsā. This system makes use of this idea and tries to show that Brahman cannot be the meaning of Veda. Hence the theory of Brahman presupposes the reflection on the theory of kāryatā, the state of being something that ought to be done. Hence Madhva says:

42. KĀRYATĀ CA NA KĀCIT SYĀT IŞŢA-SĀDHANATĀM VINĀ

(The state of being something that ought to be done (kāryatā) is nothing but the state of being the means for realising that which is desired.) This is Madhva's meaning of kāryatā.

The idea is that kāryatā in this sense cannot be opposed to the theory of Brahman. Further an insight into kāryatā

yields only this meaning but not the meaning given by Pūrva-Mīmāmsā. and to asure out enstreally notice The reason is given—

KĀRYAM NA HI KRIYĀ-VYĀPYAM NIŞIDDHASYA SAMATVATAĻ

(Kārya, something that ought to be done does not apply to all actions, because if it applies to all actions then it ought to apply equally well to the forbidden actions.)

Other definitions of kārya also are incorrect

43. NA BHAVIŞYAT-KRIYĀ KĀRYAM SRAKŞYATĪŚA ITI HYAPI KĀRYAM SYĀT NAIVA CĀKARTŪM AŚAKYAM KĀRYAMIŞYATE

2019 (The definition that kārya is a future action does not hold good. Otherwise 'The Lord will create' also ought to be a case of kārya. Nor can 'It is impossible not to do it' be accepted as a case of kārya).

These are the different meanings of kāryatā advanced by the different upholders of the theory against the theory of

Brahman.

The reason for the rejection of the second definition is given-

44. SĀMYĀDEVA NIŞIDDHASYA

(This concept of kārya also does not exclude a prohibited action. [The same is the fallacy in all the definitions of kārya imagined by several thinkers.])

(17) The meaning of Kāryatā:

TADIŞŢAM SĀDHANAM TATHĀ

(Therefore kārya is that which is desired. Similarly it is that which is the means [for the realisation of the desired].)
'That which is the means for the realisation of an object desired' [iṣṭa-sādhanam] is kārya [according to the usages even in the world.]

BHAGAVĀN IŞŢA-DEVATĀ

(Brahman which is the subject-matter of enquiry is the Truth that is desired.)

The meaning of the word bhagavān is the complete i.e., Brahman, the subject-matter of enquiry. The word bhagavān explains how Brahman is the subject-matter of enquiry. It may be noted further that the means for the realisation of that which is desired also is that which is desired.

45. MUKHYEŞŢAM VĀ sti 101 bonisəb si 2011 əslə gnid vas

(Brahman is therefore desired in the primary sense.) [It is desired in an unconditioned manner i.e., It is desired for Its own sake, but not as the means for anything else.] It is this desire that is called *bhakti* by Madhva. Evidently it presupposes not only a profound study of *Sāstra* but as well the study of *Sāstra* and teaching of it at the time when the desire is said to be there.

The same is explained:

SUMANASĀM

(Sumanasām = puruṣārthāntarābhilāṣākaluṣita-manaṣām = Of those the mind of whom is not tainted by the desire for getting other goods to be realised.) Though this type of mind is not generally observed to exist, in special cases it is possible to hold a type of this mind. But in the case of Sumanasah (divine beings) this mind is constant. It is rather this mind that makes them Sumanasah.

The truth of this idea is substantiated by Śruti:

PREYAH TAT ITI CA ŚRUTIH

(Śruti says 'It [Brahman] is desired.')

(tadetat preyah putrāt preyo vittāt preyo anyasmācca sarvasmādantarataram yadayamātmā [Br. Up].)

(That which is desired against a son, that which is desired against wealth, that which is desired against all things which are different from the individual self is the innermost principle of existence. That is this Self, the Lord.) This passage illustrates how Brahman is the desired in the primary sense.

In the Puranas also the same truth is explained as:

prāņa-buddhi-manaḥ-khātma-dehāpatya-dhanādayaḥ 46. yat-samparkāt priyā āsan tataḥ konu aparaḥ priyaḥ

(The vital breath, intellect, mind, the inner sense organ, the other sense-organs, jiva [the individual self], body, sons,

wealth etc., have become desired because they are in touch with It, [Visnu, the dearest of all.] If so, how can there be anything else that is desired for its own sake?)

Something is desired in the world. This fact points to the touch or presence of Brahman i.e., Visnu to the thing desired. If it is devoid of this touch it ceases to be desired. Hence Brahman is the desired in the desired. In other words it is desired in the primary sense. This means It is the only thing that is desired. Nothing else commands the state of being desired.

(18) Veda is intelligible because its subject-matter is Brahman

The conclusion is stated:

ITYĀDI-VĀKYAIḤ ĀKĀNKṢĀ SANNIDHIRYOGYATĀ YATAḤ 47. TASMINNEVA SAMASTASYA ITĪṢŢE VYUTPATTIRIŞYATE

(On the basis of the statements such as the above with reference only to Brahman, there are ākānkṣā, ṣanṇidhi and yogyatā for the whole of Veda. Akānkṣā is enquiry. Brahman is all-pervading. Therefore there is sannidhi with reference to It. There is yogyatā. Therefore the whole of Veda is applied to It i.e., It is the one and the only meaning of the whole of Veda. [A sentence is intelligible if it satisfies three conditions-(i) ākānkṣā—It must satisfy the desire for knowing the thing in question. (ii) sannidhi-It must consist of parts with proper meaning in proper syntax. (iii) yogyatā—It must not be sublated by any pramāṇa. These three conditions are fully satisfied only if Brahman is understood by a statement, because It is the most desired and is therefore the subject-matter of that which is enquired into. It is all-pervading and is therefore the maker of syntax and It is never sublated as it is the maker of pramāņa. For this reason, It is the meaning of every expression or sentence of the whole of Veda. It is for this reason the meaning of language as such. To hold that language means anything other is only worldly, laukika. It is the usage of the ignorant. But, for the wise Brahman alone is understood by means of every expression, sentence—every sentence Vedic or non-Vedic.] For this reason, by those that know the secret of language, the relation between word and its meaning is applied only to that which is desired.)

- (19) A word therefore means something Accomplished (Siddha)

 The same is illustrated:
 - ATYAPÜPÄN TAVA BHRÄTÄ ITYÄDAU ÄVÄPATOPI CA
 48. UDVÄPÄT VARTAMÄNATVÄT ÄKÄNKŞÄDI-BALÄDAPI
 BÄLO VYUTPATTIMAPYETI

([The beginner understands the relation between word and meaning in the following manner.] Taking for instance the sentence such as, 'Your brother eats the sweets' made to a boy, the boy understands the relation between the word sweets (apūpān) and the things called sweets (apūpāh) because (i) The things, sweets etc., are present. [Owing to this circumstance the things related to them are the objects of perception. (ii) The sweets are desired. Therefore] there is enquiry (ākānkṣā) etc., with regard to them. [(iii) There is the general understanding of the relation between the collocation of words and the collocation of things. (iv) There is a similar experience [in the case of other sentences such as 'Your brother drinks milk'] of the fact that 'by removing which object which word becomes removed and by introducing which thing which word becomes introduced, that word is for that thing'.)

(20) The Doctrine of Karyata is opposed to Economy of Thought.

So far, it is established that the relation between word and meaning applies to something that is already there (siddhārtha). A word is therefore siddhārtha. Further, to strengthen this view the opposite view is falsified:

NĀNAYETYĀDI-VĀKYATAĻ

49. ĀNĪYAMĀNA-DRSŢYAIVA VYUTPATTEḤ SAMBHAVE SATI EŞYADĀNAYANĀYA AYAM KUTA EVA PRATĪKŞĀTE.

([A beginner] does not obtain the knowledge of kāryatā by means of the sentence 'Bring' etc. [A beginner is said to understand the relation between a word and its meaning by watching the movement consisting in a later activity after hearing the sentence 'Bring the cow'.] This view is not sound.—When only by seeing the thing in question as being brought in, the relation between word and its meaning is possible to understand, why does this beginner wait for the act of bringing in the thing at a future time?)

So the position of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā with regard to the problem of explaining how the relation between the word and its meaning is known is not supported by experience. At every step it is opposed to the law of economy of thought.

50. VYUTPANNO VARTAMĀNE TU KRIYĀ-ŚABDE BHAVIŞYATI
PUNAḤ DRŞTYAIVA ŚABDA-ŚRUT PAŚCĀDVYUTPATTIMEŞYATI

([He] becomes the possessor of the meaning with reference to the verb [such as 'brings'] which has that which is present as its object. 'The one who has heard the statement 'Bring the cow' later by seeing only the same action for a second time obtains the knowledge of the relation of the word to the object'. [This is so only according to your position. But it does not mean that there was no knowledge of the relation of the verb with reference to the present object.])

51. VARTAMĀNAMATĪTAM CA BHAVIŞYADITI CA KRAMĀT ĀKĀNĶŞĀDI-YUTAM YASMĀT VIDHEḤ VYUTPĀDANAM KUTAḤ

(A thing related to the present, the past and the future time in order becomes conjoined with enquiry $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}nk_{\bar{i}}\bar{a})$ etc. How can then a command which is supposed to have no relation to time enjoy the state of effecting the knowledge of the relation of the meaning?)

The idea is this. Without jijñāsā etc., there is no knowledge of the relation in question. Command is irrelevant to jijñāsā because it does not refer to time according to you. Nor is the position that command does not refer to time correct. It is sublated by experience. In the very expression 'This ought to be done' there is a reference to future time.

52. DŖŞŢYĀ JÑĀTA-PADĀRTHASYA SYĀT ĀKĀNKŞĀ BHAVIŞYATI VYUTPATTIĻ PRATHAMĀ TASMĀT VARTAMĀNE AGATE TATAĻ

(With reference to the meaning of a word which is present there is jijnāsā by seeing it in its environment. Therefore only with reference to the meaning that is present there is the knowledge of the relation at the first instance. Only subsequent to it, there is the knowledge of the relation in the case of a future or past entity.)

53. IŞŢAMĀKĀNKŞATE SARVAḤ NA PRAVRTTIM APEKŞATE
(Every man has enquiry only with reference to that which
is desired. He does not have enquiry with regard to an activity
positive in character [because it is a case of misery].)

With reference to every activity the primary aim is either attaining to what is desired or getting rid of what is not desired. The act (pravrtti) presupposed by the former or the act (nivrtti) presupposed by the latter is only secondary.

(21) Knowledge develops into Realisation

It is only knowledge that is the means for attaining to that which is desired, but not act positive or negative.

aparokşam parokşam vā jñanam iştasya sādhanam 54. kvāpi ceştā tadarthā syāt attih hi rasa-vittaye

(The means for realising that which is desired is either the immediate apprehension or the mediate one. It is only in some cases an activity aims at knowledge. For, activity for example the act of chewing is the means for the knowledge of the taste which is given, but not of the taste which is liked.)

VĀKYĀRTHA-JNĀNA-MĀTREŅA KVACIDIŞŢAM BHAVEDAPI

(By means of only the knowledge of the meaning of a statement, [Veda in the present context,] that which is desired is realised.) This is so in cases such as 'A son is born to you'.

N.S., records the significance of the discussion as:

ayamatrāšayal. yo hi sātvika-prakṛtiḥ loka-pravādāt kāryatvādi-lingānusandhānādvā svatanu-bhavanādeḥ kartāram sāmānyato jānan sneha-māhātmya-jñānābhyām tadviseṣa-jñānārtham utkanṭhita-mānasaḥ tat-samskāra-vasācca anyadaganayan vartate; tam prati āpto bandhuriva ayam samasto vedah tat-svarūpam svapradhānameva pratipādayati; tato vākyārtha-jñānāt avāptaparamānandaḥ tat-sākṣātkāram kāmayate; tam prati tadupāsanā vidhīyate; sā ca prakṣīnāntaḥkaraṇasyaiva sambhavati itī tadartham karma-vidhayaḥ.

(The following is the subject-matter of the whole teaching: He who is of the character of enlightenment owing to the usages of the world in which he lives and by means of the inferences [in favour of the Maker of all] on the basis of the observation of the proofs [pertaining to the world] such as the state of being a product [which is meaningless without its Maker] understands in a general manner that there is a maker

of all including his own self, his body, his house as well as his existence i.e., the environment of his life. He becomes attached to this maker. He understands Its speciality in so far as he can. [Gradually] he becomes anxious to understand the definite character of It [the maker of all] as well as the attachment and the speciality with their details. Further he is led by the mental retentum. As a consequence he leads his life in such a manner as to have no interest in the discipline other than that which is in consistency with these ideas.

To him this Veda in its entirety explains, even as a reliable relative, the secret of Its individuality without subjecting it to any modification. From this knowledge of the meaning of Veda he becomes filled with the highest bliss and desires to realise It. To this person the discipline leading to It is enjoined. This discipline is applicable only to one whose intellectual faculty is completely subdued. For this reason there are injunctions of those duties that lead to the desired result.)

athavā yah sāmsārika-vividha-duhkham jihāsuh paramānandam ca prepsuh tat-sādhanam jijnāsate tam prati paramesvara eva prasannah paramesta-sādhanatayā upadisyate. tatah kathamasau prasīdati ityapekṣāyām tat-sākṣātkārah tadangatayā karmāni iti ubhayathā svapradhāna eva paramesvaro vedārthah iti.

(The same idea may be put in the following manner: A person who wants to get rid of the different kinds of misery caused by bondage and who is desirous of attaining to the highest bliss enquiries into the discipline that leads to the realisation of these two things. To him the Truth that Paramesvara [the Secondless source of the reality of both the removal of misery and the attainment to the highest bliss] Itself being pleased is the means for this realisation is taught. Further there occurs the desire to know how It becomes pleased. [To satisfy this desire] there is the exposition of Veda, the subject-matter of which is 'Paramesvara, the Secondless source of the reality of all as being for Its own sake the meaning of Veda in both the ways whether there is the exposition of the realisation of It or the exposition of the activities presupposed by the realisation. [These are the activities connected with enquiry into It.] This is the intended meaning of the foregoing considerations.) The idea is this. Veda has two portions. One expounds realisation of parametoara. The other expounds the activities presupposed by realisation. The former is the process of jijnāsā. The latter is the activities leading to jijnāsā. These activities are known as Vidyā-Karma as opposed to karma in the non-Sāstra sense. In both the cases jijnāsā and vidyā-karma, Parameśvara is the only subjectmatter.

na ca prayojana-śeṣatayā īśvarasya aprādhānyam. pratipattau aparārthatvāt. pratipattereva pramāṇa-phalatvāt. evam akārya-śeṣatayā sva-pradhāne brahmaṇi vedasya prāmāṇya-sambhavāt yuktā brahma-jijñāsā ityuktam.

(It is not correct to hold that *Paramesvara*, the Secondless source of the reality of all is made unimportant because it is considered to be the means for a result. For, from the standpoint of knowledge, It is not subordinated to anything else. The only result of the proximate causes of knowledge is knowledge itself. Thus Brahman is not subordinated to anything else that is desired. Therefore It is the most primary. As meaning It Veda is the proximate cause of knowledge. Therefore, enquiry into Brahman is justified.)

(22) The positions that are in any sense opposed to Brahman are contradiction in terms

Categorical statements are indeed accepted by the opponent as giving the knowledge of things that are already furnished:

55. NA CA SRK-SRUVA-VANHYĀDAU ATĀTPARYAM ŚRUTEḤ BHAVET.

(With reference to the sacrificial things such as syk, sruva, things used in offering oblation and agni, fire Sruti cannot have non-intention.) [Even according to the one who upholds that Sruti causes knowledge only in terms of the state of being something that ought to be done. (kāryatā) Sruti ought to give rise to the knowledge of syk, sruva etc., which are the things that are furnished and which are used for effecting a sacrifice. Similar is the case with reference to sentences like "yūpe pasum badhnāti" (He binds the sacrificial animal to the post.) The intended meaning of the sentences in question is a furnished thing like yūpa. The idea is that it is impossible to hold that a furnished thing is never the meaning of words.]

The reason is given:

YAT KIMCIT KARAŅASYĀPI YAJÑATAIVĀNYATHĀ BHAVET

(Otherwise even an insignificant means ought to have the state of being sacrifice itself.)

56. TASMĀT UPĀSANĀRTHAM CA SVĀRTHE TĀTPARYAVAD-BHAVET

(Therefore [the statements of *Sruti* made to expound the discipline such as "The Real, the Knowledge and the Infinite is Brahman" "satyam jñānam anantam brahma"] ought to be valid with reference to the meaning of each word [even as *Sruti* is valid as generating the knowledge of the meaning of *Srk*, *Sruva* etc].)

(23) The Theory of the word iti supporting Kāryatā and the fallacy in the Theory

With reference to Veda according to Pūrva-Mīmārisā the word iti coming at the end of another word gives the idea that the latter does not present the meaning that is its own. Example—the sentence 'ātmetyevopāsīta.' The word iti conjoined with ātman presents the idea that the word ātman does not have its literal meaning. Hence throughout Veda, owing to the presence of iti no word can enjoy its literal meaning. It has meaning only as being related to the word which signifies kāryatā.

Therefore to hold that a word means a furnished thing is opposed to *Sruti*. To meet this difficulty Madhva says:

ITI-ŚABDONNAYEGNAU ITYAPYUNNĪTE SMŖTIRBHAVET

57. ITI-ŚABDA-VYAPETĀNI HYAPI SANTI VACĀMSYALAM
ĀTMĀNAMEVETYĀDĪNI

(If it is said that the word iti is conjoined to [the word ātman etc.,] then if the same word iti is conjoined also to the word agni, then to that word there ought to be no relation to sacrifice and thus the idea that the word agni, sacrificial fire, is naturally related to sacrifice becomes only a case of memory. Further there are many expressions [in Veda] without being conjoined to the word iti. These words are ātman etc., found in the sentences 'ātmānameva' etc.)

A difficulty is put forward—"To hold that a word means a furnished thing is opposed to *Śruti*, because in the case of "ātmetyupāsīta" the word iti brought after the word ātmā denies that ātman is the meaning of the word ātmā. This denial is met as follows:

YOGE AGNAU API TATSAMAM

(If after the word ātman the word iti is understood, then it may be understood after the word agni also with equal effect.)

(24) Identity of Purpose in Veda

There is no division in Veda as that which is devoted to kārya, Kārya-niṣṭha and that which is devoted to Brahman, Brahma-niṣṭha. The concept of kārya is shown to be unwarranted. There is nothing to stand in the way of holding that the whole of Veda is Brahma-niṣṭha. Further the division as Kārya-niṣṭha and Brahma-niṣṭha stands for parts: 1. The one expounding karma and 2. the other jñāna. But this division is opposed to the law of economy of thought. The whole of Veda can be shown to be Brahma-niṣṭha and therefore as expounding knowledge.

58. EKA-VĀKYATVA-YOGE TU VEDASYĀPI HYAŚEŞATAḤ VĀKYA-BHEDO NA YUKTASSYĀT.

(If the whole of Veda can be understood in terms of identity of thought, to superimpose disunion on the statements of Veda is unwarranted.)

There is no impossibility of attaining to the identity of purpose running throughout Veda.

YOGASCA SYĀT

(There is the application of identity of purpose to the whole of Veda without exception and it cannot be refuted.) This fact is already established and it will be illustrated throughout the rest of Brahma-Mīmāmsā by way of showing that the whole of Veda is Brahma-niṣṭha and as such its one and only theme is knowledge.

It is said in Pūrva-Mīmāmsā 'ātmā jūātavyaḥ ityetat mokṣārtham na tu coditam. karma-pravṛtti-hetutvam ātma-jūānasya lakṣyate.' (The command that ātman ought to be known is not mentioned as the means for mokşa. It is understood that the knowledge of ātman is the means for occurrence of karma.) But this is not true.

(25) Knowledge is for Mokşa

MAHÃ-PHALE

([The application of knowledge is to the greatest of the fruits.] This fruit is moksa consisting in being aloof, kaivalya.)

This aloofness is from all that is bondage. It is completely living in Brahman. Hence this concept of aloofness is different from the Sānkhya concept of aloofness.

(26) Any idea that is opposed to Knowledge is contradiction in terms

58. The word iti is found in the so-called karma-kānda. Hence the position of the opponent is contradiction in terms.

59. ITI BRŪYĀDITI-VACO GATAMAGNAU SAMĪPAGAM

(The word iti is seen to be in the proximity of the word agni as nagirāgireti brūyāt.) This refers to Śruti "yajñāyajñā-vognaye girāgirācadakṣase" in the context of Jyotiṣṭoma. The word agni is thus near the word iti.

It may be said that to hold that Veda intends to expound Brahman also goes against the law of economy of thought. But this supposition results in self-contradiction.

kalpanā-gauravam cet syāt pṛthak-tātparya-kalpane 60. kalpanā-gauravādeva padārthā na syureva hi

(If you hold that to assume that Brahman also is the meaning of Veda is to go against the law of economy of thought, [then this fallacy vitiates your own position, because you have to assume that Veda intends also to state— $y\bar{u}pa$ (post) etc.] If owing to the fallacy of going against the law of economy of thought [you do not hold that $y\bar{u}pa$ etc., are not stated by Veda] then, [as there is nothing to present them] these things ought to be non-existent.)

PRAMĀŅĀVAGATATVAM CET TĀTPARYĀŅĀM TATHAIVA HI

(If you hold that the intention of Veda [in favour of yūpa etc.,] are known by means of other pramāṇas, then the same indeed may be the case [with reference to Brahman also.]) Brahman as the meaning of Veda is known to have been intended by Veda itself.

(27) Brahman is the Meaning of the whole of Veda

61. TASMĀT PADĀRTHE VĀKYĀRTHE TĀTPARYAMUBHAYATRA CA PRTHAGEVA CA VĀKYATVAM PRTHAGANVAYATO BHAVET

(Therefore the intention of the statements [as 'satyam' jñānam anantam brahma'] is to give the meaning in two capacities both at the same time—i. with reference to the meaning of words and ii. with reference to the meaning of sentence. [The former aims at defining Brahman by the meaning given by every word satya, jñāna and ananta separately. The latter aims at presenting the idea of indispensability of discipline (kāryatva)]. By interpreting the whole sentence in this manner according to each construction separate sentences become formulated.)

62. avāntaratvāt vākyānām vākya-bhedo na dūṣaṇam

(The sentences thus formed are sub-sentences. Therefore even with reference to a single statement the creation of sub-sentences is not wrong.) To admit of this circumstance is the nature of a sentence which is highly complex (mahā-vākya).

The truth of this observation is recognised by the opponent

ANGĪKŖTATVĀDAPI TAIH PADĀNĀNTU PŖTHAK PŖTHAK

(For by them [Mīmāmsakas] also the relations of words individually and separately are recognised.)

[This idea is illustrated by N.S., 'aruṇayaikahāyanyā pingākṣyā gavā somam krīṇāti ityādau taiḥ mīmāmsakairapi padānām aruṇayetyādīnām krīṇāti ityādi-kriyā-padena ekaikasya anvayo angīkṛtaḥ'. (With reference to this sentence it is accepted by Mīmāmsakas also that the verb, krīṇāti has its separate relation to each individual word as aruṇayā, ekahāyanyā, and pingākṣyā)]

63. KRIYĀ-PADENĀNVAYASYA VĀKYA-BHEDO HI DŪŞAŅAM

(It is indeed a fallacy if primary difference in a sentence is effected in accounting for the relation of a word to the same verb.)

When the verb is the same taking the words of the same sentence in relation to it sub-sentences may be formed. But to form a primary sentence becomes fallacious. So with reference to "satyam jñānam anantam brahma" to understand the meaning of words sub-sentences are formed and with reference to the meaning of the whole sentence no change is made. The whole sentence is mahā-vākya (primary sentence) and the sub-sentences are avāntara-vākyas. Following this method of interpretation consistently throughout Veda, it is easy to see how Brahman is the sole subject-matter of the whole of Veda in all its details.

There is another difficulty—Taking for example the sentence "satyam jäänam anantam brahma" it is seen that it restates Brahman and predicates of it satya and so on. But Brahman apart from jīva is not seen. Therefore it ought to be jīva itself. But even this does not hold good. For it (jīva) is not seen as Brahman. Therefore the meaning of the word brahman ought to be changed. This means that to hold that Brahman is the meaning of Veda is unwarranted.

This difficulty is met:

PRATYAKŞĀDI-VIRODHE TU GAUŅĀRTHASYĀPI SAMBHAVĀT 64. ATĀTPARYAM PADĀRTHEPI NA KALPYAM AVIRODHATAḤ

(If there is opposition by perception and so on, then there is the possibility of attributing even a secondary meaning to the statement in question. But with reference even to that meaning of a word the idea that the word does not intend to give that meaning cannot be entertained, because there is nothing to sublate it.)

There is no hard and fast rule that a word can have only the literal meaning and nothing else.

(28) The Indispensability of Jijnasa

The word atah of Sūtra is also taken to state that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is the highest:

Ato jñāna-phalānyeva karmāņi jñānameva hi
65. mukhya-prasādadam viṣṇoḥ jijñāsāyāśca tadbhavet

([In translating this passage the word karmāṇi ought to be so interpreted as to give the idea that they are the natural presupposition of knowledge. They are in this sense consistent with knowledge. Veda cannot be pramāṇa if it is taken to present karma that is opposed to knowledge. That is the sense in which Mīmāṃsaka and other Vedānta philosophers understand karma. Their position is not consistent with the fact that Veda is pramāṇa. By their position they introduce dualism into the Vedic teaching and thereby deny the identity of purpose governing the Vedic teaching.]

Therefore [as Veda is *pramāṇa* as expounding Brahman] actions have their result in knowledge. It is only knowledge that causes the grace of Viṣṇu in the primary sense. Therefore enquiry which is no other than knowledge has it, i.e., [the state of being indispensable.])

This means that the whole of Veda on karma ought to be understood only in terms of the knowledge of Brahman.

KARTAVYĀ TENA JIJÑĀSĀ ŚRUTI-PRĀMĀAŅYA-YOGATAḤ

(Owing to this circumstance enquiry is indispensable, because otherwise the validity of *Sruti* cannot be had.)

(29) Veda is Pramāņa

66. PRATYAKŞAVACCA PRĀMĀŅYAM SVATA EVĀGAMASYA HI

(The validity of Verbal testimony i.e., Veda in the present context, is self-evident even as it is in the case of perception.)

ANAVASTHĀNYATHĀ HI SYĀT APRĀMĀŅYAM TATHĀNYATAḤ

(If validity is not self-evident, then the position becomes vitiated by the fallacy of ad infinitum. Further in the case of that which opposes Veda by means of the other i.e., sākṣī there is the apprehension of invalidity.)

Validity is self-evident clearly in the case of sākṣī. It cannot even be doubted. Sākṣī apprehends the validity of

other cases of *pramāṇa*. It apprehends invalidity if there is defect in the cause of knowledge.

67. MITHYÄ-JÑAPTI-PRALAMBHÄDEḤ TENA VEDA-VIRODHI YAT NA MĀNAMAPI VEDĀNĀM ANGĪKĀRYĀ HI NITYATĀ

(As invalidity occurs to knowledge by means of an outside agent [such as the defect in the proximate cause of knowledge], that which is opposed to Veda is not valid owing to wrong apprehension, deceptive intention and so on. This means that the validity of the eternal and indispensable i.e., the non-personal character of Veda ought to be recognised.)

NA HI DHARMĀDI-SIDDHIḤ SYĀT NITYA-VĀKYAM VINĀ KVACIT

(Dharma (the right) etc., cannot indeed be determined with their details without the verbal testimony, non-personal in character.) This testimony can be only Veda.

68. AVIPRALAMBHASTADJÑĀNAM TAT-KRTATVĀDAYOPI CA KALPYĀ GAURAVA-DOŞEŅA PUM-VĀKYAM JÑĀPAKAM NA TAT

([If a verbal testimony that comes from a person is supposed to give the knowledge of *Dharma* etc., then] non-deceitfulness, the knowledge of *dharma* etc., the fact that the work in question comes from the man of knowledge, the capacity of the bodily organs to observe *dharma* etc., compassion, sufficient capacity to establish *dharma* etc., ought to be assumed. As it is against the law of economy of thought a verbal testimony coming from a person is not the source of the knowledge of [dharma etc.].)

69. Pratyakşah kasyacıddharmo vastutvāditi codite na buddho dharma-darśī syāt pumstvādityanumā hatih

(If it is said 'Dharma is the object of perception to some one [such as Buddha], because it is an entity', then this view is sublated by the inference, 'One such as Buddha can never be the perceiver of dharma because one is a person [even as the man who holds that view'].)

The man who holds the view that Buddha perceives dharma is not one who perceives dharma. Similarly Buddha also cannot perceive dharma, because he is a man.

 ADHARMA-VĀDINO VĀKYAM APRAYOJANAMEVA HI DHARMĀBHĀVOPI NO TENA PRATYAKŞĀVAGATO BHAVET

(To one who holds that there is no dharma, Veda is irrelevant. [But his position is contradiction in terms]. For even the absence of dharma is not perceived by him.)

The idea is this. To deny dharma is impossible, because it is not given by any pramāņa. Herein cārvāka's position that there is no dharma is shown to be wrong.

71. ATAH SAMSAYA-SAMPATTAU VĀKYAM PRATYAKSAVAT PRAMĀ

([Dharma cannot be posited nor can it be denied.] Therefore it admits of doubt. For this reason there ought to be a verbal testimony to present it and it ought to be correct even as perception is.)

(30) The Relation between Word and Meaning

Supposing that Veda is *pramāṇa*, it is unintelligible, because there is no relation between words and objects. Even supposing that there is relation between the two, that relation does not help usages. This difficulty is met as:

ŚAKTIŚCAIVA ANVITE SVĀRTHE ŚABDĀNĀM ANUBHŪYATE

72. ATO ANVITĀBHIDHĀYITVAM GAURAVAM KALPANENYATHĀ

(With reference to words, it is experienced that there is the relation of them to their objects which are inter-related. Therefore words have the state of expressing the objects which are in relation to the things that are relevant to them. [This is the only explanation available.] Any other explanation that may be put forward involves the fallacy of going against the law of economy of thought.)

The other explanations are the views that go by the names Abhihitānvaya-Vāda, Sphoṭa-Vāda and so on. Abhihitānvaya-Vāda holds that the things themselves meant by the words of a sentence give the knowledge of their mutual relation owing to ākānkṣā etc. Sphoṭā-Vāda holds that a sentence itself having the distinction of letters and words annulled presents its meaning. It is obvious how these positions are based on assumptions.

NA CĀŚAKTYĀBHIDHĀYITVAM PRAVŖTTIŚCA DVIDHĀNYATHĀ

(Without the relation between word and its meaning a word can never present an object as its meaning. If this is not accepted then there ought to be dualism in activity i.e., after hearing a verbal testimony activity must take place irrelevantly with no cogency. Or if words operate following an order then there ought to be interval in activity.)

(31) The Content of Sastra

73. ETAT SARVAM TARKA-ŚĀSTRE BRAHMA-TARKE HI VISTARĀT UKTAM VIDYĀ-PRTHAKTVĀT TU SANKŞEPEŅĀTRA SŪCITAM

(All these positions are in detail well expounded in the Science of Logic entitled Brahma-Tarka. The same is briefly indicated in this work [by means of the word atah.] The reason for the brief statement is the fact that different ideas form the different contents of different Sciences.) [Mīmāmsā and Tarka are different Sciences. (There are fourteen Sciences.) Of them in Mīmāmsā Truth i.e., Brahman is expounded and in Tarka-Sāstra the validity of Veda and so on are expounded.]

74. pramāņa-nyāya-sacchikṣā kriyate tarka-śāstrataḥ māna-nyāyaistu tatsiddhaiḥ mīmāmsā meya-śodhanaṁ

Pramāṇa = Pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama.

Nyāya-(i) unconditional and invariable concomitance which is indispensable in inference. (ii) reductio ad absurdum. This is required to purify inference.

Sacchikṣā=The exposition of pramāṇa etc., by means of uddeśa=clear statement, lakṣaṇa=definition and vibhāga=classification. All this is done by Tarka-Śāstra.

By means of the pramāṇas and the principles of thought—svarūpa = the fact as it is, sankhyā=number and viṣaya-vyavasthā = the act of determining content or jurisdiction—given by them the purification of Truth is Mīmāmsā.

75. brahma-tarkam ca bhagavān sa eva kṛtavān prabhuḤ pancāśatkoŢi-vistārāt nārāyaṇa-tanau kṛtāt

UDDHRTYA PANCA-SÄHASRAM KRTAVÁN BÄDARÁYANAH ATASTADARTHAM SANKŞEPÄDATA ITYABHYASÜCAYAT

(He, the Complete, the Omnipotent has Himself composed Brahma-Tarka. He, also called Bādarāyaṇa has composed it in five thousand passages (verses) having taken the matter from the work consisting of fifty crores composed by himself in the form as Nārāyaṇa. The subject-matter of this huge work is epitomised in Brahma-Tarka. [Brahma-Tarka is presupposed by Mīmāmsā.] Therefore to state it briefly he indicated it by means of the word ataḥ [of the Sūtra.])

(32) Sāstra is Difficult to follow

- YATONUBHAVATAH SARVAM SIDDHAMETADATOPI CA DEVAIŚCA DURGAMĀRTHEŞU VYĀPŖTO NĀTI VISTŖTIM
- 78. cakāraitāhyavajñeyāņ yuktayaņ pratipakṣagāņ

(All the foregoing ideas, [the reality of the world and so on] are presented by experience—pratyakṣa and anumāna. For this reason also they are indicated by the word ataḥ. [Of the two, Brahma-Tarka and Brahma-Sūtras, the former is easier and the latter] are beyond the reach of even the divinities. [By the request of the divinities and for the use of them] Bādarāyaṇa being engaged in Mīmāmsā has not done it elaborate. Further, because the proofs advanced by the opponents [against Sāstra] are baseless [and therefore do not require elaborate criticism] he has done it brief. [Following this fact we (Madhva) also are brief in our criticisms against the positions that are opposed to us.])

(33) One who is fitted to study Brahma-Mīmāmsā

77. Though the opponent positions appear to be Vaidika, related to Veda, they are not so in reality.

PRATYAKŞEKŞĀKŞAMAḤ PAKŞAM KAMEVĀTRĀBHIVĪKŞATE
79. TASMĀDAKSAMA-PAKSATVĀT MOKŞA-ŚĀSTREBHYUPEKŞITAḤ

([The reality of bondage etc., is easily understandable.] The opponent is incapable of understanding even that. How then is heable to imagine a position that is opposed to Mīmāmsā? Therefore what he posits against Mīmāmsā is an impotent position. For this reason he is overlooked by Sūtrakāra in this Science

on Mimānisā defined as Mokṣa-Śāstra, the Science of Release from bondage.) One ought to face experience in order to be sound.

N.S., concludes:

idam uktam bhavati. yo hi laukika-pravedanīyam api artham na jānāti tasya alaukikārthe vede adhikāra eva na asti. tathāpi tatra vaiyyātyāt pravṛttaḥ avajñām eva arhati na tu pratipakṣabhāvam iti.

(The following is the intended meaning: He who does not understand even the thing which can be understood by a man who is guided by pratyakşa and anumāna in the normal sense is not qualified to understand Veda, because Veda expounds the Truth that lies beyond experience i.e., pratyakṣa and anumāna. If he with a faith tries to interpret Veda, he only becomes loser in estimation, but the idea which he puts forward can never be a rival view, [as he is unable to transcend experience.])

This consideration implies that all Sciences that are based on pratyakşa and anumāna without being taken to have illegitimate claim are the necessary presupposition of Mīmāmsā i.e., Brahma-Mīmāmsā. Thus Brahma-Mīmāmsā is inclusive of all learning. For this reason Madhva as knowing Brahma-Mīmāmsā is recognised as omniscient (sarvajāa).

Brahma-Mīmāmsā, the Science of Freedom (Mokṣa-Sāstra)

N.S., explains the concept of Moksa-Sāstra:

mokṣa-śāstraityanenāpi tasya veda-vicārānadhikāram sūcayati. vedo hi mokṣa-śāstramiti prasiddhaḥ. "tatprīṇanāt mokṣamāpnoti sarvah tato vedāḥ tatparāh sarve eva" iti śruteḥ.

(By defining Brahma-Mīmāmsā as Mokṣa-Sāstra the author indicates the inability of man [who ignores to understand the implications of pratyakṣa and anumāna] to follow it.

It is well-known that Veda is Mokṣa-Sāstra, because Sruti says "By pleasing It [Viṣnu] every individual attains to Bliss, i.e., mokṣa unalloyed by misery. Therefore the Vedas without

exception have It (Viṣṇu) as their subject-matter [and are there to get it, mokṣa to those that please Viṣṇu by understanding them, Vedas])."

N.S.,—tam ca svarga-mātra-paryavasitam vadan kathamatra adhikriyate.

(One who thinks that Veda is limited to Svarga i.e., something that is not moksa is never able to understand it.)

N.S., concludes:

tadanena "Ataśśabdo Hetvartham" iti bhāşyam spastīkītam bhavati iti.

(Thus by all this the Bhāṣya "The word atah presents the reason [for enquiry into Brahman]" becomes clarified.)

(34) Brahman of Sūtra is Vișnu

- SVAYAM BHAGAVATĀ VIṢŅUḤ BRAHMETYETAT PURODITAM 80. SA VIṢŅURĀHAHĪTYANTE DEVA-ŚĀSTRASYA TENA HI ĀDYANTAM DEVA-ŚĀSTRASYA SVAYAM BHAGAVATĀ KŖTAM
- 81. MADHYAM TADĀJÑAYĀ ŚEṢA-PAILĀBHYĀM KŖTAMANJASĀ ATAH TATRAIVA VIṢŅUTVA-SIDDHEḤ BRAHMETYASŪCAYAT
- (By Vyāsa, the complete Himself prior to the composition of the Brahma-Sūtras is said that Brahman is Viṣṇu. By him alone by whom this Science (Brahma-Mīmāmisā) is composed the same Truth is expounded by means of two Sūtras—"sa viṣnurāha hi" and "tam brahmetyācakṣate" at the end of Deva-Sāstra. By Bādarāyaṇa, the complete Himself the passage at the beginning and the passages at the end have been composed. The middle portion has been well composed as desired by him by Seṣa and Paila. Therefore in that work itself the state of Brahman's being Viṣṇu is established. The same fact is indicated by the word brahma [in Brahma-Mīmāmisā]).
- (35) Enquiry into Brahman in the sense of Visnu i.e.; Nārāyaṇa is Indispensable and the commencement of Sāstra,

 Brahma-Mīmāmsā is Irresistable

The foregoing considerations are for the learned, i.e., only the learned well versed in the whole of Vedic literature

can understand the truth. For the others the following is given:

- 82. DOŞĀRACCHIDRA-ŞABDĀNĀM PARYĀYATVAM YATASTATAĻ GUŅĀ NĀRĀ ITI JÑEYĀḤ TADVĀN NĀRĀYAŅASSMŖTAĻ
- 83. Brahma-śabdopi hi guņa-pūrtimeva vadatyayam ato nārāyaṇasyaiva jijnāsātra vidhīyate.

(For what reason the words doşa, ara and chidra are synonymous for the same reason merits are presented by the word nārāh. That which has nārāh is called Nārāyaṇa. The word brahman in the present context also states nothing but completeness of merits. Therefore by the first Sūtra enquiry into Nārāyaṇa Itself is shown to be indispensable.)

84. An additional consideration is given:

SIDDHATVĀT BRAHMA-SABDASYA VIṢŅAU SPAŞŢATAYĀ ŚRUTAU AMBHASYA PĀRA ITYUKTO NĀRĀYAŅA-PADODITAḤ

85. ĀPO NĀRĀ ITI HYĀHA SA EVĀPSVANTARĪRITAĻ KĀMATO VIDHI-RUDRĀDI-PADA-DĀTRYĀ SVAYAM ŚRIYĀ

86. YONITVENĀTMANO

(In the Śruti "tadeva brahma paramam kavīnām" it is clearly established that the word brahman means Viṣnu. For, the beginning of this passage "ambhasyapāre bhuvanasya madhye nākasya pṛṣṭe mahato mahīyān" (The greatest of the great resides in the waters...) applies to one which is to be presented by the word, nārāyaṇa. For, Smṛti "āpo nārāh iti proktāh āpo vai nara-sūnavah, ayanam tasya tāḥ pūrvam tena nārāyaṇah smṛtaḥ" ("Waters are said to be nārāh. They are indeed the creation of nara. They are at the beginning the abode of It. Therefore it is Nārāyaṇa") says that waters are nārāh. For this reason It alone is presented as being in waters.

By Śrīh itself that which by its mere desire gives the states of Brahmā (Caturmukha), Rudra, etc., presents Nārāyaṇa as its source as "yam kāmaye tam tam ugram kṛṇomi tam brahmāṇam tam ṛṣim tam sumedhām . . . mama yonih apsu antah samudre." (I make Ugra whomever I want to make Ugra. I make Brahmā whomever I want to make Brahmā. I make Rṣi whomever I

want to make Rsi. I make him wise whomever I want to make wise. My source dwells inside the sea).

Another reason is given:

VIŞŅOḤ TIŞŢANTĪTYUDITASYA CA YASMIN DEVĀ ADHĪTYUKTVĀ

("saptārdha-garbhā bhuvansya reto viṣnoḥ tiṣṭhanti pradišā vidharmini" [Aitareya-Śruti] states that all divinities, Caturmukha and so on are there because of the desire of Viṣṇu. The same idea is supported in Śruti.

"yasmin idam sanca vicaidhi sarvam yasmin devāh adhi višve nişeduḥ." This Śruti holds that Viṣṇu is the support of all. [In continuation of the same thought there is Śruti "tadeva brahma paramam kavīnām. From all this it follows that Brahman of Sūtra is Viṣṇu.] Next)

Another reason is given:

SAMUDRAM STHĀNAMEVA CA

(The Sruti "yamantassamudre kavayo vayanti" also states that the sea is the abode of Purusa i.e., Visnu. [It concludes further "tadeva brahma." Therefore the Sruti "mama yonirapsu antah samudre" has only Visnu in view. The state of having the sea as abode is the proof for Visnu.]

Another reason is given:

87. NĀMA CĀKŞARAMITYEVA

(In Sruti the passage "yadakṣare parame prajāh" which presents the name akṣara is applied only to Viṣnu.) Next there comes the passage "tadeva brahma." Therefore by the pronoun "tat" Viṣnu alone is meant. This means that Brahman is Viṣnu.

The reason for this is given:

RCA ITYUDITAM TU YAT

(According to *Sruti "rcokşare parame vyoman"* which occurs in *Vāmana-Sūkta Akṣara* is the name of That i.e., *Viṣnu*. The word *tu* indicates that *Viṣnu* is *Akṣara* because It is imperishable. This means that the entities that are other than *Viṣnu* are perishable.)

Another reason is given:

YATAH PRASUTETYUKTVĀ CA TADEVA BRAHMA CĀBRAVĪT

(The Sruti "yatah prasūtā jagatah prasūtī" says that Puruṣa i.e., Viṣṇu is the cause of the root-matter and root-spirit (prakṛti) of the world. Referring to Puruṣa there is Śruti "tadeva brahma". The same thing is stated as "mama yonih apsu antaḥ samudre". Therefore in "tadeva brahma" by the word tat Viṣṇu alone is meant. [Therefore the word brahman of Sūtra means Viṣṇu and nothing else.])

N.S., concludes:

brahma-jijñāsā-padena hi sakala-jagajjanmādi-kāraṇasya bhagavato nārāyaṇasya jijñāsā vidhīyate ityupapāditam ... tadevam adhikāri-viṣaya-prayojanābhisambandhavatvāt brahmajijñāsā kartavyā iti ārambhanīyam idam śāstram iti siddham.

(By the word brahma-jijñāsā is indeed the enquiry into Nārāyana, the complete and the only source of the birth etc., of the whole world shown to be indispensable. . . . Thus as expounded so far, as there are—the one who is fitted, subjectmatter, the aim and the mutual relation of these three—the commencement of enquiry into Brahman is indispensable. Therefore this Science "Brahma-Mīmāmsā" is irresistable.)

Thus is Anu-vyākhyāna on Jijnāsādhikarana of the Brahma-Sūtras.

PART III

NYĀYA-VIVARAŅA

Madhva's next Bhāṣya is Nyāya-Vivaraṇa. In so far as Jijñāsādhikaraṇa is concerned the following is the text of this work:

JĪVA-VYATIRIKTEŠVARĀBHĀVĀT TASYA CA SVA-PRAKĀŠATVĀT NA JIJNĀSYATĀ ITI PRĀPTE ATHĀTO BRAHMA-JIJNĀSETYĀHA. TADVIJIJNĀSASVA TADBRAHMETI BRAHMA-ŚABDENA GUŅA-PŪRŅATVOKTEŅ NĀNUBHAVA-SIDDHĀLPA-GUŅA-JĪVĀBHEDAŅ. ATHA KASMĀDUCYATE BRAHMETI BŖHANTOHYASMIN GUŅĀŅ ITI ŚRUTEŅ. ('There is no *Iśvara*, the source of the reality of all apart from *jīva*. Jīva is indeed self-evident. Therefore it cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry. [There is therefore no necessity for Sāstra.]' [If there is this objection to the commencement of Sāstra, then Bādarāyaṇa] says "AUM ATHĀTO BRAHMA-JIJÑĀSĀ AUM." [For by means of the statement of Sruti] "Enquire into It: That is Brahman" by the word brahma completeness [of the subject-matter of enquiry] is stated. Therefore there is no non-duality of jīva, the attributes of which are small and insignificant, as is established by experience. [The attributes of Brahman are complete.] For Sruti says "Then why is it defined as Brahman? For, the attributes in It are complete.")

This passage explains how there is practically no philosophy in the positions that are opposed to Brahma-Mīmāmsā.

PART IV

AŅU-BHĀŞYA

Another Bhāṣya of Madhva is Anu-Bhāṣya. In so far as Jijāāsādhikaraṇa is concerned it says:

VIȘŅUREVA VIJIJÑĀSYAḤ

(Only Brahman as Visnu is the subject-matter of enquiry i.e., $S\bar{a}stra$.)

In this work in conclusion of all the Bhāṣyas the only subject-matter of enquiry is established to be Brahman as Vinu to safeguard the correctness of both the approach to $S\bar{a}stra$ and the knowledge that embodies $S\bar{a}stra$.

In view of the ideas so far expounded one naturally sees that in India, to think that one belongs to this or that Vedānta and consequently to this or that religion or to this or that Godhead is not justified as the whole *Vedānta* Truth is in the court of endless enquiry. Not to have seen the truth of this observation is the birth-place of faiths and the consequent seeds of disunity among men. To see the truth of this observation is the only binding force that brings men together. To make use of the term God, it is indeed the concept of God

as one imagines freely without enquiry that is the sole factor that has stood in the way of Indian integrity, if not in the way of the world integrity. As it is, no God-concept is the same as the other God-concepts. In place of concepts if people engage themselves in enquiring into God, then it is the day of blessings in the human society. The significance of enquiry is not negative. As the present work has illustrated endless enquiry is essentially positive in significance. Even at the very early stages it results in the necessity for recognising the main source of knowledge in the form of what deserves to be called Veda and the subject-matter of Veda in the form of what deserves to be called Brahman as Visnu. The continuation of enquiry goes on confirming the validity of Veda and the Truth as Visnu so that the whole knowledge becomes saturated in Veda and the whole life becomes absorbed in Visnu. This is correct knowledge and this is the life of virtues and this is the realisation of the highest Good in human life. This is indeed the lesson that man learns from Madhva, ANANDA-tīrtha.

Atha Janmādhikaraņam

BRAHMAŅO LAKŞAŅAMĀHA

AUM JANMĀDYASYA YATAḤ AUM

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